How much education do we OWE our children?

[InfraBeat]

28 minutes ago, Doug Morris said:

if we conclude a contradiction, we must check our premises

A contradiction is a statement and its denial. The statement "Parents are not obligated to care for their children" is not a contradiction.

Edited June 16, 2023 by InfraBeat

[Doug Morris]

22 hours ago, InfraBeat said:

You can't have both, or you haven't addressed the question. What do we say if Bob convinces us that the Objectivist axioms derive that parents are not obligated to care for their children? If we say that that must be wrong, because we are already certain that parents are obligated to care for their children, then where did that certainty derive from? Or would you claim that holding that parents are obligated to care for their children is implicit in cognition?

The Objectivist axioms are the axiomatic concepts of Existence, Consciousness, and Identity, as explained in the section on axiomatic concepts in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.  We don't conclude specific things from the axioms; we conclude things by using our faculty of reason to identify and integrate the material provided by our senses.  The axioms serve to clarify and reaffirm that this process is basically valid.  Thus your question does not really make sense.

Conclusions one way or the other about whether parents are obligated to care for their children are definitely not implicit in cognition.

 

[Doug Morris]

22 hours ago, InfraBeat said:

A contradiction is a statement and its denial. The statement "Parents are not obligated to care for their children" is not a contradiction.

In some of your posts, you seemed to be talking about situations in which we find ourselves with a contradiction in our conclusions.

The statement "parents are not obligated to care for their children and parents are obligated to care for their children" is a contradiction.

The postulates of a mathematical system are sometimes called "axioms", but are not axioms in the Objectivist sense.  If we try to develop a system of postulates for the arithmetic of ordinary numbers, but we find that our postulates necessarily imply that 2 = 3, we have failed in our attempt and must come up with different postulates.

 

[InfraBeat]

3 minutes ago, Doug Morris said:

We don't conclude specific things from the axioms; we conclude things by using our faculty of reason to identify and integrate the material provided by our senses. 

I would say that, roughly speaking, the philosophy is that we make conclusions about specifics by consideration of the axioms (and its corollaries) along with observations of specific facts. I took it as implicit that there are specific observations also that are used for conclusions. But to be explicit, I would say "derive from the axioms with the factual observations".

But what conflicting factual observations are involved in the question of whether parents are obligated to care for their children?

So, back to my example: Suppose Martha and Bob agree on all the observed facts, especially as to the degrees of rationality and self-preserving abilities of children. But they each claim that the Objectivist axioms along with those facts derive each their conclusion about whether parents are obligated to care for their children.

13 minutes ago, Doug Morris said:

Conclusions one way or the other about whether parents are obligated to care for their children are definitely not implicit in cognition.

Agree.

[Doug Morris]

3 minutes ago, InfraBeat said:

So, back to my example: Suppose Martha and Bob agree on all the observed facts, especially as to the degrees of rationality and self-preserving abilities of children. But they each claim that the Objectivist axioms along with those facts derive each their conclusion about whether parents are obligated to care for their children.

In that case, at least one of those two people must have made an error in reasoning, and they need to identify and correct the error(s).

 

[InfraBeat]

1 minute ago, Doug Morris said:

The statement "parents are not obligated to care for their children and parents are obligated to care for their children" is a contradiction.

Of course. That is essential to my question.

2 minutes ago, Doug Morris said:

The postulates of a mathematical system are sometimes called "axioms", but are not axioms in the Objectivist sense.  If we try to develop a system of postulates for the arithmetic of ordinary numbers, but we find that our postulates necessarily imply that 2 = 3, we have failed in our attempt and must come up with different postulates.

Indeed. 

So my question is what would Martha do if she found that Objectivism (along with the observed specific facts about children and parents) arrives at the conclusion that parents are not obligated to care for their children when she regards that as not true?

[InfraBeat]

10 minutes ago, Doug Morris said:

In that case, at least one of those two people must have made an error in reasoning, and they need to identify and correct the error(s).

That doesn't answer my question. Martha agrees that Bob's reasoning and facts are correct, but she doesn't accept the conclusion. Therefore, she can't accept the axioms.

There are:

Axioms and corollaries.

Facts.

Methods of reasoning.

Conclusion.

If Martha agrees with Bob's facts and methods of reasoning, but she holds that parents are obligated to care for their children, then she has to reject the axioms. 

Or put it this way: Suppose someone presents argument that you recognize to be from Objectivist  from Objectivist axioms, and pristine reasoning, and from facts you acknowledge, and the conclusion is that parents are not obligated to care for their children. What do you do?

Edited June 17, 2023 by InfraBeat

[Doug Morris]

1 minute ago, InfraBeat said:

So my question is what would Martha do if she found that Objectivism (along with the observed specific facts about children and parents) arrives at the conclusion that parents are not obligated to care for their children when she regards that as not true?

Why does she regard that as not true?

