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2046

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  1. Have you considered doing it on Clubhouse?
  2. I think maybe this is an issue with some of Rand's non-fiction, like speaking of the metaphysical versus the man-made as that which could not have been otherwise and so forth, without much elaboration on what sense of can/could is being used. But I haven't read that essay in a while.
  3. I think that's basically the whole thread. People often subconsciously think a thing having an identity is just mechanical causality. So they think you have things acting according to their identities, but you also have free will, so how to make that work. But they're making something that is all bottom-up causality, like an artifact in the Aristotelian sense. So they hear this Objectivist line about a new type of causality. Well there must be a new type of casualty, meaning a new mechanism. So they spend 6 pages looking around for a new mechanism, or seeing how they can change the wordi
  4. Not to mention I always love it when they, who are a them and definitely not a we, say how "we" should do anything
  5. This but unironically
  6. If it's a substance not yet discovered, how could anyone possibly answer that? That's not so much a question for the position but a problem for the position. Moreover, why assume substance dualism in the first place? Generally, people like to see arguments or at least some motivating reasons for these positions.
  7. Well, from my understanding, a substance is a particular, and is a matter-form composite. So it's not what particulars are "made out of" (like, eg., the modern chemistry term.) And matter-sans-form wouldn't be a substance, it would be prime matter. Prime matter, while a real feature of the world, isn't concretely real, or isn't a concrete, in the sense that it isn't any thing unless made determinate by form. Or at least that's the A-T line of thought (Cf. the Oderberg book mentioned earlier.) Scotus and Suarez think that prime matter can exist by itself, related to their views on the aforement
  8. I was thinking about this, and reading about a problem Aquinas had. Or really his Dominican brothers had and he set out to solve. It seemed like there was a problem with the concept of matter. We know God and the angels can't be material because of certain passages in the Bible. We know that the world of nature abounds with material things from common sense observation. We also know that matter provides the basis of potentialities and the substratum of change. Problem is, if both God and the angels are immaterial, how can the angels be different from God? God, as we know, is pure form, s
  9. Oh okay. Yeah the more I think about it, the more I think it would have to be matter-form composites as a whole applying to both mass and energy. Energy would have to be a way of conceiving of part of an already-enformed piece of matter, in other words a whole substance, in order to be a real thing capable of physical description. But really I don't know much about it. I'll check out the Handbook. The Oderberg book, Real Essentialism is something I've been reading, and had been influencing a lot of my understanding. But that's precisely what the early moderns did believe. A
  10. Also, it doesn't seem like matter-energy would be, if we take this train of thought for a second, convertible to matter-form necessarily, as if energy is being compared to form here. Aristotelian matter would subsume both notions of material-ness in the modern sense of "being composed by particles containing mass and taking up space," and energy as "the capacity to do work." Incidentally Heisenberg, while not a wholesale Aristotelian by any means, noticed something like this about the implications of quantum theory. In his 1958 work Physics and Philosophy he says a whole bunch of stuff al
  11. Well, I don't think the claim is that the chemist should explain opium by saying "it has a dormitive form in its matter." But the implications for revising our concept of matter could have big picture consequences. For one, you'd no longer have this fragmented dualistic world in which there is just these microphysical particles that somehow have no nature themselves going around in motion, and then you have a separate mental world of purposes and thought and "the soul" on the other hand (or none at all.) By rethinking modern-matter as atomic "matter as such," and thinking of it as a rela
  12. Is this not a motivating premise behind this entire thread, that you are confused as to why people aren't coerced by your proofs?
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