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Everything posted by Eiuol

  1. Nicomachean Ethics translated by Joe Sachs Book 1 1 - The ends of master arts are more worthy of choice. That is, the wider field encompasses more, so it is more worthy of choice. 2 – The city is more complete to achieve and preserve. Aristotle is describing how in his view, living in the city is a more complete human life, especially to achieve and preserve it. 5 – There are 3 ways of life: enjoyment, politics, contemplation. But this seems to leave out arts like medicine and carpentry? 6 – One form of good is what is pursued for its own sake. So that means there will be good in itself, and useful things. But not all things are good in the same form like with pleasure or honor. 7 – Happiness is life consisting of how humans are at work. 8 - Virtue should be pleasant in itself in the way that one is pleased by what they are passionately devoted to. One should be devoted to virtue. 10 – Something beautiful shines through when one bears misfortune. That is, those who act in the most beautiful way possible given the circumstances. 13 - The vegetative part could not be part of human intellect because it is especially active during sleep.
  2. Book XI (K) 1 – Species might be sources because they are indivisible. General classes might be sources because when they are destroyed, others are destroyed with them. I'm thinking this means that the destruction of something encompasses more when there are broader characteristics involved compared to the narrow characteristics of a species. If 3 – Being is traced back or is led back to one thing common. 6 – Things can’t seem to be opposite to different people unless one of them has a damaged sense organ. What is white to one person would not seem like it is black to another person, unless one person has damaged vision. 9 – Being-at-work is difficult to define, according to Aristotle. Book XII (Λ) 1- There are four types of things: perceptible, everlasting, destructible, and motionless. 2 – There are three sources: the articulation of a contrary, its deprivation, and material. 3 – Material is what changes, form is what it changes into. 6 – The motionless, independent everlasting thing cannot be potency. It must be at-work without material. There is no way for it to be otherwise, since it would grow weary and decay if it were material. I wonder though if this could be pure energy, if this would fit the limitations set by Aristotle. 7 – I think he might be saying that the motionless thing causes things to move by other things being pulled towards it, simply through its presence, and maybe that it is the cause of anything that can be thought about. Why isn’t work also pleasure? This motionless thing is a thinking - that thinks by itself - that partakes in the very thing it thinks about. So, it always has the things that the intellect is receptive of. It has to have them because it is always at work. This seems to fit nicely into a modern panpsychist view, where perhaps this motionless thing is the simplest degree of consciousness that is capable of nothing more than recognizing its own existence. 9 – The motionless thing can’t be a potency of thinking because then sometimes it will not be at work. If it thinks things outside itself then those things would be more honorable. In terms of kinds of knowns that make something, the thing without material is both what the knowledge is concerned with and the activity of thinking it. 10 – The cause of motion makes form and material one. Book XIII (M) 3 – The greatest forms of the beautiful are order, symmetry, and determinateness. 9- Number and magnitude are separate. 10 – All knowledge is universal; the sources of being must be universal and not independent. This is potency. But knowledge-at-work is not universal. Sight sees a universal of color simply because what it sees is a color. If intensity were an independent thing, it would be indivisible therefore not infinite. Book XIV (N) 1 – One is a measure. Everything has a measure that is standard. Measure is indivisible in its kind of relation to perception. Things that are the same share a common measure. This chapter is perhaps the most direct connection to Objectivist epistemology regarding concept formation in all the works of Aristotle. 4 – Attaching goodness to one would attach badness to multitude, since good is the opposite of bad, and one is the opposite of multitude.