Either she made a mistake in her reasoning from Objectivism (along with the observed specific facts about children and parents), or she got the facts wrong, or her conclusion (arrived at how?) that parents are obligated to care for their children is wrong, or Objectivism is wrong (which would be very surprising).

 

[Doug Morris]

4 minutes ago, InfraBeat said:

If Martha agrees with agrees with Bob's facts and methods of reasoning, but she holds that parents are obligated to care for their children, then she has to reject the axioms. 

How are you using the word "axioms"?  What do you consider to be an "axiom"?

Why does Martha hold that parents are obligated to care for their children?

 

[InfraBeat]

10 minutes ago, Doug Morris said:

Why does she regard that as not true?

There could be various reasons. My point is not about why she holds that parents have an obligation to care for their children, but rather that she does, for whatever reason. 

10 minutes ago, Doug Morris said:

Either she made a mistake in her reasoning from Objectivism (along with the observed specific facts about children and parents), or she got the facts wrong, or her conclusion (arrived at how?) that parents are obligated to care for their children is wrong, or Objectivism is wrong (which would be very surprising).

She recognizes that Bobs facts and reasoning are correct. So then, indeed, her only choice is:

Either parents are not obligated to care for their children or Objectivism is incorrect. 

So, what would you do if someone showed your correct reasoning from Objectivist axioms, and facts you recognized, that parents are not obligated to care for their children? You'd agree that parents are not obligated to care for their children? 

Edited June 17, 2023 by InfraBeat

[InfraBeat]

5 minutes ago, Doug Morris said:

What do you consider to be an "axiom"?

In this context, as I said, I'm talking about the Objectivist axioms. (In other contexts, I would use 'axiom' in the sense of those contexts.)

[Doug Morris]

2 minutes ago, InfraBeat said:

So, what would you do if someone showed your correct reasoning from Objectivist axioms, and facts you recognized, that parents are not obligated to care for their children? You'd agree that parents are not obligated to care for their children? 

Yes.

But I would also say that parents who choose to have children without intending to care for them are acting irresponsibly.

 

[Doug Morris]

If anyone can prove conclusively that the world is flat, I will have to accept it and adjust my thinking accordingly.  But I will be very surprised, and the adjustment in my thinking may have to be extensive.

 

[InfraBeat]

6 minutes ago, Doug Morris said:

Yes.

So you would reject that conclusion. In other matters, is there any conclusion about morality that you would reject? Suppose you find some other "tough to swallow" conclusion about morality that is derived by Objectivism with clear facts. Are there limits before you'd say that you can't accept that conclusion?

Edited June 17, 2023 by InfraBeat

[InfraBeat]

3 minutes ago, Doug Morris said:

If anyone can prove conclusively that the world is flat

But we're talking about conclusions about morality, not propositions such as in earth science. 

[Doug Morris]

1 minute ago, InfraBeat said:

But we're talking about conclusions about morality, not propositions such as in earth science. 

It's all part of reality.

 

[Doug Morris]

5 minutes ago, InfraBeat said:

In other matters, is there any conclusion about morality that you would reject? Suppose you find some other "tough to swallow" conclusion about morality that is derived by Objectivism with clear facts. Are there limits before you'd say that you can't accept that conclusion?

The tougher I find the conclusion to be to swallow, the more carefully I would look to see where, exactly, the error lies.

If the error turns out to be in Objectivism, I would have to abandon Objectivism.  (Not necessarily all of its conclusions, but the system.)  In this case, I would expect the error to be in the metaethics or in some narrower ethical topic, not in the axioms.

 

[InfraBeat]

25 minutes ago, Doug Morris said:

It's all part of reality.

The question "What is the shape of the earth?" doesn't immediately appeal to a philosophical basis, but the question "Are parents obligated to care for their children?", posed to an Objectivist, does immediately appeal to a philosophical basis.

[InfraBeat]

51 minutes ago, Doug Morris said:

In this case, I would expect the error to be in the metaethics or in some narrower ethical topic, not in the axioms.

That doesn't answer the question, which supposes that there is no error in facts nor reasoning (the reasoning by which the ethics is derived from the axioms and facts). 

But one can ask a different question: Suppose the axioms and the judgements of the facts are correct, but that there could be an error in the reasoning. So the error could be in stages earlier to, but the basis of, ethics. The error could be very soon in the reasoning after the axioms, in the epistemology or metaphysics. 

/

Going back to the other question: Is it permissible for a parent to kill his child? Or more generally, do children have rights? Or, even more generally, do humans who have very little rationality have rights? Infants, people of extremely low intelligence, people who are virtually entirely irrational, et. al. 

Even if Objectivism affirms that such humans do have rights, is it clear what the Objectivist argument is? Some people mention 'potentiality'. But that requires showing that the axioms. reasoning methods and facts do indeed provide a correct potentiality argument. 

