Eiuol

I'm not well read on Kant really in terms of what he wrote, but I do have some idea about his ideas on perception. Kant believed that reality exists independently from the mind, and since your mind has to create any of its content, reality can never be seen as it truly is. That's why Rand claimed that Kant would essentially be saying you're blind because you have eyes. Of course, any philosopher like Kant uses really dense wording that I see more like mental gymnastics. So no, Kant didn't say anything like the mind creates reality, it's more like the mind can't see reality as it "really is".

One way to help remember floating concepts is to consider what sort of errors they lead to. That way, you retain understanding the professor is teaching. Being able to entertain false or bad ideas is a writing and thinking skill too. I actually don't find that science classes are less rote necessarily, it really comes down to the quality of the professor. The other day I was auditing a graduate class in political science, and there was so much rote learning and rationalism that I simply decided it was more a problem than a benefit to attend future classes. If you can't drop the class and pick a better one, you could certainly practice writing for counterarguments. That's workable. By the way, about the definition of rationality. That's the classical view of homo economicus, so it was a very common concept for the field of economics since Adam Smith. Nowadays, plenty of economists no longer accept that definition because it doesn't describe how any real person makes decisions, let alone economic decisions. "Bounded rationality" is a term you should look into. Now I still think rationality is a misused term, but at least what it refers to with bounded rationality makes sense.

I don't think it's uncommon to associate an emotion and a thought because an event and an emotion happen at the same time, but that doesn't mean the event caused the emotion. It's possible that the emotion is lingering from something else entirely, or that the emotion and thought only incidentally occur at the same time. For example, you might be taking a test, and are feeling anxious. You are also thinking that the test is going to be difficult. You might say you are anxious because you think the test is difficult. But perhaps you are only anxious because you had an argument with your friend the day before yet for whatever reason didn't feel anxious at the time. So, it's important to distinguish thoughts from emotion, just in case you are treating the two as the same (I used to call some thoughts emotions, meaning I'd treat something as an emotion when it never was). You might say thinking the test is hard is anxiety. Emotions aren't thoughts, they're a feeling, like "I'm breathing faster than normal and it feels like a weight dragging me". To figure out the cause is more than determining the thoughts you have at the same time. Introspection is not easy at all, it takes a lot of practice to be objective about causes. Introspection or emotional skills are rarely taught, and they should be. Not that it's taught badly or in a corrupted way, but it's barely taught at all, except in some schools.

I find this an insightful point. Knowledge needs justification, similar to how moral claims need justification. Descriptions alone about ideas or supposed facts can't provide any normative standard to epistemology. Sure, one might say a contradiction is present, but why does that matter? Something normative must come into play to establish whether a claim should be accepted as knowledge. I could say "well, these contradictions comfort me so I'll accept them as knowledge". Even if I say noncontradiction is not valid, I'd still have to say what standard establishes the law of noncontradiction as knowledge! At some point, there needs to be an implicit standard not dependent on being knowledge, a basis for the concept proof anyway. So, that's where an axiomatic principle comes in. Then again, that won't establish whether or how a person will care about a standard. I think that's where choice to live comes in. So in some sense, a choice to live is axiomatic for ethics, although it has a dependency on primacy of existence that alternatives exist. You can't judge a choice to live as knowledge because it exists as the whole basis of knowledge as normative, and ethics by implication. The choice is entirely in terms of a consciousness itself.

Not sure why you think that I'm not acknowledging Rand's approach to ethics. By the way, Rand doesn't really solve the is-ought problem, it's just that the is-ought problem isn't a problem for ethics like Rand's. Any functionalist ethics like Rand's gets around Hume's "problem". Basically you can't get an ought just by saying an is. Saying you are alive doesn't mean you should choose life and anything else is immoral. My overall point is that choosing to live or not is itself not a choice that is immoral or moral; the choice is premoral and can't be evaluated in moral terms, although there are moral implications (i.e. if you choose to live, then morality is how to accomplish that).