  3. I don't see how this follows. Just because for an entity to be means that it is the sum total of all its characteristics, doesn't also mean that pereceiving the entity involves pereceiving all characteristics of it. After all, perceiving external objects doesn't cause those objects to be, or the characteristics of the object to be. As for internal objects, you do cause them to be, and the characteristics of those objects to be, but this isn't the perception you are talking about. That's imagination. What you are saying I think is interesting regard to imagination, and what it means to imagine something particular, but that's not the topic. Also, this part of your argument sounds like abusing the ambiguity of saying "we perceive entities" - those sort of statements could be interpreted as 'all' of entities, or 'some' of entities. Since interpreting this as 'all' leads to absurdities as you said, we should interpret this as 'some'. So we are still left with 2. I don't think a malfunction of perception is a good way to argue for the way perception operates. Literally speaking, it is how perception does not operate. Anyway, it might be more accurate to say that these people see a confusing array of parts, not integrated into wholes or entities. They are seeing objects of some sort, insofar as the characteristics are still on something (things that us with normal perception recognize as parts). Although maybe your point to something like "what we call an entity depends on perception, in the sense that calling something an entity depends how you can automatically integrate part of an entity into a whole". Then again, you aren't talking about the psychological process of automatic perceptual integration.
  4. Book VIII (H) 2 – If thinghood is the cause of being, one must look for what is responsible for being. 3 – Independent things are like numbers because if you add or subtract anything, they are no longer the same. They are complete of a particular nature. 4 – Articulation that includes cause is the formal cause. Book IX (Θ) 1 – Potency is a source of change in some other thing or in the same thing as other. 2 – Potencies that include reason are capable of contrary effects. That's why people can be bad or good. 4 – I don’t understand this chapter at all. 5 – Whatever something desires, is what it does, whenever what it is capable of is present and that something approaches its object. Psychologically, this would mean everyone does what they desire as long as there are no obstacles and people perceive those desires. I'd say this is why behavior can be predicted, and why people are not totally indeterministic. 6 – Actions without ends are not complete. Being at work is complete. 7 – Being-in-potency is when things are in virtue of themselves and nothing stands in the way. 8 – A thing the same in form and at-work takes precedence in time. I think this means that a mover comes before a potential. Being-at-work comes before thinghood, like man to boy. A boy (despite being what this thing is right now) grows towards being a man, and the nature of what he is, is determined by the work of being a man. When material is at-work, it is in the form that it was going toward(when it was just a potency as a material). 9 - In geometrical figures the things inside them are discovered by being drawn, so their being-at-work is in contemplation. Book X (I) 1 – To be one is to be the primary measure of each class of things. Every amount is known by what is one. This one is a standard of measure as an irreducible unit. A measure is the same kind of thing as what it measures. This suggests that if you form a class of things, they can only be made universal with a measurement. That way, everything being measured is necessarily the same kind of thing. Also, the measurement is standard and consistent because the amount that the measurement even is, is known by what is one. 3 – Things differ in genus that do not have common material and do not turn into one another. 4 – Contrary things are spoken of with one of the contrary things viewed as a deprivation. Good as the presence of something that is good, bad as the deprivation of good. 6 – The one is what measures multitude. One measures, multitude is measured. They are opposed in this way. 7 – In-between things are composed of opposites. Something in-between good and bad as characteristics of both. 8 – The genus is the material of the species. Things that differ in species are a contrariness. 9 – The articulation makes a difference in species, but material and articulation does not. There is no contrary in the last one. This idea is confusing to me.
  5. No one anywhere was claiming that they literally halt infection and transmission.
  6. Book VII (Z) 1 - Thinghood is primary in every sense of the word. 3 - One’s job is to make what is good, be good, for each person, out of the things that are good for each one. I interpret this as the good only existing at-work when the good of something is brought about by action in relation to what is good for the actor. Perhaps Aristotle thinks that the good exists itself in potency but it isn't anything in actuality until and unless someone acts for their own good. 5- A definition is a statement about what it is for something to be, of independent things primarily. 6 - If the good itself and being good are different, then being good is not actually good. Being good should belong to the good itself. Form and substance could not be distinguished because you can’t put a name on every kind of thing there is for something to be. It would be like a form of what it is to be what it is to be a horse. 7 - When creating things by art, it begins from thinking from the source and form, and production is the conclusion of thinking. Health is a pattern and knowledge in the soul. 9 - The primary thing responsible for making something is part of what is made. 10 - Letters of a syllable are parts of the form. Not even all the letters are in the articulation a syllable. This seems to be that we can articulate part of the form, but something is always left out in that articulation. Maybe this includes images in memory? Parts of a thing's articulations belong to form, the articulation is of the universal. There is no definition of form for composites. Composites are known directly by contemplation or perception. When this is no longer active it is unclear what they are, but they have universal articulation. Certainly this means that the form is itself neither a universal nor a easily defined thing. 11 - Aristotle points put that one should determine if the soul has a different material. 12 – The form and thinghood bring to completion a difference that is brought into being from a difference. 15 - You can't define the form (of a particular) because it will consist of words already known. Particulars are always unique, so you would always end up defining something abstract that isn't concretely singular. 16 - Form is not one applied to many because it can’t point out what is independent and distinct. 17 - There is something that makes a syllable a syllable rather than just letters. That something is the form.
