Eiuol

Plasmatic, please read carefully. The context about my post is metaphysics. There is no "metaphysical" context. Context is epistemological - what something is primarily depends on what you choose to focus on. I only said you were reifying because what you said suggests that there is an absolute fundamentality, implicitly advocating natural kinds - a great example of making ontology into a metaphysical fact. A metaphysical hierarchy of concepts. I'd argue that ontology is often invalid actually, since ontology is more or less deciding metaphysical hierarchy. Doing that is reification, making real what is not actually real. Ontology only makes sense in epistemological terms, i.e. purposeful knowledge.

"Table" is not more or less primary than "firewood". No concept is more primary than the other. Existence itself, not the concept "existence", is still fundamental to everything at all. Don't reify ontology. There is no unqualified absolute fundamentality, only contextually absolute fundamentality. Existence is assumed throughout and required. I don't know exact quotes, but it's pretty basic to Objectivist epistemology that no concept is inherently "more important" than another.

Your formalization looks okay, although 1 needs to be modified - it only works for objects that are tools. If purpose means subjective, fine, but more accurately it is agent relative, which is essentially how Rand thought of epistemology. That multiple concepts can be applied to one entity is no problem. There is no metaphysically primary concept, which concept you use is a matter of what you're focusing on. Tables aren't usually synonymous with firewood since tables are made out of many different materials.

Jeez... Consciousness is not equal to intelligence... It seems like you're saying thinking stupidly is being non-conscious, which makes no sense. That is, unless you accept that consciousness is purely materialistic...

Finish reading it. At the bottom: "The Global Consciousness Project is directed by Roger Nelson from his home office in Princeton. The Institute of Noetic Sciences provides a logistical home for the GCP. It is not a project of Princeton University."

If there are two different terms, they need to be distinct in some manner, otherwise they are just synonyms. Yes, love is what matters, and that's my point - romantic and friendly love are both under the some category, while the common view is that they fall into separate categories entirely. The affective intensity is greater in both cases, but the difference between the views is how to classify the nature of the intensity. Sure, RA would say romantic love is not "magically" different, but neither would the common view. I question that there really is any rational difference though, so I want to know from people who take the common view what they think the differences are. If friendly and romantic love are in the same category, you're totally right that the kinds of love shouldn't come with entirely different sets of principles. I'm not seeking a universal answer, nor an Objectivist answer even, but a rational way to talk and think about love. What are the principles involved with love, and are the concepts friendship and romance as distinct as most people claim? True, RA doesn't try to argue that there is no difference, but as far as I see, for it to be a rational view, it must argue that the difference is not so significant that it requires a whole set of different principles. Perhaps intensity and duration are the only things that vary how love is experienced, and the two concepts are to approximate general areas on those two dimensions. As an aside, no concept is "universal" - concepts are tools to understand the world. You're right about what is moral according to Objectivism. Part of Rand's point of sex being appropriate only for highest values is that the nature of sex is that it is such a grand expression of values and self-esteem that sex with anyone less than a highest value is a sacrifice, which is immoral. That is, against your self-interest. However, I think that's only an argument for "sufficiently high", not "highest". Clearly, if sufficiently high is needed, then Rand's conclusions don't follow. Maybe in principle it is proper, depending on individual context, to have people only meet a minimum, whether it is 1 or 9. The principle to use to judge if sex is moral or not changes from determining the highest value to determining the threshold minimum value in the first place.

Right, you are not and cannot be aware of my own consciousness. You can still determine that someone is conscious just as you can determine I'm not a computer. Otherwise, you're saying the zombie hypothesis is possible: it's possible to appear conscious without being conscious, so we must include more to the concept for it to be useful. Saying that consciousness as a concept ALSO includes the mechanisms it operates under doesn't help, as it quickly becomes functionalism. I see what you want to get at, but I lose you when you say "but that does not mean consciousness IS the view by which they experience it". I think this is wrong. When someone is conscious, it means they have a faculty of awareness, that's all it means. A faculty in this sense refers to the experience itself. A faculty of sight is the same: the experience of seeing. That's all sight IS!

