Jump to content
Objectivism Online Forum

ReasonFirst

Regulars
  • Content Count

    22
  • Joined

  • Last visited

About ReasonFirst

  • Rank
    Novice

Previous Fields

  • Country
    United States
  • State (US/Canadian)
    Not Specified
  • Relationship status
    No Answer
  • Copyright
    Copyrighted

Recent Profile Visitors

503 profile views
  1. @Doug Morris I think, under certain circumstances, that reason would qualify as evidence that something potentially dangerous is going on. I mean as long as you weren't on any drugs or hallucinating and you have every reason to believe that you should have seen it because you looked for it again very quickly and you didn't see it, then yes I would think that would count as evidence. @MisterSwig That is very interesting. I guess I was not distinguishing between knowledge itself and the study or theory of knowledge in my arguments. I agree with your statement about what e
  2. @MisterSwig You could be a sort of deist of the simulated world. You would believe that if the world's simulated, then the Programmer created it but leaves it alone, so no changes to the simulated laws of nature. He doesn't interfere with anything. Once you accept the arbitrary, you might as well make the most of it. The Programmer also has a backup generator in case the power goes off and he has to keep the computers running. Agreed. Just wanna say a couple things about that. 1) Even if the Programmer or the creator of the simulation doesn't interfere
  3. @Doug Morris Pardon my ignorance, but why is this a claim about "epistemological possibility" and not simply a claim about the future? How is it different from "That plane must have crashed."? Well the claim “That plane must have crashed” is just a past tense claim instead of a claim about the future. And I would say that both of those claims are claims of “epistemological possibility.” The reason I brought up the two senses of possibility is because it is relevant when you’re trying to make a determination about where on the epistemological spectrum a claim belongs: a
  4. @Easy Truth I was considering the some of the other claims that you placed in your "tentative" category of arbitrary: I can see why you place these claims in your "tentative" category of arbitrary but I don't see how the matrix claim belongs in the same subcategory with the rest of these examples. I would place both of the matrix claims in your first subcategory of arbitrary, the first one which you mentioned should be permanently ignored. I would say the difference between both of your matrix claims and the examples quoted above is that there seems to be an implication with yo
  5. @Easy Truth I think if you mean "might be" or "may be" without evidence, that is still a claim of something being "possible" when it's actually arbitrary. And I think that you agree with this as well, that's why you placed it into a subcategory of "arbitrary." I'm just trying to understand the difference between the two subcategories, and I think, in general, I do understand. One subcategory is "tentative" and the other will always remain arbitrary. But as to the two specific simulation claims you presented as belonging to those subcategories, I don't know. I also agree with you
  6. @Grames I have question about what exactly you mean when you state "hierarchically prior?" If you vertically integrate the concept "cat" to the concept "animal" and the concept "dog" to the concept "animal," is this an example of horizontally integrating the concept "cat" with the concept "dog?" I wasn't sure if the term "hierarchically prior" is interchangeable with "higher level." In the example I just gave, the concept "animal" is a higher level concept than "dog" or "cat" but I don't know if it is "hierarchically prior." I think if "animal" was a "hierarchically prior" concept to
  7. @Easy Truth What I was asking about was your position on the validity of the claims “Everything we know is simply a simulation” and “Everything we know could simply be a simulation.” I was asking about your position about where on the epistemological spectrum each claim belongs: Arbitrary, Possible, Probable, Certain. My understanding is that “certain” claims are claims which qualify as real knowledge. They are claims which are supported by a wide body of objective evidence which integrates without contradiction to point to a single conclusion. Probable means that a majority or a pre
  8. @Easy Truth I was hoping ask you a couple questions about the following two example claims that you gave. I was hoping you could first state what the difference is between these two claims. You mentioned that the latter claim belongs in a category of arbitrary that “is the hardest – it seems tentatively arbitrary?” So what makes you think that the latter claim belongs in a “tentatively arbitrary” category? What is “tentative” about it or what makes it more “tentative” than the former claim?
  9. @Eiuol I mean, if you don't think the mind is or has fundamental constituent(s), there's no reason to bring it up. I am not sure what I am “bringing up?” I mentioned that your body has fundamental constituents, not your mind. All these points that you have made about continuity being “wildly disrupted” have all referred to higher-level mental faculties. The absence of those faculties does not imply that the continuity of the individual has been “disrupted.” As long as you exist, your body undergoes a basic process (a continuous self-sustained, self-generate
  10. @Eiuol That's fine, but this is exactly why the whole bit about fundamental constituents doesn't make sense. It's not consistent, it doesn't fit in with the argument you're going for What is not consistent about it? What does not fit in with the argument that I am going for? You've probably described it accurately enough. It's not a separate experience. This is probably best left to scientists to explain rather than me but I'll try to explain it like this. What this shows is that when it comes to actions that an entity can do but doesn't have to do (such as te
  11. @Eiuol The statement from me that you've quoted from me doesn't imply that the mind and thinking are made up of fundamental constituents. They're not. I have tried to explain this before. I have not been defining "you" as a particular body. I have repeatedly stated that I am defining "you" as an entity that undergoes continuous, self-generated, self-sustained action. This is a definition of your identity and it encompasses BOTH the mind and body of you as an individual. Not partially, completely. There's no "you" without your functioning body. I don't think you understood w
  12. @Eiuol My point about the statement that you quoted was that the body of an entity is ultimately made out of fundamental constituents (whatever they may be) that cannot be broken down and that are separate from all other existents in the universe. The integrated actions performed by those fundamental constituents or macroscopically that specific body corresponds to a particular individual's mind. It was meant to refute your claim that a "branched" version of "you" would exist if someone used the transporter on you but without deconstructing you. I am saying that that "branched" vers
  13. @Eiuol I am not arguing for panpsychism. I am not insisting that the mind is a fundamental constituent. I have stated before that it is not an entity and not a thing. When I was describing fundamental constituents, I meant fundamental constituents that constitute the body, i.e microscopic entities that cannot be broken down into sub-parts and that are separate from all other existents in the universe. The integrated macroscopic interactions (actions) of those fundamental constituents correspond to the mind. And that doesn't imply that actions are reified as "things." It just mean
  14. @Eiuol No, I would say the same thing about identical twins and two separate human beings even if they were perfect copies of each other. One reduces down to fundamental constituents that are separate from all other existents and the other reduces down to other fundamental constituents that are separate from all other existents, in accordance with what I have stated before. They each perform their own actions that are metaphysically inseparable from them, i.e. they each have their own inseparable mind. There is a meaningful way to say that it is "you." A low-level continuati
  15. @Eiuol I apologize for using distracting text. You wrote, "All you argued here is that a mind can't be disembodied. I don't disagree. This doesn't say how a conscious mind can or cannot be transferred to another entity." I would say that it does because by virtue of the mind being (at a basic level) a process that is done by a particular entity, that makes it inseparable from that particular entity and makes it a particular mind. It is not a process done by another entity, it is a process done by "this and not that" entity in accordance with the law of identity (whatever
×
×
  • Create New...