Prescriptions for a Rationalist

4 hours ago, DavidOdden said:

The problem is that the external stimulus is processed by the nervous system in many ways, not all of which involve “the mind”.

In reading about perception, I was always perplexed by the way people talked about the world being presented to us in the form of entities. I thought it was enough to say that light rays strike our eyes and we see. Maybe this is a case of that Cartesion homunculus idea. But I still don’t understand what happens between the eyes and the conscious mind that distinguishes perception from sensation. It would make sense to me to say that entities are abstracted from sense data in the same way we form concepts.

4 hours ago, DavidOdden said:

For the sake of clarity, try to frame your thinking in terms of your actions, and not the abstract product your actions.

That’s a good idea. The mind as an active process is one of those ideas that I’d never heard even a shadow of in any discourse anywhere before Objectivism. I still don’t think I really understand the idea of conceptualization being volitional. Concepts always seemed automatic to me, and I think most people feel that way. You may be lucky enough to trip over a new concept in your daily life. And “life as movement” makes my insides turn. When I work for many consecutive hours at something - let’s say, meeting a deadline for something I’ve been putting off, or working a double - I often end up feeling more anxious than proud. But that’s only distantly related to the issue of perception.

What did you mean to convey with the coffee example? If everyone would see the caramel colored liquid , how is their perception different from yours , how  does knowing the identity of the contents of the liquid change what everyone can ‘see’?

11 hours ago, HowardRoarkSpaceDetective said:

In reading about perception, I was always perplexed by the way people talked about the world being presented to us in the form of entities. I thought it was enough to say that light rays strike our eyes and we see. Maybe this is a case of that Cartesion homunculus idea. But I still don’t understand what happens between the eyes and the conscious mind that distinguishes perception from sensation. It would make sense to me to say that entities are abstracted from sense data in the same way we form concepts.

Perception is an area where philosophy and science end up at cross purposes, to the detriment of both. It is definitely not a scientific question what it means to say “I see a dog”, it is hardly a philosophical one. It is mostly a linguistic one, which is why you have no grasp of the statement “naona mbwa” or “я вижу собаку”. Yet philosophers advance ideas with scientific content such as that images are displayed on a screen in the mind and are viewed by a tiny person in the brain. A proper philosophical treatment of perception and consciousness just relies on the self-evident facts that any ordinary person can observe. Specialized science then investigates the precise physical mechanism. It is, in that sense, self-evident that seeing involves light and eyes (you can’t see if either of these is missing). There is a similar relation of self-evidence between hearing and the ears, feeling and the skin, or tasting and the tongue. There is a self-evident cause-effect relationship that in English we generalize as “perceiving”.

I would say that, in the realm of philosophy, it is too much to say that light strikes our eyes and we see. Instead, “we see”, and we build on that. At a certain point we go way beyond what is available to philosophy, and requires microscopes and scanning devices to understand the mechanics of seeing. It is plainly false that “the world is presented to us” though that is how some philosophical traditions speak (supernatural viewpoints where God actively presents and we passively receive).

There is merit to the view that entities are cognitively primary, and certainly they are philosophically primary. Any account of actions or attributes has to be stated in terms of entities, but entities can be understood without knowing their attributes or actions. However, I would not say that “entities are abstracted from sense data”. First, an entity simple exists, it is not an abstraction. The entity exists whether or not it is perceived by a consciousness. Abstraction is about a relation between an entity and a consciousness, it isn’t obvious that “abstraction” is correct when talking about human perception. Second, there is some question-begging reification going on here when we talk of “sense data” or “percepts”. So-called “sense data” is (in practice i.e. as observed in the literature) the reification of the various concepts connected to perceiving an object, such as texture, size, shape, color (a package deal of its own)… The idea is that humans would have built-in detectors that measure these things and return a table of shape-color-size values, which are connected by some kind of definitional look-up with a concept like “dog” or “apple”. The concept “data” is a very “conceptual” one, data is a systematic conceptual-based classification of human observations, and there simply cannot be any “sense data” as a built-in part of the brain. The brain can house certain human cognitive faculties, which are abilities to act.

I am deliberately picking on the specific expression, because when people misspeak and describe things incorrectly, they tend to get confused about what actually is. The only ordinary way of talking about the relationship between my eyes and that dog, is for me to say “I see a dog”. In epistemology, we do seek to find more general relations regarding the source of knowledge, so we may talk of perceiving a dog, a scream, heat, or fresh coffee, abstracting away from the specific sensory method. I think it is right and proper to be confused about the difference between sensing and perceiving. They are not fundamentally different. We may use “sense” to talk about weak information, such as an apparent object in the dark that you cannot make out but you can use your visual sensors to determine that there is some entity. If you are directly looking at a plainly visible dog, you don’t say “I sense a dog”, you say “I see a dog” or maybe “I perceive a dog”. Anything beyond talking about the pre-cognitive sense organs qua entities and the cognitive action of perceiving is likely to lead to confusion.

