mightyTeuton

Infinity over infinity is not 1. It is indeterminate -- i.e. it could be anything, from 0 to infinite and anything in between (plus all negative numbers. Not sure how it works for comlex numbers, as there are probably two infinities, one for the real part and one for the imaginary, but I'm just guessing now). To illustrate: If you have (x^2+1)/(x+1) as x goes to infinite, then the limit is infinite (not one). (x^2+1)/(x^3+1) as x goes to infinite, will be zero. And (3x^2+1)/(x^2+1) has a limit of three as x goes to infinite.

He must be from Jupiter.

I misread what you had originally written. I thought that when you wrote about keeping criminals from doing a crime, you were talking about punishing them to deter others, not to keep the same one from doing it again. Who are you claiming are violent criminals? Murderers, rapists, terrorists? Who else? Do you advocate that any person who is a violent criminal should thus be put to death, since there is no hope of rehabilitation? Also, I don't think it is statistically true that no criminal who commits a violent crime can be rehabilitated, though I am sure that the number is quite low. For instance, a man who kills another man he just walked in on sleeping with his wife would probably realize the wrong he comitted instantly, and once he served his prison time (if he has the chance for parole), he would more than likely never do such a thing again. Social hedonism is one version of utilitarianism, but the most general case would be to do the most good -- however you formulate it -- for the most people. Some utilitarians say that what is good is pleasure, and are thus hedonistic. But you can hold as your standard of good to be human life, and thus to do the most for people's lives would also be utilitarian (note: I am not claiming here that the Objectivist ethics is in any way utilitarian, since the standard of good is MY life, not simply human life). If your purpose of punishing a criminal is retributive -- giving him what he deserves for his act -- then you are appealing to a notion of justice. If the purpose of punishing a criminal is to try to keep others who are considering comitting a crime from doing it, then you are appealing to a notion of deterrance. Deterring individuals from doing a crime promotes good for both the potential victims and criminals, and thus it can be said that your system is utilitarian. Thiefs often make the decision not to rob a place armed with guns, since the punishment associated with bringing a gun to the crime is much higher (in some jurisdictions, it used to be punishable by death, in fact). For many criminals, no cost-benefit analysis is ever made, and these will probably not be deterred by much. But some criminals do think about their crime a lot before comitting it, and a stiffer penalty may deter them. It is not ridiculous to talk about it.

Is that a utilitarian theory of punishment? I think my views fall more in line with ideals of justice rather than deterrance, but I don't think deterrance should be completely left out of the mix, either. The protection of rights should not only include retribution for wrongs done, but prevention of the violation in the first place. Those in charge of determining our system of punishment. Since We, the people of the USA, have a decent chance of shaping actual policy, "we" could in fact be all of us. The same result could be obtained by locking them up for life without parole, right? One interesting thing to note is that the death penalty actually costs more than locking someone up for life, due to many, many appeals and other things like highering better experts and what not since someone's life is on the line. I do not understand entirely why the assets of these people are not seized since their crimes cost us so much to punish. Perhaps it has something to do with the fact that the criminal's family would be left with little, and they weren't the ones that committed the crime.

Oh, I realize that. Thanks for the reply!

I tried to locate this info but couldn't find it. What is the breakdown for the number of posts you have to make to achieve a given rank? For instance, I think around 10 or 15 posts I moved from "Newbie" to "Novice." What is the next rank, and how long will it be 'til I get there?

Does anyone know of anything that Rand wrote on the subject of crime and punishment? A friend told me the only thing he knew was that she had mentioned that the death penalty was a marginal issue, but wasn't sure if she had written anything else. Also, how could the death penalty be a marginal issue? Shouldn't we put a lot of thought into whether we can take someone's life as opposed to just locking them up for the rest of it (since we have justified imprisonment, but maybe not the use of death)?

Which I guess I'm trying to say is what Roark (corrected spelling ) did. I know that Rand is trying to say that all they had to do was look at each other and they knew what kind of person the other was, but that's a little far-fetched, and human fallibility can still come into play. And wasn't Dominique very confused afterwards? She was feeling pleasure, it's true, but she was also feeling negative emotions. If she had wanted Howard to take her (if she liked it "rough"), I think her emotional state in the aftermath would have been a little more positive than it was.

