Eiuol

The reasons, yeah, but actions, too! "Accidental" flourishing is impossible. If you could act on faith and accidentally act on self-interest, then there really no reason to say faith is bad. It would be intrinsicist to say one must act in self-interest even if faith can result in "accidental" self-interest. Part of Objectivist morality is that the only way to flourish is to be rational, and you'd never just "happen" to flourish by faith - accidental self-interest is a contradiction. Your grammar was a bit awkward, I see that you agree with me. The problem I have and had is that you said: "So, I would argue it matters less, WHAT a religious person does, because it says nothing about their real character, only about what they have been told to think, and what they believe they must dutifully do." But since you can't accidentally flourish, isn't it sufficient to identify actions that lead to flourishing? DA: Consider that there are degrees that a person is moral or immoral. It isn't new or interesting to say Christians are against murder. Almost all people are. I think saying "murder is bad" is simple on the level of saying "winter is cold". We can ask why these statements are true, but that's not our purpose right now. In this way, murder is "very immoral", and I conceptualize these acts as "rights violations". Rights violators are the most immoral people, and harm values the most. It is easy enough to see this, so most people are against egregious rights violations. Clearly, a pro-murderer is still immoral, but it's an easy evaluation. There is a lot more to consider, especially since most people are pro-murder. Morality matters more than just who is a rights violator. This where rationality comes into play even stronger, and why I suggested "normative reasoning beliefs" as a baseline. Does the person care about contradiction, for instance? Is faith a valid tool of cognition? Perhaps a person doesn't violate rights, but if they're irrational, they'll be a harm to your values. If a person ALSO has normative reasoning principles, that's better! Past that, we can factor in more details of virtue. Is the person able to -do- good and promote their values and your values? Maybe there are honest errors about what virtue is, but if they are in fact just, honest, and productive, they're that much better than armchair academics who sit around tauting their beliefs but do nothing about it. By morally empty, I meant boring, where there is nothing more to morality than refraining from murder - that moral action is easy, and heroic people aren't so special. It ends up with excessive moral toleration since so many people pass your baseline, even those who harm your values. Adding more dimensions to morality makes it that much more important. Now, a rights respecting society is crucial to maintain a flourishing life, but it's important to make choices in your life of who will promote your values even more. Seek those people, encourage their growth.

I'm only saying you said nothing interesting. If refraining from murder is sufficient to make you moral, then most moral philosophies are perfectly fine. Again, like that other thread, you're saying you don't care or mind what others do. I don't have time or interest right now to go over why there is more to morality than social harmony - it really does matter to your life to choose who warrants being part of your life. Your question was loaded because any answer implies that there was an implication I never advocated. You didn't explain how I made an implication that "murder is tolerable in some aspects". I literally said most people don't advocate murder, meaning that it would be frankly bizarre to say -anyone- advocates murder as though it is unique moral similarity to say Objectivists and Christians don't support murder... I'm objecting to your moral relativism. I'm objecting that you didn't help the OP who never asked about tolerating murderers and thieves, or evaluating a murderer.

Loaded question.

You said nothing useful. Most people, period, are opposed to all those same things... It's a morally empty world if you only care that people aren't murderers. Even most irrational people don't murder. Basically this is leads to the bad form of tolerance, normative moral relativism: nobody's beliefs are "better" as long as we don't kill each other, so I should tolerate all ideas that don't advocate murder.

If a person can act well WITHOUT thinking well, then you're saying it's possible to divorce thought from action. You'd be saying that you could lead a good life and act on faith. I've been saying that it's only possible to judge what people do. How would you propose getting into someone's head to know a person's rationality without focusing on their actions? Isn't a person honest to the extent that their beliefs result in honest actions?

It's not that those beliefs are harmless as much as it is wrong to judge a person morally bad just for making an error. But if the belief is harmful in light of what you know and the information you have, you should give the other person that information so they don't inadvertently do things that harm your values more.

Careful about the word virtue. To call it a virtue is to say it is a type of action that is necessary to attain or maintain values, a requirement even. Tolerance in the sense I described is a lot more variable than honesty for instance. Tolerance is like kindness - sometimes it is good, sometimes it is bad, and most of all, even non-emergency situations may not require it. On the other hand, honesty is always required, except for some emergency situations. By tolerance, I don't mean needing to cope or social peace. I'm referring to fallibility, where you can't assume the other person being wrong is evasive - you yourself may be wrong, so sometimes it's worth tolerating differences. I wouldn't excuse irrationality as an 'impulse' though, I wouldn't tolerate that one bit. You have to judge the whole person, including accepting that the other person is immoral to some degree.

