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Basically. What the proper legal recourse is remains a separate topic, but yes, the principle would be that no one would ever be able to build an invention without the owner's consent. What's the issue with that? No one can eat food without the producer's consent, no one can live in any house they want without the owner's consent, etc. Property rights, by nature of being a proper basis for trade, don't result in stifling of creativity any more than The Man is holding you down with ownership of capital, factories, etc. So, I don't know what unrealistic standard you are talking about.

One person's failure at explaining how to induce doesn't mean no method exists. Also, how is it true that the *only* way to induce, or make any kind of generalization, or even abstract information, is by using criticism and existing explanations? To me that indicates a problem with the Popperian method, if all you have is explanation and criticism; where does the explanation and criticism come from? (I'm asking, those questions aren't rhetorical.) Omitting things due to irrelevance *is* measurement omission. Rand didn't necessarily mean measurable as always and only quantifiable, just that there is some type of measurement to consider. "Greater than" would qualify as a kind of measurement, even if not a precise number. Then that measurement (and any number of other measurements) is left out when forming a concept with some uniting measurement(s). I don't think measurement omission is as specific as you think Rand meant. So, in what way do you think that Rand overemphasizes?

People create pianos. People create methods to build pianos. People do not create the laws of harmonics. People do not create facts about reality. Simple as that.

"emphasis on critical method, criticism (ideas stand unless refuted)" Isn't this one the most problematic? I read it as you can come up with *any* idea you want on *any* grounds and it is true until proven otherwise. 9/11 Truthers, or any conspiracy theorists cannot be totally proven because the basis of a conspiracy is what cannot be known now. They are testable theories, and I know Popper rejected untestable or unprovable theories. I believe that this makes Popper's ideas of science to be about a negative process of looking for holes in a theory by a typically piecemeal process, while Rand's ideas are a positive process on developing theories by making connections.

You can't define land ostensibly. As I said in the OP, there is no intrinsic boundary, a boundary has to be defined conceptually. I brought that point up because it's an example of property in a conceptual sense with application to concrete objects. Controlling a piano in a conceptual sense I mean having control over conceptual aspects of production, in the same way you'd have control over land in a conceptual sense. You can do all sorts of things on your own land, but really what the point is of land is to do things on or with, not to just "have" land. Ideas of production are used just as much as land is used, and you can even define the extent of privileged use (or what I described as "range of application" at first) in terms of what the method is useful for. That's a discovery. It's not a product of one's thinking in the same sense as a method of building certain pianos. The principles of harmonics aren't simply created.

You couldn't say "This!" about land either. My main idea is that Franz should be able to take Wolfgang to court, not necessarily that demanding money is the only thing Franz can ask for. I say "take to court" because that's what one would do for any rights violation. If at least I can say that Wolfgang's piano is the same as Franz' piano in a conceptual sense, and I can say that a method to produce that piano is a product of Franz' thinking, then Franz also has the right to control the production of that piano in a conceptual sense. That might not necessarily mean outright confiscation of the piano, don't boil it down so simply.

I addressed this earlier when I said that you don't need to write up a contract to find someone accountable for using your property, like I mentioned before about loaning a bike. If they ruin your bike, or otherwise infringe upon your ability to use it, then it's sensible to say that regardless of any contract, you can legally demand compensation. Contracts alone are fine for special agreements between two parties, but violating rights is not dependent upon a contract in place that can be violated. Slavery for instance is a rights violation even with a contract; theft (or blameworthy damage) of a bike is a rights violation even without a contract. Contracts may or may not be a matter of custom within a society, but questions of property rights or any other rights are never a matter of custom. I'm saying that IP is far more important and fundamental to one's flourishing than say, what clothes your employer requires you to wear as a contractual agreement.

I started to answer this question in my OP. I explained the ways I thought that IP can be objectively defined and therefore be enforceable. I didn't write the post to just ask about IP in general, I wrote it specifically to discuss what you are asking. What would be a right way and a wrong way to consider IP - is there anything about Wolfgang's piano that would belong to Franz? Part of my argument is that the duplicate is still Franz's piano based on the piano's origins and purpose, so at the least, Franz may limit and control how that piano may be made. Yet as Nicky's first post suggested, the proper legal response is, for example, monetary compensation, not quite confiscation of the piano that Wolfgang made. I started by explaining how I understand IP to be relatively inductively, and it seems you overlooked that important part.

