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Eiuol

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  1. Feel free to do something about it. I told you before, whyNot perpetuates the atmosphere by his sheer frequency of posting, repeating what he says, and needling people over and over about things he already addressed before. Lock the thread I guess. Merjet and I could make a new thread about the paper he has been talking about.
  2. Why do you bother? I don't think anyone is at risk of taking his ideas very seriously. Anyway, I think there is a better interpretation of what Rand is saying than yours. The context of the quote is about the precise way in which (human) volition can change the shape of reality itself. Clearly, we can't change the nature of reality and its elements with volition. We can identify and conceive of the way the elements of reality can be moved around to act differently, but this isn't changing the nature of the elements of reality. In an Aristotelian sense, we imitate reality, that is, if I want to build a house, I can only put things together by their nature as if the house developed from the movement of the Earth's tectonic plates. It is not by sheer will that I transform the elements of reality into the elements of a house; the elements of reality don't go through metamorphosis through your willpower. Cognitive process should be interpreted with a similar context in mind. Volition does not control perception. Volition does not control the automatic functions of your body such as heartbeats and breathing. It only has direct control over cognition, the operation of your reasoning processes (or any process beyond the actual operation of perception). Volition can control movement, to the extent that a plan of movement is necessary, and that basic identification needs to be immediate. More than that, identification and abstractions - anything extremely abstract for that matter - themselves have no purpose other than how they serve your life and flourishing. Abstractions and identifications need to ultimately manifest as physical action and movement if they are to have any impact on life and flourishing. It's not lost on Rand that cognition serves a practical purpose, her entire theory of epistemology and the nature of man's mind revolve around how important they are to being alive. If anything, your R2 definition from Rand is a better definition of her meaning.
  3. Book II 2 - Is something called incidental when it should be ascribed differently? Examine cases where a predicate has been asserted or denied universally to belong to something. Define terms, even incidental terms. Define what you think should be called what most people call them. Sometimes you need the definition a doctor uses, sometimes the definition of most people (clearly advocates contextual definition for dialectical discussion). 4 - Alter terms into more familiar ones so that the thesis becomes easier to attack. If you want overthrow a view, ask what it is in reality that is real if the thing in question is real. If you want to establish a view, ask what thing in reality must follow if the thing in question is real. I can tell that this isn't just about logical relationships between propositions, but what things in fact are real.
  4. 9 - The types of predicates where the 4 types of questions are found are the 10 categories. 10 - Be careful with contradictions of contraries, especially if you combine the contrary predicate with the contrary subject. You might be talking about doing doing good and those who are good, the contrary predicate being doing evil and the contrary subject being those who are evil, but it doesn't necessarily mean that you should do evil to evil people in the way you argue that you should do good to good people. Most precisely, the contradictory proposition is that you should not do good to people who are not good. 11 - A thesis is when an eminent philosopher states something against general opinion, or a reasoned view contrary to usual opinion. Don't bother arguing with people who are in need of punishment or perception. 13 - The means to be supplied with reasonings: -securing propositions -figuring out how many senses there are of an expression -findings differences -investigating similarity 14 - Collect various propositions, and similar ones, and contrary ones. Record these under various headings. Then note specific ideas of eminent thinkers. Aristotle seems to be recommending a writing process very much like modern scientific and academic writing where you always begin with a survey of relevant ideas. 15 - How do you find the different senses of a term? Contraries (the opposite of sharp is flat, which might refer to notes or solid edges) Sometimes words are ambiguous (the opposite of love is hate, but the physical activity of love has no opposite) Differences of kind (a clear color versus a clear sound) In relation to the deprivation or presence of a state (states such as when using your senses) Inflected forms (if justify has more than one sense, then so will justly) Signified predicates (good food signifies something different than good medicine) Distinct genera (for example, river bank versus a bank the institution) Comparability (a sharp note can't be more sharp than a sharp flavor) Distinct differentia (sharp note, sharp flavor, different differentiae) As species or differentia (color of a body, versus clarity of a note) If you remove the object described by an adjective, does the adjective retain the same meaning and sense? 18 - Aristotle says how useful examining multiple meanings is for clarity and reasoning. But after all that, he says that for argument or dialectic specifically, you can't always do that and you should beware unless you really can't discuss the subject any other way.