I kind of lost interest in posting further since Grames was articulating thoughts that were like mine, so I had no particular reason to post. But plelase don't say that I should think about Objectvism "more" seriously, implying that I'm not taking it completely seriously. There's no reason for that. Indeed I was asking questions without reference to anything Rand said, that doesn't make it skepticism. I ask a question because I think the only way to even discuss a choice to life having a "should" along with it is to answer that question. I also like Socratic-style discussion, so I ask questions without answering them. It was just getting at how why you "should" choose life doesn't make sense. I should've said "prerational and premoral" though. Also, choosing to live is the same as choosing life. Choosing to live, the process, is the same as choosing life, which to be part of your condition is also a process. It is not possible to say you choose life without also chosing to live. The only issue seems to be that you find my statements to be subjective in nature, but neither subjectivity nor objectivity applies to choosing life! " One chooses to live because one acknowledges the facts of reality, as presented by Rand in Galt's speech, that life and death are the only alternative; that one acknowledges one is a a living being who needs to make a choice to live as a man or woman of reason." This is where I see a naturalistic fallacy. First off, there is implication that if you don't choose to live in the exact way Rand prescribed then you're not really living. If you didn't intend that, fine, but it's plainly true that people have been choosing to live for millenia without even implicitly acknowledging that life and death are the only alternatives. Then it seems to me you're trying to make a normative statement that there are good reasons to choose life as your ethical standard. That is, because you are alive, you *should* pick life. That's a naturalistic fallacy where the fact that you are alive makes it right or moral to live, but you can't just say something is good because it's natural or you already exist. The thing is, all you can do is describe the ways life is chosen, otherwise you'll always hit the naturalistic fallacy and Hume's is-ought "problem".

Right, but it's a naturalistic fallacy to say that therefore you should choose life. Is-ought type of fallacy. So, by what standard would you suggest to choose life with?

I don't know where you're getting the second part from. The quote says that value can't be separate life. It doesn't say anything about whether you should choose life. Think of it this way: by what standard would you judge that life is something you should pursue? There is literally no reason to pick life over death except by some kind of preference. Rand's argument is basically that there is only a choice between existence and nonexistence. The only reason she gives to pick one is that you have values to live for already, or as a baby it derives from pleasure/pain sensation.

How so?

There is no support, at least not moral support (any argument is circular). The only idea like support is that death requires no action, while life does, so if you choose life for whatever reason, how to maintain that is morality. I only brought up infants because it's worth saying why the choice to live is not limited to adults.

Because there is no particular *reason* to choose life, the reality is that pleasure or pain are generally how people end up "choosing" life as babies. That doesn't mean the standard of morality is hedonistic, it's just that there is no rational (or irrational!) reason for choosing to live, so it will sound subjective. Objectivist ethics only revolves around how you need a code of ethics to live, but it makes no argument for why one should choose life. Rand is pretty specific that the choice to live in her view begins with pleasure versus pain. Anything else would be a glaring example of an is-ought fallacy (secondhander elaborates pretty well).

I would think about it in terms of if you find a contradiction in your thinking you should change your mind, but that possibility doesn't suddenly make your principles into purely subjective ones. I find it annoying when people presume certainty equals close-mindedness and unwillingness to consider new information and knowledge.

And $25 used now.

That's kind of a loaded question. You can't base the efficacy on capitalism in the same way you base morality on the nature of man, because you don't base morality *only* from the nature of man! You take the nature of man and various other facts. So, of course there is no proof in the form you asked about, it's the wrong epistemological approach in the first place. Unless you just want a logical organization. Anyway, 2046, it is fine to explain a deduction of principles in a logical order so long as you remember that the deduction itself isn't the discovery of principles. A formal proof in that way is fine and possible, sort of like how math proofs demonstrate logical consistency but not what is true in reality necessarily.