Are you sure about this? At least for me, I usually am aware if I am dreaming, I just don't necessarily control the dream. Part C of Grames' post should address that.

Maybe that day, nothing at all would happen. The next year even, perhaps nothing. But if there are piano making competitors, then realistically, there is possible economic loss, including the piano Wolfgang made. Indeed, if Franz didn't *know* anything, then it really doesn't matter. However, we're talking about when Franz does know. Realistically, any discussion on rights presumes someone finds out about a violation and can demonstrate a loss that hinders life sustaining action. All Franz did was show Wolfgang the blueprints, presumably in excitement, perhaps believing nothing would happen or that Wolfgang wouldn't build the piano. A contract isn't necessary, for example, to loan you a bike, although if you sold the bike or otherwise made a profit from my bike, I'd probably have the legal right to take you to court. In the same way, I'm saying that looking at a blueprint does not mean it is permissible to go make the piano and profit from it. At the very least, Franz should have a legal right to ask for compensation of some kind for the profit he would have asked for, at least through court proceedings. To add onto the story, or background for Franz, if he had just began selling pianos within a month for $500, do you think he has a legal right to be compensated for those $500 Franz would have asked for? The question to ask is more about what defines a product of one's thinking and efforts. Is the idea behind the blueprint a product? Without a blueprint, I'd argue it wouldn't be a product, and only a product in the sense of figuring out a math problem. What Franz has is a creation, taken from research and being able to make a product, more than just figuring out an abstract solution. (By the way, I say IP is ownership regarding *some* ideas, but IP is not ownership of *merely* ideas. It's not a major point, but it's there.)

Moving on... (He said she said doesn't help anything and I want to keep this on topic. Post in that other thread if you find it necessary.) I'm using this thought experiment to ask specific questions I've been thinking about. As I suggested earlier, but this time directed at anyone reading: At which point do you agree or disagree? Do you disagree on how I described property? Do you disagree about the *reason* I said Theseus would still own the same ship? How does my thought experiment change when you take away the immediately concrete re-building and use a *duplication* instead? Answer any or all of these questions. First off, I don't think that self-ownership should be part of the story in explaining property (I also don't think one owns the information in their head). It's more sensible to talk about how property is a right to action of one's body in the first place. If you own your body, then what are you anyway? What would then own *that*? There is an infinite regression that can only be done with integration of mind and body where there is no outside agent that owns either. Homunculism is false, in other words. Since I reject self-ownership as a valid concept, the only story of property that I can tell is about the abstract nature of what I may use according to own will. My relationship to reality is only by means of abstraction as related to perception, lest we live like bears and own a cave by sitting inside. For *sustaining* flourishing, actual goods relating to abstractions are necessary, like a particular house. Whether I own myself does not enter into the equation, nor do the particles/tangibility of something become fundamental characteristics. But at the same time, all that can sustain my flourishing is action in the world. A problem comes in at this point, since I'm only implying that one needs to use the what they produce. But what, in fact, qualifies as being a produced? To stick to the dispute at hand, does a blueprint/patent for a piano qualify as produced in the same sense as you produce a house out of trees that you cut down? If a blueprint/patent is not produced in that same sense, then IP is invalid. Again, the particles are not what fundamentally make anything unique and having identity. For the standard ship of Theseus question answered in an Aristotelian way, what counts even more are types of causation, or to use Objectivist terms, the measurements retained after abstraction (let's say at least the important features). Replacing each piece one by one won't result in not-Theseus' ship. But in my modified case, does Franz rebuilding his piano out of the same pieces, does Franz end up with a new piano? Or is it the same piano? Nicky, thanks for emphasizing that property rights are rights to actions. I didn't say that explicitly, but I should have. I don't know, though, who you meant by "you" when you said "you are trying to deduce a more abstract question of property rights from a more concrete application of rights (the ownership of materials)." What I set out to do first was to talk about how sticking to concrete applications of rights only, like that invalid inference, is doomed to fail for justification of property in the first place. Franz rebuilding was intended to talk about property in general, then Wolfgang rebuilding intended to transition from the agreeable case to the core disagreements on IP. I might not have succeeded in conveying that. Good point, I overlooked this. Same deal about the next phrasing you disagreed with. I don't quite understand what you mean. How would you propose figuring out if IP really does follow from principles of property rights? My thought experiment is meant to be useful in the sense that if one has a strong case for IP, then figuring what Franz may or may not do about Franz should be easy. Since "it's just obvious" is not acceptable, the questions I started out with in this post are also important. The point isn't to deduce an answer from a single case, but to make it easier to think about philosophical questions. Regarding "we need to have a reasonable constraint to its range of application. This way, claims to property can be objectively evaluated. A range of application isn’t as simple as saying a physical boundary. That may apply to a basketball, but not an open cattle range - there is no intrinsic boundary to land. Some degree of value is needed as well, otherwise there would be no need to recognize any existents in a special way with regard to individuals.": I think I wasn't clear about what my standards were, since both of you didn't quite get what I intended to convey. I agree, there is constraint to what legal, rightful actions are. I'm basically saying that not only am I talking about legal constraints, but also what way is the (alleged) property in question privileged for your use? If you land on the moon, you don't have automatic privilege over the entire moon. So, instead of constraint, I should say "privileged use constraint". Property must at least be definable in terms of use. Land can be defined in terms of square acreage, or natural borders (rivers, mountains), etc. A basketball's privilege use is its distinctness as an entity. If IP is valid, how should one define its privileged use? As for "some degree of value", I just wanted to convey that property is worth something to someone, in a realizable way. Look at Alpha Centauri as many times you want, but you can't claim it as yours for looking at it first. You can value Alpha Centauri as a nice star to look at, but nothing about the star itself can be traded, harvested, invested, built up, etc. There isn't even a way to get there, any more than there is a way to attain any value out of a time machine, or warp drives. After writing this, I see how "degree of value" isn't useful as a term here. I don't know a better term right now, but this explains what I'm referring to.