  7. These works are not normally given this name, but it seems appropriate because everything here is about psychology in particular. Sense and the Sensible translated by J. I. Beare A lot of this involves discussing the elements in relation to the nature of the sense organs themselves, like the eye being moist. I suppose this is the closest thing to looking at the organic chemistry and cellular composition of the sense organs. Aristotle spent a lot of time figuring out if more than one object can be perceived at the same exact moment in time. He eventually concludes that we can. He also speaks of magnitudes where intervals might be imperceptible because they are so small. I think of this like the way you can't literally see things in a constant stream. There are in fact gaps. Logically, it would seem that you can never really perceive wholes. The solution is that the dimensions of an object are not immediately present, in the sense you can see 5 feet ahead but don't actually know that it is 5 feet. The reasoning here is confusing but ultimately it seems that the point is if you happen to see 5 feet ahead, you don't need to say that you perceive with exact precision 5 feet ahead to actually perceive 5 feet ahead. You don't need the exact dimensions to say that you see something. Memory translated by Joe Sachs All things thought about are given a quantity even when none is given to start. This is possible through the primary power of perception, the sort that makes perception of motion and time possible. Memory always has an image. Since memory requires the perception of time, images are an attribute of the perceiving power. Recollection is a type of reasoning about experiences one had before. Sleep translated by J. I. Beare Aristotle thought that all organs must lose power when they work beyond their time limit, and this is when sleep is necessary. Since all the senses go off at the same time, it is a common and controlling organ of perception that causes sleep or makes possible for it to happen at all. This organ is the heart, but digestion starts sleep as a process. Dreams translated by J. I. Beare Dreaming is an activity of the faculty of sense perception, but in terms of presentation. Illusion caused by disease affects the same faculty that produces the same effects in dreams. When we perceive something, a remnant remains afterwards, such as colors remaining in the sensory field after looking at the colored thing. After this, people are easily deceived by sense perception in the case of emotions affecting the way one judges what they see. This happens during waking, and since during sleep the senses are powerless, sense perception is displayed anyway. The result is how dreams come about. All of this amount to what I would say is a theory of dreams based on psychological reasoning. Divination in Sleep translated by J. I. Beare God doesn't send dreams of divination because commonplace people receive them but not the best people. And it can't just be from reasoning out what will necessarily occur at a very specific location because it surpasses the wit of man. So these dreams can only be causes, signs, or coincidences. They can be signs in the sense of hearing a bomb go off in your dream but it was actually only something small that felt. They can be causes in the sense of being inspiration for things when you are awake. Length and Shortness of Life translated by G. R. T. Ross Aristotle doesn't say anything especially notable other than he thought that longevity was about a ratio of moisture and size. Youth, Old Age, Life and Death, and Respiration translated by G. R. T. Ross Respiration is usually just treated as a way to reduce the heat in an animal. Larger animals have more need of cooling. Animals like fish that live in the water don't need to respire because the water cools them down enough. But not cetaceans and whales because they have lungs so they cool themselves with air. I'm surprised that other thinkers understood that fish do breathe by means of the gills and taking in air that is in the water, but Aristotle argued that fish do not.
