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2046

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Everything posted by 2046

  1. Hey hey no technical jargon here you elitist! By the way, since this was a point under contention in this thread, I'd like to post ARs comments on this, from a letter to John Hospers:
  2. Most objectivists are like most amateur philosophy hobbyists in general: they're roleplayers.
  3. I do appreciate a good book summary. But as you may have guessed, I have different thoughts. I'm glad you brought up dogmatic philosophy as a technical term because that's part of what I mean here. You say at once that you don't care for such academic claptrap as using strict technical terms for things (my words.) You only are interested in philosophy insofar as it contributes lessons to living your life. But also your main thesis is what Objectivists think about Kant. They get him wrong! I wanna fix that! I'm sorry but I do see a tension between those things. Don't get me wrong, pursue whatever your interested in. I think I get the motivation: suppose two people you're friends with are fighting. If only they realized how much they have in common. You want Randians to like German philosophers because that's what you like. But if what you're interested in is what we call a reputational rehabilitation of Kant in a very specific philosophical circle, then precisely using specific technical terms (and in ways that appeal into that circle's framework) is going to be a huge part of that. I think this list is great. Any one of them could be its own fullblown topic. But we need references to the text, and explanations of the terms into mutual language, and argument as to how they are similar or different. Do they reach the same conclusions from different premises? If so why? Etc. Here are some examples of his type of thing being done well. (And some are just blog posts.) "Rand, Kant, and the Objectivity of Colour" Roderick T. Long "Rand on Kant: Let’s Use This as a Teaching Moment" Jason Brennan "Conceptualism in Abelard and Rand" Peter Saint-Andre "Ayn Rand and Friedrich A. Hayek: A Side-by-Side Comparison" Edward W. Younkins
  4. Thank you, I was unsure what was going on there. My comments will be limited to matters of interpretation (until the very end.) When you're doing something like this, there is always the danger of stretching things out too much. There is also the danger of verbal agreement or disagreement when people are using words out of historical context and applying them to different people. In other words, of a sort of anachronism and equivocation. Example: Suppose set myself to claiming Aristotle was a libertarian on the issue of free will. And I just claim that in passing in a paper about some different topic. Is that okay? Well, is he a libertarian? It's hard to say. The controversies over free will and determinism postdate his writings, and he doesn't ever address that question. It's more accurate to talk about the various parts of the soul and the role they play in choosing, and what counts as a voluntary action to Aristotle. It might be possible to do a text search for everything he said and using surrounding context, that I might make a thesis about whether or not he was a libertarian, if I converted the language over, but that takes work and space of its own. If I want to gain that point, I have to put in the honest toil, I can't just beg the question in passing. At best I would have to say, grant me this extremely controversial point passing, for the purpose of the point I'm trying to make. That makes my work a lot weaker. Kant's thesis was aimed at the proposal that there are certain a priori conditions of experience. This was meant to answer questions raised much earlier by Hume that brought about deep skepticism about causation, self, and the relationship of mind to reality. The philosophy of mind emerged later in the late 19th and early 20th century as a distinct sub-discipline dealing with the relationship of mind to body and reality in general. In the second half of the 20th century, it developed its own unique technical language to answer questions brought up earlier. Rand and Peikoff weren't a part of these debates. Nor were these debates or their technical terms aimed specifically at answering "how does conscious arise" or "what causes change in consciousness." So is Peikoff a physicalist? I doubt it. He's not answer the questions you are asking and he's not using the terms you use. Nowhere does he say those things ("it arises out of just physical objects impinging.") The only time he talks about impinging in OPAR is talking about sense perception, and he distinguishes that from consciousness per se. Is he a physicalist in the sense of the contemporary use of the technical term? Absolutely not. The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy entry on physicalism states: The Oxford Companion to Philosophy entry on physicalism states: To me, paradigmatic physicalists are the ancient atomists, Hobbes, Marx, and people like Smart, Donald Davidson, and the Churchlands. Peikoff definitely isn't saying anything like that, or even remotely near that, and explicitly argues against materialism. So, in other words, for me, I'm saying 'no, that point is controversial, if you want to gain it by honest toil, I'm going to need a lot more.' As to your main thesis: you started off making a really controversial claim about Rand and Kant, then shifted it to Schelling, then started asking and answering other questions without tying it back to the main thesis, or motivating it or signposting it. The whole thing just seems scatterbrained to me.