No, I didn't... I'm sorry the humor failed and you took it as an insult. That is sincere. I was criticizing an idea, not who you are a person. But I called the value of anti-IP like I see it. If that's too judgmental, there is nothing more to say. I did not call *you* anything, but I can't force you to believe me that it was not an underhanded insult. I don't want to make this into another set of personal defenses though, so I'll leave it at that.

For the record, the original post isn't *about* what you said or didn't say. It's a fresh discussion not directed what you argued at all. I think 2046's point was that "some people" literally meant any number of people on the Internet. In any case, I'd rather you address the thought experiment directly. At which point do you agree or disagree? Do you disagree on how I described property? Do you disagree about the *reason* I said Theseus would still own the same ship? How does my thought experiment change when you take away the immediately concrete re-building and use a *duplication* instead? Answer any or all of these questions - or anyone else for that matter. Expect a long post tomorrow, hopefully aimed at all the posts so far. Dreamweaver, I liked that addition you gave. I think it's a bit soon to discuss that example, but it does show how *integrity* of certain ideas is worth considering. I think information integrity only makes sense for ideas that have a corresponding physical implementation. How to build a certain piano has information integrity with regard to evaluating the nature of a product. Evolution as a theory is not dependent upon any kind of integrity, it's just an evaluation of facts whose truth is not affected by beliefs. Forgot to add: "Saying that you somehow own that "physical implementation" without also owning the immaterial pattern or design itself -- without somehow having a property stake in the idea that stands behind all physical instances -- is a semantic dodge." Not really. IP is supposed to be a "one-to-many" relation. One pattern/design applies to multiple physical implementations (one piano design, many corresponding pianos). Furthermore, there must be at *least* one member in both parts of the relationship. So, I guess it is fine to say idea ownership, as long as you keep in mind the relationship that I mean in this context. IP isn't tenable without a relationship with physical implementations. Ideas as such would mean no relationship is implied.

