You must admit, we experience possibility and choice from a first person perspective (lets say special insight), whereas we only observe external physical entities behaving in a deterministic (classical) or utterly probabilistic (QM) manner.
Note we have the same situation when we think of consciousness or experience, we can ONLY ever experience/observe our own consciousness, our own experiences, we could never know the actual experiences of another person, or a bat or “what it is like to be” a thermostat.
My point is we could never understand experience or consciousness as it actually “IS” to be those things from the point of view of something else… say an atom or a rock which has neither. So in some fundamental sense, third person science of inanimate matter can NEVER tell us about a phenomenon we ACTUALLY experience. A non-conscious, non-experiencing machine would be utterly incredulous at hearing that we “experience” what it is like to taste onions, “what it is like” to see red, to feel sad, to think or to blank out. If our machine were also conceptually deficient it might be tempted to say that “The subsystem of the universe which happens to be you must be having the illusion of an experience”… (deficient indeed because an illusion IS an experience…). Does not mechanism of the universe imply mechanism without experience.. or IS there “something it is like to be” a clock, a car or a thermostat?
Although I cannot think of why… I leave open the possibility that the same is true in a sense for free will… that no matter how long we stare at classical or QM systems, no matter how much we think about it, we perhaps will never see how “free” can “arise” out of determined + random. Perhaps it is irreducible, the way consciousness experience is. In other words perhaps we cannot simply throw out the concept of “free will” just because we can see no way of constructing it from our constituents. Currently the same holds of consciousness.
Although I cannot think of why… I leave open the possibility that the same is true in a sense for free will… that no matter how long we stare at classical or QM systems, no matter how much we think about it, we perhaps will never see how “free” can “arise” out of determined + random. Perhaps it is irreducible, the way consciousness experience is. In other words perhaps we cannot simply throw out the concept of “free will” just because we can see no way of constructing it from our constituents. Currently the same holds of consciousness.
Free cannot arise out of determined; the two are antithetical, as are determined and random. Free will is antithetical to predestination as well. But one with free will can act as a causal agent (one of many), e.g., I choose to tip the 1st domino, or I choose not to tip the 1st domino. The wind may tip the 1st domino before I touch it, or a pebble may prevent it from toppling into the next domino. If one argues that my choice to tip dominoes was caused like wind and pebbles, then proof lies in the identification and reproduction of every event back to a 1st cause, and lacking that, one must express faith that something other than oneself was responsible for the 1st domino falling, or not.
If a proper view of causality doesn’t require (or can’t deliver) the identification of a 1st cause, then free will combined with random action* fairly well accounts for the reality we experience, and Determinists are simply attempting to avoid personal responsibility for their actions.
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* My use of the term random is meant to express actions that can’t be accounted for. One may presume that causality is reactive, i.e. that some action caused a following action to occur, but without identifying every prior action, every variable, in short, lacking omniscience, even causality lacks the kind of empirical proof that free will does. Free will is apparently as true as consciousness and reality, by self evidence.
Free cannot arise out of determined; the two are antithetical, as are determined and random. Free will is antithetical to predestination as well. But one with free will can act as a causal agent (one of many), e.g., I choose to tip the 1st domino, or I choose not to tip the 1st domino. The wind may tip the 1st domino before I touch it, or a pebble may prevent it from toppling into the next domino. If one argues that my choice to tip dominoes was caused like wind and pebbles, then proof lies in the identification and reproduction of every event back to a 1st cause, and lacking that, one must express faith that something other than oneself was responsible for the 1st domino falling, or not.
If a proper view of causality doesn’t require (or can’t deliver) the identification of a 1st cause, then free will combined with random action* fairly well accounts for the reality we experience, and Determinists are simply attempting to avoid personal responsibility for their actions.
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* My use of the term random is meant to express actions that can’t be accounted for. One may presume that causality is reactive, i.e. that some action caused a following action to occur, but without identifying every prior action, every variable, in short, lacking omniscience, even causality lacks the kind of empirical proof that free will does. Free will is apparently as true as consciousness and reality, by self evidence.
