Questions -- Chapter 1 of OPAR

[The Trendy Cynic]

While reading OPAR, I have a pad of paper and a pen next to me and I write down any questions or confusions that I'm unable to figure out at the time. When I finish a chapter, I go back and see if I can answer some of the questions I wrote, but I'm still left with a collection of minor questions and little clarifications that I was hoping you may be able to help me with. These all refer to the first chapter of OPAR -- "Reality."

1) What is meant by "existence IS identity"?

I'm having a bit of difficulty grasping the exact way the word 'is' is being used in the expression 'existence IS identity.' The ways of using 'is' that I'm familiar with are to either:

a) state that the first concept is subsumed in the second ('a bird IS an animal') or

state that the concepts are completely interchangable ('speed IS velocity')

Am I right in assuming that 'existence IS identity' doesn't fit into either of those categories? I just want to verify that this is a unique use of the word 'is,' in that it explains the fact that existence and identity do refer to the same things, but aren't completely interchangable because they do so from different perspectives... I'm unable to think of another example where 'is' was used in the same way.

2) Isn't consciousness implicit in the first sensation, in that you are sensing it?

Dr. Peikoff says that consciousness is grasped -- even in implicit form -- by a child much later in his development. As I understand "implicit," it means that all of the necessary facts are present but have yet to be integrated into a concept. Doesn't a baby possess implicit knowledge of all of the axiomatic concepts after that first sensation? "There is (existence) a sensation (identity) of which the baby is aware (consciousness)?"

3) What is the Objectivist definition of the Universe?

I see it clashing a little bit with the physicists' definition of the Universe. Objectivists hold (and I do not know how they can make this statement) that the Universe is eternal. But this is blatantly contradicted by the prevailing theory of the time, the Big Bang theory (which, among other things, theorizes a beginning to Time itself). I understood philosophy to take a pretty much 'hands-off' view of the sciences, yet in this situation I see it contradicting scientific evidence without any evidence of its own.

4) How does Objectivism assimiliate Quantum Mechanics?

Quantum Mechanics is weird, weird, weird. Duality of identity seems to be supported by weight of evidence (ie. if, at any given time, an atom is 50% likely to decay, then it is both DECAYED and NOT-DECAYED in equal parts until it is observed and it 'chooses' one of them). This has been extended to the macroscopic world via Schroedinger's Cat... if there's a cat sharing the interior of a closed, opaque box with a cyanide capsule that's configured to break when the atom mentioned above decays, then if the atom is both DECAYED and NOT-DECAYED, then the cat is both DEAD and NOT-DEAD.

Once again, I would prefer Objectivism to take a hands-off position on science (in that, if Objectivism is going to be contradicting scientific research, I'm going to have to say 'uh-uh'). As I see it, though, current understanding of quantum mechanics (particularly Schroedinger's Cat) explicitly violates Identity.

5) How is God necessarily primacy of consciousness?

This will be a sticky question, because I'm not supporting the existence of God at all. I'm merely questioning one tiny assertion Peikoff makes about the concept of God, namely that it is necessarily primacy of consciousness. But couldn't a theist relate intuition to a sixth sense of the world, thus claiming that intuition is indeed an element of existence that his consciousness is aware of (thus supporting primacy of existence)? Just to support the idea that it isn't immediately arbitrary, if that theist is genuinely feeling it, then wouldn't dismissing such a feeling be akin to dismissing the perceptually self-evident?

6) A quote I completely do not understand:

"By the nature of existence, however, such "hope" and "prayer" are futile. Leaving aside the man-made, nothing is possible except what is actual. The concept of "omnipotence," in other words, is logically incompatible with the law of identity."

Huh-what? How does the emphasized line 'nothing is possible except what is actual' somehow lead to the next sentence? Peikoff seems to state this as if it is an inarguable conclusion, but it seems to me he left out a couple of sentences before getting there... could someone please explain what logic leads from the second sentence to the last one?

[JMeganSnow]

1. It is the same concept viewed from a different perspective. One implies the other. Paraphrasing: "In order for something to exist, it has to exist. In order for something to exist, it has to be something." Identity is the "something", existence is the "exists". The idea of existence without something that exists is absurd, just as is the idea of a something that doesn't actually exist.

2. It is implicit, in that the data to be grasped, i.e. your consciousness, exists in reality. However it is not GRASPED, even implicitly, until a child begins to examine his method of perception. That's the difference.

