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2046

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Everything posted by 2046

  1. That is a good example of why Objectivism needed the concept of substantial form.
  2. Plus the fact that freedom (and the main issue is about what political rights are at play) means I do what I want and I don't have to explain the reason to anyone.
  3. When you are this much of a miserable old man, your ridicule is of no value. It's similar to knowing Bill O'Reilly is out there shaking his fist at you on TV.
  4. People find it hard often to hold two different things in their mind. They don't often see when they are shifting the goalposts or moving one criticism to cover up another. The best advocates will say "yes we are forcing you to labor because we think it's murder." That's quite a different thing than "you're not taking responsibility for the consequences of your actions" or "no one's forcing you to undergo some sort of labor." But it is common to retreat from one criticism into another.
  5. I voluntarily had a person on bike relationship which sometimes can result in breaking ones arm. Damn it I guess I can't go to the doctor and get a splint now because who am I to skirt the consequences of my actions. They're either this dumb or they think you are.
  6. The inability to understand something is not necessarily a comment on the something.
  7. One thing I've noticed among the pro-Russian right wingers is that they spend a lot of effort telling you about all this stuff about the US/NATO expansion, leaked phone calls, Azov, etc. to keep focus on the US/NATO as the "bad guys" in their current programming. But very few of them (?) either (a.) continue to say that since the US/NATO did all this stuff that therefore Russia's invasion is justified and amounts to self defense on the part of the Russians, or (b.) continue to say that nonetheless Russia's invasion is not justified and in fact they are committing a grave injustice worthy of resistance on the part of the Ukrainians. Question: why is that? Possible answer: They're not interested in the typical philosophical questions surrounding the issue. Finding out what one ought to do about a given situation in accordance with some set of general principles. (I mean in a Socratic sense that "care for one's own soul" would lead one to make sure one wasn't supporting or condoning or excusing injustice.) The interest here isn't even philosophical or practical at all. There is no truth one is trying to get at. One's goal is something else, like promoting one's self being an exciting contrarian "maybe I can make myself look like a really cool transgressive thinker." It's kind of a role play in one's head. The use of one's faculties is not aimed at guiding action, but is rhetorical in nature, as if to say "don't look there!" To remind one "we're bad too!" is designed to shift the focus of the listener and leave the rest to implication. Counter proposal: Putin/the Russian government does not have a legitimate security interest in NATO not expanding eastward or in the Ukraine wanting to be part of Europe. The reason is very simple: Putin is not a legitimate ruler and the Russian government is not morally legitimate. Putin has no right to rule at all, not over Ukraine and not even over Moscow. Indeed I, 2046 have more of a right to rule over Russia because at least I haven't violated anyone's rights or liberties and would immediately resign. It may or may not be strategically prudent to not upset Putin, to include tactical deception about one's intentions to join NATO, but he has no moral claim to keep NATO from his doorstep.
  8. Another possibility: it could be made into this or that coherent position, if fleshed out and clarified. But that's probably not it, it's probably just bullshit (in the Frankfurtian sense.)
  9. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lochner_v._New_York Alito actually mentions Lochner v NY in the opinion and explicitly calls it "freewheeling" and "discredited."
  10. After reading the leaked draft, this is indeed the main line of reasoning presented: the argument from democracy. Highly contentious moral views ought to be decided by the people, this is one, therefore this ought to be decided by the people. A second line of reasoning in the draft is an appeal to history or tradition. He argues that if a freestanding individual right to bodily autonomy is appealed to, well there's no historical basis for that, and after all it would lead to legalization of drugs and prostitution and that would just be crazy.