 

1 hour ago, DavidOdden said:

However, I would not say that “entities are abstracted from sense data”. First, an entity simple exists, it is not an abstraction.

Maybe I should rephrase that. I had the impression that we’re confronted, visually, with colors and that sudden changes in color form edges which we then recognize as delimiting certain shapes. From there, we can infer from certain combinations of shapes that some parts of our visual field correspond to objects that are physically distinct from their backgrounds. We gradually automatize the recognition of certain visual cues like variations in lighting or disparities between what our left eye sees and what our right eye sees or how appearances change when our perspective changes relative to an object, e.g., moving our heads. Eventually, we learn that we can reach out and grasp a part of our visual field and move those shapes and colors to a different part of physical reality.

So aren’t concepts like “edge” or “shadow” and “depth” implicit in learning how to distinguish objects from their backgrounds? Don’t we have to learn them first?

My understanding is that a single variation in the visual field is enough to implicitly gain the concept “existent”. Let’s say I open my eyes for the first time and see that the left and right sides of my visual field are different colors, the concept of “color” only being possible because I can distinguish the one color from the other. Maybe there is a stark change from one to the other, or maybe there is a gradient. Either way, it’s clear that something is causing that difference and that that something must be distinct from the rest of existence. So “existent” requires me to recognize that there are at least two existents: the thing causing the variation as well as anything that isn’t that thing. Then, as I perceive more and more variations, I also distinguish more and more existents, all the while abstracting out certain shapes or interfaces that appear more than once. This process would be the beginning of discovering the “what” rather than just the “that”. These implicit concepts would then be automatized like any other implicit concept. 

Rand seems to think that this whole process is fundamentally different from the kind of conceptualization that allows us to recognize a group of existents as “cups”. But is not possible for “edge” to be thought of as an existent rather than an attribute? Isn’t it begging the question to say that I recognize an entity as having attributes when the only reason I know that the attributes belong to the entity is that I learned to recognize entities by first recognizing their attributes?

6 hours ago, HowardRoarkSpaceDetective said:

So aren’t concepts like “edge” or “shadow” and “depth” implicit in learning how to distinguish objects from their backgrounds? Don’t we have to learn them first?

There is a substantial difference between the process of discovering facts, and the logical organization of those discoveries. Rand did not develop that point much, since she was focused on the philosophical question of what knowledge is, and not the scientific question of how children acquire knowledge.

Certain concepts are psychologically more fundamental: the units are directly perceivable. Individual being (which are not concepts) can be perceived, e.g. Mommy, Daddy, Billy, Rexx. An infant does not need to acquire high-level concepts such as “background”, “foreground”, “edge” in order to be able to see and identify people and animals around him. Nor does a child need to first learn the concept “mammal” or “animal” in order to learn the concept “dog”. Instead, the child starts with first-order concepts like dog, cat, pig, cow and so on, then learns higher-order concepts – probably “animal”. These are scientific questions of child cognitive development, not philosophical issues. At some point the child, who is probably now an adult, knows a number of intermediate concepts like “mammal”, “snake”, “reptile”, but probably not “Canid” or “Caniform”. If you have a full conceptual system, then you can ask about logical relations between concepts, for example humans are warm-blooded, but is that part of the definition of human? (It is, rather, a consequence of being a mammal).

One other point to keep in mind is that humans rarely form concepts, they learn concepts that were already formed. The word and reference of “goat”, “sheep” and “dog” are already determined for English, the child simply has to properly connect the name and the definition (which it has to learn from context, it isn’t told this), to reach the adult standard (and they often fail in small ways, which is why we don’t speak Old English any more). Children make myriad mistakes in arriving at definitions (which are generally ostensive, not verbal).

The development of visual or auditory perception is an interesting mystery. One thing to bear in mind is that humans are born prematurely, without fully developed nervous systems. We are “hard wired” for certain things, but the wires don’t have all their insulation from birth, myelination continues through infancy, to the point that the infant can physically see and hear more like adults do. How we actually learn concepts as we grow up is one thing, the logical structure of concepts and what it means to be a concept is a different and in my opinion resolved matter.

@HowardRoarkSpaceDetective – I have a curiosity question and a communication, which may be worthless, of how utterly alien to me is what you are going through and a few quick thoughts on your remarks about perception.

My question(s) is: Have you ever taken a course in physics (maybe the electromagnetism or optics part) or a physics lab? Have you ever taken a course in chemistry and with a lab attached to it? Have you ever taken a course in geology, and did it get you out in the field to witness the items of the subject matter? I mean at the introductory college course level (which in the decades since my time with those might now be put into high school – I don’t know). One is learning some methods to knowledge mankind has won in those areas in such courses, however much or little the course material self-reflects on its methods and the forms of the attained knowledge.

I was eighteen when I read Rand’s fiction, which was ten years after Atlas Shrugged appeared. I never would have expected a philosophy to make me happy or show me how to be happy. As it turned out, philosophy was itself one of my pleasures. And in the case of Rand’s philosophy, it was a sweet thing to see the insights into the relationship between happiness to pleasure and to rationality and the relationship of happiness to morality. But no, happiness was my individual pursuits in learning and creating and in romantic love.