  8. Book IV (Γ) 2 - What is one is the same as what is. 3 – One cannot be in error about axioms because it is necessary to arrive with this knowledge if one wants to know anything. 4 - If there are infinite definitions, then a being is also defined as its opposite. Therefore, there cannot be infinite definitions of anything. 5 - If someone is more in the right that things are or are not in a certain way, then he is saying how things are. This seems like Aristotle is saying that if anyone says that people can only be more or less right relatively to another person, that person is actually making a definite claim about how things are. 6 – Cratylus thought that you couldn’t even step into a river. This chapter has a lot to do with nothing having any identity, and this is someone more extreme than Heraclitus. Book V (Δ) This book is a dictionary of the sort that aims at dispelling ambiguity. It's hard to tell why this book was placed in this position. 4 – Nature is what is present in something all along as a source of notion, potentially or at-work. 12 – The primary kind of potency is a source of change in something else or as something else. 24 - Composite independent things are made of sensible material. The form is made of intelligible material. Intelligible material seems to be that which makes something able to be conceptualized. 27 – Defect is when something loses a part that is not decisive to its form. So, these things would be nonessentials. Book VI (E) 1 – Nature is concerned with things that are separate and have motion. Math is about things that are motionless and not separate. First philosophy is about things that are separate and motionless. 3 – Against determinism? This chapter has a lot to say about if all things necessarily lead to one result, and in what sense. 4 – True and false are in thinking. I think the idea is things are how they are in reality so there is no sense in saying that things are true if things just are. Likewise, reality can't be false if things just are.
  9. Metaphysics translated by Joe Sachs Book A 1 - Aristotle says that art is about things that are usually the case, produces something, and often involves skill. It seems that art in this sense is any subject that is deeply inductive by virtue of being extremely complex or being heavily context bound. I would say that anything he says about art pertains more to what we think of as induction in the modern world than what he says of what is translated with the word induction (epogee). Art comes out of many conceptions from experience, in a universal judgment or as from what is similar. This idea is even more like the modern sense of induction. 2 - Aristotle seems to say that people seek knowledge out of the freedom to do so and that knowledge freely gained is the best. This is explained mostly in terms of how scholarly thought is best accomplished when leisure is possible. But leisure seems to also suggest that knowledge can be pursued more deeply when one doesn't need to worry about basic survival or warfare. If knowledge freely gained is the best, then implicitly, I think Aristotle is advocating freedom of thought. 3-8 - A history of analyzing causes. 9 - Forms are shared in so they must be of independent things. They must share in each by virtue of what is not attributed to underlying subject. If forms were patterns, then there would be forms of forms. Aristotle says that philosophy has become mathematical for people. He is pointing out that other philosophers of his time were overly focused on the abstract instead of observation. Book a (α) 2 - Acting for sake of something requires that the process be finite. 3 - Mathematical precision is best for immaterial things. Book B 1 - It is easier to know you reach the end if you know all the ways you can get stuck. 3 - There cannot be a genus of thinghood because the differentia needs to be outside the genus. 4 - If the one is not independent, the number of things can’t be either. If the one is independent, then how is any being more than one? 5 - If the forms are things like points more so than the forms own bodies, nothing could be independent. 6 - If the universal were independent then Socrates would be many kinds of animals. I think this means that if a universal is independent, it would have being - in which case Socrates would be an independent individual animal, independent individual human, and so on, all at the same time.
  10. There have been 2,929,862 infections and 89,574 coronavirus-related deaths reported in the country since the pandemic began. There have been 16,800 infections and 34 coronavirus-related deaths reported in the country since the pandemic began. That is from your links. The percentage of the peak is higher in Iceland because the peak itself is significantly lower than it is in South Africa. All you did is show that you don't know how to interpret data.