3. Dr. Peikoff uses the terms Universe and Existence interchangeably to an extent. The Universe is the sum of all extants, after all. It does not contradict the Big Bang theory in that, whatever existed before the Big Bang (and you can't get something from nothing) existed , and thus was part of the Universe. (In fact, if time didn't exist prior to the Big Bang, then concepts such as "before" don't apply, anyway.)

4. Objectivism doesn't assimilate the special sciences. It is for the special sciences to assimilate philosophy, not the other way around.

5. Emotions are not tools of cognition. By what means does the theist gain knowledge about the existence of god? By no means. What evidence exists of this "sixth sense?"

The concept of a supreme creator of everything is necessarily primacy of consciousness, it assumes the existence of a consciousness before there was an existence.

6. If you are omnipotent, you can do ANYTHING, and thus you can contradict ANYTHING, which means the fact that A=A, that things are what they are, ceases to be. Hence, ominipotence contradicts identity, because it is the ability to change identity on whim.

[AisA]

4) How does Objectivism assimiliate Quantum Mechanics?

Quantum Mechanics is weird, weird, weird. Duality of identity seems to be supported by weight of evidence (ie. if, at any given time, an atom is 50% likely to decay, then it is both DECAYED and NOT-DECAYED in equal parts until it is observed and it 'chooses' one of them). This has been extended to the macroscopic world via Schroedinger's Cat... if there's a cat sharing the interior of a closed, opaque box with a cyanide capsule that's configured to break when the atom mentioned above decays, then if the atom is both DECAYED and NOT-DECAYED, then the cat is both DEAD and NOT-DEAD.

Once again, I would prefer Objectivism to take a hands-off position on science (in that, if Objectivism is going to be contradicting scientific research, I'm going to have to say 'uh-uh'). As I see it, though, current understanding of quantum mechanics (particularly Schroedinger's Cat) explicitly violates Identity.

Objectivism, qua philosophy, can state with certainty that any "understanding" that violates the law of identity is false.

For a rational theory that is consistent with identity and explains what has come to be known as quantum wierdness, I refer you to Lewis Little's Theory of Elementary Waves. You can read about it here.

[AisA]

3) What is the Objectivist definition of the Universe?

I see it clashing a little bit with the physicists' definition of the Universe. Objectivists hold (and I do not know how they can make this statement) that the Universe is eternal. But this is blatantly contradicted by the prevailing theory of the time, the Big Bang theory (which, among other things, theorizes a beginning to Time itself). I understood philosophy to take a pretty much 'hands-off' view of the sciences, yet in this situation I see it contradicting scientific evidence without any evidence of its own.

The big bang theory postulates the creation of existence from non-existence and is thus false. For some excellent insights into this subject by Stephen Speicher and others, I suggest you use the search function to find the threads where this has been discussed.

[AisA]

6) A quote I completely do not understand:

"By the nature of existence, however, such "hope" and "prayer" are futile. Leaving aside the man-made, nothing is possible except what is actual. The concept of "omnipotence," in other words, is logically incompatible with the law of identity."

Huh-what? How does the emphasized line 'nothing is possible except what is actual' somehow lead to the next sentence? Peikoff seems to state this as if it is an inarguable conclusion, but it seems to me he left out a couple of sentences before getting there... could someone please explain what logic leads from the second sentence to the last one?

If you wish to discuss passages from OPAR, please provide page numbers so that we can review the quote in context.

[realitycheck44]

6) A quote I completely do not understand:

"By the nature of existence, however, such "hope" and "prayer" are futile. Leaving aside the man-made, nothing is possible except what is actual. The concept of "omnipotence," in other words, is logically incompatible with the law of identity."

Huh-what? How does the emphasized line 'nothing is possible except what is actual' somehow lead to the next sentence? Peikoff seems to state this as if it is an inarguable conclusion, but it seems to me he left out a couple of sentences before getting there... could someone please explain what logic leads from the second sentence to the last one?

Okay, I hope this makes sense.

There are two types of objects. Metaphysical and man-made. If it is man-made, it has to be produced by man (ie Existence has primacy over Consciousness.) That which is metaphysical will not change, it will act in accordance to its nature, ie("nothing is possible except what is actual"). When man acts on a metaphysical, it becomes man-made. With either kind of object, neither hoping nor wishing will change anything. Praying will not make God come down and help you because that would mean that you are changing a metaphysical object without acting on it. God cannot be man-made and metaphysical at the same time. (The law of Identity).