  5. What, in your words, do you take physicalism to be?
  6. That is a good example of why Objectivism needed the concept of substantial form.
  7. Plus the fact that freedom (and the main issue is about what political rights are at play) means I do what I want and I don't have to explain the reason to anyone.
  8. When you are this much of a miserable old man, your ridicule is of no value. It's similar to knowing Bill O'Reilly is out there shaking his fist at you on TV.
  9. People find it hard often to hold two different things in their mind. They don't often see when they are shifting the goalposts or moving one criticism to cover up another. The best advocates will say "yes we are forcing you to labor because we think it's murder." That's quite a different thing than "you're not taking responsibility for the consequences of your actions" or "no one's forcing you to undergo some sort of labor." But it is common to retreat from one criticism into another.
  10. I voluntarily had a person on bike relationship which sometimes can result in breaking ones arm. Damn it I guess I can't go to the doctor and get a splint now because who am I to skirt the consequences of my actions. They're either this dumb or they think you are.
  11. The inability to understand something is not necessarily a comment on the something.
  12. One thing I've noticed among the pro-Russian right wingers is that they spend a lot of effort telling you about all this stuff about the US/NATO expansion, leaked phone calls, Azov, etc. to keep focus on the US/NATO as the "bad guys" in their current programming. But very few of them (?) either (a.) continue to say that since the US/NATO did all this stuff that therefore Russia's invasion is justified and amounts to self defense on the part of the Russians, or (b.) continue to say that nonetheless Russia's invasion is not justified and in fact they are committing a grave injustice worthy of resistance on the part of the Ukrainians. Question: why is that? Possible answer: They're not interested in the typical philosophical questions surrounding the issue. Finding out what one ought to do about a given situation in accordance with some set of general principles. (I mean in a Socratic sense that "care for one's own soul" would lead one to make sure one wasn't supporting or condoning or excusing injustice.) The interest here isn't even philosophical or practical at all. There is no truth one is trying to get at. One's goal is something else, like promoting one's self being an exciting contrarian "maybe I can make myself look like a really cool transgressive thinker." It's kind of a role play in one's head. The use of one's faculties is not aimed at guiding action, but is rhetorical in nature, as if to say "don't look there!" To remind one "we're bad too!" is designed to shift the focus of the listener and leave the rest to implication. Counter proposal: Putin/the Russian government does not have a legitimate security interest in NATO not expanding eastward or in the Ukraine wanting to be part of Europe. The reason is very simple: Putin is not a legitimate ruler and the Russian government is not morally legitimate. Putin has no right to rule at all, not over Ukraine and not even over Moscow. Indeed I, 2046 have more of a right to rule over Russia because at least I haven't violated anyone's rights or liberties and would immediately resign. It may or may not be strategically prudent to not upset Putin, to include tactical deception about one's intentions to join NATO, but he has no moral claim to keep NATO from his doorstep.
  13. Another possibility: it could be made into this or that coherent position, if fleshed out and clarified. But that's probably not it, it's probably just bullshit (in the Frankfurtian sense.)
  14. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lochner_v._New_York Alito actually mentions Lochner v NY in the opinion and explicitly calls it "freewheeling" and "discredited."
  15. After reading the leaked draft, this is indeed the main line of reasoning presented: the argument from democracy. Highly contentious moral views ought to be decided by the people, this is one, therefore this ought to be decided by the people. A second line of reasoning in the draft is an appeal to history or tradition. He argues that if a freestanding individual right to bodily autonomy is appealed to, well there's no historical basis for that, and after all it would lead to legalization of drugs and prostitution and that would just be crazy.
