Eiuol

A robot can do that, insofar as a robot is just man-made. I'm not aware of Rand making any argument that it is impossible to create a conscious entity with free will. Binswanger might, but presumably you're asking about Rand.

Hey, I was gonna say Robin, but Butters just makes it humorous!

This would make sense if Eddie got to the gulch, too. But he didn't. I'm not going to chalk it up to Rand running out of space in the book to explain his fate. It's crystal clear, though, that Eddie wasn't invited or else he rejected the offer. Don, your response is exactly what I was driving at. I had a hard time phrasing. One major difference between Eddie and Dagny is visiting the gulch. It changed Dagny. Eddie developed over time, but he wasn't shaken to the core as Dagny was. Dagny had a lot of internal struggle to finally say sticking to TT was not selfish. She was quite moral in thought and deed before, but she shifted her values upon this realization. Thanks to the gulch, Dagny acquired new knowledge first hand and improved her life even more. Dagny didn't find the gulch from a moral success other than the take-action stance she had. Eddie was able to keep TT alive, and Dagny figured she'd save TT by finding the destroyer. Of course, what happened is that Dagny learned in the gulch. She learned things that Eddie didn't outside the gulch. It altered her values. Eddie wasn't really a "moral failure", he just lacked knowledge. But what happens if it takes too long to learn, or the opportunity to learn doesn't present itself? Someone with more knowledge is going to be better off in the long run. That person is Dagny. Is Eddie truly blameless for his lack of knowledge? I think on some level, he refused to be open to the possibility he was wrong about TT. Regardless of that answer, where does moral development come into play? Rand seems to present Eddie as a person who got his only moral education from Dagny and "absorbing" morality through osmosis in society. We see many examples of Dagny's moral education in her early years, and Eddie was more like an incidental sidekick (if you like South Park, he's basically Butters). It's reminiscent to me of how Nietzsche spoke about the importance of being well-bred and having good blood - not genetic superiority, but developmental superiority. Think of the tennis match between Dagny and Francisco, it's a pivotal developmental moment. It also reminds me of Rand's essay the "Comprachicos" where poor education destroys minds, and by implication less-bad education hinders minds.

My last sentence is a direct response.

Dramatic license is putting Eddie in the situation. We can, however, evaluate Eddie as a person within the story apart from what Rand thought about Eddie. Of course I'm going to "read into" it, that's what books are for! I think Rand, by leaving his fate open, is allowing us readers to really think about Eddie and read between the lines. So far in this thread, I've seen more examples where Eddie acts according to a duty to TT rather than his self-interest to further his life. Dagny has a happy ending, while Eddie has an ambiguous ending as a struggle to survive at all.

Kira Argounova is this person. "We The Living" is a tragedy, as Kira was wholly good, and was literally killed by the "system". She tried damn hard to live. Eddie is not like Kira. He, apparently, lived and developed his morality directly from Dagny. He "aimed" at morality e.g. Dagny like Aristotle's Golden Mean, but didn't live it egoistically. I'd like to see the quote, but it sounds like Eddie could rebound - it depends on if Eddie, finally, decides to give up on TT. I'm not trashing him, I'm saying he didn't develop into truly egoistic person.

"The issue at hand, is that there's really no objective law on what degree cops are allowed to use force in comparison to citizens, especially when that act of force initiates a death." If doing your job is minimal regard for responsibility for the results of one's actions in the name of "The Law" or "Doing what I'm told because it's my job", then sure, this cop did fantastic. It's rather disrespectful to cops to suggest that "doing one's job" is a measure of blameworthiness of one's actions - unless we want to admire those who apparently are unable to make distinctions about what degree of force is proper, specifically. The most you quoted was specific in stating that the problem is a lack of an objective law on what is proper force in comparison to citizens. Otherwise, "it was his job" as part of an answer is a cop out regarding -why- this type of response in this context is proper. Your example "They are allowed to use the necessary non-deadly force" is not objective, since "necessary" is left to whatever the cop feels is necessary, totally subjective. Immediate threat helps, but that doesn't address the Garner case since there was no immediate threat. The non-deadly force part is still subjective. And this sorta thing happens enough that existing laws aren't defined well enough.