Thanks, AisA. I did a search for a post of this subject assuming there had been one, and it came up empty. Thank you for pointing it to me. Betsy's suggestion that Roarke's spiel about marble was actually deeper than it seemed, I think, illuminates the fact that Roarke was telling Dominique that her seductiveness would have consequences. She wanted it, and he wanted it, it seems. But that still doesn't change the fact that she fought him hard when he came on to her. If I really like a girl, and I know by her behavior that she really likes me, and I try to sleep with her, and she struggles, I know that if I were to continue, I would be raping her. It just seems that there is really no other way to explain it than rape.

Besides the fact that she struggles -- which, I admit, could just be the result of kinkiness (though I would like to know how many strangers have S&M relations on their first encounter...) -- at nearly the end of part 2, chapter 2, Rand writes: (Elipses are Rand's) So she says (or thinks, at least), that she was raped. It does not matter that she enjoyed it. From Roarke's point of view, he forced a woman to have sex with him, who struggled to the point of drawing blood. How could anyone know that someone fighting so fiercely actually wants it? And she didn't really know she wanted it herself until after he had committed the act.

This may be unecessary on an Objectivist website, but... FOUNTAINHEAD SPOILER WARNING I am in the middle of The Fountainhead, and I just read about Howard's rape of Dominique. What in God's name is supposed to be heroic about that? I absolutely loved Atlas Shrugged, mostly because of how heroic all the characters were, but I am just not understanding Roarke that well, and after he raped a woman I have to find some answers. What was Rand trying to show? I understand that Dominique actually enjoyed it, and presumably it is the only way that Roarke could have had her or something, but I thought people were ends in themselves and not a means to an end... If anyone has any insight into how this rape is justifiable, please enlighten me.

According to Bertrand Russel, Marx, as well as anyone else who ever talks about dialectic struggle, got the idea from Hegel. The form of materialism you speak of is from Marx, but the concept of applying dialectical logic to something comes from Hegel.

I think by dialectics, Clausewitz is referring specifically to Hegel, not Kant. Though it is true that Hegel was influenced by Kant, Hegel is the one who was obsessed with the "dialectic," by which he essentially meant that everything was a synthesis of itself with its contradiction. Thus, the truth lies in determining this synthesis. An example (from Russel's History of Western Philosophy): The absolute is pure being -- it just is, without assigning qualities to it. But pure being without any qualities is nothing; therefore, the absolute is nothing. From this thesis and antithesis, ans also the claim that the union of being and not being is becoming, we can now state a more true fact of reality: absolute is becoming. From here you can keep whittling away the problems with your claim by melding it with its antithesis. He is most famous for using dialectical logic to explain history as a constant battle between nations, working toward perfection. Marx picked up on this concept and replaced nations with classes. Hegel was obsessed with the absolute, and therefore it makes sense that you see one of his followers using the term in his field. You can also see Kant's influence on Hegel in this idea of "suspending the effects of time and space." Only a dualist who believed that time and space were merely relationships existing in our mind only could think that the effects of time and space could be suspended, especially by the government! Of course, Hegel's philosophy is just mystical garbage, and so one has to examine the claims of anyone who was heavily influenced by him with an eagle's eye. His dialectical argument goes against the law of identity, and his beliefs in time and space place consciousness above existence.

The concept of a priori knowledge, that we know some things without having to integrate them ourselves from perception, seems to be false. However, when we are discussing things in science, we distinguish between "a priori" and "empirical" formulae. The former is preferred over the latter, since it is derived deductively from a general principle instead of tweaking parameters (for mostly no good reason) until you get a match with reality. It also allows one to demonstrate the validity of that general concept. My question is, does a priori in the scientific sense represent a different concept than a priori in the epistemological sense? My thought is that it does, but I'm confused by the similar terminology.

Primacy of existence is an axiom of existence. If there were no humans, or other conscious animals, existence would still exist, and therefore the primacy of existence comes before the primacy of consciousness. This is also against the primacy of existence and identity. Existence is existence, and as such, any existant is subject to the laws of existence (i.e. physics), such as gravity (if it has mass) and the speed of light. They are possibly not analogous. And I think we have shown that the "greater" gods are contradictory. Where does that leave the "lesser" ones?