  11. 4 – The nutritive soul is concerned with food and offspring. Having another like itself is the closest to the eternal. I'm not sure if this means that having offspring is required for the good life, or that having offspring is the end for the nutritive aspects of the soul, but not necessarily what the intellectual soul must seek. 5 - The work of perceiving is produced by external things. There of course has to be something to be perceived in the first place. 6 - Motion, rest, number, shape, and size are common to all of the senses. 7 - Something must be between the sense organ and the thing perceived because it is not the quality itself that moves the organ. This sounds like the quality of something must produce effects on something else external to the perceiver. 9 - Uncovered organs seem less accurate. Eyes are not covered in an ant, but they are in birds. 11 - The organ of touch is not itself skin. We know this because when we use a tool or cover our skin, the outside thing seems to work like touch. But Aristotle doesn't really say what the organ is. In modern terms, I would say that the organ is all the neurons under the skin. Sense is in a way the mean of contrary attributes of perceived things. Anything too loud or too quiet cannot be sensed. 12 - Sense is receptive of the form of perceived things, like wax being receptive of shapes. The senses are acted on by things, not because of what the things are, but the attributes the things have. Book III 1 - There is no particular sense organ for common attributes because we just associate particular senses to the common attributes. 2 – Since we can distinguish different types of attributes, we must be able to distinguish the difference by something else. 3 – Opinion is affected by persuasion and speech, while imagination is not. Some animals have imagination but none have speech, so imagination is not opinion. 4 - Intellect is not mixed with the body and has no organ and is potency of the soul. Intellect in this sense could be something immaterial and something externally independent like a cosmic entity, of which various things with souls make use of. But other times it sounds like it might be the power of anything that exists to be intelligible by virtue of its form, yet requires a particular entity with a soul to be actualized (while not being a consequence of a sensory or physiological process). The intellect is receptive of intelligible things. 5 - Intellect is caused by becoming all things, and it is productive by forming things like the way light produces color. It becomes all things in terms of their intelligible aspects, in just the same way that the senses become what they sense in terms of the sensory aspects of the things sensed. The intellect brings about forms. I wonder if this is evidence that Aristotle thought that forms are just epistemological artifacts while the intellect is the intelligibility of things that makes an epistemological artifact possible in the first place. 8 - Intellect is the form of forms, the overarching form. The potency of knowing or perceiving are the same things that are known or perceived. Intelligible things are present in perceptible forms. 10 - Intellect that reasons for the sake of something and is concerned with actions causes motions; desire is the starting point. 11 - There is sensory imagination when trying to visualize something and deliberative imagination when making calculations.
  12. Not the electrons, no. Not any more than I see your skin cells by looking at you.
  13. It's not just a description, true, but form is abstract and many times he says it is what makes a thing what it is in the way that a knife is a knife by having such a pattern of action or identity as to go towards cutting, an identity which the entity acts out. But the form is nothing metaphysically real except in the sense that having an identity is real. Form is actualization, not itself actual. Matter is potential because the things that a knife is made out of, the steel, the atoms, the handle, none of these things actually have a nature unless and until it has a pattern of action or an identity, so conceptually speaking, you can distinguish form from matter. But they are absolutely inseparable. It's more about his belief in the shape of the universe and how things move, he just applied his theory about form and matter to it as well. But I didn't get to reading Metaphysics yet. But we can section this off to another thread to talk about another time.
  14. The Soul translated by Joe Sachs Book I 1 - Perhaps the first thing to ask is if something is a thing, a quality, or quantity; potential or being-at-work; divisible or not. Even when nothing is happening, feelings still arise. So the soul can't simply be a response to the external world. 2 - Many thinkers thought that like is known by like, so by this reasoning, if the soul knows everything, it is like everything. 3 – Plato thought that soul had intellect and moved in a circle. But this means the intellect thanks the same thing many times in a row. But all thinking is bounded, so this can't be. Many people make the mistake of not asking how the body is affected by the soul, or which kind of bodies. 4 - The human acts by means of the soul in the sense that perception goes to the soul, while memory comes from the soul to motions. This is like the modern distinction of bottom-up processing from top-down processing. This is reason to think that Aristotle sees the human soul as all the psychological capacities of people. 5 – Is living in all the parts or some of them? It seems rather that the soul holds the body together. Book II 1 – Material is a potency while form makes the look of that material as a result of why it is called what it is. Soul is the form of a body with life as potency. If the eye were an animal, the soul of it would be sight. 2 – Where there is perception there is pain and pleasure, and where there is pain and pleasure, there is desire.