You'd have to evaluate what they say and do, less so than a specific belief. Many beliefs are subject to change, even your own, yet why belieifs are different may be an utter lack of virtue. Other times, it's only a different set of information, so a belief isn't always a matter of negative moral evaluation if they are able and willing to be rational. Even if their method is bad, they may be totally fine about thinking. In a way, I'm talking about "tolerance" in terms of errors - this is not tolerance if the person is plainly irrational. For these people, and even people who share your values, beliefs alone don't warrant a positive or negative evaluation. Take the example you gave. A devout Christian may have erroneous beliefs, so since they act virtuously, those Christian beliefs aren't necessarily morally bad for you or them. I'd question if they "really" are devout, although it is moot if they're honest. On your end, the view is irrational, but that isn't to say they're acting irrationally, acting on faith, or acting on emotional reactions. In a way, I'm saying a person's normative reasoning beliefs take precedence and is the main measure for judging another person's moral character, a baseline perhaps. Of course, some people compartmentalize. Some people are wholly irrational in one area, but fine elsewhere. In that case, evaluate how they integrate that irrational belief into their life. Is it a driving part of their career? Or is it just a topic they are opinionated about but their career is elsewhere? A friend of mine has obvious socialist beliefs and is opinionated about it, and I think irrational about it. But they're mainly into music and aesthetic values, and very positive views of music. Their political beliefs are a conflict to be sure, but their actions, not just words, are good.

As related to the OP, I found an interesting book: An Aristotelian Realist Philosophy of Mathematics: Mathematics as the Science of Quantity and Structure

"How does pursuing any other value that involves personal risk not place ones "ultimate" value further down the list?" Depends on how risky it is and the value in question. The word "risky" has all sorts of connotations and in a way makes uncertainty perfectly acceptable. " If the man was a life guard jumping to save a swimmer in distress would you withhold moral judgement?" I thought you implied suicide, as in he wanted to kill himself, not "died as an unfortunate consequence he couldn't foresee". I'd investigate what happened before judgment. I'll put it this way: 1) deliberate suicide is amoral, 2) acting without consideration in a "suicidal" way is immoral, and 3) the unforeseeable is not the fault of anyone so it might be moral when someone happens to die. Unforeseeable is something like it turns out a shark was in the water when there was no reason to expect a shark. He has the moral -right- to do any of the three, but only 3 might be -morally right-. Why? Because 1 disregards life anyway, and 2 is immoral because it's avoiding knowledge while at the same time wanting to live. By the way, there is no "between" choosing to exist or not. Rand argues that the law of excluded middle applies here. Putting life at risk could be 2 or 3 above, but it's not a continuum of life pursuit in a specific choice. A continuum only exists when evaluating people in their whole character. I agree with Rand, as in I don't see a reason to evaluate specific choices as "in between".

You're asking about the morality of suicide. It is the only sort of choice that is itself not a choice of morality, as it is the foundation to good or bad. I explained this in my first few posts in terms of the choice to live. So, his actions are neither good nor bad. Yes, impediments to choice are morally bad and I agree. If that is your benchmark, you are missing numerous other considerations of Objectivist ethics and grant many standards as valid by implication, thus moral relativism.

That there are multiple valid standards of morality. Subjective to the degree in your case you are broadly stating morality as based on whatever an individual deems important. To you all that matters is that "choice" happens. Not a mention of what SORT of choices are right. So in comes ethics to get us to interact peacefully. The ethics-as-distinct idea you've defined in only social terms, and making no judgment of another person's choice as right or wrong, only judging IF a choice is made or able to be made. As long as I act peacefully, literally anything else is valid. Stated differently: only those who seek destruction of the social world is wrong. If someone wants to be a hedonist, that's just as right as someone who holds Catholic morality as their standard. The essential question is, as you stated: "What in this case is essential to pursuing any value?" Choice is one important part, but that alone misses things, like how some choices lead to loss of value, or how to measure a value in the first place.

Part of the issue is you said "immoral to use force against someone". No, the Objectivist view is that initiating force is immoral.

Right. This is moral relativism. As I said before. And exactly why it fails to address Vect. What you said "makes sense" now, but it is still a lot of equivocation that avoids the clear context of Rand's essay "Objectivist Ethics".

Okay, that explains a lot! What you're saying makes sense. But I have to say, I don't think the OP is talking about "ethical standards", it's talking about the basis or reason to choose to live in the first place. I'd argue that your moral/ethical distinction only opens the door to an altruistic or duty-bound society. I treat the words as a synonym. That's a topic for another time, though.

I never argued that they're unrelated. You're talking about rights, then somehow saying ethics is only relevant in a social setting. Ethics is broader, it applies to all actions. Rights are a type of moral principle, not a principle that makes morality relevant... Again, you are talking about rights, all by saying ethics is only about social context. Your point isn't clear because your posting is rife with equivocating rights to morality. "Thank you for the link. I'll look into this, but my position doesn't dispute the need for morality on a desert isle, or anywhere else. " You said the exact opposite in post #29: "If it were possible to be entirely self-sufficient, to live without any interaction with others, then ethics would be irrelevant."

All you're describing is the Objectvist view on rights. And redefined happiness for no reason as "maintaining peace". "It's only in consideration of the consequence of interaction with others that an ethical view (of proper action) becomes relavent." isn't what you are saying now: "What does concern them is the measure of control (choice) they have over their existence. This where ethics becomes relevant in some form of, "do as you're told" vs "you're not the boss of me" " You are saying different things. But then you throw in "some form of" that doesn't follow. You are saying ethics is primarily about choice, and it is primarily about impediments to choice. There is more to choice than impediments, and two primaries is impossible. Then you avoid the OP's question anyway by saying "oh, some people have reasons to opt out". That's the topic of the thread: why not opt out?