Very hands-on, experimental, and individual is happiness, and hot-iron in passion and determination in realization. Just me. Just you. I’ve had specific winnings of happiness in these fifty-seven years since first reading Rand, and they have been indeed concordant with the general virtues Rand highlighted and defined (but I with seldom a thought in my specific pursuits to that frame being needed for directions; rather, a concordance as natural as waking in the morning). Tragedy, immense tragedy is all too likely. It came to my life, and when I could really no longer remember what happiness was, really was, Rand’s proposed standard Life, not the purpose Happiness, was part of my rescue and my slowly coming back to pursuing happiness again. And for us all, there are our own limitations of ability (as you noted) and the fact stated by Spinoza: “All excellent things are as difficult as they are rare.”

Our perceptions (and those of other high animals) have been interlaced with attentions and actions from the day we are born. Water is around one in the tub, and one finds things about it before language and instructed learning. Instruction is the usual route to knowing the ice on the ground in winter is made from water. Still higher instruction for coming to know that there are molecules and what is water vapor and steam. Our modern advantage from knowing about molecules and components of them is marvelous, but there is sturdy knowledge possible before that: Aristotle and his contemporaries knew that water evaporates and forms the clouds from which we get rain. Archimedes knew still more about water. And power from water was brought into service of the mill and time-keeping before H2O was known.

Knowledge of illusions comes after a lot of veridical perceptions and the regular value of them, even though illusions were mixed in with them. Knowledge of how we feel something as cool or as warm comes after acquaintance with those feelings. The Greek skeptics using those feelings for concluding non-objectivity of those feelings have now been exposed as fallacious, now that we know enough of what our sensors are detecting.*

Most of our knowledge of illusions is from instruction. But illusions as well as veridical perception are real. It was common to Kant, Russell, and Rand-Branden-Kelley that perceptions do not err; only perceptual judgments can err. That is incorrect. For the higher animals—ones with enough memory powers (as Aristotle and Rand correctly correlated with animals having percepts)—in many situations, perceptions are leaders for actions, and that goes for some illusory perceptions also. Visual perception of a stick in the grass I’m picking up to be out of the mower path is leading the hand to location for picking up in the air medium in which the human animal and his ancestors evolved. The fact that we can explain why a straight stick partially submerged in water looks bent does nothing to change the fact that how it looks is misleading of action (until joined with reflective thought and retraining motor action for the special circumstance). 

Some illusions are not remediable, and beneficial illusions should not be remediated anyway. One is going to see the moon or the sun when near the horizon as larger than when they are higher in the sky. I don’t think we yet know how this illusion arises in our visual system, but when we do learn how it works, it will not cease to be in operation unless we implement some compensatory component into our natural visual instrumentation. Most of us will opt for the purely natural way and continue to enjoy the harvest moon. Until we are told that the “moon illusion” is an illusion and given the reasons for judging it to be an illusion, many of us (myself included) would never have noticed that there was anything illusory about it.

An example of a beneficial perceptual illusion is the Mach Band***** effect. The eye of an animal such as we, having a certain circuit arrangement in the retina, will have in visual experience change in grayness of a surface at its edges. A highlighting of edges can increase our safety and our effectiveness in footing and manipulations.

We have developed methods for how to distinguish the illusory among our perceptions. We have come a long way in knowing the neurology of receptions and processing of our various sensory receptions. (The Greeks did not know that nerves were involved.) It is not necessary or appropriate to walk around worried always if support will be there for the next foot to land. The common-experience worries and adult-to-child instruction on that is appropriate basis for any such worry. The inculcated contrived worries of early modern philosophy from Descartes, Berkeley, and Hume are at high level in the head, and these can indeed be jettisoned in the course of rationality, our rationality today.

Much is known now about brain processes engaged in processing of sensations and the distinct processing that is the occasion of a percept. Before that advance in neuroscience,   Rand-Branden-Peikoff correctly held to the percept, not sensation, for the beginning of knowledge of entities and motions. The beginning at nerve receptors is not the beginning of our knowledge even though the sensory receptions were the beginning of the physiological process producing that with which our knowledge begins. 

C.S. Peirce, American philosopher in the late 19th century and early 20th had some words of enduring value for us. He stressed that sense impressions (today, let’s say instead the Triesman sensory elements in preattentive perception) are not first in our knowledge. We are not shut out from the external world,

“informed only by sense impressions. Not at all! Few things are more completely hidden from observation than those hypothetical elements of thought which the psychologist finds reason to pronounce “immediate,” in his sense. But the starting point of all our reasoning is not in those sense impressions, but in our percepts. When we first wake up to the fact that we are thinking beings and can exercise some control over our reasonings, we have to set out upon our intellectual travels from home where we already find ourselves. Now, this home is the parish of percepts.” (1901, 62)

 

Peirce, C.S. 1901. Pearson’s Grammar of Science. In Houser 1998.