Interesting thoughts to ponder…
For clarity what I meant by “determined + random” is a sort of combination, algorithmically or functionally of these two types of processes into a larger system. Imagine a first black box whose inputs determine with certainty its output, then connect the output of that black box to a second black box which takes multiple inputs, it however produces a “probabilistic” output (has a statistical correlation with the inputs .. i.e. it is somewhat limited by the inputs.. but any one output of this second box is within its limits “random”), this probabilistic output perhaps is input to a third black box with multiple inputs from multiple other black boxes, some of which are deterministic and some of which are not… on and on. The resulting system or algorithm or functioning is what I call “determined + random” .i.e. a combination of the two.
For clarity what I meant by “determined + random” is a sort of combination, algorithmically or functionally of these two types of processes into a larger system. Imagine a first black box whose inputs determine with certainty its output, then connect the output of that black box to a second black box which takes multiple inputs, it however produces a “probabilistic” output (has a statistical correlation with the inputs .. i.e. it is somewhat limited by the inputs.. but any one output of this second box is within its limits “random”), this probabilistic output perhaps is input to a third black box with multiple inputs from multiple other black boxes, some of which are deterministic and some of which are not… on and on. The resulting system or algorithm or functioning is what I call “determined + random” .i.e. a combination of the two.
The problem I find with this approach is that determinism is inherent to mechanical models via the programming, i.e., a programmer worked out how to react in advance according to known variables, excluding unknowns for obvious reasons. What you call, “determined + random” is essentially determined by programming, and your programmer becomes the “primary mover”. The result is a conclusion that is as vulnerable to argument as the programmer’s free will; what caused him to create the program he did, and could he have programmed it differently, or not at all??
What we are left with is the appearance of freely willed actions, i.e., intent, interacting with physically determined attributes, e.g., round shapes roll, square shapes stack, etc., that produce mixed outcomes; sometimes fulfilling, sometimes frustrating ones original intent. If we discard free will based on discrepancies between ones intent and outcome, we might as well discard physical attributes based on discrepancies when round shapes fail to roll due to variables we can’t account for, but exist nonetheless.
I keep coming back to Harrison’s statement that free will is self awareness, because if free will doesn’t exist, what is it that we are actually aware of?
Could the Pope embrace Oism and institute accordant laws?
If you find the possibility of such rather *um* improbable, why? Doesn’t the Pope have free will?
“You say that so often; I do not think it means what you think it means.”
The Pope would not institute oist laws unless he understood and accepted Oism. He couldn’t do such unless he invesigated it rationally which he cannot do if he is a self-consistent catholic.
Ergo the Pope cannot, by definition, do that.
The freedom to choose arbitrarily can be empirically refuted; the freedom to decide with logical consistency is another form of causality.
Concerning the free will discussion, because you are all accepting the fundamental premise of determinist metaphysics none of you can logically escape determinist conclusions.
In short, determinism rests on the premise that some kind of most basic particle exists, and nothing but those particles really exists as everything is made up of them in some configuration. This premise is false.
The above presupposes that 1). The ontology of fields is a settled issue, and most importantly that a philosophical question like volition need any input whatsoever from the special sciences period.
The above presupposes that 1). The ontology of fields is a settled issue, and most importantly that a philosophical question like volition need any input whatsoever from the special sciences period.
The attack on free will originates entirely in bad science. Showing that that science is bad is defending philosophy.
Do please try to keep straight who are your allies and who are your enemies.
"The attack on free will originates entirely in bad science. Showing that that science is bad is defending philosophy. "
Even if the premise that determinism began as a false conclusion on a special science issue is correct, (which I’'m not sure it is and given that the paper rejects the notion of entities being primaries I certainly wouldn’t grant its special science premises of what "good science is ) A valid response need only point out the top down approach to a philosophical question is methodologically false.
Grames said:
“Do please try to keep straight who are your allies and who are your enemies.”
Well I do consider you to be an advocate of reason, and a very effective one at that, but on issues like the above, we aren’t on the same page. That said, I don’t think of you as an enemy!
