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intrinsicist

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intrinsicist last won the day on December 7 2021

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  1. In a proper limited government people join in voluntarily. It's a voluntary contract that one joins in on to institute a single governmental institution. People are free to leave at any time, and start their own agency of force elsewhere, so there is no violation of the non-aggression principle.
  2. I mean, isn't that just a restatement of our differing positions on metaphysics? I made an argument for why my metaphysics is better, but I don't feel like it's been understood or responded to. So I don't see that we've made any progress at all yet.
  3. I don't think I'm stating anything abnormally. What other philosophers have you read on the subject?
  4. I would say it rather the other way around. I can relate, different metaphysical views are extremely difficult to communicate about the first time you encounter them, I think because really everything is defined in terms of metaphysics, and so it becomes very hard to make sense of the language when discussing between different viewpoints. I probably should have taken an extremist approach on the difficulty of communicating about metaphysics to begin with, but that is tedious to do, and I am just writing in plain English, which should be able to be understood with some reading comprehension, at least in principle.
  5. I've tried to describe the difference between metaphysical essence vs. no metaphysical essence in my original post (in the "epistemic universals" section, the "winged things" discussion, etc). If there are metaphysical essences, then we can say something like there is a principle of uniformity regarding instances of that kind, valid universal inferences are justifiable, etc. There is something in reality which makes things hold true about instances of that kind. I wouldn't describe a thing's nature as a "characteristic" of the thing. A characteristic is some aspect of a thing, like its size or color. Its nature is like its abstract definition (which includes characteristics).
  6. Yes. We don't have automatic knowledge about reality. We have to acquire it through sense perception (for concretes) and through concept formation (for universals). Sure, one engages in mental action (the process of concept formation) in order to unite one's perceptions under a concept United where? In your mind, no. You need to do the mental work to identify the unity. In reality, yes. The apples are already united as units of a kind (the universal apple).
  7. Yeah of course. That's what I'm arguing against. Curious for your response.
  8. Also @Eiuol I've already responded to you previously on this issue...
  9. Check the quotes at the top of the thread. I'm just stating Rand's position. I'm not stating anything controversial here. I don't know why this is confusing. If you are saying that, "if something exists in reality, then it cannot be an abstraction", well that is the standard Objectivist position, and that is what I am arguing against. Not sure if that helps clarify. This thread is an argument about metaphysics. I have raised no issue with the epistemology.
  10. This sounds like you're trying to argue for Aristotelianism vs. Platonism. But Rand is neither. Her position is that abstractions (e.g. the "manness" in man), do not exist, full stop. There is no such thing metaphysically, abstractions are purely epistemological. This is just the standard Objectivist position. I'm not sure why you are explaining that here.
  11. intrinsicist

