itsjames

This is fantastic. I was dropping the context of the concept "law". Thanks for clarifying that. This conclusion makes intuitive sense to me, but I don't understand the argument Peikoff gives for it in OPAR. The essence of his argument is that if several actions were possible to a particular entity in the same circumstances, "such incompatible outcomes would have to derive from incompatible (contradictory) aspects of the entity's nature." WHY? What does it mean for an action or outcome of an entity to "derive" from an aspect of it's nature? I agree that an action of an entity must be consistent with it's nature. But for it's actions to be derived from it's nature, is saying something entirely different. We don't discover how entities act by "deriving" their actions from their nature. We observe how they act in different situations, and the sum of these actions (along with all the observable attributes of the entity) are what constitute our concept of what the entity is, of it's nature. Now this is interesting. I was viewing choice as being a form of action. (Peikoff defines actions as what entites "do".) If one views the choice focus as being a kind of action, your bold statement above (no pun intended) implies that there is only one course a man's life can take from any given moment onward, since in any given moment, whether he chooses to focus will be determined by whether he was previously in focus and on what his mental contents were at that time. Perhaps choice should not be viewed as a type of action. I'm going to have to ponder this. I'm not looking for a validation of volition. I agree that it is axiomatic. What I was is a logical link between volition and causality. I want an argument for why volition is consistent with causality.

Thanks, Jake. I agree that that is the crucial statement that is leading to my confusion, that the law of identity implies only that things must act in accordance with their natures and doesn't say anything about a things actions being entirely determined by its nature. I apologize if I'm dragging this on and no one is interested anymore, but nevertheless there's still something that bothers me about this. Maybe this a question better left to science, but what precisely about a balloon is it that makes its actions entirely determined by the laws of physics? I suspect that the proposed answer will be that the balloon "doesn't make choices." I agree that balloon's don't make choices. But when we point to a man and say "he will choose what he wants to do next," we are pointing, not to a spirit, but to a physical man. What precisely about a physical man is it that allows him to make choices as compared to a balloon which cannot? Again, I suspect the answer will be "Because man possesses a volitional consciousness. Man is a union of a physical body and a volitional consciousness, whereas a balloon is just the physical body. So calling him a 'physical man' is misleading." But man is still a product of physical things. Man is made via chemical reactions that happen in the womb. There is no point at which a volitional consciousness is "injected" into the womb. So what precisely about the physical components which make up man is it that permits him to make actions which aren't entirely determined by physical laws?

Thanks for all your replies. I understand the points you all are making, but I'm going to have to spend some time thinking about this for myself before I decide it's been resolved.

I agree that volition is axiomatic. And I think I know what axiomatic means also. But in OPAR, before Peikoff explains why volition is axiomatic, he first uses the argument I quoted above to explain why it is not a contradictory quality for man to have. I was trying to point out what I thought were some errors in that argument. I believe a correct argument for this exists, and I've presented my argument in the posts above. But so far no one has convinced me that Peikoff's argument is correct. I realize that the fact that volition is axiomatic is all we need in order to know that volition is in the nature of man, since men can only act according to their nature. But I was hoping to also have in my arsenal an argument for why volition is not contradictory without using the fact that it is axiomatic. I trust I'm not the only one who feels this would be illuminating. I also wanted to make a correction to something I said in my last post. I said something like "if man chooses not to think, then thinking isn't in his nature". I realize now that that is incorrect. What I meant is only that the act of "refusing to think" is not against the nature of any particular man. Afterall, if "refusing to think" was against a man's nature, he wouldn't be capable of doing it, because it would contradict his identity. But we are all capable of refusing to think, so it's not against our nature.