  11. In this view, I'm saying honesty is a principled commitment to never distort, fake, evade, misrepresent, or pretend things are other than what they are. I think that's a pretty straightforward reading of what Rand is saying in both the fiction and the non. Call it the knowledge acquisition view of honesty, or aspect of honesty, as opposed to the conventional "don't deceive others" view or aspect. A commonplace example might be a person in a relationship that feels bad vibes or more distant behavior from their partner that has been building for a while, but doesn't investigate its source and keeps pretending everything is fine. This has nothing to do with the fact that the person may not actually achieve knowledge even after discharge of one's epistemic obligations. But neither does it have to do with refusing to deceive deceiving others. It has more to do with practicing self-deception. The person isn't really seeking correspondence with reality, or if they are, only up to a point. As a result, the ability to acquire knowledge about the relationship or why the person feels a nagging anxiety will be hindered; their wellbeing and happiness will be hindered. Keep in mind what we're discussing here: whether honesty is just about "not deceiving others" or whether it is an intellectual virtue about one's own relationship towards facts in guiding one's own knowledge acquisition that derives its status as a virtue from the value of knowledge to the virtuous agent. This personal aspect of honesty as I'm highlighting it does not utilize the usual type of arguments about not about damaging reputation or relationships with others or about ill-gotten gains, not being able to get away with it, or any of the social reprocussions, but about making sure your own mind is active and you're not bullshitting yourself ("the unreal can have no value.")
  12. The concept to be placed opposite is seeking correspondence in the appropriate ways as opposed to just having correspondence. I do think there is a concept of seeking correspondence (a long winded way of saying seeking truth) in inappropriate ways. An example might be phlogiston, a substance thought to be released during combustion. They early chemists really were trying to understand something, had various reasons for why they postulated this, and began to abandon the concept after it became clear that there was no such thing and the reasons were methodically bad.
  13. It is broad, but the relationship in the relevant sense is of "not faking reality in any manner" (VOS 28 my emphasis), and "loyalty to reality" (Journals 648.) The import of loyalty and not faking carries more weight more than just correspondence, but is about seeking correspondence in appropriate ways. That does not require others to apply.
  14. That is not really what the virtues are for, so it sounds like you're talking about something different right now.
  15. You must be honest for yourself, you must be rational for yourself, etc. All of these have the "for yourself" elements. But being in a Robinson Crusoe type scenario isn't a stable pattern of flourishing, the vast bulk productivity takes place in society and with friendships and relationships and trade is paramount.
  16. I mean if we're going by Rand's honesty, that isn't even what she says honesty is. The pivotal feature of Rand's egoistic honesty versus the conventional account is one's relationship to facts, not to the beliefs of others. Independence can be contrasted with dependency, but the moral 'pull' of independence comes from the responsibility one has to oneself. Justice, in common parlance we often speak of resiliency in terms of not being unfair to too harsh or unjust to oneself. Rationality is often a cooperative enterprise and is inherently connected with language use, productivity without others to trade with is impossible, and pride often deals with commitment to one's moral conduct in the face of criticism or disapproval from others, as well as giving and receiving honor from others. Integrity deals with congruence with one's words and behavior, which far from being a redundancy with "be virtuous" is a sharpening of the focus on something that comes up almost every day in life. There are a lot more aspects to the virtues from different angles than are accounted for here. It's not easy to just put ones "founded in ethics" over in this basket, or "requiring others" in that basket. If by ethics we mean anything pertaining to our character, then they are all for that. If living well requires others, then they are all for that as well. Rather it seems they all interpenetrate in both individualizing and social ways (as one would expect who knows what logikon and politikon point towards.) We are left asking again, "what was the need for this distinction?" "What problem is it solving?" We may as well divide the virtues into those with even amount of letters and those with odd, or those over six letters long and those under.
  17. NOL doesn't have anything to say about a "basic political unit," though. It certainly doesn't try to put a number on it (like saying two or more, of three or more.) Obviously you do need two or more, but just two or even three isn't a political community. There, the concept of a polis, or political community is the proper object of political theorizing. It needs to be sufficiently large that law and customs have a need to be institutionalized. If there is anything like a "basic political unit," it would be the individual. The argument for this is the same as the argument for individual substances being the most real things. Societies or communities aren't substances in themselves, but are composed of substances. That you would need a "basic political unit," though isn't clear to me. The political community is composed of individuals and the political community is for the happiness of the individuals composing it.
  18. I mean this talk of a "basic political unit" what does it mean? What problem is it solving? There is a question about the foundation of politics and there is a question about the basic political unit. Are those the same thing? What work is the basic unit doing?
  19. Might I suggest a different thread specifically for this tangent, I'd hate to interrupt the latest open vs closed reattack.