Some expansion of my post after talking to people about this specific post. With regard to love being the "most exclusive", it doesn't need to imply total exclusivity. Even though Rand was probably thinking about exclusivity as it is usually meant, i.e. monogamy, there is reason to say it doesn't have to singular. Picture a triangle representing how many people fit into categories of relationships. At the bottom and most diverse level, there is anyone I interact with. Narrower than that might be say, acquaintances, followed by friendship, and so on until romantic love reaches a singular point. Instead of a point, it is fair to treat the whole shape as a trapezoid, where multiple people qualify as romantic partners. This is still the most exclusive, where the fewest people fit into this category. As I understand RA, although romance can be the most exclusive, it doesn't follow that therefore romance is the most important. I don't have a lot more to say, maybe Eponine might for how it might matter for RA. Secondly, I want to emphasize the part about the distinction between friendship and romance. RA is basically that the distinction is one of degree. Objectivism suggests, at least by anything I read, that the distinction is one of kind. "Kind" isn't the best term, as all emotions share some common features by virtue of being concepts of consciousness, although it conveys what I want. The trouble is some overlap possible where romance is "low" and friendship is "high" - a borderline case. This overlap doesn't mean that the distinction is one of degree necessarily, as all emotions transition proportionally and multiple emotions may be present at the same time. As friendship grows, it makes sense to say when there is romantic compatibility, the feelings of romance would increase. It helps with psychological visibility and understanding the other person's sense of life. Simply put, friendship and romance correlate, it just doesn't mean they fall in the same category. However, I've still yet to identify what essential feature(s) differ between romance and friendship besides intensity. No answer about that has been given to me, or at least the best answers are vague or too open to be worthwhile for philosophical discussion. To use my lettered dimensions again, romance may only share dimensions A-B of friendship, and differs on dimensions C-E, including affective intensity. What are dimensions C and D? The similarity is down, but differentiation is needed to point out if romance is a special category of love, all on its own. If romance is not a special category all on its own and only part of a continuum with friendship, it is proper to have sex with anyone in the continuum, provided they meet a rational standard - it isn't in principle wrong to have sexual friendships. For RA I think, the rational standard cannot be romance since it belongs to the continuum.

Right about what? A faculty of awareness means it is referring to one's being aware - it's the ability of awareness. Nothing else really. If you claim that it's "more" than that, and want to show that you're correct, then I need a stronger argument. I think "adding" more leads to all the errors of functionalism and property dualism.

"Wooden table" is two concepts: wooden and table. There is nothing wrong with multiple concepts applying to one entity. Perhaps you can make it into one, but then it's still a type of table. That is its genus is "table" and the concept table also applies to it. If it is used as firewood, then you'd probably say "this table is primarily treated as firewood". It always was firewood to the extent it meets the essential character

"Relationship anarchy" is a term I've been thinking about lately. The term isn't referring to anarchy as about rejecting government - it is not political. Instead, it is about rejecting rules that exist on a social scale for how to treat relationships, especially regarding friendship and romance. I don't mean a disregard for social norms altogether, I just mean social norms pertaining to romance. The link is a decent source, but keep in mind that the term hasn't been around long at all, so a lot of it is vague or disregards principled thought, but a gist of the idea is there: and RA implies a few more ideas, namely, non-monogamy and because each relationship is independent of other relationships. Think of it as a form of polyamory. That you have two or more mates (I mean "mate" as a romantic relationship) need not mean that the two relationships leech the quality of love with both your mates. Additionally, sex between friends is morally acceptable with this view, since it rejects the norm that sex ought to be between mates only - or only with your "highest value" in Objectivist parlance. Clearly, RA is not an Objectivist view, at least regarding sex. To be clear, the rest of my post assumes selfishness as a virtue and all that good stuff, I'm discussing this on questioning Objectivist views of sex and romance. Let's make the Objectivist view about romantic relationships clear: A lot more can be said, but I chose these points because I think they are the most essential. As for sex: This last quote is from the Playboy interview, and I think it is a source at least reliable as most of Rand's non-fiction for portraying Objectivist philosophy. These quotes open questions for me. For one, why is romantic love the "most exclusive" form of love? I read lines like this before, but it seems to come out of nowhere while not making a lot of sense considering the points like love is an unlimited response to be earned. So how can romantic love be "more exclusive"? I suppose it means a sharper focus and more intense love, but I'm still not seeing why exclusivity matters other than how it is a standard view. RA, and polyamory in general, both reject exclusivity. Additionally, I don't see exclusivity as an Objectivist view if we look at Rand's overall message, that love is an unlimited response to values and sense of life. My other question is why sex is only proper with regard to highest values as opposed to sufficiently high? Let me take an arbitrary value ranking of people as follows: Philip, 7; Kate, 9; Rick, 1; Gina, 5. Suppose 7 is a sufficiently high valuation to warrant sex, assuming the feelings involved are still a notable response to values. That means it is proper to have sex with Philip and Kate. Rick is perhaps equivalent to a one night stand where sex happens once but not contact again. Gina is a good friend, but there isn't a great deal of intensity despite an enjoyable friendship. Philip is "just a friend", while Kate is a mate. Yet why would Objectivism say sex is only proper with Kate? RA goes further than simply saying sex doesn't need to be with highest values - it says that sexual/romantic relationships don't have to be more important than non-sexual/romantic partners. To begin, I want to pay attention to the difference between friendship and romance. Some would say they are a difference in kind, except when I take into account all that Rand wrote on love, I don't see how even Objectivism properly justifies that conclusion. Take this line from ITOE: Somehow, romantic love is incredibly unique, all while Rand is saying here that romantic love is more intense than liking, not a concept with a different genus. Love versus hatred is an example of two concepts of consciousness with a different genus. I prefer to get more precise than this, though. I say romance and friendship share many dimensions and vary on a dimension of intensity of loving feelings. What kind of feelings does friendship cause if not just a reduced intensity of loving feeling? It doesn't seem like there's a reason to preclude loving acts like sex in friendship if love should not be purely platonic. If romance shares dimensions A-D with liking, but primarily differs along E, intensity, then it would make sense to say that in principle sex is proper in greater degrees of E. Furthermore, the degree of E doesn't mean always that the relationship is more valuable. In my mind, it is epistemologically important to define relationships in terms of maximizing values rather than holding romantic love as the "be-all end-all" form of love. Otherwise, it compartmentalizes thinking in unnecessary ways. ((All quotes about Objectivism I got from the lexicon.))