Concerning the free will discussion, because you are all accepting the fundamental premise of determinist metaphysics none of you can logically escape determinist conclusions.
In short, determinism rests on the premise that some kind of most basic particle exists, and nothing but those particles really exists as everything is made up of them in some configuration. This premise is false.
I disagree with your 1st sentence.
What are the reasons by which you arrive at your conclusions in the last sentence?
SL, the basic idea is the rediculous notion that :
“What our best contemporary physics reveals is that there are no elementary ‘particles’, fundamental events, or some such particulars. There are only processes of various scales and complexity.”
In other words actions without entities!
This is the type of nonsense a top down approach leads to. Basic epistemology is abandoned and logical hierarchy ignored.
I recommend anyone who thinks that the question of ontology, in regards to any of the main concepts in physics, is a clear cut settled issue, actually research the historical debates that erupted when those concepts were birthed. Those questions have now been basically ignored by todays professors. Almost all the texts on the philosophy of physics, in particular of dynamics, I have read, start by the author explaining the rampant dissmissal of the very questions the text sought to ellucidate.
Many aspects of quantum mechanics are well confirmed, but quantum mechanics and relativity theory – both special and general – cannot both be correct. Not only is quantum mechanics incompatible with _general _relativity unless it is transformed in a way that can account for gravity, _special _relativity plus conservation of energy forces a _field _physics, and, therefore, a field metaphysics. This is because any transmission of energy from one ‘particle’ to another has to be across some space and will, according to special relativity, take some time. For example, if an electron oscillates in one place and thereby elicits a force on an electron in another place, that force can be felt only after a delay that honours the limitations of the speed of light. But given the law of conservation of energy, it makes no sense to suppose that that energy simply disappears as it leaves the first electron, only to re-appear sometime later, when it arrives at the second. So, there must be a field encompassing both places, _through _which the energy travels. Furthermore, quantum _field _theory involves its own well supported empirical consequences, such as the Casimir effect. It is not just a mathematical but physically irrelevant fix.
In fact, the incompatibility between quantum mechanics and special relativity is overcome by quantum field theory, and superstring theory now aims to overcome the incompatibility between quantum mechanics and general relativity. But despite these achievements, a satisfactorily unified physics is still wanting. A field version of superstring theory has still to be developed, yet quantum fields are still needed to preserve special relativity together with conservation of energy, and to provide for the possibility of explaining non-local phenomena.
Although there is much for physics yet to resolve, the general direction is becoming clear enough for some conclusions of metaphysical significance to be drawn. According to our best science, there are no elementary ‘particles’, or basic particulars, at all; everything is composed of quantum fields. Quantum field theory shifts the basic ontology of the universe from micro-particles to quantum fields. What have seemed to be ‘particles’ are now conceptualized as particle-like processes and interactions resulting from the quantization of field processes and interactions. Those are no more particles than are the integer number of oscillatory waves in a guitar string. Each of the apparent particulars assumed by a physicalist ontology is a quantized field process.
The quantum fields exist, the quantum fields act.
Dr. Peikoff, an actual philosopher well versed in Objectivism, has not seen any justification to specify an a priori entity ontology all the way down.
The Wavefunction: Essays on The Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics by A. Ney and D. Albert
“If we are going to take the mathematical form of a representation as a guide to the metaphysical structure of the entity represented, then we need to consider carefully how that representation came to be in use, what alternatives there might be, and what conventions are in play in using algebraic objects as representations of physical entities.”
Grames said:
"Dr. Peikoff, an actual philosopher well versed in Objectivism, has not seen any justification to specify an a priori entity ontology all the way down. "
Thats because he hasn’t applied the same reduction to “fields” or “entity” that he applied to the concept “energy” in the 1976 lectures.
Oism explicitly states that entities are causal primaries.
Edit: it also contains the ingredients for prescribing how to validly concieve of hypothetical entities.
If you examine your quote from The Wavefunction Essays, it is saying, essentially, that a proper epistemology need be adhered to in order to ensure we are using the mathematics correctly. In this regard, the special science of philosophy can serve as a guide to ensure complience with the proper method of identification within the other special sciences.
