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Eiuol

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Everything posted by Eiuol

  1. Eiuol

    Fred Miller

    This looks wonderful! I found a translation by Joe Sachs which is pretty precise, but I felt it was lacking in terms of going for the flow of ideas. Thanks for sharing.
  2. Eiuol

    Health & Evasion.

    Great, but sometimes a nose just doesn't match and will never match the face it is on, except with plastic surgery (which sometimes makes it worse). I think you overestimate how much of beauty is in individual control. At least, until we master gene editing. You can show some examples if you want, it probably would make discussion easier.
  3. Eiuol

    Health & Evasion.

    Maybe they don't care enough about health, and maybe they do evade the importance. I don't know, and I'm not that interested. Health does matter, I agree with you there. I'm not arguing that lack of health is an evasion, I'm saying that lack of beauty is not necessarily an evasion. But what does this have to do with being beautiful and evasion? You're trying to say something about them not being beautiful, as if it is a moral failure on their part. A lot of the time health has nothing to do with what you do, it's not actually rare to have a genetic disease because there are so many. Forget disorders even, a beautiful nose is genetic. You could talk about fashion and makeup in order to look more beautiful, but those don't have to do with health.
  4. Eiuol

    Health & Evasion.

    This is fine, or at least defensible. But it overgeneralizes since sometimes health issues have no visible physical effects or manifestations (especially psychological issues). What does this have to do with evasion? It sounded like you were saying lack of beauty is a moral failure.
  5. Eiuol

    Health & Evasion.

    What makes you think physical beauty is the manifestation of health? I mean, we could say generally beautiful people are healthy, but this doesn't mean all healthy people are beautiful. Say, certain nose shapes are more beautiful than others, but eating better or working out or all sorts of other things won't affect that. On the other hand, drug use has detrimental effects on health, which often manifests in ugliness. Rand probably isn't the best choice for comparison here, because she used amphetamines for a while, which are bad for your health pretty much in every way. Still lack of beauty doesn't have to reflect a carelessness about health, as perhaps they might even have a health disorder of some kind. I don't know the health history of the people you mentioned. But there are plenty of intellectuals throughout history even who went into intellectual fields because they were unhealthy from no fault of their own. For instance, Nietzsche had numerous physical health problems that were no fault of his own, and he was a person who admired physical beauty in people, and acknowledged his lack of it. Health seems inessential. It's a factor, but not very important when we measure if someone is beautiful. I mean, bad health can screw with your body and therefore your looks. Except, the reason people are beautiful or not is their aesthetic traits. If being healthy meant being beautiful, we would use the same word and concept.
  6. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    I mean, if you don't think the mind is or has fundamental constituent(s), there's no reason to bring it up. Separate experience or not, it shows that you don't need absolute continuity. The whole integration you describe is no different than me saying the mind must be embodied. You can lose access to mental faculties with the split brain but still act in a way as if you never lost those mental faculties. And if you effectively quarantine the hemispheres, there is a complete inability to integrate any information from the other side. It isn't that they are quarantined, but there are *portions* of processing that become completely inaccessible and not integrated. But if you identify an individual there, an individual personality and thinker, you are including a piece of consciousness that is coming from and unique to a body part. There is not an absolute continuity here, portions of your experience have been torn apart. Control and awareness that you normally have goes away, but behaviors still occur. Continuity is wildly disrupted. At the very least, you acknowledge some information can be reintegrated in a very roundabout way, but I don't think this would be much different than reintegrating everything at the end of the transporter. I don't think I would change your mind completely with this, I just think it would make you consider more about how continuity can be gained in one way, but lost in another, at the same time. If we want a complete and utterly continuous body, we can't lose portions of continuity then gain them again. I don't recall that exact wording, but it sounds like something she would say. It's something I would say too - I do think the mind and body are one. But it leaves open whether there has to be *a* body, or a *specific* body. It's safe to say a specific mind though, since the whole point talking about relating mind and body is whether a mind exist completely independently from a body. We aren't trying to explore whether a body can exist independently from my mind. The mind doesn't exist as an entity either (which you agreed with earlier).
  7. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    That's fine, but this is exactly why the whole bit about fundamental constituents doesn't make sense. It's not consistent, it doesn't fit in with the argument you're going for. You assert this, yet I was asking you why I should define a self in this way. I'm asking why continuity of body is important. I mean, it's fine to say that the mind must be continuously embodied in order to exist, I'm just not getting the importance of a specific and exactly precise body. The rest of what you say follows from your premise, so I'm not disputing what you say as a consequence of this premise. But I question your premise in the first place. Okay, I don't think I explained as much as I needed to. When I said adapt, I meant it can appear that someone behaves as if their brain was never split. They take advantage of cues instead of relying on the same information as they use to. To figure out what the left side of your body is doing, you would just have to use your left eye. You would probably have a difficult time naming what you want to interact with, but you could use many other cues to figure it out. With enough practice, this is second nature. Normally, this is no problem. But experimentally, we can manipulate this. I can show one image to each eye. Say I show a horse to your right eye, and a pencil to your left eye. If I ask you what's on the left side of your body, you wouldn't be able to tell me. You would have no idea. But if I ask you to demonstrate how to use the thing I show to your left eye, you would be able to do it. You won't be able to verbalize it, but you can do it. The right side of your brain could process that sort of information, like tool use, but since it doesn't really process communication, if you have a split brain, you won't be able to verbalize what only your left side perceives. I don't think I described the experiment perfectly, but there are examples where scientists experimentally control your perception so that they create dichotomous behaviors. I don't know if we can say these are separate experiences, but if you require absolute continuity of everything, something is being violated here. Yes and no. It depends on what level of specificity of sameness we are talking about. If we care about absolute physical continuity, as applies to physical property and we want to figure out which ones are physically distinct so that they can be used, they are different. This is like figuring out how to determine what to call my new body. But if we want to go more general, we would talk about intellectual property. I'd be asking if your car is the same kind of car, and if you produced it with my particular method of making cars. If you use the same method and patterns, yes, it would actually be my car in this case. Or at least, that specific physical instantiation is not mine, but I can dictate to you how you may or may not reproduce such a car. My argument about the mind is supposed to parallel the point here about intellectual property. It depends on the specificity we want. For the transporter, I'm not convinced that we should care about the specificity of an exact specific physical instantiation of a mind. Interestingly enough, I went over a big thought experiment with that with DonAthos several years ago. This whole transporter argument I don't think is much different than the argument over if intellectual property is valid.
  8. Eiuol