Zak

[TomL]

1) What is meant by "existence IS identity"?

b] state that the concepts are completely interchangable ('speed IS velocity')

Peikoff, in fact, intends and means the latter. Being in existence means having an identity, and vice versa. The two are interchangable.

2) Isn't consciousness implicit in the first sensation, in that you are sensing it?

Yes, but even with the first sensation, the child cannot yet grasp it. Consciousness can only be grasped, even implicitly, through the process of induction, by differentiation of the sensations themselves as apart from the act of processing the sensations. To see this fully, you will need to read/listen to Dr. Peikoff's validation of induction, which is a separate work.

3) What is the Objectivist definition of the Universe?

Existence is not only interchange with "identity", it is also interchangable with "universe".

Philosophy is a guide to the sciences. It has something to say to physics: "The universe is that which exists." If a physicist then tries to transcend that boundary, he can do so only through an arbitrary assertion (and would thus be wrong). In reality, any truthful discovery of fact is in the universe by definition, since the universe is everything that which exists. Discovering something outside of what we now consider to the universe won't make the original definition wrong, but merely expand its context.

4) How does Objectivism assimiliate Quantum Mechanics?

Thankfully, there are others who know much more about this than I do. But I will be reserving judgement on TEW and such until such time as David Harriman's forthcoming book on the history of physics is published. I have reason to trust David Harriman's ideas in the area, and I have my reasons for not trusting other "authorities" mentioned in this thread.

Once again, I would prefer Objectivism to take a hands-off position on science (in that, if Objectivism is going to be contradicting scientific research, I'm going to have to say 'uh-uh'). As I see it, though, current understanding of quantum mechanics (particularly Schroedinger's Cat) explicitly violates Identity.

Philosophy properly guides the study of physical science and all science. The Objectivist position is this: "To the extent that quantum mechanics and its conclusions are true, then it is consistent with classical physics." By what means are irrelevant, once you grasp that no two things, which are true, contradict each other in any way.

Perhaps the venerable boiling water analogy I already mentioned in your previous thread has slipped your mind. Say a man does an experiment and determines that "water boils at 212F." He is correct. He is not later proved wrong when another man does an experiment at a higher altitude and discovers that "water boilds at 211F at a higher altitude". You are simply adding more context. The original discovery is correct within the context available at the time, and the definition is amended to state that "water boils at 212F at sea level", and not "water does not boil at 212F".

For quantum mechanics to claim that physical mechanics is wrong is the same as the final, obviously wrong definition, above.

Scroedinger's Cat, for example: how would one connect a cyanide capsule in such a way to an atom? Arbitrary. In reality, no such connection can be made, so its ridiculous to posit such a thing. The fact that atoms might be both decayed and not decayed in the same instant doesn't mean that the cat is both dead and not dead. The cat is, in fact, alive until it is dead -- the cat carries no properties of atoms in itself as cat qua cat. If you could cause the death of the cat with an atom, it would not alter this fact, the cat would never be both dead and not-dead at the same time. This is the kind of ridiculous assertion that I assume quantum physicists make. As true as their discoveries are, the context-dropping is rampant in trying to relate quantum mechanics to classical physics.

5) How is God necessarily primacy of consciousness?

But couldn't a theist relate intuition to a sixth sense of the world, thus claiming that intuition is indeed an element of existence that his consciousness is aware of (thus supporting primacy of existence)?

Any such "sixth sense" is arbitrary and conjured up only through imagination, and imagination presupposes a consciousness capable of conjuring it. Since you have then used consciousness as a foundation for existence, you are handing primacy to consciousness rather than existence.

Just to support the idea that it isn't immediately arbitrary, if that theist is genuinely feeling it, then wouldn't dismissing such a feeling be akin to dismissing the perceptually self-evident?

"Genuinely feeling it" does not equal "having evidence in the form of facts of reality detected with one's perceptual faculties". Thus, the idea is arbitrary. There is no genuity of emotion when one has no actual evidence, but only one's imagination. The emotion may exist, but it would be fake -- and yes, you can easily train your subconscious to trick you. Most people do.

6) A quote I completely do not understand:

"By the nature of existence, however, such "hope" and "prayer" are futile. Leaving aside the man-made, nothing is possible except what is actual. The concept of "omnipotence," in other words, is logically incompatible with the law of identity."

Omnipotence includes the possibility of doing something which is not possible, which is a contradiction. For the concept 'omnipotence' to have identity i.e. to exist, it must not include that possibility.. therefore, it is a non-concept.