I know what your point was, but my claim is that even if you explicitly say you base it on evidence, that's just a post-hoc explanation about what is fundamentally learned and/or cultural. Even one of the articles you linked says gender roles are learned, nothing at all to do with fundamental characteristics of male and female behaviors. In other words, gender roles aren't due to a functional difference between males and females, but due to some practical consideration that may be perfectly fair or unfair. Discussions about altruism are a lot like this. People aren't inherently altruists, yet plenty of people talk about how long altruistic behavior has existed in order to demonstrate that people are naturally altruistic. So much of human behavior is adaptable and changes a lot throughout history that any built-in differences between males and females doesn't hold up well as a theory. Case in point, from what you linked: ""That women sometimes become successful hunters and men become gatherers means that the universal tendency to divide subsistence labor be gender is not solely the result of innate physical or psychological differences between the sexes; much of it has to be learned," the authors write. " I question how good that study is, but it doesn't disconfirm anything that I've said. Just because one sees behavior or even common behavior doesn't mean that it's in-born. More evidence of that from your link to from that Scientific American article: "But just because a difference is biological doesn’t mean it is “hard-wired.” Individuals’ gender traits—their preference for masculine or feminine clothes, careers, hobbies and interpersonal styles—are inevitably shaped more by rearing and experience than is their biological sex. " "Wood and colleagues are among the few neuroscientists to analyze male-female brain differences for their relationship to gender type, as opposed to strict biological sex. Their findings do not prove that social learning is the cause of male-female differences in the brain, but they do challenge the idea that such brain differences are a simple product of the Y chromosome." Scientific American is probably the most reliable source of the ones you linked, and it backs me up well, while the Wikipedia article (which is also worthwhile) shows how there is no kind of scientific agreement. For the most part, there are statistically significant differences, but that doesn't mean significant to interaction with people or significant to how one lives their life. Sorry I didn't get to all I wanted yet, I took longer to get to this and write this much than I expected.

Why do you think the morality/legality distinction is important here? I already explained how I think IP is the same as any other kind of property, so it should be treated like land or objects. I gave reasons why the concept of IP matters. I also explained why it deserves legal protection.

You misunderstand me. I know you aren't talking about superiority, the point was that historically, they were viewed as mostly the same except for inferiority. I think the separate spheres idea came out of some need to "justify" equal treatment under the law, so thus separate spheres. That then permeated into culture at large in western civilization as we know it today, but it's watered down a little now. That's where the origin is. I don't recall what Aristotle said on gender (although he was sexist), but I thought he also took the stance was that women are just inferior, therefore not allowed to take roles beyond house-keeping because that's easier than politics or commanding an army. I'm sure there were gender roles in this sense, roles stemming from what women were expressly permitted to do. For the most part though, men and women worked together, at least average people. That's how it was before the Industrial Revolution/Enlightenment. Royalty is another story and context entirely, though. It's getting late, I'm getting tired of typing today as well, so I can gather a lot better sources tomorrow, otherwise we'd be both making assertions that require more than anecdote or common sense. Most likely incorrect? Well, I have more to show than an assertion, I'll get some sources for you then. Your link isn't the greatest for information, it reads like a pop-science article. That's okay, but it's easy to argue against. Well, no, because that's about as distinct as it gets. Of course it'll sound pathetic - you're trying to argue there are more substantial differences! Anyway, what differences do you mean then? Hormonal differences substantial enough to lead to what? Physiological changes is probably about as distinct you're going to get, men on average will be stronger physically. I'd bet that the proposed differences have barely been researched, and what has been researched has never ended up very strong. My whole point is that individual differences are much greater than any difference you'll find between genders, so with regard how to treat people even a romantic context, gender is insignificant. I'm sorry if I missed something in your posts, so please mention some differences for me so I don't need to look through all your posts. Split the thread into a separate one, that's all (one thing to do as a mod is to keep this all somewhat organized if things go really off topic). I'm not implying I'll delete anything. Related, yes, but it's not really about romance now or the implied social requirements. It's more like a scientific and historical angle now.

These type of distinctions usually stem from the "separate spheres" idea of the Enlightenment when notions of masculinity and femininity first came around. I don't want to get into the reasons for now, but no, there hasn't been a really clear historical distinction until around the 1800s. Before then, the only distinction people made was that women were *inferior* to men in every way, depending on the culture. After that, men and women were treated as very different types of people altogether. If you want to go really far back to tribal cultures, men and women weren't as distinct as you portray. Literally, people were tribes, they hunted together, or men sometimes would also service the game, etc. Of course, women had babies and I think that has a big impact early on about taking care of their kids, after a little bit of time, raising a kid was a tribal endeavor. I could theorize a lot about why this is, but my point is the historical distinction you mention is not really there. And any research I know that would support you says there are indeed some cognitive differences, but not enough to make an impact on how one leads their life. There is more difference between me and you than between males and females in general. A difference for example is that females can make better distinctions for red colors than males, but really it's not a big deal on the level how concepts of femininity/masculinity suggests differences should be strong. If you want to keep talking about this, I'd suggest starting a new thread to keep this separate.