Houser, N., editor, 1998. The Essential Peirce. Volume 2. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

 

 

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7 hours ago, Boydstun said:

My question(s) is: Have you ever taken a course in physics (maybe the electromagnetism or optics part) or a physics lab?

I took a few but, as I did the rest of my pre-Objectivist educational career, treated them as a matter of course rather than a learning opportunity.

7 hours ago, Boydstun said:

It came to my life, and when I could really no longer remember what happiness was, really was, Rand’s proposed standard Life, not the purpose Happiness, was part of my rescue and my slowly coming back to pursuing happiness again.

Can you explain this a little more? I do get confused about whether it’s proper to say that man’s ultimate goal is happiness.

7 hours ago, Boydstun said:

“All excellent things are as difficult as they are rare.”

This is precisely the opposite of my attitude growing up. It must have been a fear response to think this way, but I was always certain that the most important things in life should happen naturally and without conflict, especially when it came to romantic love. I couldn’t see how a lifelong commitment could work otherwise. I still don’t really.

I’m not sure that I’ve ever been happy in the sense that Rand means, as an ongoing background emotion. I’m still not sure I understand what happiness is at all. I had no concept of pursuing it intentionally until Rand, that’s for sure.

7 hours ago, Boydstun said:

An example of a beneficial perceptual illusion is the Mach Band***** effect.

Okay, this definitely made me rethink things. I guess no amount of conceptualization at any level could alter perception in that way. But I don’t quite understand why you claim that perceptions can err. Our actions are still based on our judgments. Percepts don’t directly cause them. And a gap in our knowledge - for example, what causes the sun to be so large at the horizon - doesn’t constitute an illusion, per Rand. No?

HRSD – “Percepts don’t directly cause them. And a gap in our knowledge - for example, what causes the sun to be so large at the horizon - doesn’t constitute an illusion, per Rand. No?”

Yes, I’d say that’s what the Rand take on illusions covertly leads to: a denial that there are illusions. Nothing malfunctioned, on this view (she did not originate it), because where we have understood what the process neurologically amounts to, we find a system operating perfectly naturally in a way so as to yield the result that people call an illusion. To the contrary, there are sensible reasons for saying the “moon illusion” is an illusion. I’ve taken of a photo of the rising moon, and it’s a real dud; the largeness we so love is absent in the photo—just a plain old moon. Then too, it is not reasonable that the moon should be changing its size as the earth rotates and the moon takes on different elevations. Yet no judgement is made when we see the large moon near the horizon. We just see it as large there and see it as small at high elevations in the passage. The visual system is doing what it’s got to do in either case, but it is misleading. My camera is showing the disappointing truth. Evolution structures perceptual systems with what is available for making those instruments so as to deliver truth enough, in a statistical way, for survival of the species of animal. Nature can here and there deliver a misleading percept, I’d say, and the species get on well enough. Thankfully, WE are able to deliberately create illusions, for production of entertainment and creation of art.

SB – “[Tragedy] came to my life, and when I could really no longer remember what happiness was, really was, Rand’s proposed standard Life, not the purpose Happiness, was part of my rescue and my slowly coming back to pursuing happiness again.”

HRSD – “Can you explain this a little more? I do get confused about whether it’s proper to say that man’s ultimate goal is happiness.”

As you know, Rand took Life to be the ultimate standard for assessing goodness or badness of choices and actions, but she took happiness, in her sense of it, to be the purpose of each individual’s life. And she noted that in the experience of happiness there is a sense of fulfillment, which she suggested was a form of experiencing the circumstance that one’s life is an end in itself. Usually, circumstances are such, I think, that one can just focus on the particular objectives that have their place in bringing one happiness, especially if what brings you happiness brings the state Rand articulated concerning it. But emergencies come up, for example, and people rightly get glued on fixing injury or saving life. Even in better, more regular times, I’d say, it’s good to make checks on how well one’s pursuits are consonant with life matters such as one’s health or the task of making a good life for oneself and family. Continuing life and making a life are nuts and bolts stuff of thought. Then too, happiness is serious business and needed for continuing life. Kant didn’t think we could win happiness in earthly life, but even he admitted some happiness might be needed for continuing life and doing one’s duty. And he thought we should try to make ourselves worthy of happiness.

 

A long tele lens 500mm or more, photograph a foreground subject juxtaposed with a rising moon in the background delivers the effect of “flattened perspective” and an enormous moon as we know it.

Contradicting prevailing opinion, the moon IS magnified just above the horizon, due to seeing it obliquely through greater atmospheric density. Like looking at it through a convex lens. I’ve tested it to my satisfaction. Shoot the moon at the horizon and again a few hours later with the identical focal length lens, accurately measure the two images on screen and the first will be larger. Our eyes don’t trick us, that’s an “optical illusion” that exists.