Why are you asking me? Clarify it yourself. I can't get more precise until you make counter-arguments. I'm not sure what you oppose. That the proper role of government is to protect rights in no way change or contradict what I said. Harrison, it wouldn't be thought-crime, because I'm talking about people who have shown themselves as animal abusers and is itself a threat. Verbal threats aren't thought-crime, and the threat in an animal abuser is more demonstrable than that even.

Not exactly. For Objectivism, your stance as an observer cannot be disregarded. Concept formation and knowledge is dependent upon you as an observer and what you can grasp about the world. In some sense this is "subjective" i.e. observer-relative, but it doesn't deny that the nature of reality is independent of your wishes and desires. What you know about tables has to do with your attitude/stance towards things that express characteristics of tables. There is no "Absolute Table" in reality, but what you refer to as a table, to be objective, should be characteristics that are measurable, even if that measure is relative to you as an observer. In the case of tables, it will be relative to the function an object serves for you, namely, a flat surface on which to place objects.

I said "deeper", not "beyond". Less than a paragraph is shallow and rationalistic (If I don't directly harm you, I should legally be allowed to do whatever I want, QED). Deeper is actually talking about the purpose of rights. So far, I don't think you're being Socratic, if you have a reply, type it out. I don't wanna chase you to find your argument. I'm not talking yet about what the punishment should be. Read my reductio argument carefully, it is a chain of reasoning that seems to be the best I have to say we may do ANYTHING we wish to animals.

Nope, it's totally impossible that I can think about a topic without thinking deeper about individual rights. Obviously there is nothing to say about wanton destruction except it is their legal right to annihilate anything. Nothing else at all. I have the right to buy dogs then proceed to drown them just as I can burn all my books if I wanted - it may be dumb, but animals are equivalent to objects. Therefore there ought to be no legal repercussions for using property as I wish. After all, there is nothing threatening about torturing animals for fun and has no impact whatever on our rights-respecting society. The ability to choose to abuse or not abuse animals is much like racism: it is irrational, but it is important that we all are able to deem to be rational, save for initiating force. Indeed, it is up to each of us individually if grabbing a brick and beating a friendly dog to death is rational. No person should make that decision for us regarding animals, land, or objects. Clearly, the choice to kill animals depends on how you want to run your life. Astounding response Nicky, I realize my error now. *** Come on, really, it's only wrong to blow up the moon if it rains fire on Earth? It's okay if I managed to divert the debris? The point is that the act of destruction is at a level beyond even regular criminal behavior. Someone willing to destroy for mere entertainment is in fact a threat even in this unusual and improbable case that doesn't involve rights. It involves the foundation of rights where we establish what is necessary to live in a society. Abuse and torture of animals I propose is a threat to us with the sort of irrationality involved. Government protects rights, yes, but I don't think it precludes some psychological cases of violent behavior towards living things that are intelligent enough, like orcas, intentional or not. Remember, we're talking about harming animals for pleasure/enjoyment, not for consumption or medical experiments. It is possible to kill and torture animals, but not objects. At the least, the legal topic of animal abuse ought to be treated differently than self-abuse or damaging one's own objects.