You didn't phrase it as though there are multiple valid options. I wouldn't ask anyone for evidence why they want to be a fiction writer over being a dentist. There are numerous factors where if you gave advice on which one to choose, you really should be talking to people who already find dentistry as appealing. Someone deciding between an opera singer or chef wouldn't have a reason to read that advice. This would be fine, even it was about a preference. "Race is not fundamentally relevant to sex or romance. For mentally healthy, non-evading heterosexual adults, one's identity as a man or woman is a "big deal." " The way I read this is that this is an explicit statement that finding gender non-essential is anti-life, not just a different choice than you. So, it's not saying why existence is preferable to nonexistence. It's saying one viewpoint equivalent to preferring a state of nonexistence. That *does* need a satisfactory demonstration.

It dawned on me earlier in the week that the ship of Theseus thought experiment has a great deal of application to intellectual property questions, at least if I modified it a little (turns the modification is like a modification by Thomas Hobbes). A ship is being re-built one piece at a time, and I find that little analysis is needed to conclude that rebuilding the ship in the same way with the same pieces means it is still the same ship. Theseus still owns the ship, it’s the same type of ship, the ship is used for the same purpose, etc. I think that is like Aristotle’s solution to the original problem, at least according to Wikipedia. In addition to all that, it is still property of Theseus. But not because it’s made of the same pieces, therefore, any resulting artifacts will be his! To frame it another way, I’ve seen some people argue against IP by saying “if I build something with materials I own, then I own whatever the resulting artifact is – even if the inventor wants to prevent me from doing so”. My point is that Theseus still owns the ship because of the purpose and particular implementation of an idea still remains, despite the obvious physical transformation. But I want to go through this with a modification of this thought experiment that I came up with: the Piano of Franz. (Yes, that same Franz if you remember an earlier thread, but it’s quite different). Franz has a specific blueprint to build pianos, which are special kinds of pianos with building specifications that Franz developed after figuring out new techniques to bring out important acoustic qualities. His brand of piano is distinct. Right now, he has only built one piano – he needs investors first. Recently, he took the piano apart and will rebuild it, to make sure his blueprints were perfect. The pieces are organized on the floor, and Franz can rebuild it with his blueprints. He goes piece by piece, until it is complete. Does Franz own the piano? This part so far is deliberately simple. I would bet most people say yes, Franz owns the piano. The reasons, though, may vary. As I said, I don’t think it’s just because he owns the individual pieces. The stance I take is that he owns the coupling of an idea with the corresponding physical goods made from that idea. Keep in mind, since property is what one needs to maintain their existence, and by extension, their flourishing. (I’m skipping a lot of inductive steps, I know, I can’t write a book here.) To be able to define what is actually part of maintaining one’s existence (as related to their personal evaluations and decisions), we need to have a reasonable constraint to its range of application. This way, claims to property can be objectively evaluated. A range of application isn’t as simple as saying a physical boundary. That may apply to a basketball, but not an open cattle range - there is no intrinsic boundary to land. Some degree of value is needed as well, otherwise there would be no need to recognize any existents in a special way with regard to individuals. I would argue that the pieces are of no value to Franz anyway, and the value only comes from the fact he knows how to build his brand of piano. Although I’m sure Franz can build other styles of piano that are very old, the pieces are for making a Franz brand piano. So, you couldn’t say “the pieces have infinite uses, why focus on a piano brand?” Building a treehouse is not his intention. In this sense, his pieces are only of value because of what he wants to create. Franz could sell the parts for a price, but since no intrinsic monetary value of goods exist, I can say that relative to him, there is no monetary value. The value is in the potential piano, similar to how value of farmland is potential crops. No actual piano exists, so what I’m getting at is that the property in question is intellectual in nature, not merely concrete existents. Let’s modify this a little bit. Suppose Wolfgang saw Franz’s blueprints, and Franz said nothing special to Wolfgang about building a piano. Unbeknownst to Franz, Wolfgang acquires the necessary pieces to build the piano. Later on, Franz visits his friend Wolfgang’s house after hearing beautiful piano music. When he greeted Wolfgang and saw the piano, he realized it was his own piano that he designed! Franz finds this to be unjust and even as theft, because it was his design and creation. Should Franz have the right to bring Wolfgang to court if he so chooses? In the earlier case, if Wolfgang took a finished piano or even the piano pieces without permission, that is a clear case of theft, and should be taken to court. But where does the difference come in with Wolfgang creating a piano with his own materials? An easy answer is to say that the two pianos are not exactly the same, so inventing a type of piano does not imply owning pianos that Wolfgang (or anyone else) creates. People own what they make, and it follows that what they make is their property, fitting all the standards I mentioned earlier with constraint to range of application. My answer is that there is no difference, except perhaps what the property in question is. The easy answer I find to be too materialistic by ignoring the very means and person that enabled Wolfgang to build the piano. Franz did a lot of research, then took time to develop the specific piano design. He had to figure which wood to use, how to bend the wood, how to set up the curves, etc. The whole value of the piano is in every case dependent upon what Franz developed. Other people even find value in the piano. To the extent that the design is useful to many people, not just the piano itself, there is reason to say Franz should have the right to control the design in any manner he chooses – who can use it, how he wants to profit from it. If anything, the usefulness and value to multiple people makes a design worth recognizing as property, especially since Franz designed it for the reasons anyone would create or seek property. The value a variety of people hold towards the piano is indicative that at least some people find the piano design a contributor to flourishing, even for Franz. In ethical terms, this means Franz has a right to his designs and what people may make from those designs, or to shorten the phrase down, intellectual property. In the same way that rebuilding the ship of Theseus still means the ship is owned by Theseus, rebuilding Franz’s piano still means the piano is owned by Franz, even if the result is more than one tangible Franz brand piano. * Aside: I first thought of all this by watching a but a totally different topic. Spiral theory of knowledge!