Tony, I don’t know why you get that result. However, this NASA note argues the difference in perceived size is an illusion (although the difference in color is not an illusion). They mention the squashing effect as being due to atmospheric lensing. Is the size in your image near the horizon larger in the vertical direction, not only the horizontal direction? The next time I see a rising moon, I’m going to try the NASA test of looking at the moon upside down, which they say dispels the illusion. They mention that astronauts also experience the illusion in outer space. I assume they mean experience of a moonrise over the curved edge of the intervening earth or the earthrise over the curved edge of the intervening moon. I wonder if you asked the astronaut to look at these from an upside down view, what response you would get.

Of related interest: Research on Visual Illusions of Animals

@BoydstunIt still seems to me that illusions are epistemologically contextual, which would make them not perceptual illusions but perceptions that contradict our contextual conclusions. Isn’t your position still a case of trying to compare the percept to the way reality “really looks”?

23 hours ago, Boydstun said:

Then too, happiness is serious business and needed for continuing life

This is the kind of formulation that I have trouble with. Happiness makes life easier, but isn’t it also the whole point of living?

On 6/10/2024 at 4:37 PM, Boydstun said:

@HowardRoarkSpaceDetective . . .

Our perceptions (and those of other high animals) have been interlaced with attentions and actions from the day we are born. Water is around one in the tub, and one finds things about it before language and instructed learning. Instruction is the usual route to knowing the ice on the ground in winter is made from water. Still higher instruction for coming to know that there are molecules and what is water vapor and steam. Our modern advantage from knowing about molecules and components of them is marvelous, but there is sturdy knowledge possible before that: Aristotle and his contemporaries knew that water evaporates and forms the clouds from which we get rain. Archimedes knew still more about water. And power from water was brought into service of the mill and time-keeping before H2O was known.

Knowledge of illusions comes after a lot of veridical perceptions and the regular value of them, even though illusions were mixed in with them. Knowledge of how we feel something as cool or as warm comes after acquaintance with those feelings. The Greek skeptics using those feelings for concluding non-objectivity of those feelings have now been exposed as fallacious, now that we know enough of what our sensors are detecting.*

Most of our knowledge of illusions is from instruction. But illusions as well as veridical perception are real. It was common to Kant, Russell, and Rand-Branden-Kelley that perceptions do not err; only perceptual judgments can err. That is incorrect. For the higher animals—ones with enough memory powers (as Aristotle and Rand correctly correlated with animals having percepts)—in many situations, perceptions are leaders for actions, and that goes for some illusory perceptions also. Visual perception of a stick in the grass I’m picking up to be out of the mower path is leading the hand to location for picking up in the air medium in which the human animal and his ancestors evolved. The fact that we can explain why a straight stick partially submerged in water looks bent does nothing to change the fact that how it looks is misleading of action (until joined with reflective thought and retraining motor action for the special circumstance). 

Some illusions are not remediable, and beneficial illusions should not be remediated anyway. One is going to see the moon or the sun when near the horizon as larger than when they are higher in the sky. I don’t think we yet know how this illusion arises in our visual system, but when we do learn how it works, it will not cease to be in operation unless we implement some compensatory component into our natural visual instrumentation. Most of us will opt for the purely natural way and continue to enjoy the harvest moon. Until we are told that the “moon illusion” is an illusion and given the reasons for judging it to be an illusion, many of us (myself included) would never have noticed that there was anything illusory about it.

An example of a beneficial perceptual illusion is the Mach Band***** effect. The eye of an animal such as we, having a certain circuit arrangement in the retina, will have in visual experience change in grayness of a surface at its edges. A highlighting of edges can increase our safety and our effectiveness in footing and manipulations.

We have developed methods for how to distinguish the illusory among our perceptions. We have come a long way in knowing the neurology of receptions and processing of our various sensory receptions. (The Greeks did not know that nerves were involved.) It is not necessary or appropriate to walk around worried always if support will be there for the next foot to land. The common-experience worries and adult-to-child instruction on that is appropriate basis for any such worry. The inculcated contrived worries of early modern philosophy from Descartes, Berkeley, and Hume are at high level in the head, and these can indeed be jettisoned in the course of rationality, our rationality today.

. . .

I’d like to amend these remarks. I should say that percepts are leaders for humans and higher animals. They are leaders and misleaders for action. I should not say that percepts are sometimes erroneous or that they err. If a monkey swinging through the trees takes in an illusion of where a branch is, he may reach to empty space and fall. It is the reach and consequence based on the misleading percept that is error. Same for Tarzan.

13 hours ago, HowardRoarkSpaceDetective said:

@BoydstunIt still seems to me that illusions are epistemologically contextual, which would make them not perceptual illusions but perceptions that contradict our contextual conclusions. Isn’t your position still a case of trying to compare the percept to the way reality “really looks”? 

. . .