Life without survival isn't life at all, and life with only survival isn't much of anything. If life is the standard, it implies competency and ability to survive along with psychological well-being. Now, it's one thing to die in the process, but it's quite another to die in the name of an abstract ideal as Eddie seemed willing to do. To be selfish in Rand's sense is to live in the name of yourself towards abstract ideals that serve your life. So yes, to die -for- the sake of someone or some ideal is irrational, as you'd be serving the ideal instead. If anything, the above quote shows how Eddie was serving an ideal rather than using an ideal as an enhancement to his own life. Dagny did not feel she had to "start the train" by the end, but earlier on she was probably saying "I must go back to TT in the name of the best within me, I must keep TT going!" She was a lot like Eddie, really. She learned that it wasn't selfish. So she fixed her ways. If we take Eddie as similar to Dagny, the difference at the end is that Eddie didn't learn. Maybe, just maybe, Eddie would fix his errors just after his last scene, he'd end up surviving and happy. In the context of the book, while Eddie's strength may be courageous, he isn't heroic or a moral paragon. He's decent, but no one you'd really point to as "Ah, he's an admirable hero!" Well, no - the paragons of morality undoubtedly survived and then thrived. If Eddie is the average, decent person, it probably takes Eddie's last moments to realize his errors. Keating was like that in The Fountainhead, except Keating had numerous moral failings, not just misplaced values. It was too late for Keating's dreams with painting (Roark said as much, Keating agreed I think). Was it too late for Eddie? Probably not. I think -that's- the question most important question here.

Loyalty is fine, it is a specific type of integrity. But being loyal "to an ideal" is not the same as being loyal to values pursued for one's own sake. An ideal life as possible is sensible but to see an abstraction as the ideal to live for the sake of is a form of idealism as Kant believed. That isn't to say Dagny thought he was worthless, or that friends with misplaced values are worthless, but if a person is loyal to an idea differently than they are loyal to the "I", then that is not selfish at all. At the same time, if we are to take Eddie as morally equal to Dagny or Rearden, then there is still a major issue of how being a creator makes one's life better in the long run than being a capable doer. Who knows for sure what happens to Eddie, but he ended up losing after all his efforts - just as Dagny would've lost if she didn't learn to leave TT. But hey, if he left the train, the last piece of TT, he'd have a chance to live. If he irrationally clinged to TT like a captain staying on a doomed ship, then he'd definitely die (selflessly) for the sake of TT.

It should go without saying that pursuing something dear is not always selfish. The whole question is if Eddie was being selfish, rather than "possessed" by TT and pursuing the well-being of TT as though it was his master. You specifically distinguished Eddie as someone who wasn't in it for himself, which is by any definition not selfish.

A big point of the book is that the strikers were only in it for themselves! If Eddie wasn't in it, the strike, only for himself, he is literally not living by the principles of the strikers. That isn't to say he was useless or as bad as people at large, but he didn't learn to be wholly egoistic. I want to look up some quotes tomorrow, as any good literary criticism would cite specific passages. In a way, Eddie became Nietzsche's "Last Man" at the end, and unable to keep going because his comfort and security of TT was gone (except he didn't see it as a good way to live as the last man might i.e. without any dreams or passions).

If that's the case, morality makes no difference to one's survival. We can judge the characters independently of any author's desired intention, within the story, so what Rand -wants- Eddie to be doesn't have to be the case. I just need some book quotes really.

Why is Eddie the one lost? Why isn't Dagny lost, too? I understand that some people unaware of the gulch or people like Dagny, those people we can consider, if they're virtuous, as good men lost. But Eddie wasn't in that situation, and if Dagny being gone is what sends him to his fate, then he was dependent on Dagny in a deep way. I'm pretty agnostic on if Eddie really dies, I don't have any reason to think he'd be able to last. He is no paragon of independence. If there are examples of Eddie being independent, I'd like to see some - it's been a while since I read AS.

If he had things to love still, then he's just stupid or dogmatic to stay and die. No other way to put that. Then again, Eddie's fate is open-ended, so he might have changed his mind. Maybe the passage above isn't Rand's view, but that isn't to say Rand is right and Jim is completely wrong. Eddie seemed to have a passion to be a servant to Dagny or imitating the virtuous without acting in a fully matured sense of egoism. In other words, Eddie never matured into an egoist as Dagny did. If anything, the story of Eddie is a tragedy, not just in terms of his fate, but also his development.

There always might be a "better" person that exists, but that's not knowable, making all relationships transient by your meaning. It's not really integrity to stay "loyal" to an unknowable value and presume the "ideal perfection" exists. Still, I'm not seeing how promiscuity applies here. Besides, I'm saying even if Dagny knew of someone else of similar value, it would be immoral to stop loving one person for only reasons of monogamy, and I doubt its possible to stop feeling love due to mere willpower. Dagny probably loved Rearden still. Whether she should have sex with him is another question.

Nah, you just didn't understand at first. If you didn't understand my question yet (if you thought I meant physiology, well, I didn't) , then there's no way what I said would look consistent. Enough of that though, I think I clarified as far as possible.