Really depends on what you're best at articulating, but the book on mysticism would be neat. That "guidebook" might end up the most interesting - there are plenty of books on atheism, although such a guidebook could easily become trite.

Actually, I specifically say that the "greatest good" does not always mean it's good for a particular individual. I try to, at the end, talk about how to figure out if capitalism is necessarily good for all people. It's one thing to say it's "moral", but you can't avoid that determining what is moral depends on what real consequences there are to your life. Consequence doesn't need to be a scare word, Pragmatic ethics is about consequences in terms of actions, not entities. Consequence though just refers to events and actions that have an impact on you, which isn't only "what happens". Your statements don't contradict what I'm getting at. I started stating some things I knew were false, wrote them out in quantifiable terms, and looked at the steps of why they're insufficient to analyze a social system. I think Rand went through a similar process of "proof" based on her statements on the industrial revolution, as I was explaining earlier. Before you respond though, read the previous post.

2046 gave a good response to elaborating on the parts you underlined. I misstated nothing: basically capitalism flowing from ethics is a logical organization of principles. How you arrive at these principles varies upon how reality works and the relationship between facts. It's in that way Rand built a system integrated facts, not a series of derivations from first principles. Consider it this way: Objectivist ethics is about what is the best for your own life, which you would have to discover from the facts of reality, including existing social systems. "Let me be more specific, all people in this new society C+dx are part of a free Capitalist system (this is C) except for one exception (this is the dx): people who are 1. severely and helplessly addicted to drugs (never sober), 2. self-destructive, barely functioning mentally and barely surviving (non-prosperous), 3. completely unwilling to seek treatment and will not be persuaded to do so... these people.. and only these are forcibly taken to rehab, the drugs are cut off from them, they receive counselling for drug addiction and the psychological causes of it, until such a time as they are rehabilitated. These people once rehabilitated and rational are now free and signs a contract to pay back the efforts to rehabilitate them and a further amount as interest on the debt etc. These people now make it in the world, and produce, trade, invent, and prosper." Okay, I'm going to rephrase this a bit. H[rehab welfare state] = X + rehabilitation(A) H[capitalist] = X where H is some arbitrary measure of economic well being (happiness) of a country, rehabilitation(A) is some amount of value addicts add who will eventually be rehabilitated, and X is some amount of value added by everyone. All things being equal, S[rehab] is undoubtedly better than S[capitalist]. As an egoist, it's in your interest to be in a country of great economic well being - more value, more money, more food, etc. But is this how economics really works? So far, it's just a purely consequentialist "greatest good for the greatest number". The greatest number may be helped, but you may be that burnt grain of rice that is so much worse than the aggregate well-being of the whole rice bowl. Most grains will be great, except for a few. That's sort of what Crow is asking. As an egoist being that one grain of rice is terrible. You would want to be in a system where you can prosper. In fact, I'd argue that some liberal-minded use that line of reasoning to make all kinds of arguments against "systems of power" oppressing the weak. Take it a bit further: H[capitalist] = X - hindered( B ) where hindered( B ) is value lost when some people are unable to live well because they're held back somehow. Perhaps you can say they are people who fail to get rehabilitation, just consider H[welfare] has a smaller number of untreated addicts. It would be that much worse for everyone and people in B. If you're in B, tell me, what is good for your life about capitalism? I suppose you'd say it's more moral. But what makes it more moral if your life is made worse? Of course, equations aren't always so straightforward. Is it possible that rehabilitation(A) necessarily leeches from X? Is there a limit on A before rehabilitation is a loss? And is there really a class of people being deprived by a capitalist structure? I'll try to answer by pulling apart my variables to see if I'm m issing anything. Suppose you want to split up the parts of H. You can't really have everything but only vary a single value H = security + technology + food + entertainment + social life + ... This takes into some account differing values. It seems that much more unlikely you can easily raise the value of H. Fiddle with technology, food goes down. Fiddle with food, entertainment goes down. And so on. This is how totalitarian regimes work, so it's just explaining that H[capitalist] OR H[welfare] > H[totalitarian] is true. In other words, all these pieces of H have a causal impact on the rest. But H[welfare] > H[capitalist] may be true, especially if you can't make fine discriminations within H! That is, applying a function (economic policy) to one component of H applies to all other components of H, with non-uniform results. However, I'm still only answering on utilitarian grounds. A moral underpinning is necessary to figure out what we want for a social system. At least for now, I want to stick to an individual level. I = (H / population) +/- V (H / population is the average H) I[capitalist] compared to I[welfare]. where I is individual H, and V is some individual variation from the average. Which society is better for you? Objectivism would say I[capitalist] is by nature greater than I[welfare] no matter who you are, no matter what pieces make up H. Taken as I stated it, the higher H, the higher I is. So, which ever is best in sum is necessarily better for you, only if V stays the same. Objectivism would still say I[capitalist] still will be higher than I[welfare], or in other words, V under [welfare] wouldn't decrease in a switch to [capitalist] (i.e. a person wouldn't be "marginalized" by society). Fortunately, we can observe existing societies which have changed from one social system to another. The collapse Rome, collapse of the Soviet Union, decreased war in the Balkans, Italy abandoning fascism, China a lot less communistic-looking, etc. On this basis of study, you would probably notice a trend of equal rights being important in net happiness. Yet I'm at a loss how to get right from here to establish that capitalism is best for you as an individual. To figure that out, we'd want to use some observations of different societies to establish what's required to lead a happy life. That means figuring out moral principles from observing existing prosperous countries. What are people doing? With enough time, you can figure out using reason and trading while respecting rights is part of the better, prosperous societies. Basically, there is no formal proof in the sense described by Crow as in establishing capitalism as the most moral system from "first" principles of ethics. The issue is that you need to use observations of societies to establish first principles and what actually leads to a good life!