So what to think if someone gave us an iron-clad derivation - from the axioms, with perfect Objectivist reasoning, and clearly true facts, and including a refutation of the potentiality argument - that children do not have the right not to be killed by their parents?

Edited June 17, 2023 by InfraBeat

[Doug Morris]

37 minutes ago, InfraBeat said:

So what to think if someone gave us an iron-clad derivation - from the axioms, with perfect Objectivist reasoning, and clearly true facts, and including a refutation of the potentiality argument - that children do not have the right not to be killed by their parents?

If it all checks out perfectly, it would follow that parents have a right to kill their children.

And if it is similarly proven that heterosexual relations are immoral, we would have to accept that too.

And if it is similarly proven that everyone should experiment with meth by their 20th birthday, we would have to accept that too.

In each case, it would be appropriate to check very carefully for errors.

If we find we have to draw a conclusion that we find very hard to swallow, it would be a good idea to examine why we find it so distasteful.  If this does not lead us to find an error after all, it means our distaste is misguided, and it would be a good idea to examine what this implies about what is going on with us psychologically.

 

[InfraBeat]

2 hours ago, Doug Morris said:

If it all checks out perfectly, it would follow that parents have a right to kill their children.

That answers the question. 

I'm interested in seeing how one would derive: "It is not permissible for parents to kill their children" or "It is permissible for parents to kill their children", and "Parents have an obligation to care for their children" or "Parents are not obligated to care for their children". ['permissible' and 'obligatory' in the ethical sense]

Starting with the axioms [and I comment on them]:

EXISTENCE. AXIOM 1 

""existence exists" ("Existence" here is a collective noun, denoting the sum of existents.) This axiom does not tell us anything about the nature of existents; it merely underscores the fact that they exist." [OPAR]

(1) 'existence' there denotes the sum of existents, so the axiom asserts that the sum of existents exists. So we may remark that existence itself, which is the sum of all existents, is an existent. 

(2) "they exist". 'they' refers to the existents that contribute to the sum of all existents. I would think that they do exist, since they are existents, since they are summands in the sum of all existents. To say 'the existents exist' is true by the definition of 'existent' as 'something that exists'.

(3) The axiom is not just that existents exist, but that the sum of all existents exists. Is that self-evident? Why would it be irrational to recognize that existents exist but be agnostic as to whether there exists the sum of all existents? 

CONSCIOUSNESS. AXIOM 2 is said to be a pair of corollaries from AXIOM 1:

COROLLARY 2a

"Something exists which one perceives" [OPAR quoting Ayn Rand]

COROLLARY 2b

"One exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists." [OPAR quoting Ayn Rand]

(1) It would seem that we should recognize that we have experiences, at least in the most basic sense, without judgement yet whether any of the experiences are sensory. Then we should recognize that having experiences is to have consciousness. As to perception, it depends on what we mean by 'perception'. If 'perceive' has the particular meaning of 'to have sensory experiences' then we have not yet established that any of our experiences are perceptions. 

IDENTITY. AXIOM 3 is said to be implicit in AXIOM 1 and AXIOM 2.

"To be is to be something, to have a nature, to possess an identity. A thing is itself; or, in the traditional formula, A is A. The "identity" of an existent means that which it is, the sum of all its attributes and characteristics." [OPAR]

(1) "to be is to be something" seems to be true by the meanings of the phases "to be' and 'something'.

(2) 'have a nature' is not defined prior to this axiom. Is it defined in the axiom as 'to be the sum of its attributes and characteristics'? 

(3) 'attributes' and 'characteristics' are not defined prior to this axiom nor in this axiom.

Edited June 17, 2023 by InfraBeat

[necrovore]

It looks like the problem here is that you are trying to use deduction instead of induction.

[InfraBeat]

3 hours ago, necrovore said:

deduction instead of induction

What is your basis for holding that it is not correct to use deduction in this context? And you'll use induction but not deduction for that basis? What is the first thing I said that you consider to be not correct, especially on account of using deduction? 

Edited June 18, 2023 by InfraBeat

[necrovore]

5 hours ago, InfraBeat said:

What is your basis for holding that it is not correct to use deduction in this context? And you'll use induction but not deduction for that basis? What is the first thing I said that you consider to be not correct, especially on account of using deduction?

When you say:

21 hours ago, InfraBeat said:

I'm interested in seeing how one would derive ...

Starting with the axioms...

That is the first thing you said which is not correct. Trying to "derive things from the axioms" is a fundamentally deductive approach, but you cannot derive anything from the axioms.

What you have to do is start with perception, integrate the facts into concepts and principles, and only then you can apply the principles to new facts by using deduction.

You have to do this in such a way that the axioms are not contradicted; that is what the axioms are for.

Edited June 18, 2023 by necrovore

[InfraBeat]

deleted by me

Edited June 18, 2023 by InfraBeat