Measurement is what can give our best view of how things are independently of how they appear. We have ways of measuring the distance of the moon from earth and ways of measuring the diameter of the moon. In my attached drawing, the two lines’ intersection at the left is to be taken as the point of a person’s head on earth viewing the moon. The moon is the vertical line segment off to the right. Our visual perception of how big is something in the distance is importantly informed by what is the angle subtended by the object in our view. What that angle is in terms of mere geometry, physical and Euclidean, can be calculated. What subtension our visual system reads out for the moon near the horizon is definitely larger than the mind-independent value calculated by geometry. I don’t know if the subtension read out by the visual system when viewing the moon at a high elevation is close to the calculated geometric subtension. But let us suppose that all along the moon’s arc across our sky, the subtension read out to us by our visual system never matches the subtension angle computed from the physical geometry. Then I’d say there is a size-illusion in all of our (uncompensated) visual perception of the moon from the earth, it is a greater illusion when the moon is near one’s horizon, and all of this we would know for fact.

In evolutionary history, there was no disadvantage in such an illusion for something so distant, so far as I know. 

For things on earth, of course, we often can not only observe what is given by nature, but manipulate and experiment and observe outcomes. Years ago I contrived the Mach-band effect for my own witness. Get a half dozen paint strips at the hardware store. Get all of them the same strip of grays. Cut out one particular gray from all of the strips. Holding each of those six chips up square to my face, I can see each is uniformly gray across its surface. Yet when I set those six identically gray chips on the table top arrayed with them snug next to each other long-side to long-side, I no longer see their surfaces as uniformly the same darkness of gray across their surfaces. Rather, I see that sculpted variation, darkest near the joined edges, such as you have seen online concerning the Mach-band illusion. It is most plausible that uniform grayness is the fact of each chip even while they adjoin each other, and with proper artificial instruments, I imagine there are lab folk who can make that confirmation and reinforcement of the trueness in that respect of our earlier perception of uniform level of gray that we observed when holding up each chip by itself to the eyes.

Is the effect only evident in varying shades of gray, or are there ‘colored hues’ that trigger the same phenomenon in human vision?

If it’s just gray, it may be due to detecting motion and or spatial awareness in low to no light conditions.  Like a reverse ‘glow’ in detection of a creeping jaguar in the night and the effect is noticed or more easliy ‘practised’ in ‘normal’ light conditions, are the edges anymore apparent with the chip test in low light conditions , any predictions ?  :slight_smile:

1 hour ago, tadmjones said:

Is the effect only evident in varying shades of gray, or are there ‘colored hues’ that trigger the same phenomenon in human vision?

If it’s just gray, it may be due to detecting motion and or spatial awareness in low to no light conditions.  Like a reverse ‘glow’ in detection of a creeping jaguar in the night and the effect is noticed or more easliy ‘practised’ in ‘normal’ light conditions, are the edges anymore apparent with the chip test in low light conditions , any predictions ?  :slight_smile:

Tad, I don’t know about differences in the perceived effect under low light conditions.

A nice review article on functional circuitry of the retina is here.

An apparently classic article on perceived size and distance is here.

I’d like to test with  colored chips someday. Maybe you could. I assume there is a grayness element as part of what we are seeing in colored chips. So even if there were a mild level of Mach band effect with colored strips, it might be due to the grayness factor in the colored chip. I bet there is no noticeable effect at all viewing the colored chips (because I remember only lateral inhibition wiring of rods, not cones, being talked of for the illusion).

I notice pulling down Principles of Neural Science by Kandel et al. (2012, fifth edition) from my shelf just now that the amount of research-yields concerning the mammalian retina is by now staggering. (This book should win a ribbon for mass.) On the “may be due to” I’d say no, we have to read what the scientists have found, which may take us some labor, but pretty sure that by now they’ve got some reliable detail on the process leading to the effect to show us (which is complex due to complexity of the reality of neural processing under investigation).

A sense organ responds to an external stimulus and produces something, for example the basilar membrane responds to pressure waves coming from external sound by transmitting a complex pattern of electrical signals, which are transmitted electro-chemically to the auditory cortex. The pattern reduces to three properties, location (on the basilar membrane), count (of excitations) and timing (the preceding two over some time in milliseconds). There are myriad layers of brain processing and the end result is that (for a person) you may have a basis for thinking that someone said “Hello”, or that the violinist is out of tune, or that someone is taking pictures with a motor winder.

For each of these actions, we can create a reification of the product of the action – a classic example is “impulse”, which is a change in the momentum of an object over time. It isn’t harmful per se to speak of “a sensation” which refers to the experience of the action of a sense organ, as long as we remember what it refers to – not a physical object with physical boundaries and mass, but a complex pattern of actions. We are directly aware of having sensations. However, people also say things like “I sense that the violinist is out of tune”, which is metaphorical talk, because that is a high-level logical conclusion that is (hopefully) ultimately based in a sensation generated by a sense organ. On this point, Aristotle would have been wrong in believing that the eyes sense colors, the brain enables a conceptual conclusion about color (encoded as a language-specific label like ‘pink’, ‘red’, ‘orange’…) based on sensations created by the eyes. The immediate input from the sense organs can be called “sensations”, and they cease to exist very quickly. The expression “sense data” suggests a degree of permanence that simply does not exist in sensations, thus I reject it in favor of “sensation” on the lower transduction end, or “percept” on the higher cognitive end.