    The Case for Open Objectivism

    That's not accurate actually, the view is that individual rights are a necessity to a healthy and functioning society, not an end in itself. I mean, if you're talking about individual rights and then also other things to enhance that, sure. But you can't have individual rights if you propose specifically racist policies (judging people collectively according to their race). I mean, individual rights aren't some appeal to a platonic good, the whole idea is that it does in fact work better on a practical level and a moral level. If you accept individual rights as theoretically good, but in practice see them as a failure, you are actually rejecting the theory in the first place.
  9. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    I think it got buried and you probably missed it. I wasn't thinking of a hive mind when I said a parallel mind. I was thinking of something like this, from this show. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3Bu2DOM66g Parallel, like parallel processes in a computer. If we are only talking about reassembly and disassembly, this doesn't really apply. For reassembly, what Devils Advocate wrote is plenty I think (and if entanglement is required for this, fine, doesn't change anything). Most of what I wrote is if we disassemble the person and then assemble them at a new location with new materials. The parallel mind bit is only to address your concern if you want to talk about assembling with new material without any disassembly on the original end. It would be weird, you just might need to come up with ways to differentiate which parallel process of me you want to refer to. It's not much different than being put under for brain surgery, and your brain is split in half. The brain hemispheres of split brain patients basically act independently (although the brain naturally figures out how to adapt). They are different, and it's even arguable that both hemispheres have a first-person perspective. I won't really go over the research, but you could show a split brain patient a picture of an item to retrieve only to the left eye. If you tell them to retrieve that item with their right hand, they won't be able to, and they probably won't be able to verbalize the item they saw (usually the left side of the brain takes care of language, but the left side of the brain doesn't control the left side of the body). There are many examples of this from research. But you still refer to all of this as "you", despite your ability to distinguish between right Don and left Don.
  10. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    But that's just it, the mind and thinking are not made up of fundamental constituents (if we assume that the mind is irreducible). You have been characterizing the mind as a biological consequence, if you want to define "you" as only a particular body. I don't see why I should define "you" that way. Of course you partially consist of an entity that undergoes continuous, self generated action - except that can occur in any kind of body. That definition doesn't help me, if anything it reaffirms 1) the mind must be embodied, and 2) selfhood is qualitatively continuous (even if quantitatively we can measure durations where you lack any consciousness). You've argued for also continuity of body, fine, I just don't see a clear demonstration that this matters. If a continuous body is necessary, it seems to me you would need to categorize prosthetic limbs as not part of the person using them. Or as I mentioned earlier, if we created a prosthetic hippocampus that helps generate memories - would those not really be your memories? It isn't. It's a new body, but the same person in every other way. I'd be quite satisfied with this, I'd be meaningfully the same person. I wouldn't know any difference, and no one else would. "But Eiuol, if you step in the transporter, your body is going to be destroyed and your first person awareness will be interrupted!" And I would step in anyway, because this is good enough. I don't see a reason to go any more specific. But that's how you defined psychological processes. " What you call the "psychological processes" are just healthy biological processes of a certain intensity."
  11. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    Then why were you talking about this? "T´╗┐hese 5 fundamental constituents are FOREVER (in ALL of the past and ALL of the future SEPARATE from one another no matter what may be done to them, keeping in mind that they cannot be destroyed and "reconstituted" because they are fundamental constituents). " Was it an argument by analogy? If so, it doesn't really work, because we aren't talking about physical things. If you want to talk about actions, as long as we acknowledge an entity is performing actions, we can't talk about reconstitution or destruction. Actions happen, they aren't made or destroyed. Your analogy only helps if we focus only on if two entities are identical. If this isn't and what you mean, I'm not sure what your point was. You would cease to exist, but why can't you come back if technology is advanced enough to re-embody your consciousness? The best way I can explain why you can't come back is if consciousness and the mind is reducible. Which you sort of said - psychological processes are just healthy biological processes of a certain intensity. It's like saying thoughts are just healthy processes created by neurons of a certain intensity. So of course your specific body would be "you", because consciousness would just be a level of intensity from the body. Yet in another thread you were talking about how intensity and complexity is a problem if that's all the definition is. But I'm not overly concerned about the specific body. I'm more concerned if your personality and values are being enacted; I'm concerned about the process, not the specific material parts accomplishing the process. And since it is a process, it can start and stop. The only question is if this process can restart if it stops. I'm not even trying to make a complex argument. I like whaat Devils Advocate said: "Supposing that Individual "A" passes through the system and emerges fully intact and self-aware, what evidence would there be to dispute A's claim to identity?" If it acts like you, if it thinks like you, if it looks like you, has memories that are yours, and it thinks you're you, then it's you. If it walks like a duck... For what it's worth, SL's recent post makes clear the perspective I'm coming from. I don't disagree with any of it, but I'm offering my answer to the questions posed.
  12. Eiuol