How does it follow from "I know what is bad for me in reference to others" to "ethics becomes relevant when I consider the consequences of interacting with others"? All you're saying now is that I need to observe others to be able to know what is good or a bad - a perfectly legitimate claim that I agree with. Aristotle's Golden Mean is basically that, where we look to others to see how a virtuous person acts. If living in total isolation, you'd have no information to work with to help you figure out how to be virtuous. This is totally different than saying morality is only an issue in social settings with consequences - which always leads to moral relativism I described earlier. Social consequences makes for varying moral systems depending on the society and time period. To judge moral systems, we need a standard to measure them that can apply man qua man rather than man qua society. A more sensible standard is where we start developmentally and by nature, which is aiming for life. That isn't "it's good because it's natural", it's that it's the only standard and time to need a code. It provides the means to happiness, that's the purpose ethics serves.

DA, I don't know the point of the first part? Are you saying morality is dependent on interaction with other people, and if we analyze it without the social part, it'll be unavoidably subjective or meaningless? That is only a plausible angle to explain why the concept "morality" grew and developed, as opposed to an explanation of morality. Even if it were true that it explains morality itself, we still run into VECT's question: Why use this standard as opposed to another? Why wouldn't someone wonder if it's okay to do an act if they were alone? "Simply acting" is not any promise something beneficial will happen, so at the least, it's plain stupid to "simply act". A hidden premise here appears to be psychological egoism, where people always pursue their self-interest. If that were true, simply acting would always be in your interest, so morality would be irrelevant - you do what's in your interest anyway. The problem is, many people really do ignore their interests or fail to consider their interest, so end up doing something besides what is in their interest. We don't even have a meaning to "self-interest" by which to act, it is a moral concept that doesn't happen automatically. Ethics is still meaningful before we start talking about social topics, partly why it's a separate topic than political philosophy. Of course if someone really is alone is unlikely, and looking for a social basis for ethics to the root of ethics is going to overlook life as the root to that social basis being relevant! Taking a social basis will be other-centric, because you already rejected ethics as being self-centric. The issue there is altruism at least implicitly, where we must act with regard to what other people may say or do in response to you. Then, out of guilt, you'd wonder "is it okay for me to do such and such?", not just out of a need to think and evaluate. All I agree with is that choice is what makes deliberate action possible. The choice need not be deciding one day "I must live!" It only needs to orient our action. Rand brings out a fundamental choice, but it isn't saying what we ought to choose. That happens developmentally - Rand's explanation is rooted in pleasure/pain, and other explanations may be possible as to why babies don't need to be instructed to live. Values will arise in life-furthering action, just by nature of living. Foods, activities, and so on. It's possible to declare "I don't want to live!", and there's no "duty" to avoid it. But it involves deliberately denying or evading existing values. Nihilism perhaps. If you want to persuade a person to further their life, it requires pointing out their values and how it goes along with happiness. Reason has power there - I can guarantee your friend VECT, does have values to pursue, and grasps why it matters. It takes noting how drug users fail to lead a good life - real world evidence.

Why do you wish it were different? It's up to an individual, yes, and there are reasons to say life is pursued developmentally speaking. "Wholly subjective" seems to say there is no reason at all. I don't see any bad implications of what I explained.

There is no shouldn't there. All you'd say is ethics doesn't matter at all for that person and they'll never be happy.

That's the conclusion of people who consider fractional reserve banking to be immoral. Basically, I described sharing. Like in math, show your work! Don't just show your conclusion.

Can you post some differences here? I'm very interested!

What are you talking about, seriously? VECT didn't say he knows the answer. He literally is saying he doesn't understand by explaining what he doesn't understand. He already knows there is some error, or he's looking to see if Rand made an error. Let's keep it productive, recognize that by asking a question, he is spending time learning.

There is no reason, there is no "shouldn't". Rand doesn't even say there's a decided reason. She suggests pleasure/pain is a feeling that for developmental reasons affect seeking life. Later, we may identify the choice for life in explicit terms, but the only reason to offer is that by seeking life, happiness will come with it. If you choose non-life, okay, in which case, by Rand's position, you won't have any happiness. As soon as you choose non-life, there is no sense of ethics that matters. So, yes, in some way, life is a subjective matter, but here, the important point is that as babies, before we even know what life is, we do life-sustaining actions without a deliberate, reasoned out plan. By implication, values are formed. As an adult, we can analyze those values and measure them against life, which is where value derives. We'd probably say that there are reasons to maintain that life. Your concern seems to be that moral relativism might be true. Moral relativism is basically that more than one standard of morality is valid, but not necessarily all standards. Rand argues that only one standard of morality is valid because of the two fundamental alternatives: existence and nonexistence. For the record, cognitive development is pretty relevant to Objectivist ethics. Developmental factors are important to explain a system of ethics. We're blank slates at the moment of birth, but not any moment after that.