Park Zoo

I don't approve of moderator Felipe's highly personal and seemingly arbitrary standards for locking threads, so I won't be posting here anymore. Nevertheless, this exchange was entertaining, educational, and thought-provoking. I thank you for it.

Well then it's just a matter of time until this takes to the mainstream. And yet this crew has been working for some time now. What EVP I've heard on Art Bell's show strikes me as hoax work. Ghost voices should routinely plague recording engineers, radio operators, video editors, and everyone working with nearly any sort of equipment!

Perhaps I misunderstood. I'm not seeing a contradiction here. Yes, we choose. The electrochemistry is, in fact, how we choose. That is why pills and drugs can influence our behavior at all. Given that dynamics (such as speed) and arrangements are physical, you'll have to either accept that mind is physical, or believe that it is spirit. There really is no having it both ways. For you to say that mind is beyond the ability of a laboratory to study is putting it firmly in the area of mysticism. And each year, science learns more and more about the brain and mind. What you are feeling is the personal sensation of being alive. I'm not denying that; I feel the same thing. But there is nothing non-deterministic about it; we are composed of atoms identical to those found in stones and stars. Do atoms stop behaving according to the typical observed principles and adopt odd properties when placed inside a brain? Science has not found anything so peculiar about the human brain; it is simply larger and more complexly interconnected than those more humble models found in snakes and spiders.

Sorry, but with the t and t + 1 example, you've already accepted determinism. Now we're off to see if there is any ghost in the machine. Tell me about the dichotomy between mind and brain. Apparently they are in communication with each other? Is it physical communication? (If it is, it means that brain and mind are spatially separated; brain is one organ and mind another.) Or is it non-physical communication? Do you think modern advances in Neuroscience reflect any of this?

I find this a strong argument against religion. Look at the sketchy history of the concept of Deity. Look how it was postulated by awe-stricken cavemen, and how it grew alongside human society. In hunting societies He's a powerful animal. In pastoral societies, God is a shepherd; in warrior societies He's an awesome fighter. Next He is a master engineer who designed the universe as a big machine. It's not that we have no evidence for God. It's that we have too much! And all the evidence shows that it's a man-made idea.

Then I really don't think there is any dispute between your position and that of materialists and determinists. Let me see if you agree to more explicit statements. Do you agree that the state of a mind is completely determined by the state of its brain? Even that doesn't go quite far enough. It's like saying "speed needs an moving object to perform its function". Consciousness and speed are nothing but observed attributes of certain real things. Not only does consciousness never appear apart from brains, but it is meaningless to even think of it as anything but the activity of a brain. Although I know you're not claiming this, your wording paints the mental picture of a disembodied consciousness in search of a brain through which it can perform its function.

I don't know that the determinists are making such absurd claims. We may have a confusion with our definitions. If I told you that the state of your mind at time t precisely determines its state at t + 1 (taking into account the external stimuli, of course), would you take that as a contradiction of your volition? Seems like you're getting mystical about consciousness. Are you sure it's not simply a description of what brains do? Isn't it just a verb that describes the electrochemical dynamics of certain neuron bundles? It's not a physical "thing", yet neither is speed. But both are physical descriptions of physical systems.

Then I'd have to conclude that it is clarifying the working definition of identity; letting it be known that Objectivism shall apply it to all existents, in presumable distinction to other philosophies that might use the term "identity" to something which only applies to some existents.

Claiming to be able to conceive of 4 > 4 is as bad as claiming to be able to conceive of nothing existing, or of A not equalling A. It shows that you're no longer taking the discussion seriously. Is it conceivable that something could exist and lack identity?

This is a straw man. Determinists are not saying that humans find it incapable to get up after lying down, or that humans cannot be observed making choices. They are only saying that their volition is determined by the physical consitution of their brains. (To argue against that, one would have to say that volition is determined by non-physical factors. What the heck are those?)

If I knew the position and energy of every molecule in a brain at a certain moment, would I be able to predict that mind's state (and thinking, and volition) for a short time afterwards? He suspects that his will is determined. There's nothing ironic here at all.

He's using it as a (presumably conceivable) alternative to his statement. I'm showing that his alternative is self-refuting and inconceivable, nullifying his proof. Because all theorems are tautologies (they are true under all conditions) but not obvious because of the limited abilities of the human mind. That is how mathematical information differsfrom empirical observations. It is the analytic/synthetic dichotomy. However, Objectivism rejects the analytic/synthetic dichotomy, treating mathematics as an empirical science, and claiming that states of nature are as determined as the laws of mathematics. (Am I wrong?) Thus there are no "other worlds", only ignorance of this one. With the obvious difficulties of quantum uncertainty, chaos resulting from human actions, and the sketchy idea that human brains are material yet nondeterministic, it's an interesting point I'm not finished pondering. I absolutely refuse to accept that you, or anyone else, can conceive of 4 > 4. It doesn't imply anything, but when combined with other statements, yet more statements are arrived at? That is how I define implication. Null statements whose only meaning are "I am taking his conversation seriously and not goofing off" cannot be made to imply anything else, in whatever hierarchy. The first meaningful statement made after "Existence Exists" in Galt's speech is "If that which you claim to perceive does not exist, what you possess is not consciousness." It could be taken as an empirical observation about consciousness, or a trivial definitional rule, describing the way he intends to use the term.

A statement known to be true carries information when the listener can conceivably imagine alternatives. If you tell us that you're wearing a hat today, or that it is snowing in Tampa, that is information to anyone that can conceive of alternatives. If you tell us that 4 = 4, or that every green hat is a hat, that is not information because anyone that understands your language will agree. An exception could be made for complicated mathematical theorems that are not obvious; however, we are not discussing one of them here.

Do you realize that information selects between different possible states of reality? The smallest unit of information is the bit, which tells which of two possible states of reality are true. If only one of those states is conceivably possible, there is no information. This is my fundamental problem with the pseudo-statement "Existence exists", and I fail to see how information could be contained in the structure between a set of statements none of which carry any information. Is this hierarchy a logical proof that can convince a "primacy of consciousness" exponent of their error? Or are they like arguments based on God's Word: sound reasoning to those who already believe, and utter rubbish to those who don't? Galt compounds his error by continuing with "If nothing exists...", for if nothing exists, Galt doesn't exist, and neither does his argument. This does nothing to convince anyone of anything.

I think that a line of pseudo-reasoning that concluded that nothing exists could be safely discarded as erroneous by absurdity without the explicit assertion that, in fact, existence exists. And I think that the insistence that existence really exists would fail to convince someone who stubbornly refused to "believe in existence". An information-less statement cannot legitimately be used to arrive at conclusions about reality. And it has here been agreed that the statement under question carries no information. Therefore its deliberate expression is fruitless. Why then is it ever uttered? Is it ever used in chains of reasoning that do arrive at conclusions about reality? You've agreed that it carries no information, yet it asserts something. But an assertion is an assertion about reality. (If you want to challenge that, you'll have to point to some chunk of non-reality that can be asserted about.) Can a statement make an assertion about reality but not convey any information? Can a statement have meaning but not have meaning about anything in particular?