Now, there are words like “error” and “illusion”, as well as “deceive”, that are sometimes applies to the process of getting from external stimuli to mental states. The term “deceive” is plainly a lie. Lying entails an intent (to cause a consciousness to believe to be true something that you know to be untrue). Your eyes and ears do not have an intent, that should be the end of that part of the discussion. An “illusion” is a kind of error, so we should first simply say what an “error” is. The concept depends on a standard for action, and an evaluation whether the standard was met. If two sub-atomic particles interact in a manner which is in fact impossible in the universe, we have an realized contradiction. If the particles interact in a manner prohibited by a particular standard (the “laws of physics”), the failure is not in the universe, it is in the standard – we would now know that the standard was wrong. Sense organs do not “metaphysically fail”, they do what they do according to their nature (which can change over time), and your expectation as to their nature is in error. You may think you are hearing some sound “out there” when objectively there was no such sound, instead the sensation was caused by the death of a basilar membrane cell. The error that arises is the interpretation, where you impute a body-external external cause behind the sensation, and you failed to consider the alternative of a body-internal fact (cell death).

Illusions / errors are “real” in the sense that they do happen, but they are always invalid conclusions about the cause of the sensation. Illusions are a problem for knowledge only when you fail (yes, fail) to consider alternative conclusions, and to focus on the mental process behind your initial impression. The bent-stick illusion can be overcome by changing the physical input (modifying the light being reflected, or changing your position relative to the stick). You cannot “see the stick as straight” by will-power, but you can still know that the stick is straight by a rational process, because a conceptual conclusion “the stick is straight / bent” always comes from a rational analysis of what you immediately sense. Sometimes the proper answer is “I don’t know which of these two explanations is correct”.

All illusions are remediable, but some of them require going beyond the sensory resolution of the bare human body. A mildly obscure example is that you can tell that a 100 Hz tone is not the same as a 120 Hz tone, but you cannot tell whether a 100 Hz tone is the same as a 100.5 Hz tone (you will tend to think that they are the same). No amount of focus will allow you to just use your ears and “hear” the difference. The remedy is to use other higher-tech methods. You also can’t see a virus, therefore you will fail to visually distinguish a cup of pure water from a cup of pure water polluted with a virus.

As far as Rand’s take on illusions is concerned, I am not aware of her having any. It is a fundamental premise of hers that the senses are valid, from which it does not follow that illusions do not exist. The phrase “check your premises” occurs very many times in her writings, and is invoked in recognition of the existence of failures of reasoning (not the senses).

But does the validity extend to the explanation of the process of turning external stimuli into mental states and thereby showing the seat of the experience of those states?

It does to the extent that the explanation logically reduces to the senses (axioms).

 

Rand 1957:

“An animal is equipped for sustaining its life; its senses provide it with an automatic code of action.”

“Reason is the faculty that perceives [broad sense of the term], identifies and integrates the material provided by his [man’s] senses. The task of his senses is to give him the evidence of existence, but the task of identifying it belongs to his reason, his senses tell him only that something is, but what it is must be learned by his mind.”

“The mystics of spirit declare that they possess an extra sense you lack: this special sense consists of contradicting the whole of your five. The mystics of muscle do not bother to assert any claim to extrasensory perception: they merely declare that your senses are not valid, and that their wisdom consists of perceiving your blindness . . . .” (emphasis added)

“The day when he [e.g. a two-year old child] grasps that the reflection he sees in a mirror is not a delusion, that it is real, but it is not himself, that the mirage he [say, age three or beyond] sees in a desert is not a delusion, that the air and the light rays that cause it are real, but it is not a city, it is a city’s reflection—the day when he grasps . . . that his senses do not provide him with automatic knowledge in separate snatches independent of context, but only with the material of knowledge, which his mind must integrate—the day when he grasps that his senses cannot deceive him, . . . that his organs of perception are physical and have no volition, no power to invent . . . that is the day of his birth as a thinker and scientist.”

Rand thought, correctly, that there is some automatic integration of sensory receptions: importantly, integration of sensory receptions into percepts. “Sensations are integrated into perceptions automatically, by the brain of a man or of an animal” (FNI). She thought that developmentally, in early childhood, one had consciousness of mere sensations that one learned to integrate into percepts, and in time the integration became automatized. That sort of developmental picture had been set out in James’s famous Principles of Psychology (1890), including processes of automatization. Rand expressed also her view (in GS and in “The Comprachicos”) that at the level of thoughts, there is also a sort of automatic integration that goes on when one has gone idle in one’s active, controlling, logical thought, and that automatic integration is inept and, really, I’d say, little better than integrations one experiences in a dream while dreaming.