    The Case for Open Objectivism

    You clearly don't even agree with the sentiment, you haven't spent any time saying what you agree with. You're not getting any points for saying you agree with the sentiment, but then none of your beliefs at all coincide with individualism or individual rights. The more you say, the deeper the hole you dig.
  13. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    How are twins an example of anything? By all the things I said about how to identify if someone is the same person, twins fail all those tests. I don't need to talk about fundamental constituents in order to demonstrate that. Actually, all the content of your argument is about how a mind must embodied. From there go to essentially "different bodies, therefore different minds". I think part of the problem is you insist on the mind as a fundamental constituent. If you want to argue for panpsychism, fine, but you should be clearer about that. After all, you describe the fundamental constituent as something like waves, or atoms, or particles, or something. At first I thought you were talking about how actions and processes are accomplished by physical things, but now I think you are re-ifying actions as if they are also "things". When I said irreducible, I was thinking of actions and processes that can't be broken down into sub actions and sub processes. When you say irreducible, it sounds like you mean there is something remaining when you physically pull everything apart. In other words, your point seems to be that "you" is a fundamental, material soul. Or if it is not material, you are supposing there is a way to pinpoint where consciousness occurs. A bigger problem that hasn't really been addressed much by anyone is what makes "you"? When I say "me", what is the referent? You could say "my mind and body", but this doesn't help with regards how to expand or grow. Your body is not always in a state to support "you", which includes higher level of functioning. Without higher level functioning, the person you identify as yourself is no longer there. You can normally identify yourself by recognizing your values and beliefs, even your belief that you are yourself. Although your essential biological processes might continue, your essential psychological processes that makes you an individual stop during a coma. If your biological processes also stop, as in the transporter case, your psychological processes stop just as much as when you are in a coma. So if you can recover from a coma, or loss of consciousness, or sleeping - states of mind where "you" aren't there at all - you can certainly recover from biological death. But if you want to be clearer about your position, you need to better define what "you" is.
  14. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    That's an argument if your mind can be embodied in something other than a human body. I think that's a different argument. Clearly, you can't be conscious if the body you end up with can't enact all the things that make for consciousness and your mind. So, again, all you said is that the mind has to be embodied. That's why I mentioned earlier about if there needs to be some strand of consciousness leftover. I don't think coma is my best example either. But the more important point is that there are times when your mind goes off. First-person experience goes off, awareness goes off. In the times when your mind is still on, but in terms of minimal awareness, I don't think there's any meaningful way to say it is "you". Your thoughts, your values, your beliefs. So to tweak the coma example, you are temporarily psychologically dead. The thing to keep in mind is that continuity of beliefs, thoughts, and awareness, is what makes you an individual (and feeling that continuity from within).
  15. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    All you argued here is that a mind can't be disembodied. I don't disagree. This doesn't say how a conscious mind can or cannot be transferred to another entity. If you want to define "you" as also the physical body you have, that doesn't make sense to me. As long as there is a body it doesn't matter. The question is if you have a psychological death, not just a biological death. It isn't enough to say "the light went out". Another way to phrase the question: if you die biologically, does this mean you always die psychologically? You're right that consciousness is a state, but I was using the term in the sense of a capacity or faculty. I'll be more precise about it. Also, it is very distracting when you use caps. Use italics instead.
  16. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    That's the problem right there. I'm not treating consciousness as a constituent, fundamental or otherwise. I am treating it as irreducible, but I'm not also treating it as a fundamental "thing". That is, it isn't made out of parts to take apart and reassemble. Rather, consciousness and the mind is all or nothing. As I said earlier, the mind is a process. That's why it can go out of existence then return to existence. I described earlier that some things can go out of existence then return. I'd agree with you if consciousness or the mind were a type of particle, or fundamental constituent of reality. My whole point is that if a mind is continuous in all the ways I mentioned, that is the same "you". The mind is not an entity anyway, at least not by Objectivist standards. An entity would be some sort of physically bounded object, usually on the perceptual level. I need to flesh it out more, but I don't mean a sort of hive mind (as if one mind can control the other). I use the word parallel to be something like parallel processing in a computer, where the processes are completely distinct in the sense of different flows of information, but they still originate and come from the same thing. Those processes don't necessarily need to be connected any point back into a single process. Distinct future histories. Like the TV show Counterpart. This is the same issue for DA'x point 2d. To be sure, there are distinct physical entities, but this doesn't necessarily mean those other entities don't embody "me". Whatever first-person experience there is, it is the experience of me. It is the same me that I know, the same me that you know, and the same me that my friends know. Even if my body is obliterated, my mind is not. This is not a mind-body dichotomy since I'm not proposing that the mind is ever disembodied. Another issue is 3b. We can certainly call two first-person experiences distinct, but it doesn't follow that more than one experience means more than one person. Your first-person awareness before a coma is distinct from after. Your first-person awareness before sleeping is distinct from after you wake up. There is a gap in time where you lose awareness completely. They are separate first-person experiences. And for clarity, 3e. I agree that first-person perspective isn't "attached" to specific patterns. The pattern of "me" includes first-person perspective as an attribute. It is not a re-attachable item. But we should recognize that our first-person perspectives aren't continuous like a movie. There are huge gaps in time where we have no first-person experience. First-person perspectives start and stop. All that happens is the state of my consciousness pattern changes, such that sometimes first-person perspective is off, other times it's on. Further, the state of consciousness sometimes changes so much that it completely halts. Not just a "dimming" of consciousness.
  17. Eiuol