[TomL]

if, at any given time, an atom is 50% likely to decay, then it is both DECAYED and NOT-DECAYED in equal parts until it is observed and it 'chooses' one of them

OK, after further thought, I have to reject this entire idea. The likliness of decay in no way indicates an actual state. The atom is either: decayed, or not decayed, but not both at the same time.

To say that an atom only has a state "when it is observed", and not in reality, again hands primacy to consciousness. It is the same as saying "the chair in this room doesn't exist if no people are in the room to see it". Rubbish.

[The Trendy Cynic]

Thank you all for your help -- all of my questions were answered, and most of my unexpressed 'could he mean this?' questions were confirmed with a 'yes he does!'

OK, after further thought, I have to reject this entire idea.  The likliness of decay in no way indicates an actual state.  The atom is either: decayed, or not decayed, but not both at the same time.

Well, actually there is evidence to support the fact that, in QM, 'likely state' and 'actual state' are one and the same. I've listed it below in quotes if you're interested... it has no bearing, really, on this discussion... I agree with the comments made regarding QM in this thread, and no longer see any conflict (and I've yet to read the Little Waves page, which I'm looking forward to). Besides, it's clear to me that the axiomatic concepts are inviolable, and it's silly to question them solely on the basis of a very poorly understood science. So, as I said, this is just for your personal interest, so stop reading if you aren't curious

The easiest way to explain this is through the double-slit photon experiment. In this experiment, single particles of light (photons) are fired through a filter with two small slits in it, then passed through an open space before hitting a photosensitive screen. The photon has an equal chance of passing through either of the two slits.

Mathematically, it is possible to calculate the probability that the photon will hit any given part of the far screen. If we treat these photons as particles (like paintgun pellets being fired randomly through the two slits), then it's most likely that the photon will hit the screen directly in front of whichever slit it moves through, and gradually less likely that the photon will hit a part of the screen further away from that location. Graphing this, it looks like a mountain, with the peak of the mountain being that location on the screen directly in front of the slit. Obviously, with two slits, there's two probability functions, each one peaking directly in front of a slit.

This graph can be reproduced on the photosensitive screen if the experiment is run long enough. That area right in front of the slits will be the most exposed to photons, because more photons hit it, and the screen will be gradually darker (less exposed) as one moves away from that center point.

The result, after letting this experiment run for awhile with single photons moving through in quick succession, is very different. Instead of a single bright patch gradually fading on each side, an interference pattern appears on the far screen -- alternating bands of light and dark. This doesn't make sense, because the photon was alone in that space -- there was nothing there to interfere with it, to push it one way or the other.

The weirdness gets even weirder with the realisation that the interference pattern matches exactly what we would expect if those two probability functions had some physical effect on the single photon as it moved through the space -- as if the photon didn't exist, but its probability function did, and the two functions (one for each slit) interfered with each other as waves do.

Physically, the only real way to conceive of this behavior is to think that the photon actually is its probability function, which interferes with itself as described above, and the photon only 'chooses' its location on the far screen when the photosensitive screen 'observes' it -- the photon passed through both slits, or the atom is both decayed and not-decayed, or the cat is both alive and dead, all until they're observed -- because the fact that each of these things are in two states simultaneously has a very real and observable effect on the results of the QM experiment.

[Tom Rexton]

OK, after further thought, I have to reject this entire idea.  The likliness of decay in no way indicates an actual state.  The atom is either: decayed, or not decayed, but not both at the same time.

To say that an atom only has a state "when it is observed", and not in reality, again hands primacy to consciousness.  It is the same as saying "the chair in this room doesn't exist if no people are in the room to see it".  Rubbish.

Probability is an epistemological concept--it is not intrinsic to the event in question. Probability refers to a state of knowledge. The irrational interpretations of Quantum Mechanics would have you believe that when you toss a coin, until you actually see the result the coin is 50% heads up and 50% tails up.

[Hal]

The irrational interpretations of Quantum Mechanics would have you believe that when you toss a coin, until you actually see the result the coin is 50% heads up and 50% tails up. 

This is because when you assume otherwise, your predictions become incorrect unless you're prepared to incorporate some form of non-locality into your theory. See Bell's theorem.

Edited February 28, 2005 by Hal

[The Trendy Cynic]

This is because when you assume otherwise, your predictions become incorrect unless you're prepared to incorporate some form of non-locality into your theory. See Bell's theorem.

Exactly.