  15. 5 – Anything that moves itself cannot move itself as a whole. To cause motion in itself requires that it is caused by something motionless. Otherwise parts would move the whole and parts at the same time. 6 – There can only be one eternal first mover, which must be continuous. 7 – Change of place is the primary motion. What moves itself most authentically brings about this motion. Change of place belongs more to things that take up their nature more. This sounds like actualizing nature means to be active in a primary way especially, or at least that it is bounded together with something that is active in a primary way. 8 – Motion in a circle is from something itself to itself. 10 – Even if a thing could move continuously without something pushing it again and again, the motion will be consecutive rather than one.
  16. I don't know what you're talking about. Form is not a boundary, unless you mean the shape of something. The boundary he explicitly says is place. Yes he begins with what you're saying, but that's not what he ends up with. But perhaps that's the way I'm reading it. There is some ambiguity. He does say it is like a container that can't move. But it doesn't have independent existence, it isn't a special category, it isn't the attribute of something singular, it is just the innermost motionless boundary of what contains. But this kind of boundary is always within something else, it doesn't just spread out. So it is a boundary of something, even if it is not literally equal to that boundary and it is mostly relational. There is nothing wrong about the form and matter distinction, although Rand got wrong what Aristotle meant. Form is the abstract description of what makes a thing what it is, quite similar to the essential of a concept, but it also describes for the sake of which something acts and its pattern of action. Matter is what something is in physical terms but of course something can't exist without having some pattern of action and sake for which it acts. That's why matter according to Aristotle is only a potential. Importantly, neither form nor matter is even close to platonic because he never tries to make form into something concrete or something that can exist independently and act. He usually spends the most time checking premises. Anyway, I should have said the most important parts for this conversation are those about the void, chapters 6 and 7 and 8 that I mentioned.
  17. Meteorology translated by E. W. Webster Book I Natural phenomena in outer space are treated as if they are things occurring on earth in terms of the way things move and interact. Comets, shooting stars, and the Milky Way are treated as if wind and fire operate the same way in outer space, like circular motion stirring things in such a way that they catch fire. When the natural phenomena are things that already happen on earth, like snow and rain, descriptions and causes make more sense. In chapter 14, Aristotle discusses the way that the earth has not always been the same, that rivers can come into existence while others might dry out. He directly recognizes that this process is sometimes man-made, but also sometimes natural. Because there is no end to time, Aristotle says that everything about the parts of the earth will change in time. Book II 3 - Throughout the book Aristotle describes the water cycle, which makes everything else grounded despite the use of elements in his theories. He uses the fact that water loses the salt when it evaporates as evidence that another substance is added, rather than something that is part of water already, that makes the sea salty. 5 - Aristotle recognizes that the earth is symmetrical north and south, so it has north and south poles, and this is what makes places habitable. 8 - Earthquakes are thought to be caused by dry wind inside the earth. The main evidence for this seems to be the noise that earthquakes make, as if it was a release of wind that makes the noise. A lot of the stuff about wind and earthquakes are spurious correlations. But it is interesting that he describes tsunamis correctly in a way that makes sense that wind might be involved. He thought that a strong wind pushed the water back, and caused the earthquake, then the wave rushed in. Book III Aristotle has much to say about rainbows. Since these come about from water or rain, they come about through something like a mirror, but since the particles are so small, the mirror only reflects the color. It's interesting that he understands that it has to do with optics and not simply emitted from the sky. Book IV This entire book is basically antiquated chemistry. It is based on the 4 elements, and describes things like boiling or thickening.
