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  1. @Easy Truth I was hoping ask you a couple questions about the following two example claims that you gave. I was hoping you could first state what the difference is between these two claims. You mentioned that the latter claim belongs in a category of arbitrary that “is the hardest – it seems tentatively arbitrary?” So what makes you think that the latter claim belongs in a “tentatively arbitrary” category? What is “tentative” about it or what makes it more “tentative” than the former claim?
  2. @Eiuol I mean, if you don't think the mind is or has fundamental constituent(s), there's no reason to bring it up. I am not sure what I am “bringing up?” I mentioned that your body has fundamental constituents, not your mind. All these points that you have made about continuity being “wildly disrupted” have all referred to higher-level mental faculties. The absence of those faculties does not imply that the continuity of the individual has been “disrupted.” As long as you exist, your body undergoes a basic process (a continuous self-sustained, self-generate
  3. @Eiuol That's fine, but this is exactly why the whole bit about fundamental constituents doesn't make sense. It's not consistent, it doesn't fit in with the argument you're going for What is not consistent about it? What does not fit in with the argument that I am going for? You've probably described it accurately enough. It's not a separate experience. This is probably best left to scientists to explain rather than me but I'll try to explain it like this. What this shows is that when it comes to actions that an entity can do but doesn't have to do (such as te
  4. @Eiuol The statement from me that you've quoted from me doesn't imply that the mind and thinking are made up of fundamental constituents. They're not. I have tried to explain this before. I have not been defining "you" as a particular body. I have repeatedly stated that I am defining "you" as an entity that undergoes continuous, self-generated, self-sustained action. This is a definition of your identity and it encompasses BOTH the mind and body of you as an individual. Not partially, completely. There's no "you" without your functioning body. I don't think you understood w
  5. @Eiuol My point about the statement that you quoted was that the body of an entity is ultimately made out of fundamental constituents (whatever they may be) that cannot be broken down and that are separate from all other existents in the universe. The integrated actions performed by those fundamental constituents or macroscopically that specific body corresponds to a particular individual's mind. It was meant to refute your claim that a "branched" version of "you" would exist if someone used the transporter on you but without deconstructing you. I am saying that that "branched" vers
  6. @Eiuol I am not arguing for panpsychism. I am not insisting that the mind is a fundamental constituent. I have stated before that it is not an entity and not a thing. When I was describing fundamental constituents, I meant fundamental constituents that constitute the body, i.e microscopic entities that cannot be broken down into sub-parts and that are separate from all other existents in the universe. The integrated macroscopic interactions (actions) of those fundamental constituents correspond to the mind. And that doesn't imply that actions are reified as "things." It just mean
  7. @Eiuol No, I would say the same thing about identical twins and two separate human beings even if they were perfect copies of each other. One reduces down to fundamental constituents that are separate from all other existents and the other reduces down to other fundamental constituents that are separate from all other existents, in accordance with what I have stated before. They each perform their own actions that are metaphysically inseparable from them, i.e. they each have their own inseparable mind. There is a meaningful way to say that it is "you." A low-level continuati
  8. @Eiuol I apologize for using distracting text. You wrote, "All you argued here is that a mind can't be disembodied. I don't disagree. This doesn't say how a conscious mind can or cannot be transferred to another entity." I would say that it does because by virtue of the mind being (at a basic level) a process that is done by a particular entity, that makes it inseparable from that particular entity and makes it a particular mind. It is not a process done by another entity, it is a process done by "this and not that" entity in accordance with the law of identity (whatever
  9. @Eiuol you wrote, "That's the problem right there. I'm not treating consciousness as a constituent, fundamental or otherwise. I am treating it as irreducible, but I'm not also treating it as a fundamental "thing". That is, it isn't made out of parts to take apart and reassemble. Rather, consciousness and the mind is all or nothing. As I said earlier, the mind is a process. That's why it can go out of existence then return to existence. I described earlier that some things can go out of existence then return. I'd agree with you if consciousness or the mind were a type of particle, or
  10. @Eiuol you wrote "I think you're asking in the second question what would happen if I use a transporter that assembled another version of me at the other end of the transporter, while my current self stayed put. In a sense, that would only be one of me still. But this is where it would get weird. I would describe this as a "branched" version of me. It would be like having a parallel mind. I don't think in principle a mind must only have 1 first-person experience. Why not 5 distinct first-person experiences? Part for part, they are distinct, but they are still all me. " And you also w
  11. @Grames I'm sorry I have one more question related to misperception. Let's say for example that I misperceive a temperature, do I have a right to claim that a temperature exists in some quantity even though I haven't perceived it? Or if I misidentify a watercup as a ball, do I have a right to claim that something exists? This kind of relates to my thinking about "depth perception" and it being distorted. If your perception is distorted, you have misperceived something (some object) but I think you must have at least done something right if you were able to achieve the form of perception th
  12. @Grames you mentioned “Your issue is very much similar to debating if a thing is truly red or merely painted red. The appearance of redness is genuine in either case, and so is the appearance of three dimensionality in your example where the 3-Dness is 'painted on'. That appearances can be deceiving is long known.” So here is what I find troubling about your statement. In your example, there is actually something about the paint that contains physical properties that I perceived as red. It EXISTS and is there for me to perceive it. And it was placed on the object which also EXIS
  13. Recently, I read a transcript taken from one of Binswanger's lectures in which he defends perception from certain skeptical attacks against it. He calls perception "inerrant" which means that the information that you do perceive cannot be wrong because it is silent and cannot play tricks on you because it does not tell you anything. The concepts that you form based on perception can be wrong, according to my understanding of Binswanger. At first, I was in complete agreement with this but then I thought of the example of depth perception. With modern 3D glasses (either passive or active), i
  14. So I read Bissell's paper and some of his statements have certain problems. Ayn Rand did once say that a consciousness that is only conscious of itself implies a contradiction and therefore an impossibility. She mentioned this to argue that the process of consciousness starts with an entity receiving sensory data from the outside world and ends with external and subsequently internal awareness. But some of the statements that Bissell makes conflict with Ayn Rand's statements. For example, Bissell states "Consciousness is a necessary aspect of brain processes at a sufficiently high le
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