I'm writing it up now. I'll probably post it tomorrow. =] It's a different take than usual, related to the ship of Theseus.

Secondhander has asked Kevin how this advice has worked out for him. I asked the same. Other people probably have in other threads. Kevin has never answered. There is no "proper" challenge to make because there is nothing to criticize except Kevin's methods of an utter lack of examples. I mean, Secondhander gave some examples, DonAthos did, while others have just questioned Kevin's methods of analysis that are weak or just don't follow. Alfa gave some examples too. But nothing like that from Kevin. This is human behavior here, with numerous factors, so examples are great, and can only help with context. Sure, there is no refutation per se, but there is nothing to refute - it's just empty of content. That's rationalism (that's not an insult, I mean to say that it leads to an error of thinking or an incorrect conclusion.)

Why couldn't you just as well say choose the left sock? I've heard that example from Russel before, but I didn't understand why you can't just say "pick any member". Another way to approach my question is: what are the limitations of choice functions in general. As far as I've seen, this all depends on how the choice function must behave, such as it must have a distinct end to its process, which would be problematic for any infinite set of course. My thinking is that as long as there is something to select, then any arbitrary selection is sufficient. On the other hand, I probably need to understand ZF axioms first. I still don't notice though what's bad about my reasoning.

Can my statement be phrased with better terminology then?

But why *should* one regard their femaleness or maleness as extremely important? Yes, I get it, if someone wants what you propose, they should follow your advice perhaps. But is it good for one's life? Apparently not. People have asked you before how this advice works for you. Your are posting to an audience that likes evidence, so I don't think that's an unfair question. Actually, I don't think heterosexuality really exists (preferences do, though), more like a cultural thing not based on any particular facts. The concept hasn't existed through most of human history), so you might be right. The conclusions of what that *means* I think is exactly what you propose. But is it any good for life!? Careful though, it sounds like you're insinuating that anyone who disagrees on "maleness" and "femaleness" being very important to romantic love is mentally unhealthy, or evading, or that non-heterosexuality is disordered thinking. It's interesting that I like these posts to the extent it seems like socratic dialogue, except with assertions instead of questions. The assertions are plausible, and opinions that I've seen, so it's as though it's getting me to think about assumptions others may have.

Okay, I thought it was something like that. Some people may use folk physics/psychology/etc (what just "feels" right and obvious without particular specialized knowledge), but as Nicky suggested, I doubt Objectivists are any more prone to reasoning with what's "obvious" than anyone else. Perhaps the type of direct perception for Objectivism leads some to misinterpret a whole lot and just go by what looks obvious, perhaps resulting in too easily rejecting abstractions. That type of error would be empiricism, as suggested by Peikoff in Understanding Objectivism. Not empiricism as in starting point, but empiricism as in an overly skeptical attitude towards abstraction.