  16. In this view, I'm saying honesty is a principled commitment to never distort, fake, evade, misrepresent, or pretend things are other than what they are. I think that's a pretty straightforward reading of what Rand is saying in both the fiction and the non. Call it the knowledge acquisition view of honesty, or aspect of honesty, as opposed to the conventional "don't deceive others" view or aspect. A commonplace example might be a person in a relationship that feels bad vibes or more distant behavior from their partner that has been building for a while, but doesn't investigate its source and keeps pretending everything is fine. This has nothing to do with the fact that the person may not actually achieve knowledge even after discharge of one's epistemic obligations. But neither does it have to do with refusing to deceive deceiving others. It has more to do with practicing self-deception. The person isn't really seeking correspondence with reality, or if they are, only up to a point. As a result, the ability to acquire knowledge about the relationship or why the person feels a nagging anxiety will be hindered; their wellbeing and happiness will be hindered. Keep in mind what we're discussing here: whether honesty is just about "not deceiving others" or whether it is an intellectual virtue about one's own relationship towards facts in guiding one's own knowledge acquisition that derives its status as a virtue from the value of knowledge to the virtuous agent. This personal aspect of honesty as I'm highlighting it does not utilize the usual type of arguments about not about damaging reputation or relationships with others or about ill-gotten gains, not being able to get away with it, or any of the social reprocussions, but about making sure your own mind is active and you're not bullshitting yourself ("the unreal can have no value.")
  17. The concept to be placed opposite is seeking correspondence in the appropriate ways as opposed to just having correspondence. I do think there is a concept of seeking correspondence (a long winded way of saying seeking truth) in inappropriate ways. An example might be phlogiston, a substance thought to be released during combustion. They early chemists really were trying to understand something, had various reasons for why they postulated this, and began to abandon the concept after it became clear that there was no such thing and the reasons were methodically bad.
  18. It is broad, but the relationship in the relevant sense is of "not faking reality in any manner" (VOS 28 my emphasis), and "loyalty to reality" (Journals 648.) The import of loyalty and not faking carries more weight more than just correspondence, but is about seeking correspondence in appropriate ways. That does not require others to apply.
  19. That is not really what the virtues are for, so it sounds like you're talking about something different right now.
  20. You must be honest for yourself, you must be rational for yourself, etc. All of these have the "for yourself" elements. But being in a Robinson Crusoe type scenario isn't a stable pattern of flourishing, the vast bulk productivity takes place in society and with friendships and relationships and trade is paramount.
  21. I mean if we're going by Rand's honesty, that isn't even what she says honesty is. The pivotal feature of Rand's egoistic honesty versus the conventional account is one's relationship to facts, not to the beliefs of others. Independence can be contrasted with dependency, but the moral 'pull' of independence comes from the responsibility one has to oneself. Justice, in common parlance we often speak of resiliency in terms of not being unfair to too harsh or unjust to oneself. Rationality is often a cooperative enterprise and is inherently connected with language use, productivity without others to trade with is impossible, and pride often deals with commitment to one's moral conduct in the face of criticism or disapproval from others, as well as giving and receiving honor from others. Integrity deals with congruence with one's words and behavior, which far from being a redundancy with "be virtuous" is a sharpening of the focus on something that comes up almost every day in life. There are a lot more aspects to the virtues from different angles than are accounted for here. It's not easy to just put ones "founded in ethics" over in this basket, or "requiring others" in that basket. If by ethics we mean anything pertaining to our character, then they are all for that. If living well requires others, then they are all for that as well. Rather it seems they all interpenetrate in both individualizing and social ways (as one would expect who knows what logikon and politikon point towards.) We are left asking again, "what was the need for this distinction?" "What problem is it solving?" We may as well divide the virtues into those with even amount of letters and those with odd, or those over six letters long and those under.
  22. NOL doesn't have anything to say about a "basic political unit," though. It certainly doesn't try to put a number on it (like saying two or more, of three or more.) Obviously you do need two or more, but just two or even three isn't a political community. There, the concept of a polis, or political community is the proper object of political theorizing. It needs to be sufficiently large that law and customs have a need to be institutionalized. If there is anything like a "basic political unit," it would be the individual. The argument for this is the same as the argument for individual substances being the most real things. Societies or communities aren't substances in themselves, but are composed of substances. That you would need a "basic political unit," though isn't clear to me. The political community is composed of individuals and the political community is for the happiness of the individuals composing it.
  23. I mean this talk of a "basic political unit" what does it mean? What problem is it solving? There is a question about the foundation of politics and there is a question about the basic political unit. Are those the same thing? What work is the basic unit doing?
  24. Might I suggest a different thread specifically for this tangent, I'd hate to interrupt the latest open vs closed reattack.
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