I don't think you answered my question. Let me first point out that I am not a determinist. I believe in free will. I agree with Peikoff's assertion that free will is axiomatic. However, so far, I disagree with the argument he makes for why free will is non-contradictory, or consistent with the nature of a human being. I gave my argument in two posts made under the topic Free Will and the Law of Causation. Just because a man "wants to live" does not mean he won't be buffeted around in the wind. Whether or not he is buffeted around will be determined by this particular man's nature. If he has a focused mind, eager to understand reality and control his own life, then he will not be buffeted around in the wind. But if his mind is unfocused and he chooses to be a couch potato his whole life, then that is his nature. I agree that it is an inescapable part of his nature that if he refuses to think, then he will perish. But this is different from saying that it is in his nature to think. It is only in his nature if he does it, if he is a thinker. I completely agree with this. By the nature of a human mind, by the fact that it is separate from it's environment and operates independently from it's environment, a man's surroundings will not think for him. He must do that himself. I agree that everything must act according to it's nature, ie. consistently with their nature. A thing cannot act in contradiction to it's nature. But my real question is, why is it being claimed that, for inanimate objects, their nature entirely determines their action in a given situation, whereas for man, his actions are not entirely determined by his nature? Now, just because I'm claiming man's actions are determined by his nature doesn't mean I'm opposed to free will. A man's free will follows from what I said above, that his mind is separate from it's environment and must operate independently of it's environment. A man's actions are determined by what he is, that is, by his mind. In other words they are determined by the choices is mind makes. But his mind is a part of his nature. So why is it being claimed that, in the same situation, a particular mind may act in two different ways, whereas a balloon must always act in the same way? For the reasons I gave above, I disagree that by "refusing to think" a man is not acting according to his nature. I agree with this. My problem isn't with volition being axiomatic. It's with Peikoff's argument for why it's consistent with the nature of man.

I think my question can be reduced to the following. Why is it exactly that a balloon's actions are entirely determined by it's nature, but a man's actions are not?

I've been reading through OPAR for the first time. I think it's great so far, but I have a problem with an argument Peikoff uses for free will. On the bottom of page 14 and the top of page 15, he gives an example of a balloon filled with either helium or sand and explains why the balloon would rise in the former case and fall in the later and that only one of these two actions is possible to it in each situation. Then he remarks, "If under the same circumstances, several actions were possible--eg. the balloon could rise or fall, everything else remaining the same--such incompatible outcomes would have to derive from incompatible (contradictory) aspects of the entity's nature. But there are no contradictory aspects. A is A." (Italics Peikoff's) The first time I read this, I thought it was a solid argument. I only questioned it after I read the argument for why free will is non-contradictory in the next chapter. On page 69 he says, "The law of causality by itself, therefore, does not affirm or deny the reality of an irreducible [human] choice. It says only this much: if such a choice does exist, then it, too, as a form of action, is performed and necessitated by an entity of a specific nature. "The content of one's choice could always have gone in the opposite direction; the choice to focus could have been the choice not to focus, and vice versa. But the action itself, the fact of choosing as such, in one direction or the other, is unavoidable. Since man is an entity of a certain kind, since his brain and consciousness possess a certain identity, he must act in a certain way." (Italics Peikoff's) Now, why can't Peikoff's free will argument above be used in say the balloon example? In other words, what's wrong with this argument: "The balloon's motion could have gone in either direction; it could have risen or fallen. But the action itself, the fact that it must move in one direction of the other, is unavoidable. Since a balloon is an entity of a certain kind, it must act in a certain way." I realize this conclusion is absurd. But the structure of this argument and of Peikoff's argument are the same. Does anyone have a better understanding of this?

Hi Obdura, How do the origins of the particles of which we consist have anything to do with our free will? I assume you don't believe that each of us willed ourselves into existence. I don't either. Our existence is the result of the universe acting in accordance with it's nature. So, yes, we did originate from forces outside of our control (obviously.) But once we come into existence, the primary motive force that determines the development of the rest of our lives, which determines the choices we make, is our mind, which is what we are. The existence of free will follows from the nature of the human mind. The mind is separated from it's environment, it requires fuel from outside sources, but other than that, it runs totally on it's own. Free will is not anymore complicated than that.