(1) Places consciousness as primary over existence. (2) You have to define what these powers would be that are non-contradictory (X-ray vision or something)? Clearly, no existant can be omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, or all good. Whether or not a god could control lightning or not is limited by physics, and thus far would be conceivable (so long as the "God" uses technology to do it; I'm not so sure any organism could evolve that could control weather... except maybe Storm on X-Men, of course!) (3) is impossible. Something cannot exist if it is not possible to exist. God, as defined by (1), (3), and in certain aspects (2), would not be possible. And granted that parts of (2) are possible, would something that was just better than the rest of us be a god? Were Pacos Bill, John Henry, and Paul Bunyan gods? Or by "powers limited by..." do you mean that a God is capable of doing everything possible, i.e. non-contradictory? So long as those powers are within the physically possible as well (like not travelling faster than light), then it is conceivable. But notice that this rules gods like Haephestos out of godhood, as Haephestos could not do everything, just some things. Only the Abrahamic God and others comprable in power could exist minus their "contradictory" powers, but as far as I know, there has never been a nigh-omnipotent god defined in a religion, as the concept is useless.

The original post you were replying to did not appear in this thread to me. Is that because it is in another thread, and you somehow posted to this one when you replied, or is it because I am a limited member or something?

Since the concept "God" does not link to anything in reality, it leads to difficulties in defining it. Therefore, everyone is working off a different definition. Even the Christian God is different to different Christians. As long as we leave the concept arbitrary, we cannot prove anything about his contradictory nature. Everyone here seems to agree that any God that is omni-anything is a self-contradiction. Any God that exists outside of existence is not possible. Any God that created anything ex nihilo is likewise non-existent. But when you get into gods like Hercules, who were superhuman, there existence is in the realm of possibilities (meaning non-contradictory). To A. afarensis, for instance, we would be "super" to them, having the ability to use our minds far beyond what they could. Likewise, some human with, say, sonar capabilities would be a "super" human, assuming all else being equal. Are these gods, though? God is defined by Mirriam-Webster as: 1. The supreme or ultimate reality: as (a) the Being perfect in power, wisdom, and goodness who is worshiped as creator and ruler of the universe ( Christian Science : the incorporeal divine Principle ruling over all as eternal Spirit : infinite Mind 2 : a being or object believed to have more than natural attributes and powers and to require human worship; specifically : one controlling a particular aspect or part of reality 3 : a person or thing of supreme value 4 : a powerful ruler Definition one can both be non-contradictory and contradictory. If God is the supreme or ultimate reality, then God is merely existence, which exists, and therefore God exists. The concept God, in this case, would be useless, since we already have the concept existence, and they mean the same thing. Besides the difficulties in defining "perfection" in power, wisdom, and goodness (potentially perfection is being all-powerful, -wise, and -good, all three being contradictory), God could not create the universe, unless we assume that God himself is say, someone existing outside our universe (universe not being equal to existence, but more like maybe inside a gravastar, or one of many multiverses or something). This is arbitrary, though, and most likely never demonstrable, so it is useless to postulate. The whole "eternal Spirit" nonsense is just mysticism, and could never be defended by a rational argument. And an infinite mind, while not even definable (what is the quantity for mind?), cannot exist, since it is infinite. Definition two starts out with the tricky notion of "natural" attributes, which could be a number of things (like "common", or "found in nature", or "genetically encoded", or "possible by the laws of physics"), so a God with "supernatural" abilities could and could not be possible, depending on your definition of natural. "Requiring worship" is never justified -- just because someone can do something special, it does not follow that I owe him my worship. Definition three is what Rand uses in Anthem when her character becomes a "God". Since I am of supreme value to myself, I am my own God. Definition 4 is pretty archaic. So what are we going to use as the definition of God?

Nope; N/A; yes; and yes. I wasn't asking what people thought, I was asking what Objectivists thought. I'm sure that at least one (and hopefully several) people who consider themselves Objectivists could answer me. Would it be wrong to go onto a biology forum and ask a general question like, What do punctuated equilibrium evolutionists think about X? Sure, not all people on the forum may be a P.E. evolutionist, but they may still know something about P.E.'s thoughts on X, and those that are P.E.s can answer my question as best they can. Here's a scenario: let's say I am curious about quantum physics. I know exactly where I can go to read about it (textbooks, journals, etc), but there are two problems with these sources as they relate to me (besides the fact that I do not currently own them). (1), I know it will take a long, long time to read through these sources, and (2), they may be at a level beyond my current understanding. Now, I discover that there is a forum for quantum physics on some website. It would be foolish to think that any leading figures ever post there; in fact, most posters are probably people trying to explore the subject themselves. Some may be at my level -- from whom I could learn nothing -- but others will already know things that I don't, and could give me insight into, say, band energy diagrams, even when I do not have the faintest understanding of fermi-dirac distributions. Given this push in the right direction, I can then vaguely grasp the concept of transistors, even though my understanding of it was not provided rigorously or by an expert. At this point, I may have a general outline of what I could learn from a textbook, and thus be able to integrate the textbook information more seamlessly when I do read it. Is this, in your opinion, a poor strategy when attempting to learn a subject? Which is why I understand the importance of reading them, and am currently doing so. But it takes time, and when you are confronted with arguments that challenge others you have heard, you like to resolve those issues quickly, or at least get some intuition to keep you satisfied until you get to the primary source's argument. Good to know. One thing I have learned is to be more hesitant in asking a question before I have explored it more on my own. I won't post again on this issue, so if you want the last word, go for it.