1) I was asking a question that needs exact details. Rand didn't give exact details. Therefore, Rand failed to answer my question. 2) There is a such thing as differentation occurring without experiencing the act of differentiation. This is notable when distinguishing figure/ground, or when a passing object "grabs" your attention. Indeed, it is a pre-conceptual question, but I see no explicit philosophical theory presented by Rand as to the nature of the thing in reality that is grabbed. It is your assertion that all differentiation is conscious, and I don't see anything in the Rand quote that says it is or isn't. Integration is, but not necessarily differentiation. 3) The sort of answer I think would work is linking abstract mechanisms (sort of like how math works) to first-level concepts. It is not a question of the neuroscience or physiology. My previous link is one way to look at what I mean.

Short answer: It's immoral to do that. Long answer: First, before I answer, why or how does promiscuity enter the picture?

I think there is a major reading comprehension issue going on here. "Said" was used as synonym for "meant", with clarification that you're right that Rand has good points, it isn't enough to answer my question about -exact- details. The missing part is specifically what it is that a mind does to in fact differentiate prior to any other knowledge. Not just that there is a mechanism, but what allows a mechanism to "grab" onto anything in the world. "Science is a priori" at least appeals to the idea we can justify without "grabbing" anything for science, so it's relevant.

Those quotes support what I said. That is, Rand didn't show -exactly- the requirements to differentiate, and then how -exactly- to make sure the meaning created corresponds to reality. Clearly, though, Rand had a good idea and start.

If that's all empiricism meant was, then sure. But empiricism generally is not merely that "all knowledge comes from experience" but also along the lines of how knowledge is built from perceptual "simples" as Locke believed. Or some other additional thesis that is skeptical of abstraction or representations. Logical positivists are similar, but really do find abstraction as something that is problematic to justifying our contact with reality and the knowledge we have. It's no accident that Godel was closely associated with the Vienna circle. He saw that, at least with regard to his theorems, we're not going to get completeness by some axiomatic foundation alone. The thing about either empiricism or rationalism is that there is a "gap" between experiences and abstractions, and the gap is a major problem to fix. It's an issue for Objectivism to answer, but I think it really eliminates any gap at all leaving the "gap" more like a question for philosophy of cognitive science and in-depth epistemology beyond what Rand wrote. My previous post is kind of why I think the gap isn't real. I read about one philosopher that I think gives a lot of good ideas for a view I find useful to build on. http://www.susannaschellenberg.org/file/Papers.html

Isn't it Eddie's fault that all that he loved was gone yet he had nothing new to love in its place? Dagny managed to develop new values, everyone else admirable managed it. Eddie, apparently, did not. When he lost TT and knew Dagny wouldn't reciprocate his love of her, he had nothing. Creators make values. Eddie didn't create anything beyond or separate from TT.

Yup, that quote is what I'm saying. Either explain what you meant ("knowing what in experience the symbols you are referring to mean"), or I still won't understand what you were talking about. Quoting Rand isn't helping. The "what in experience" doesn't have meaning, a symbol does. Unless you forgot a comma as "...what, in experience, the...", which changes what you said quite a lot.

Let's be clear: Objectivism, as in Rand's system of philosophy, is neither empiricism nor rationalism. It is not a Hegelian synthesis of empiricism and rationalism, either. I see it as validating knowledge to correspond with reality which perception allows us to be in contact with. If we (people on this forum) say "knowledge comes from experience" we would mean all knowledge is connected to or rooted on experiences. The process of concept formation is a fallible, active process that can fail to connect to experiences. How can a connection be made? Rand gives key factors: differentiation and similarity, then integration from there. How does differentiation work prior to a first experience, or for first-level concepts? Rand doesn't answer how it happens. There has to be something attuned to the world, lest everything is a mass of colors. So one answer is "a priori" categories or knowledge. A better answer is that some mechanisms in the mind are already attuned to the world, but they are not ideas or conscious mechanisms.

True, but if we accept that all knowledge is connected, all knowledge can inform all domains of knowledge. As related to the OP, there is no separated "pure" or ontological foundation upon which reality is -built-. There is only a logical foundation of what I -already know-. That was my point, and why Plasmatic's phrase "knowing what in experience the symbols you are referring to mean" made no sense to me. Looking at the Rand quote: The idea is not the same. Meaning of a concept consists of its units. The meaning of a word is the concept it symbolizes. A unit, or even the "what" of experience (entities), doesn't have a meaning. A concept has meaning. The meaning consists of units, but it doesn't suggest the units reveal their meaning. That's why 1+1=not 2 is valid. It depends on your context. Knowing what the units are won't tell you what '1' means on its own.