  20. I mean, not really. While there is a great deal of exegesis of "the arbitrary as neither true nor false" in ch. 5 of OPAR, but the burden of proof principle is a logical commonplace. On the second point, I had made the following remark already: "The one way we could know whether we were in error about a given faculty is by discovery of some truth which reveals us our error." This is the way to counter the method of Cartesian doubt with regards to individual faculties, that all of our faculties couldn't be in error all the time. But the point of the simulation or BIV scenarios is not to deny existence, it's to deny your knowledge of it. Imagine someone saying you are really a brain in a vat, you are hooked up and experiencing a simulation. They're perfectly content to say yes, existence exists, you just don't genuinely experience it beyond what is fed to you. And since we can imagine this being the case, it is therefore possible, unless the realist prove it's not. The way to counter this is the burden of proof principle, and a denial of the assumption that because something is imaginable it is possible.
  21. You're confusing some things here. "Skepticism" does not mean "we're living in a simulation"/BIV scenarios. Those are two different things. Skepticism comes from the Greek skepsis or skeptikos which can mean questioning or doubt, and is associated with the suspension of judgment. The historical skeptics cultivated a refusal to assent to anything. (See Popkin's History of Skepticism.) There are two basic types of skepticism, universal and particular. The number one argument against universal skepticism is the self contradiction argument. This argument proceeds by pointing out that the act of professing universal skepticism requires one to process knowledge about something and thus would involve contradictory beliefs. Note this isn't an "objectivist argument" at all. It's like the first thing any philosopher would probably say in response to skepticism. The simulation scenario is a variation of Rene Descartes evil demon argument, from the Meditations. The connection with skepticism is by way of the method Descartes uses called methodical doubt. It doesn't really matter all the details of this, but the reasons Descartes gives for doubting one or more part of our faculties, but the point is it doesn't really make sense. The one way we could know whether we were in error about a given faculty is by discovery of some truth which reveals us our error. The point is more about differing starting points in epistemology. The introduction of the evil demon, or the simulation or the BIV, the exact mechanism involved is besides the point, the point is the method. It doesn't really make sense to believe any old thing until it's disproven, that's not how cognition works. Instead you need a reason for believing something, not a reason for disbelief in something. That was the point Russell was trying to make. It's also just not true that "everybody but objectivists" thinks this. Very few people think skepticism is the way to go, or think methodical doubt is the way to go. To know this you could spend time talking to people who do philosophy professionally. Or like attend a basic undergraduate course in knowledge theory, where undergrads are usual given Descartes as a low-ball target. Another way you could know this is by looking at the 2020 Phil Papers survey, which surveyed the philosophical views of 1785 English-speaking philosophers from around the world on 100 philosophical questions. For instance, the exact question that Cartesian demons and BIVs was constructed for, external world skepticism, the results were: External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? Accept or lean towards: idealism 6.63% (5.44%) Accept or lean towards: skepticism 5.44% (4.76%) Accept or lean towards: non-skeptical realism 79.54% (78.17%) Other 11.62%
  22. I'm a little unclear about this part of what you're saying. Sounds like you're saying proving this would be straightforward, or more well known, except for the bad arguments that are hard for people to see are bad. (?) But "proving, entirely from consciousness, that there is a world outside of consciousness" is not what you're trying to do, I assume? I mean that is impossible to do and faulty to attempt. That's definitely not what an Aristotelian-Randian approach would attempt, anyway (not sure if that's what you're going for then), but maybe if you were going for a Cartesian-style approach.
  23. Arguing about definitions is part of any sort of meaningful discussion though, especially philosophical ones. I mean look at that Socrates guy, that's kinda how the whole enterprise got started. If your standard is that which you never get disagreement or pushback on, I agree you should be vexed. In terms of voting, yes sure people disagree about just what independent reasons there are for doing things, and voting can be a way of solving it. Certainly "ballots over bullets" can have some sort of instrumental value in solving some sorts of disagreements. But that is some ways away from saying that voting is intrinsically valuable, or that the vote is itself what gives the reason its force. More less that it is the best or only way of solving such disagreements, or even that some disagreements call for bullets.
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