I wholly plan on reading Rand's and Piekoff's views on epistemology, because I realize that no one can express them better than they. In the mean time, however, to get an idea for what those views are, I most certainly can enquire as to those views from anyone willing to answer me. Ms. X may tell me what she thinks about the dichotomy, but that is not what I asked; I asked what Objectivists hold, or rather, what does Objectivism say about the dichotomy? Anyways, I didn't mean to offend you by asking questions. I hope that is not the case.

LauricAcid, isn't the distinction you are trying to make the analytic/synthetic distinction ("a rose by any other name...")? You are trying to say that there are some sentences that are true without the need of using empirical evidence. Thus, as you put it, all ravens are ravens is true, so long as our concept of raven is consistent. Your other sentence, that all ravens are black, is neither true nor false until we have empirically verified it to be either. Is the reason that Objectivists deny the analytic/synthetic dichotomy because of the law of identity? I've been chewing on this all night, and that is what I have come up with. Basically, A is A, so saying that man is the rational animal is the same thing as saying that man is man -- the first sentence is "synthetic", and the second is "analytic", but since they profess the same truth, there is no such dichotomy? But this reasoning does not work for my earlier example. Without accepting determinism, saying "It will rain Tuesday" is not the same thing as saying "It will rain on the day it will rain," since without perceptual information, we cannot verify whether Tuesday is the rain day or not. Nor can I see it working for something like "Sally is happy"; though it may be that A is A and Sally is Sally, it does not follow that Sally is happy -- even if it is often in her character to be so.

They reject it, as Leibniz rejected it? I know that Objectivists believe in free will, and Leibniz rejected it on deterministic grounds. So on what grounds do Objectivists reject it? Or, since you point out that it is a false dichotomy, that could also mean that there are MORE options than just analytic or synthetic. Is this the case?

Are you implying that what I proposed as knowledge is lacking a metaphysical connection? I did indicate that knowledge has to be tied to reality in order to be true knowledge. I also, however, made the claim that knowledge was an epistemoligical, not metaphysical, entity; but this was in the attempt to say that knowledge does not exist like people exist, i.e. there is not some literal entity inside of our heads for every bit of knowledge we posess (we may have neurons that store this knowledge, but they are no more knowledge than the electrons stored in a memory cell are a pixel).

Not to bring Kant into the mix, but it sounds like you guys are talking about analytic statements. An analytic statement is one in which the predicate is the subject: "All men are men." These sentences are true, and the logical inverse is false ("all men are not men"). Thus all analytic statements can be judged as true or false without any reference to reality (and thus, what you guys are debating as "self-evident" versus "self-contradictory"). Synthetic statements, on the other hand, rely on perceptual data to verify its truth: "It rained on Tuesday". These are what you are calling the middle ground (neither self-evident or -contradictory). As a side note, Leibniz held that all statements are analytic. He was a strict determinist, so in making a statement such as "It rained on Tuesday," if you fully understood the nature of that particular Tuesday (which only God can), it follows that "It will rain on the day that will rain", which is a true statement independent of reality (if it were false, than it wouldn't be the day that it will rain). But since determinism is garbage, we can leave Leibniz as an interesting footnote.

This is a question that philosophers have been grappling at for years! But I suppose, off the top of my head, some mental entity (epistemologically, not metaphysically) that reflects some truth about reality. Thus, I can say that I know of the existence of gravity, but not of angels: I can know that 1+1=2, but not that prayers are in fact answered. I would also add that knowledge has to be supported by facts; like the broken clock that is correct twice a day, an arbitrary belief that coincidentally reflects reality is not knowledge. I wrote this very quickly, so please try to get the gist of what I am saying and not what I actually said. I value precision, just not before bedtime.