    The Case for Open Objectivism

    I didn't mention motivation. I've described your position. You didn't actually say I described your position incorrectly, you just seem to not like the word. I spent pages addressing your actual arguments, I just have near zero motivation to persuade someone who thinks that racism is good that it is in fact bad. I see it on a level of explaining why rape is bad. It's not worth it. It's unfortunate that some people use the word racist merely for shaming, but here I'm using it to describe your actual position. 2046 said so as well, but said your argument even failed to be arguments for racism. They are mostly assertions, not arguments.
  18. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    There would be a gap, and during that gap, I'm not claiming that the mind is still there. It goes out of existence, then it comes back. Not all things that go away can come back, but some things can. Capacities and processes, like the mind, can go away and then return. There is temporary amnesia, temporary aphasia. Does there need to be a strand of consciousness leftover in order for consciousness to return in full? I don't think so. Not only can you lose some of your consciousness, but all of it. If I were designing the technology for a story, I would do a piece by piece disassembly then reassembly. I think there would be fewer potential problems this way, fewer ways for the technology to go wrong on the reassembly stage. But if disassembly is all at once, and reassembly is all at once, this is possible. A mind really does blink out of existence sometimes. If you get knocked out, you lose consciousness. The consciousness went away. It blinked out of existence. But when you wake up, there is continuity of you as a self, even if experience was completely gone for a period of time. You don't say that the old you died, and a new you came to be. In the case of the transporter, you are re-embodied. I'm not claiming that at any point there is a disembodied mind. In other words, any "death" is temporary. A biological death, probably.
  19. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    Yeah, I missed that post. Yes, you have my position correct. I think you're asking in the second question what would happen if I use a transporter that assembled another version of me at the other end of the transporter, while my current self stayed put. In a sense, that would only be one of me still. But this is where it would get weird. I would describe this as a "branched" version of me. It would be like having a parallel mind. I don't think in principle a mind must only have 1 first-person experience. Why not 5 distinct first-person experiences? Part for part, they are distinct, but they are still all me. The point you seem to be trying to bring out is if reconstruction without deconstruction produces the same person, or two distinct persons. If they are distinct persons, then clearly, deconstructing the original person means the original person is completely gone, dead, kaput. I know my solution is very weird, but I don't think that violates the law of identity.
  20. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    I can't read B more carefully, what you wrote simply isn't very clear. I reread it like 10 times, so I rephrased what I understood. I don't think it matters much either, because we aren't questioning if the transported person has first-person experience. All we need to know is if it is the same individual.
  21. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    Not really. I've thought about that before, I view that as simply travel rather than any kind of transporter scenario. I'm claiming that this "disassembly and reassembly" isn't destroying or annihilating what I call "you" and what you call "me". I don't see this as different than being completely frozen in a block of ice, then revived. In a way, I'm saying the mind is not disassembled at all through this transporter, because we are already assuming that at the other end of the transporter, the person feels as if they had been going about their day just like any other. Even if every single particle is pulled apart such that your body is a cloud (clearly biologically dead, but revived at the other end). If you can't view the viewpoint as causal, then I don't think you can call it first-person experience. I don't think something can experience itself as not itself. If you mean "view" as in believe, this is fine, but if you mean as in experience, I think you're wrong. There might be a "computational limit" for a specific mind, but I don't see why we can't say there are infinite self-referential viewpoints.