And let me just say... it's foolish to think that physicists -- physicists -- would arbitrarily dismiss contradiction and theorize some form of physical nature to probability as if they didn't value identity, causality and non-contradiction to the same level Objectivists do. They do. Their entire study -- the sum total of scientific knowledge -- is based upon the universality of those concepts, and they aren't going to flaunt them capriciously.

I'm not saying they are correct, but these sorts of wacky conclusions are necessitated by the current understanding of QM. There is currently no other way to describe single photon behaviour in the double-slit experiment without radically contradicting something profound: Either causality, locality or identity, something is being flipped on its head. Blissfully steamrolling over this fact is irresponsible at best, as in all likelihood it probably will have profound implications on all fields of human knowledge (including philosophy) when the answers are finally understood.

[AisA]

I'm not saying they are correct, but these sorts of wacky conclusions are necessitated by the current understanding of QM. There is currently no other way to describe single photon behaviour in the double-slit experiment without radically contradicting something profound: Either causality, locality or identity, something is being flipped on its head. Blissfully steamrolling over this fact is irresponsible at best, as in all likelihood it probably will have profound implications on all fields of human knowledge (including philosophy) when the answers are finally understood.

Dr. Little's Theory of Elementary Waves explains the double slit experiment without contradicting anything. It is a brilliant piece of induction.

[Hal]

Dr. Little's Theory of Elementary Waves explains the double slit experiment without contradicting anything.  It is a brilliant piece of induction.

The last I heard about TEW it still hadnt given a satisfactory resolution to Bell's Theorem, and while I'm personally not qualified to comment on it, several of the Objective physicists who I think had previously championed TEW (Harriman and Norsen) have withdrawn their support.

http://www.objectivescience.com/articles/dh_tew.htm

http://www.objectivescience.com/articles/t...still_fails.htm

etc

Has anything changed?

Edited February 28, 2005 by Hal

[TomL]

There is currently no other way to describe single photon behaviour in the double-slit experiment without radically contradicting something profound: Either causality, locality or identity, something is being flipped on its head. Blissfully steamrolling over this fact is irresponsible at best, as in all likelihood it probably will have profound implications on all fields of human knowledge (including philosophy) when the answers are finally understood.

I am completely ignorant on quantum mechanics, but I know enough about the universe to know that there can be no contradiction between what we now know for certain about the macroscopic world and any facts we may discover about the microscopic one. In other words, when we do find a way to describe single photon behaviour in the double-slit experiment (whatever the hell that is ), it will not contradict causality or identity (I don't even know what locality is so I won't say).

I would also implore you, Trendy Cynic, to at least read all the way through chapter 4 before questioning too much chapters 1 & 2 (in OPAR). Write your questions down, set them aside, and when you've finished chapters 3 and 4, read your questions. You'll probably find you can answer them yourself.

The key point I want to make is that Objectivism is an integrated whole -- it's all tied together in an extremely strong framework, and depending on your individual experiences and implicitly held premises, various parts of it will answer questions you have about other parts. But they will answer it, if you make the connection between the parts in question.

[The Trendy Cynic]

Still have to read TEW. I'm going to read it right this instant... as soon as I finish this post.

I would also implore you, Trendy Cynic, to at least read all the way through chapter 4 before questioning too much chapters 1 & 2 (in OPAR).

Having just completed chapter 4 today, I'm in complete agreement with you -- in fact, I think I'll include Chapter 5 in that as well because I feel the section on arbitrary propositions has huge ramifications on how the average person might process claims made in the first few chapters.

Had I read through to the end of chapter 5 before questioning volition in chapter 2, for example, I would have understood the contextual/hierarchical nature of knowledge, the fallacy of the stolen concept (which I thought, until recently, referred to making use of a concept without aknowledging it) and the nature of arbitrary claims -- all of which would have helped me better understand the axiomatic nature of volition.

[Free Capitalist]

You'll have to forgive me for being a little cynical here, but that username "Trendy Cynic" kind of disqualifies you from being a truthful and earnest seeker of understanding.

Edited March 1, 2005 by Free Capitalist

[TomL]

You'll have to forgive me for being a little cynical here, but that username "Trendy Cynic" kind of disqualifies you from being a truthful and earnest seeker of understanding.

Give him a chance to read and integrate... he'll probably change it on his own. Gosh.

[AisA]

The last I heard about TEW it still hadnt given a satisfactory resolution to Bell's Theorem, and while I'm personally not qualified to comment on it, several of the Objective physicists who I think had previously championed TEW (Harriman and Norsen) have withdrawn their support.

http://www.objectivescience.com/articles/dh_tew.htm

http://www.objectivescience.com/articles/t...still_fails.htm

etc

Has anything changed?