I think it would be incorrect to think that in perceptions with percepts, one needs to wait on integration by thought to get any identification of what a perceived thing is. Some amount of “what” is already in one’s perception of a bowl of oatmeal as that and a spoon as that. And a lot of perception of “what” is at work before acquisition of language and aids in that acquisition and works ever after to buoy thought in language.

Kant had it that we cannot have errant perception because (i) error requires judgment and (ii) perception, of itself, does not judge at all. I think (i) is slightly overstated. Judgments affirm in language what is the case of something. Classical philosophers from Descartes to Kant were blind to thought without language and to the powers of prelinguistic identifications in early childhood of what is the case. They exaggerate verbal instruction for knowledge acquired by the child, important as that mode of learning truly is.

In that final quotation I gave from GS, Rand used the word “delusion” twice. That term suggests something “just in the head” (or as children say nowadays “just in the brain”) or something wrong with the mind or brain. To learn of mirror reflection that reflected objects are not in the space on the other side of the mirror would not seem, I say, to be learning that the reflection is not a delusion, but to be learning (perhaps namelessly) that there are such things as illusions and that that space seen in the mirror as lying on the other side of the mirror is an illusion.

I have never seen a mirage. I’ve heard that people in too much heat too long can hallucinate, which is not mirage. I gather that experience of mirage, such as Rand described, is an illusion. Someone suffering a heat hallucination would be an episode rightly described as a delusion in perception. I have suffered hallucinations a couple of days due not to heat in a desert, but due to an encephalopathy due ultimately to bladder blockage. Hallucinations can be fantastical plays off of receptions of elements that would normally go into veridical perceptions. But hallucinations are not illusions. And delusions are not illusions. It seems Rand garbled the English here.

“The validity of the senses.” What are the various cases that had been made for “the invalidity of the senses”? Salient to the early Objectivist philosophers were probably the various forms ancient and Renaissance, but especially those in early modern philosophy. That would be a good project: compile the variety of alleged invalidity of perception and argue against each, thence showing variety of meaning “validity of the senses”.

Rand indicated that all forms of arguing the senses to be invalid run into a general problem that there is not meaning in the possibility of invalidity in all sensory episodes without there being meaning and actual occasion in the world for validity of the senses, that is without there being some occasions of valid perception. Good wide point. My additional proposal has been that natural instrumentation in animals for taking in the environment is teleological. There are dedicated targets for the sensory systems, where the structure of those systems have been selected in the course of evolution. 

Instruments we design for detections and measurements have a dedicated object (which I shall designate by all-caps TARGET). We can manipulate and adjust the instrument to capture just that object for presentation to our senses. We could design a camera with the purpose of imaging a straight stick partially in water such that the camera system compensates for difference in the indices of refraction of air and water. A sensor in the air and a sensor in the water feeding information ultimately to the camera would likely be required, and this information processed in an automatic way in the camera recorder. The camera would show a straight stick because we had made the instrument system an indicator of our information purpose, our TARGET: straightness present in objects it detects. Design of the instrumentation systems that are our natural sensory systems are the result of natural processes of evolution and individual development employing living processes in an environment having whatever material resources are locally available at the time. Mere typical success in detecting or measuring the target (lower case) of the sensory system regularly associated with objects, motions, or media pertinent to life of the animal gives enough probability for preservation and reproduction of the animal.

I mentioned the TARGET of an instrument we design. There is another sort of target of an artificial instrument, which is also at work in our natural, perceptual instruments. Advantage in animal species evolution or in survival of the individual animal is not the TARGET of a natural perceptual instrument. Nature is not a designer, though it yields designs, and there are no TARGETS for natural perceptual systems. There is a  target (lower-case) of an instrument which is in the detailed constitution and operation of the instrument. Our modern motion-detecting devices have as their target: alterations in level of light being received by their sensors, which has some fair correlation with objects moving in the field. Our purpose, our TARGET—detection of moving objects—is not the target we put into the design of the instrument. I maintain that this is the way to view natural sensory systems, from thermal contact systems to visual systems having a distal stimulus.

Veridical perception, I say, is neuronal system indicating in consciousness things as they are. Illusions are neuronal system indicating in consciousness things in some ways as they are not.

I say percepts are leaders to reality, due to our constitution. Percepts not only present. They indicate due to our constitution. Their character of automatically_ indicating_ in consciousness is what makes percepts components in empirical cognition. The proverbial straight stick partially in air and partially in water indicates a bent stick. Understanding how it comes to look bent does nothing to change the circumstance that the perceptual presentation is misleading (contra Branden c. 1968, 47–48; Kelley 1986, 88, 93; Peikoff 1991, 40; Binswanger 2014, 72–84; Salamieri 2013, 49–52; 2016, 281–82).

Kelley and other Objectivist philosophers ignore the leading I attribute to perceptual presentations prior to any perceptual judgment. That is a mistake. The quality in perceptual presentations that I have called leading, and the importance of that quality, should be recognized and put to work in a realist philosophy of perception.

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And if the stick didn’t bend , there’d be no rainbows .

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