  22. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    Objectivist metaphysics is very thin. As far as the law of identity, there is nothing else to be said other than the thing can't be itself and then not be itself at the same time. A thing can't be entangled and not entangled at the same time - leaving aside if the science of quantum physics is valid. In other words, the scope is very wide, and applies just fine when using technology and peculiar scientific theories that go against common sense. Your speculation is fine, but I don't think you even need entanglement to make the point. I don't think there is any meaningful way to say that the "you" has disintegrated or ceased to be. If QM explains how consciousness is continuous across time, even in gaps of awareness, fine, but we don't need that detail. The fact is, regardless of how, it's simply continuous in the same circumstances as the transported person. I meant that you don't feel as if your consciousness "froze", or that you were "out". If the transported person is the same way, that is one less reason to think the person died. That's right. The implication here is that for something to be meaningfully the same, there must be some kind of similar pattern. That is, in this case, there must be a similar "mind pattern", even if everything else is different. Further, to be the same instance of a mind pattern, continuity is required. To say I'm wrong, you have to demonstrate that either continuity ceases, or that my tests of consciousness and self are not sufficient to determine if someone is the same person. In case my use of the word similar throws you off, I'm saying that because physical form can change, which might require converting from an electric pattern to a digital one. The pattern is otherwise the same. This might change my position about a digital mind upload (going from electrical chemical patterns to digital patterns might qualify as loss of continuity), but this doesn't affect what I say about the transporter.
  23. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    Well, several things. Continuity of experience (the sort of feeling when you wake up, whether that is from sleeping or a coma) Continuity of memory (feeling that your past history is connected to your current history, and your imagined future history) Some progression or linear set of events from original form (how you change from when you wake up in the morning is a pretty straightforward change) A sense of free will There might be other ways to tell if someone is the same person, but I am essentially using things for a basic psychological evaluation of feeling present and feeling like an individual. Whether it is a thought experiment or real life, this is what I would do. Any amount of time. It can be any of those things. I question if a purely online form could meet all the criteria, (e.g., do you need sense perception to have continuity of experience?) but nothing makes me say no right off the bat.
  24. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    If you assert this is so by the constraints of the thought experiment, fine, but I contend this is a plot hole. This "permanent void" needs some kind of explanation. Death is a permanent void because there is no means to resume continuity of that consciousness. Resuming continuity is built into your thought experiment, so I don't see a permanent void. In a way, I'm asking you to be more specific about what the permanent void of death even is. There are plenty of voids that go on, so if absolute cessation is your standard, you already said when the void ends, it is not a permanent void. If duration is your standard, the transporter is already a lot quicker than a coma, it is not a permanent void. I'm throwing all kinds of tests of consciousness and self (memory, likeness of experiences to prior experiences), and I'm still not getting your permanent void interpretation. The memory part is important, because I see this as a critical part of establishing whether you are the same person. I don't think it would matter how many you swap out, exactly like the ship of Theseus. I don't think the sameness of the molecules even matter, as I said about the amnesiac who has brain damage and can't remember what happened 10 minutes ago. If we replaced the damaged brain tissue with completely prosthetic material, you might contend that this new prosthetic piece of brain creates "false" memories because they are artificially created. It's not that the original brain tissue are the only real parts of the original person. An artificial heart doesn't create "false" circulation, it's just as real as the circulation before. Of course circulation lacks FPE, I just don't see what changes about FPE except a temporary void. As long as my other tests of consciousness and self pass (so far, we haven't come up with cases where these tests aren't passed), you could reconstitute me with whatever you want.
  25. Eiuol