  5. This is strange to me because Aristotle's clear that scientific knowledge is a narrow form of knowledge that you arrive at through deduction and demonstration from already known knowledge. I don't understand translators sometimes, their choices often seem to drop context or make Aristotle's terms considerably more abstract than they actually are. I really think the best translation is "mental vision". There is no need to use an English term with widely different connotations and origins. Mental vision is even more "colorless" than the word comprehension because it captures the context better whenever he uses the term nous. It seems to imply a mental focus, an awareness, not in the form of propositions, a way to engage the world mentally, the way the soul (life) has contact with reality most generally.
  6. https://inductivequest.blogspot.com/2009/10/aristotles-view-of-induction-summary.html This is further support for how this section is not talking about induction as we understand it. In this instance, "induction" is "leading to" and is a form of deduction.
  7. Topics translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge Numbered in terms of chapters. Book I 1 - Reasoning is dialectical when it uses generally accepted opinions, as distinct from using demonstrations (mostly deductions). 4 - arguments start with propositions, the subjects of reasoning are problems. Problems and propositions are only different in terms of how they are phrased; Problems are questions, propositions are statements. 5 - Properties belong to that thing alone but do not indicate the essence. There are also temporary properties, which are relative. 6 - If you show that the attribute (subject?) in question fails to belong either to property, genus, or accident, you have demolished the definition. 7 - There are 3 kinds of sameness: Number (the referent has more than one name, like doublet and cloak) Specifically (the same species) Generally (the same genus) But Aristotle still suggests more, despite the 3 kinds. In reference to alternative names and definitions (same as the number distinction) in reference to a shared property (what can acquire knowledge is the same as man, which sounds like specifically) Substituting a term with an accident (Socrates is the same as the man who is sitting)
  8. 93b - 100b 10 - A definition is: an indemonstrable statement of essential nature, or a syllogism of essential nature (the difference is grammatical form), or the conclusion of a demonstration that has given essential nature. 11 - One version of the 4 causes, but not the commonly mentioned version. It seems to be missing material cause, and "antecedent which necessitates a consequence" replaces it. Aristotle seems to me cases where causes are linear as opposed to simultaneous or complementary. A cause can both exist for an end as well as by necessity. A cause might also only be for an end, like why people build houses. 12 - Further ideas about temporality in relation to causes. Processes are divisible, events are indivisible and atomic. Past events and present processes are not contiguous. Aristotle says that a process contains an infinity of past events. But I don't understand how if a process contains an infinity of past events, that it wouldn't be contiguous? In any case, the issue might be translation, and Aristotle recognizes that this explanation is not good enough because he says he will talk more about it later (he might be offering a response to his ideas). 13 - This section basically describes what we would consider epistemology about the way concepts are related to each other. Aristotle talks about a method to tracing predicated elements that contain or involve the definable form. I understand this to mean finding what are in fact the essential elements of a subject that are put into its definition. Even more simply, the method of how to properly define something. He talks about attributes that apply to the subject and has wide application, but doesn't extend beyond the genus. This sounds equivalent to the CCD. Hue applies to red, but also green, and in fact all colors - the genus. These are the kind of attributes we need to think about. Further he says that if you're writing a book about a subject generically as a whole (a general handbook about a subject), you should divide the genus into species, then find the definition with the help of what I called the CCD. After that, examine the differentiae. Divisions are not primary. But dividing from something more general to something more specific will guarantee that the general category will contain everything more specific. Find