As I understand it, determinism, or at least Laplacian determinism, states that if the exact state of every particle in the universe could be determined, then the entire course of the universe from that moment on would be pre-determined. Even if it were possible to determine the state of every particle in the universe (which it isn't, by Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle), it would still be incorrect to say that our choices are pre-determined by outside forces. After all, each one of us is a part of the universe. So, determining the state of every particle in the universe would involve determining the states of all the particles of which each of us is made. So our choices aren't determined by outside forces. They are primarily determined by the particles which make up ourselves. They're determined by us, by what we are. Hence free will.

Most people have at least one concrete thing they are interested in, even if they haven't identified it as being a value. We all need something that keeps us going and gets us out of bed each day. For me, ever since the age of 13, music has been my most important value. After I began playing the violin, I became super interested in everything musical and started transcribing melodies (especially ones from soundtracks, like star wars) just for the fun of it. Then I started to realize, "gee, I spend a lot of time doing this, it must be really important to me!". And I guess that's when I began to identify music as being a value. But I imagine it happens that way for most people. You're automatically going to enjoy doing certain activities more than others, and then you'll stop and look at what you've been putting all your time into, and identify that as being your main value.

A tall order is right! I'm hoping some of the thinking will become automatized after a time. But the fact that identification and integration are the only means we have of understanding and controlling nature is the only reason I'm able to fight the exhaustion as long as I do. I still have moments though where I just want to stop thinking and lay down for a few minutes. Perhaps the exhaustion will go away after my mind gets used it though, like going to the gym I hope?

Hey everyone, This is my second post and I haven't introduced myself yet, so I'll do that now. My name is James. I'm a graduate student in applied mathematics and I'm studying to become a composer in my spare time. For most of my life, I've been very interested in learning how to get better at thinking about various things (board games, following movies, cooking, playing instruments, learning math, learning languages, etc.) I've never had a remarkable ability at any of these things, but I've always managed to do well at school work. I guess you could say I'm what people call "book smart." But I'm not great at much else. For instance, out of all my friends, I'm the only one who hasn't ever won a single board game that we've all played together, I have a very hard time following movies unless I really concentrate, I'm generally not "good with my hands" when it comes to cooking in the kitchen, or working on anything mechanical, and after about 10 years of being involved with music (I played violin for about 6 years, then moved to guitar when I came to college, and I've played keyboard on and off throughout all that time) I'm still not great at any one particular instrument. So, I've been trying to figure out what the hell I'm doing wrong, and after rereading ITOE, I think I may have gotten a clue. I don't remember the page number, but somewhere in the book Ayn Rand said that all human thought follows the pattern of "Something exists. I'm conscious of it. I must discover it's identity." I totally underestimated the value of that statement the first time I read the book. But I've been trying to implement it to everything I do over the past few weeks, and it's had astonishing results for the most part. In math, I've been reading my class notes much more thoroughly, making sure I integrate everything I learn without contradiction into a coherent whole. In music, when learning a new piece on say the keyboard, I've been relating it to all the other pieces I know, figuring out the nature of the notes and rhythms that are used, which means seeing how they relate to the notes and rhythms used in every other piece I know, and why they convey the emotions they do. In daily life, I've been observing everything around me more closely, grouping together trees, birds, cars, windows on buildings, trying to be aware of what I'm seeing at all times and how many objects of a given kind I'm seeing, etc. Anyway, while I think this has been helping me in all aspects of life, I've been finding it to be exhausting! I've never thought so hard about everything before. And I'm wondering whether other objectivists live like this on daily basis or whether I'm taking things to an extreme? All thoughts would be greatly appreciated. Thanks.

I think the point David is making, and I apologize if I've misinterpreted, is that the concept "existence" precedes the concept "consciousness." This is different from saying that everything which currently exists had to exist prior to your consciousness existing. For instance, a musical composition did not exist before the composer who composed it created it. But existence still comes before consciousness conceptually.