"Reading Walt Whitman in ninth grade changed the way you see the world? Well, getting drunk before basketball games with kids who lived at the trailer park near my house did the same for me. In fact it’s part of the reason I feel so strongly about public schools."

I am surprised by this, but more in the sense that I met him less than a year ago, and planned to take one of his classes. I really wanted to learn from him directly, but now that opportunity is gone. One word I'd use to describe him: wise.

I plan to respond to it, I've been thinking about it.

It's mostly speculation from what I've heard about regarding discussions she had with Isabel Paterson, her decision to study history in college, and an epistemology with focus on discovery not deduction per se. Organized arguments after having already reached a conclusion is not the same as how the conclusion was reached. Writing about her inspirations would be probably incoherent in written form as it would be for anyone. I don't have a reason to think Rand reasoned from any "first principles" like the Rationalists of the Enlightenment. For the most part, it's pretty clear that Rand based so much of everything on life as the standard that results in a positive state of existence for body and mind. And you also have to take into account how her epistemology considers reality to be a "whole" meaning all knowledge is connected. To reach any objective conclusions requires knowledge from many different levels of abstraction. Indeed there is a logical hierarchy to Objectivism, but there is no primacy of principles. Principles of ethics have an impact on principles just as much as principles of politics have an impact on principles of ethics. If capitalism were not the most prosperous system for an individual, you'd have to compartmentalize morality and the structure of society you live in, much as a deontologist would do. I can't possibly know which relevant factors Rand considered, but I'm confident in saying that she didn't consider politics and ethics to be divided so distinctly - it wouldn't be possible to have an immoral prosperous society or a moral unprosperous society without tremendously altering your view on ethics. I'd say that the nature of man flows to morality flows to politics as you said, it's just that various principles are intermingled. Would it be possible to conclude man's nature as a trader of value without studying structures of society, especially the industrial revolution? Not objectively, anyway.