    On Suicide

    https://activeobjectivism.com/2020/12/05/on-suicide/ Peikoff’s argument is a proof by contradiction: since you are already pre-committed to remaining in reality in the very act of debating the issue, any conclusion which denies that premise is self-contradictory. Since choosing to die implies a contradiction, it cannot be rationally justified, and therefore cannot be morally justified. No one can exit the realm of morality guiltlessly.1 Peikoff unfortunately continues from this point to argue in favor of suicide: On the one hand he says the commitment to life is axiomatic, and that there is no justifiable basis for questioning it, and on the other hand that suicide is justified if one’s condition is hopeless. I submit that this is a contradiction. This defense of suicide is inconsistent with the basic moral premises of the philosophy. The mistake here is derivative, not fundamental. The philosophy as a whole is sound, but the position on suicide is not. To deal with his position as charitably as possible: his justification is reminiscent of Rand’s “Inexplicable Personal Alchemy”, where she values one’s “metaphysical self-preservation” over and above one’s “physical preservation”, and she argues for keeping one’s integrity and one’s metaphysical view of reality intact, regardless of the consequences, even if it leads to one’s death. Rand’s argument is not to violate one’s moral code, to not collaborate with an enemy or play their game. I wholeheartedly agree, in circumstances where one faces such a choice, one should not for example steal from another in order to live, or in her example, that one should not give up the names of one’s allies in the face of torture or a firing squad, in the name of integrity, in the name of the best in man and addressing his essential nature, even when he has become a monster. But this doesn’t justify taking one’s own life. That is an act compromising one’s own moral integrity, and it is not a noble crying out in the name of a benevolent metaphysical view of man and reality, but rather a tortured cry of one who has accepted a malevolent metaphysical view of man and reality, and refuses to go on in that world2. So indeed the act of suicide has exactly the opposite nature as what he tries to attribute to it. Suicide is not an “affirmation of life” Consider Roark, for whom suffering “only goes down to a certain point”. Because he can create, because he can achieve positive values, nothing else can seem very important, and ultimately, “it’s not really pain”. Or consider Dagny: she did not believe in suffering. She would not allow pain to become important. She knew that “it does not count – it is not to be taken seriously” – “even in the moments when there was nothing left within her but screaming and she wished she could lose the faculty of consciousness”. As John Galt said, “I know the unimportance of suffering, I know that pain is to be fought and thrown aside, not to be accepted as part of one’s soul and as a permanent scar across one’s view of existence.” We exist for earning rewards. That is what motivates us, that is why we act – not for escaping pain. Pain is not going to make us function; it is not an incentive that gives us fuel. To commit suicide, purely for the sake of escaping pain – so far from being an affirmation of what life ought to be, it would be a declaration that suffering is necessarily a part of life, that it is important and that it does matter. It is the rejection of the belief that “suffering is unimportant, and is only to be fought and thrown aside and not accepted as a meaningful part of one’s view of existence”. To affirm life is to continue to seek happiness despite the tragedy and hopelessness of the situation. One cannot affirm one’s life by destroying it. In Peikoff’s own words: That is an affirmation of life. Positive values are possible despite suffering In psychology there is a concept known as resilience. Resilience is the ability to adjust one’s expectations and one’s goals according to one’s circumstances – even in the face of a dramatic change of one’s circumstances, as in the case of devastating loss or extreme suffering (or to use Peikoff’s examples, in the case of a painful terminal illness, or being a prisoner in a concentration camp where one can see no chance of escape). It is the ability to stay optimistic and look on the positive side – to seek and to find good things that are within one’s range. Consider the findings of a recent study: “Locked-in patients trapped inside their paralyzed bodies have told doctors they are ‘happy’ using an astonishing new brain computer interface which deciphers their thoughts… On seven out of 10 occasions the patients said they were happy despite their utterly debilitating condition”. Or consider the case of Christopher Reeves, as Louie describes: If Reeves committed suicide he would have achieved less than he was capable of – it would have been self-sacrificial. And yet if Reeves held himself to the same standard of being an able-bodied Superman actor, something more than that of which he was capable, he would have achieved nothing but failure – and still would not have achieved the things he could have, which would be equally self-destructive and self-sacrificial. So the fault with a former athlete or actor, for example, who decides to commit suicide because they can no longer pursue their previous career, is that they lack resilience (the movie “Me Before You” dramatizes exactly this issue). Even in pain and suffering one can love life, and realize that it is priceless opportunity that one should get the most out of that one can before it is gone. Note that she said “I love life in spite of them all” – she loves the positives in life in spite of the negatives. What these people are reporting, and others can personally corroborate, is that pain and pleasure are not mutually exclusive values on a single continuum. One can be in pain, and yet feel pleasure. One can be suffering, but happy. They are independent variables. Every positive thing one can experience, from the simplest joy of opening one’s eyes and enjoying the view, is still a positive, despite any level of suffering that is happening at the time. The pain cannot take that positive away. Joy is not “the absence of pain”. Such positive values do exist for anyone who is conscious at all. As I quoted from Eioul, “only a real nihilist may say existing at all is an excruciating horror.” You exist for the sake of enjoying those values, and every action you take should be for the sake of that end. Reducing suffering is a means to an end There is always room for rational risk-taking as a means to pursue one’s values, even significant risks. Risking one’s life in a military context, for example, is the defense of one’s life, it is the pursuit of life and the pursuit of happiness. It is exactly the opposite of making a deliberate choice to die. An irrational risk is a tradeoff in which the reward, in terms of one’s life and happiness, is less than what one is risking. In the case of suicide, one is sacrificing one’s life and happiness entirely – there is no tradeoff at all there! A soldier is risking his life for the sake of his quest to pursue life and happiness. Suicide does not serve such a quest. And this is not to say that pain is a good thing, either; pain is a miserable evil that ought to be fought. Pain and suffering are terrible afflictions, and if someone you loved were suffering, you would want to do everything you can to help them find relief. Pain medication is a good thing. Even if one wanted to risk one’s life with a dangerously high dosage it can be worth it. Pain interferes with one’s thinking, one’s values, and one’s actions. A person in tremendous pain can and sometimes should take a dangerous risk with pain medication in order to bring themselves to a more functional level, and it would be right to assist them in doing so. There is always room for rational risk-taking, even significant risks like in military contexts, or in this case taking high doses of pain medication. There is a risk, but it is a rational risk taken for the sake of a reward; it is ultimately for the sake of life and happiness. The pursuit of eliminating suffering is a good up until the point that it becomes an absurdity: where you are sacrificing your ultimate value – your life – for a lesser value: the relief of suffering. That is not a moral choice. *** 1) Gotthelf, “The Choice to Value,” p. 44 2)
  12. @Eiuolis there any argument to which I have not responded ? Do you have an answer to any of my arguments? Is there something in particular for which you need more clarity or precision?
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