what elements a set of individuals in a species have in common. Repeat this, but for a different species in the same genus. Keep going until you find a particular identity, and can create a formula for that identity, that is, the definition. But! If you reach several formulas, you have to do more work. Or at least, you are defining more than one thing actually. Although this still is far from scientific experimentation, Aristotle clearly advocates for examining specific individuals of multiple species and finding out what they do. 14 - Collect common characters that you observe. Sometimes, though, the common character has no specific name. 17 - Effects may have more than one cause, but not when the subjects are the same species. 19 - If you possess scientific knowledge from birth, it would mean that you possess apprehensions more accurate than demonstration and fail to notice those apprehensions. If you need to acquire those apprehensions, you would need to do so with pre-existing knowledge (but you don't have the apprehension in the first place of any knowledge!). So, there must be some capacity, because we still manage to apprehend things, but it can't necessarily be superior then developed states like scientific knowledge. Aristotle explains this capacity by reasoning from animals in general. Because of sense perception, all animals have a discriminatory capacity. To the extent that sense impression does not persist, the animal doesn't "know" anything beyond the simple act of perceiving. If the sense impression persists, and repeated enough, it becomes memory. When memories repeat enough, they become experiences; memories becoming experiences is possible for those with the power of systematizing. Essentially, Aristotle is saying that the capacity and basis for our ability to possess scientific knowledge through demonstration is built up from the capacity of sense perception. He is giving a biological explanation. The content of sense perception is universal? This is unclear. Then again, Aristotle literally says his statement will be unclear. He says that intuition is always true. I doubt that he means intuition in this context the way we mean it.
  9. What point are you trying to make by quoting me? You didn't seem to disagree with anything I said, and you didn't make a new point.
  10. If some people include me, at least for me, I granted that there is some kind of "force" (I'm using quotes because we are talking about causes and explanations) going on to explain the way users are being banned or moderated. I even granted that there is actual use of force to some extent generally speaking. Specifically, I denied that your explanation is essential or gets at the most important causes. It doesn't matter if something is likely or not, what counts is if the explanation involves essentials or is essential. Besides, you can't know the likelihood of something happening by chance before you have an essential explanation, you can only use that reasoning to say something like: "this is supposed to happen 10% of the time, but in this circumstance it happens 90% of the time, therefore there must be some other distinct explanation". Outside of that, all you really said is that "this thing happened, and there is always some kind of essential explanation for all things that happen". You wouldn't say that something is so likely to happen by chance that it is not necessary that there is a force at work. That would be absurd. I'm not even sure exactly what "this" is. I'm taking it to be moderating or banning users for bad reasons. At least for me, I'm not arguing that force does not exist underneath everything, I'm saying that initiation of force is not the essential explanation of everything that happens within the system. Sometimes it is, sometimes it isn't. More precisely, the system is characterized by some use of force that distorts everything, but that distortion is not itself the essential cause. If it was, you would have to say that every successful business venture in capitalism is essentially explained by the use of force. This is bad going forward. But of course, it doesn't mean that is always what was happening.
  11. Interesting. So so free will and consciousness are wholly distinct. I access my consciousness with free will. But my free will exists separate from my consciousness. I wonder what my capacity of free will is a property of. My spirit? My free will is also not conscious, because otherwise it would be a property of consciousness. It must be some sort of alternate "consciousness", like the type of consciousness in the Phaedo that existed before I was born.