If you could make your life better by say, stealing, it would be moral. But your life is not in fact made better in the long run by stealing. Indeed, morality doesn't trump reality - if "distasteful" things made your life better, then it would be moral and should be embraced. If capitalism is not the most prosperous system, then obviously the facts are different from what I thought they were, which would likely even change my idea of individual rights being good. I think you're suggesting that the best social system according to Rand only takes into account reasoning from "first principles" of ethics. But given all of Rand's beliefs of epistemology, she also uses facts about social systems to establish what is moral. If capitalism is not the most prosperous for you, then your understanding of morality would change, too.

They are, when morality is based on positive effects to your well-being. You're talking about morality regardless of and even in outright opposition to your well-being. If capitalism is a moral system, then it will have a positive impact on you as an individual. Or are you saying that capitalism has not necessarily been proven to be a system that is good for everyone, even if it's beneficial to you (i.e. a person born to a rich family may make capitalism good for them, but bad if they are born into poverty)?

I'm talking about how she reached the conclusion. By her own admission she thought about history and the industrial revolution a lot to figure out what actually is the most prosperous, especially by talking to her friends Isabel Paterson and Rose Wilder Lane. She never even said anything like discovering the roots of morality then deducing that capitalism is the most like it. I would presume that it was in reference to what would be the best for her as an individual. And from there she wanted to figure out why capitalism in even a limited sense is more prosperous than non-capitalism. I'm sure her reasoning was pretty messy, as it is for any process of inductive reasoning. And eventually, she noted what she saw as a connection between morality and the most prosperous system: individual rights. So once she concluded that the essential was respecting individual rights, the best defense to give is in moral terms, because individual rights as a moral principle are stronger than consequentialist arguments. Of course, if capitalism were not prosperous, then the whole bit about individual rights goes out the window. Or at least, you have to start all over with figuring out what is the best social system to live under. As to whether Rand engaged in a leap of faith, that's entirely an epistemological question. Basically, I'm saying that concluding capitalism is the only moral system depends upon many other earlier discoveries, including the prosperity of capitalism and concepts of individual rights. Once the induction is made, you wouldn't need to state the important but not-essential characteristics - what matters when discussing social systems is the moral argument. Proving it though is not the same. I suppose it's an open question whether C:TUI did well enough to prove it. I don't think she proved it well enough, but I still think she got most of it right. Sure you could say that. If killing and stealing were great for building an overall greater life for yourself, then it would be good. If kindly trading were inferior to stealing and killing, then capitalism is "less good" and not "the" moral social system. The point you seem to be making is that if you did anything immoral, regardless of the consequence. I think of something like stolen concept here. You can't talk about the immorality of rights violations until establishing that a system of individual rights (i.e. capitalism) really is good for your life. Establishing capitalism as good actually requires establishing capitalism as the most prosperous social system first.

If "aggregate" prosperity is raised, then I would question if the supposed system is the moral one and that I was mistaken about capitalism. Objectivism isn't a philosophy where the moral thing to do has inferior results to the immoral thing. So if there really was greater prosperity across the board and for yourself, to me that suggests capitalism is not a superior system. Usually pro-capitalist argument of the Objectivist sort are that non-capitalist systems are unsustainable by their very nature so can't ever be a raise in prosperity for anyone. But Rand didn't reach the idea that capitalism is the ideal system from first principles. As Dante was saying, it's mostly an empirical question that can't be answered by simply a priori principles of morality. As best as we know, capitalism is the best based upon ideas of what fundamentally allowed for greater prosperity after the industrial revolution, i.e. individual rights. You seem to be saying: I don't care about the consequences of capitalism, it's morally right based upon individual rights. Rand seemed to be saying: Capitalism brings about the greatest prosperity, which is good for me. What is good for me is moral. The morally good part is actually what leads to the prosperity. If someone discovered greater prosperity from non-capitalist systems, then Rand's arguments for capitalism would be ruined. Doesn't invalidate egoism, though.