    The Transporter Problem

    What *about* the FPE is different, that doesn't equally apply to waking up from a coma? That's my question. You said it's different, without saying what is different. Again, your response is suffering from imprecision. When you wake up from a coma, what about "you" has woken up? You already agree that the same arrangement of molecules has woken up, and you also specified that the transporter creates the same arrangement of molecules - physically nothing is different. You're saying that the first-person experience is different in some fundamental way, fine, but I still have no idea what difference there is, even from the perspective of the person being transported. You said that the transported person even remembers being transported, and everything feels continuous. The difference, then, seems to be as banal and trivial as the difference between my state of mind before writing this post, and after. Just like somebody in a coma, just like the person with severe amnesia. Amnesia isn't just forgetting, some types of amnesia are the inability to create memories in the first place. This isn't a sci-fi example, there are real people with this kind of amnesia. In fact, you could argue that an amnesiac effectively dies when their ability to remember moment to moment has been obliterated. But these people also have brain damage (whole parts of the hippocampus are destroyed) - they are physically different. So the amnesiac fits your concerns even better, and is more clearly different than the transported body. I call the amnesiac the same person, and changes even more than the transported person, which is why my position is that the transported person is the same. SL is saying that the question is moot if a perfect copy is not made (a fine and consistent position); I'm saying that even if an imperfect mind-copy is made, the person is still the same. Both of these are begging the question. I know your position, that's not my question.
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