  12. 90b - 93b 3 - Not all definable things are demonstrable. Not all demonstrable things are definable. Definition reveals the essential nature, it is of the essential nature of something. Demonstration reveals whether an attribute that attaches to a subject, it demonstrates a connection. 5 - Continually dividing - the method of division - does not provide an inference, as it doesn't demonstrate. It cannot answer why, since there is no middle term. 7 - If definition can prove the essential nature of the thing, can it also prove that the thing exists? It can't, because definition and demonstration are about different types of things, and existing is not a genus (and therefore can't be an essence). A demonstration can't prove that a particular name has to mean any particular thing. 8 - Aristotle says he will start again and think about which conclusion so far are soun. So anything incomplete before or seeming to imply something else is only because he is working through everything. It really does seem like he's getting at how a definition should properly be of essentials, but not something that proves or demonstrates. You cannot apprehend the reason for a fact before apprehending that a fact exists. You cannot apprehend the essence of something before apprehending that it exists. You might accidentally be aware of a thing through an element in its character, like the blockage of light during an eclipse, but this doesn't count as knowledge because you still don't know what the element is of in the first place. (This sounds similar to when Rand mentions implicit knowledge). You can't deduce essential nature, but through deduction you can exhibit essential nature. Yet he concludes that the essential nature that has a cause distinct from itself can't be known without demonstration, and it cannot be demonstrated? Something doesn't make sense to me.
  13. It should have been clear that they were talking about the capacity of volition, not the act of volition...
  14. Well, it says "even a preconceptual infant", so that would imply she is also talking about animals besides infants. It's like saying that thing with even the most potential for conceptual thought without having conceptual thought have these characteristics, so it's reasonable to think that perhaps there really is such a thing as preconceptual volition. It's not proof, but it's a reasonable possibility worth investigating. I think sense of self can be thought of as different than self-awareness. Animals vary in the extent that they can retain memories and recall paths to different locations (distinct from going to a location only from stimuli or as a reaction), so would be aware of the memory within their own awareness. By the way, all self generated motion has to be based on the environment, don't you think? Or maybe better is that there is a reciprocal relationship between environment and actor.
  15. 87b-90b 31 - The mere act of perception cannot provide scientific knowledge. You cannot see commensurable universals directly. Not clear if he thinks there are exceptions. He mentioned eliciting the universal from an act of perception. Maybe he means when you already possess knowledge of the universal? 32 - 2 kinds of fundamental truth: from premises of a demonstration, from subject-genus 33 - the object of scientific knowledge and opinion can be about the same. The difference comes in with how you apprehend the object. You can have a true opinion that doesn't qualify as knowledge in the sense that an opinion that man is animal means that you think man is not necessarily animal and animal is anonessential (not part of the nature of man) element to man, while knowledge that man is animal means that you think that animal is an essential element in man. Book II 1 - Is the connection between an attribute and a thing a fact? Why is there a connection? Does the thing exist? What is the nature of the thing? 2 - Why there is a connection and what is the nature of the thing both essentially ask "What is the middle term?" At least when the connection is determined to exist or the thing exists.
  16. I didn't say there is no government problem. I am saying it is not the essential problem of this so-called "censorship".
  17. 84b - 87b 23 - there are a finite number of terms between the conclusion and the subject. You can condense everything between the subject and the conclusion, until the remaining premise is immediate. In particular, the premise of the subject becomes single. This would be a basic unit. This also sounds like reduction in the Oist sense, which is also a type of demonstration. 24 - Aristotle presents an argument that demonstration of particulars is better than demonstration of universals. It revolves around saying that universals don't touch reality as much as particulars, and more likely to mislead. I think he is presenting a reasonable argument, maybe even his own devils advocate argument, because it is such a clear rejection of Platonic forms. Basically: "abstractions are further from reality, so isn't demonstrating them inferior in all cases?" Demonstration of the commensurable universal it is actually the best because it could say the most about reality. The extent of what it covers (multiple individuals), and how it is predicated of the subject by that subject's very nature, will provide a great sum of knowledge that isn't detached from reality anyway. This makes sense, because if the best arguments had to do with concrete particulars, that would be a concrete bound mentality. But conceptual thinking, and thinking with the essentials of concepts, is best for human thinking. 29 - How many ways can you prove a conclusion?
