Rand 1957:
“An animal is equipped for sustaining its life; its senses provide it with an automatic code of action.”
“Reason is the faculty that perceives [broad sense of the term], identifies and integrates the material provided by his [man’s] senses. The task of his senses is to give him the evidence of existence, but the task of identifying it belongs to his reason, his senses tell him only that something is, but what it is must be learned by his mind.”
“The mystics of spirit declare that they possess an extra sense you lack: this special sense consists of contradicting the whole of your five. The mystics of muscle do not bother to assert any claim to extrasensory perception: they merely declare that your senses are not valid, and that their wisdom consists of perceiving your blindness . . . .” (emphasis added)
“The day when he [e.g. a two-year old child] grasps that the reflection he sees in a mirror is not a delusion, that it is real, but it is not himself, that the mirage he [say, age three or beyond] sees in a desert is not a delusion, that the air and the light rays that cause it are real, but it is not a city, it is a city’s reflection—the day when he grasps . . . that his senses do not provide him with automatic knowledge in separate snatches independent of context, but only with the material of knowledge, which his mind must integrate—the day when he grasps that his senses cannot deceive him, . . . that his organs of perception are physical and have no volition, no power to invent . . . that is the day of his birth as a thinker and scientist.”
Rand thought, correctly, that there is some automatic integration of sensory receptions: importantly, integration of sensory receptions into percepts. “Sensations are integrated into perceptions automatically, by the brain of a man or of an animal” (FNI). She thought that developmentally, in early childhood, one had consciousness of mere sensations that one learned to integrate into percepts, and in time the integration became automatized. That sort of developmental picture had been set out in James’s famous Principles of Psychology (1890), including processes of automatization. Rand expressed also her view (in GS and in “The Comprachicos”) that at the level of thoughts, there is also a sort of automatic integration that goes on when one has gone idle in one’s active, controlling, logical thought, and that automatic integration is inept and, really, I’d say, little better than integrations one experiences in a dream while dreaming.
I think it would be incorrect to think that in perceptions with percepts, one needs to wait on integration by thought to get any identification of what a perceived thing is. Some amount of “what” is already in one’s perception of a bowl of oatmeal as that and a spoon as that. And a lot of perception of “what” is at work before acquisition of language and aids in that acquisition and works ever after to buoy thought in language.
Kant had it that we cannot have errant perception because (i) error requires judgment and (ii) perception, of itself, does not judge at all. I think (i) is slightly overstated. Judgments affirm in language what is the case of something. Classical philosophers from Descartes to Kant were blind to thought without language and to the powers of prelinguistic identifications in early childhood of what is the case. They exaggerate verbal instruction for knowledge acquired by the child, important as that mode of learning truly is.
In that final quotation I gave from GS, Rand used the word “delusion” twice. That term suggests something “just in the head” (or as children say nowadays “just in the brain”) or something wrong with the mind or brain. To learn of mirror reflection that reflected objects are not in the space on the other side of the mirror would not seem, I say, to be learning that the reflection is not a delusion, but to be learning (perhaps namelessly) that there are such things as illusions and that that space seen in the mirror as lying on the other side of the mirror is an illusion.
I have never seen a mirage. I’ve heard that people in too much heat too long can hallucinate, which is not mirage. I gather that experience of mirage, such as Rand described, is an illusion. Someone suffering a heat hallucination would be an episode rightly described as a delusion in perception. I have suffered hallucinations a couple of days due not to heat in a desert, but due to an encephalopathy due ultimately to bladder blockage. Hallucinations can be fantastical plays off of receptions of elements that would normally go into veridical perceptions. But hallucinations are not illusions. And delusions are not illusions. It seems Rand garbled the English here.
“The validity of the senses.” What are the various cases that had been made for “the invalidity of the senses”? Salient to the early Objectivist philosophers were probably the various forms ancient and Renaissance, but especially those in early modern philosophy. That would be a good project: compile the variety of alleged invalidity of perception and argue against each, thence showing variety of meaning “validity of the senses”.
Rand indicated that all forms of arguing the senses to be invalid run into a general problem that there is not meaning in the possibility of invalidity in all sensory episodes without there being meaning and actual occasion in the world for validity of the senses, that is without there being some occasions of valid perception. Good wide point. My additional proposal has been that natural instrumentation in animals for taking in the environment is teleological. There are dedicated targets for the sensory systems, where the structure of those systems have been selected in the course of evolution.
Instruments we design for detections and measurements have a dedicated object (which I shall designate by all-caps TARGET). We can manipulate and adjust the instrument to capture just that object for presentation to our senses. We could design a camera with the purpose of imaging a straight stick partially in water such that the camera system compensates for difference in the indices of refraction of air and water. A sensor in the air and a sensor in the water feeding information ultimately to the camera would likely be required, and this information processed in an automatic way in the camera recorder. The camera would show a straight stick because we had made the instrument system an indicator of our information purpose, our TARGET: straightness present in objects it detects. Design of the instrumentation systems that are our natural sensory systems are the result of natural processes of evolution and individual development employing living processes in an environment having whatever material resources are locally available at the time. Mere typical success in detecting or measuring the target (lower case) of the sensory system regularly associated with objects, motions, or media pertinent to life of the animal gives enough probability for preservation and reproduction of the animal.
I mentioned the TARGET of an instrument we design. There is another sort of target of an artificial instrument, which is also at work in our natural, perceptual instruments. Advantage in animal species evolution or in survival of the individual animal is not the TARGET of a natural perceptual instrument. Nature is not a designer, though it yields designs, and there are no TARGETS for natural perceptual systems. There is a target (lower-case) of an instrument which is in the detailed constitution and operation of the instrument. Our modern motion-detecting devices have as their target: alterations in level of light being received by their sensors, which has some fair correlation with objects moving in the field. Our purpose, our TARGET—detection of moving objects—is not the target we put into the design of the instrument. I maintain that this is the way to view natural sensory systems, from thermal contact systems to visual systems having a distal stimulus.
Veridical perception, I say, is neuronal system indicating in consciousness things as they are. Illusions are neuronal system indicating in consciousness things in some ways as they are not.
I say percepts are leaders to reality, due to our constitution. Percepts not only present. They indicate due to our constitution. Their character of automatically_ indicating_ in consciousness is what makes percepts components in empirical cognition. The proverbial straight stick partially in air and partially in water indicates a bent stick. Understanding how it comes to look bent does nothing to change the circumstance that the perceptual presentation is misleading (contra Branden c. 1968, 47–48; Kelley 1986, 88, 93; Peikoff 1991, 40; Binswanger 2014, 72–84; Salamieri 2013, 49–52; 2016, 281–82).
Kelley and other Objectivist philosophers ignore the leading I attribute to perceptual presentations prior to any perceptual judgment. That is a mistake. The quality in perceptual presentations that I have called leading, and the importance of that quality, should be recognized and put to work in a realist philosophy of perception.