If you go to the TEWLIP discussion group ( http://groups.yahoo.com/group/TEWLIP/messages/1) you can find answers to the various objections that have been raised against TEW. It is a very long list -- over 1500 messages -- and I have not read them all. However, quite a few of those starting at about message 450 deal with Bell's theorem.

By the time you get to the end of the list, you will see that all of the objections have been answered (as of 6/2004). I don't know if Harriman and Norsen have since changed their minds or not.

[The Trendy Cynic]

You'll have to forgive me for being a little cynical here, but that username "Trendy Cynic" kind of disqualifies you from being a truthful and earnest seeker of understanding.

It's sarcastic, meant to parody the absurdity of the generally cynical attitude of today's society by painting it as a social fad that, to be consistent, they should be equally cynical of. While this admittedly doesn't fly with the Greek origins of the word, I coined it years ago considering only the colloquial definition.

It's a rejection of cynicism through sarcasm, not an acceptance of it, primarily as a defense against today's oh-so-trendy rejection of idealism.

It's also a fairly good defense against those people who put more stock in one's name than in one's words, wouldn't you say?

[Hal]

If you go to the TEWLIP discussion group ( http://groups.yahoo.com/group/TEWLIP/messages/1) you can find answers to the various objections that have been raised against TEW.  It is a very long list -- over 1500 messages -- and I have not read them all.  However, quite a few of those starting at about message 450 deal with Bell's theorem. 

Thanks, I'll check it out.

[JMeganSnow]

It's a rejection of cynicism through sarcasm, not an acceptance of it, primarily as a defense against today's oh-so-trendy rejection of idealism.

It's also a fairly good defense against those people who put more stock in one's name than in one's words, wouldn't you say?

Yes, but it may also result in your being labeled a troll when you're just confused. In addition, "Trendy Cynic" is NOT your name (or at least I hope not) therefore it counts as your words. It is a harsh thing to ask honest people to disregard a self-chosen descriptive phrase.

[Free Capitalist]

There's no dichotomy between putting one's trust in one's name and one's words. Online, where people choose their own names, I put my trust in both the name of the person and what they have to say. Usually the former is a very reliable method of understanding the latter.

[Malkuth]

4) How does Objectivism assimiliate Quantum Mechanics?

Quantum Mechanics is weird, weird, weird. Duality of identity seems to be supported by weight of evidence (ie. if, at any given time, an atom is 50% likely to decay, then it is both DECAYED and NOT-DECAYED in equal parts until it is observed and it 'chooses' one of them). This has been extended to the macroscopic world via Schroedinger's Cat... if there's a cat sharing the interior of a closed, opaque box with a cyanide capsule that's configured to break when the atom mentioned above decays, then if the atom is both DECAYED and NOT-DECAYED, then the cat is both DEAD and NOT-DEAD.

Correct me if I am wrong, but doesn't the wavefunction of the atom (which was previously in a superposition between the parent and daughter isotope) collapse as soon as the state of the atom has a consequence on anything else? That is, doesn't the wavefunction collapse as soon as the particle it emits triggers the apparatus that releases the cyanide?

If I remember correctly, the "observer" which causes a wavefunction to collapse in any situation in quantum mechanics doesn't have to be a conscious one. For example, if you set up the doulbe slit experiment in such a way that you could, in principle, tell which slit the photon/electron/particle/whatever went through, then the particle would behave "as a particle" rather than "as a wave" and no interference pattern would be observed--even if no conscious observer chose to take into account which slit the particle went through. Whatever apparatus was set up to detect which slit the particle went through could be considered an "unconscious observer" in this instance. In the Schrodinger's Cat thought experiment, the apparatus which triggers the release of the cyanide would be the "unconscious observer."

Of course, I don't know much about quantum mechanics, so I don't know if this interpertation is at all correct. I would appreciate if anyone would care to verify or correct me.

[hunterrose]

Per my resolutions, I'm digging into OPAR, and I have some questions about Chapter 1.

Causality, in the Objectivist viewpoint, is a fact independent of consciousness, whether God's or man's. Order, lawfulness, regularity do not derive from a cosmic consciousness...

I do not understand the steps to this conclusion. Earlier (p.14) Peikoff says that the child's desires do not affect entities' actions, but that seems quite different from demonstrating that no consciousness can affect any entity's action. How is this conclusion reached as a metaphysical fact?