  18. I hope you realize it looks like you answered the wrong question. I said "you aren't aware" and you said "but of course". Anyway... Basically, please stop. Stop. You aren't trying to find a charitable interpretation or have a careful and rational dispute. You keep needling and needling. You post 3 times in a row. I'd really rather keep it on topic with DW's new thoughts than you popping back in every few posts almost to repeat what you already said.
  19. Jeez, so you aren't even aware that you have free will over your own body to some extent. Now it makes sense why you think that volition couldn't have to do with locomotion. No, you don't control each muscle for each step, but I never considered that somebody would think that they don't control any of their muscles.
  20. it's a pretty decent article, because it advocates for types of changes without any government regulations.
  21. 82b - 84b 22 Predicates that signify substances (concrete individuals) are either identical with the subject or species of the predicate. Predicates that don't signify substances are accidents or coincidences. Here Aristotle explicitly rejects Plato's Forms as relevant. He calls them sound without sense, which makes me think of a parrot that doesn't know it says. In this context it sounds like he's criticizing as if it's obvious that Forms are disconnected from concretes. It sounds like attention but I think it's another example of how these texts are used as teaching tools. It's a good place to transition into criticizing Plato if he wanted to in a lesson. If we know the consequent in a demonstration only through the antecedent (the premises), and if there is nothing better than knowledge, then the series going down must terminate somewhere if there is scientific knowledge of the consequent. If it doesn't terminate, then you can't acquire scientific knowledge through demonstration. Basically, if you could go on forever, there would be an infinite number of things to possibly demonstrate. If there are infinite things to possibly demonstrate, then there can be no determinate definition. The best you could do in this case is pick an arbitrary cutoff point in terms of your premises and treat that as a hypothesis. But this can't demonstrate what is necessarily the case about a subject. The series when going downward must terminate in a substance. Aristotle does not mean terminating in the smallest part of a substance, but terminating the individual whole. If that same series goes upward, it must then terminate somewhere, because if it went on infinitely, there would be infinite attributes in a definition - but infinite attributes can't apply to a single subject. I think by definition he means all the essential elements (elements that are necessarily part of something by nature) of something.
  22. You mean you aren't aware of any instance of controlling your own muscles directly? Separate from that, do you think that the theory is that volition is only related to muscle motion?
  23. That's how logic works. It doesn't matter what you meant to say. What you mean to say might be true, but what you are saying is illogical by the way you have arranged your terms. Now you said it explicitly. You believe that volition causes consciousness (you said this earlier), you believe that consciousness causes volition, you believe that consciousness exists before volition. Put that together and you have a contradiction. I think this probably is the case. That's why I think that anything which is conscious has some degree of ability to choose. I think this is most fitting to the way that we observe animal behaviors in relation to their fixed action patterns, where context changes resulting behavior changes to varying degrees depending on the animal. Earthworms barely change, humans change quite significantly. It seems that consciousness without some kind of means of intended selection would do nothing at all. It would be passive. Epiphenomenal. Awareness without purpose or goal.
  24. 78b - 82b 13 - Knowledge of the fact is when you know something is the case or exists as an observation (such as birds fly) but don't know why. Knowledge of the reasoned fact is when you know why something is the case (one reason birds fly is that they have evolved to do so). Aristotle basically says that knowledge of the reasoned fact is the domain of the respective expert. It's interesting to note that he acknowledges that math concerns itself with forms (based on all my reading so far, it is best to interpret "forms" as "concepts") but not anything empirical, so can't say anything about "knowledge of the fact". Math might be able to explain why some things are the case, however. This can be done in combination with other fields that are more connected to the empirical. Aristotle says you could combine optics and math for example. 14 - "all A belong to all B, all B belong to all C, therefore all A belong to C" is the most scientific logical figure. 18 - Here Aristotle is very clear about the importance of sense perception. He explicitly says that it is impossible to grasp universals without induction, and that induction requires sense perception. 19 - Can you do descend from the highest abstractions all the way down to particulars infinitely? Can you ascend from particulars to the highest abstractions infinitely?
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