  18. Book II 1 – Matter is always bound up with a contrary. Hot and cold share the same matter. 4 – The coming-to-be of the elements is cyclical. For example, Fire + water results in earth + air. 5 - Matter is not perceivable and it is the intermediate between extremes, or contraries in this case. 6 – Aristotle says that the excellence and good of each thing that comes about by nature (as compared to fortune) is its nature. The cause of these things is their determinate condition. If something is compounded out of elements, such as fire, what does the soul consist of? If the soul was made out of fire, then it would change only in a physical way. But that doesn't explain memory or gaining skills. 7 – It seems that Aristotle says that through the mean, contraries turn into each other. 9 – It is art, not wood, that makes a bed. The form is the essential nature, and it is an end - as a figure or form that expresses a formula of essential nature. Matter is moved, form moves. 10 – Coming-to-be and passing-away can both happen cyclically and forever because movement on a circle will approach and then retreat. All things in nature strive for the best, and since not all things exist eternally, the next best thing is perpetual coming-to-be. This sense of striving for the best sounds to me like Aristotle is saying that the nature of anything is to exist in its fullest extent and its fullest work. 11 – If something will come-to-be absolutely and necessarily, then it is always coming-to-be, in the sense that it can't possibly not-be. So if the existence of something is necessary, then it is eternal. This must be cyclical because this process be unlimited, and the relationship of necessity goes both directions. In a way, this is eternal recurrence from Nietzsche, if it were interpreted as a real metaphysical theory. Aristotle however explains why individual animals don't recur, by distinguishing species from number, where species recur but not individuals.
  19. 4 – Alteration is when the underlying thing remains but a property changes. 5 – Matter cannot be separate from magnitude. If it was, it would lack either place, or concrete existence. And it cannot exist within a body as its own separate form of existence, because then there would be infinite matters within the body. 7 – If A and B are like each other in all respects without difference, then there is no reason to think that one should act on the other any more than the other. If A and B are different from each other in every respect and not identical in any way, then there is no reason to think that one could be affected by the other. It would be as if saying white could affect line. The proper relationship should involve contraries. The 2 things must be similar in genus but different in species. Active power is that from which a process originates. The end for the sake of which the process takes place is not active. A state is when apparently the active power brings about an end. In a sense then, a state is a form. 10 - We don't say wood combines with fire, food with body, shape with wax, or properties with things. Combination should involve things that have separate existence. Compounds might be different than the constituents, but the constituents may remain potentially. Their power of action is preserved. Combination should not depend on every part being side-by-side because this makes perceptual acuity the standard of something being a combination.
  20. Generation and Corruption translated by H. H. Joachim Book I 1 - Those who think that there is an underlying One must maintain that all coming-to-be is alteration, because everything is singular anyway. The singular thing is what changes. Those who say that there is more than one ultimate kind, alteration is distinct from coming-to-be. This would be because some things come together or go apart. 2 - Those who dwell in close association with nature and its phenomena are better able to formulate the foundations of their theories, and their principles admit of wide development. Suppose that you divide something until I can no longer be divided, so that the underlying thing is all that remains. This would mean that this thing has no magnitude, and would be a point. Or this would mean that the thing is no body, and would be a nothing. In both cases they can't be put together and make something come-to-be. 3 - Unqualified coming-to-be applies to substances. Qualified coming-to-be applies to qualities.
  21. It's not that the place does it, he just means that these things end up in a place that is proper to their nature. He says "certain influence" which sounds like a translator's effort to suggest "something like influence but not quite actually influence". We might say that place is a final cause of the movement of fire according to Aristotle, and final cause is never a thing in his eyes. It's abstract. It's not really relevant to this discussion, things still need to move in the same way, places still need to exist. He eventually defines place as simply the boundaries of any particular entity.
  22. That is what he thought. Really only the earth remains still in the sense he didn't think that the earth could go any more towards the center of the universe. I don't think it's consequential to what he thinks place is. Somewhat, but Galileo made things mechanistic and reified math. What do you mean? He didn't think that place influenced motions. It is not that place influenced the motions, but that he thought the elements moved in a particular way just as we think of how oil always float on water. But, the first chapters are different than the later ones, he is exploring the topic. I'm mostly presenting it for the questions, not his answers.
  23. Since in this case space and stuff always exist simultaneously, this is more reason to think that space is a characteristic. Because if you actually were only left with "space" there couldn't be anything actually there that exists, by your own admission. And you could not be left without space either, because then things would not have location. If entities are metaphysical primaries, then space must be derivative of those primaries. I don't see how space could have any independent existence, or at least why you suppose there are 2 metaphysical "types".
  24. Suppose you removed the particles, or whatever is there that is material. How would you differentiate what is left with absolute nothingness? Presumably what is left after you remove the material things is space, and if you remove space, absolutely nothing would exist.
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