I said borderline for property. Not borderline for rights. I SAID that my reasons were NOT that animals have rights. To consider a "borderline" case of property that does not involve right violations in the thing harmed may be something as extreme as blowing up the moon to see the pretty fireworks. No owns the moon but I'm inclined to say it is proper to forcibly stop that destruction. People can own animals, but I think it is fair to say that legally speaking we can't use the same rules as we would for owning objects. Please read carefully, don't go off thinking I'm advocating animal rights. I was careful to say borderline about treatment as most property is treated.

Whether compensation justifies an action is a weird distinction. It'd make more sense to say that the return on value being sufficiently high makes some actions moral. If, for instance, you had skills as a doctor but were not given a sufficient trade, treating someone would be immoral and unjust to yourself. Other actions aren't a matter of a sufficient trade as some are against one's nature. Peter Keating is a great example of someone seeking material gain at the cost of acting against the nature of man, reason and independence! Nothing is "worth" that cost unless you forgo that nature. Is there a "sufficient" trade for animal torture or mistreatment, or even a positive pay off in some way? I'd say it is against the nature of man to abuse animals in ways that abuses the animal's nature. It is destruction for its own sake, which is only a disvalue if compared to any sensible value. The question is then what one ought to do in regards to moral transgressions. I'm kind of unsure how to treat it legally, but I'm partial to saying animals that people abuse may be forcibly taken from them. Not because animal rights per se are violated, but because it is a quality of destruction unlike someone breaking their own property. That is, animals are a borderline case of what is property or not, so in the case of pets, we can treat the destruction differently.

A metaphysical possibility is different than a metaphysical impossibility. Generally, both are arbitrary insofar as we can't evaluate the truth of either statement. I'm not going to go off and say The Matrix is an arbitrary movie, but simulations exist as well as computers. So although it is arbitrary to say it is a true, we can imagine such a scenario and talk about it, even if we well know that the actual scenario is invented. I am not saying we ought to make any evaluations of how the world is from imagination, but in the process of discussing the scenario we may incidentally think of a real-world question to ask, especially things that are metaphysically possible. Haven't you ever had cool ideas stimulated by thought experiments without evaluating if the experiment is a real situation? It goes into the topic in the sense anything I think about should have some practical or pragmatic element to it. If fictional scenarios motivate your creativity, go ahead, just don't start thinking fiction itself tells you how reality works or is an actual fact of reality. Otherwise, I'd be unable to distinguish pure imagination from how the world is. There is nothing practical about saying imagination is maybe real; some philosophers have thought that if you can imagine something, it must be real because <insert bizarre arguments>.

The plan is 12 noon somewhere in the Central Park area of the city. No exact location yet, I'll do some research on a spot. Still August 16th, Saturday.

Before I make my bigger post, I am wondering, would you agree that even if we're in some simulation like the Matrix, it is still reality that is all around you? There is nothing about a simulation that is "unreal" other than being artificial. Of course even tools are real, even if artificial. Similarly, whether something is tangible is not important for what is real or not. For Objectivism "real" means tied to reality in some manner. Insofar as you perceive, reality is what you perceive - HOW or WHAT you perceive doesn't matter. Existence exists still applies. Even in Plato's Cave, everything in the cave is real: the shadows, the fire, the walls, the chains. Although a simulated reality is arbitrary to assert, it's not really a fallacy unless you use it as proof of something. Depending on how you imagine it, like all thought experiments, you may reach useful conclusions or ideas.

I think the point is that moral sanction doesn't matter - either it has rights, including self defense, or no rights at all. If it has no rights, sanction doesn't matter. If it does have rights, your sanction is irrelevant to whether or not it defends itself. Whether you ought to respect its rights, if it has any, is a separate question.

Oh I meant to say that in general, you sound relatively correct for once. =P That is, to differentiate, we need to observe non-conscious things and other conscious things. When the concept is formed, the definition and word are necessarily part of the concept, with many other aspects that are non-essential. Indeed third-person consciousness, seeing others as conscious, doesn't conflict with first person consciousness. But we mustn't forget that cause is not equal to effect; the cause of consciousness is not the same as the effect, which is consciousness, the first-person point of view or faculty of awareness to use Rand's terminology. Perhaps it sounds minor, but I am absolutely saying consciousness is only a first-person experience. SL began with the opposite claim.

Fair enough. After thinking about it more, the only thing I opposed was defining what it means to assign value to something. A circular explanation can grow unwieldy and lead to weird ideas if not pointed out. Besides that, I think there is a lot more to be said about preferences and options than the general point that values properly understood are about maximizing your values in time and quantity.

Huh? Please don't be cryptic.

Disagreeing about what consciousness refers to means we disagree about what is happening in reality.