Eiuol

"Relationship anarchy" is a term I've been thinking about lately. The term isn't referring to anarchy as about rejecting government - it is not political. Instead, it is about rejecting rules that exist on a social scale for how to treat relationships, especially regarding friendship and romance. I don't mean a disregard for social norms altogether, I just mean social norms pertaining to romance. The link is a decent source, but keep in mind that the term hasn't been around long at all, so a lot of it is vague or disregards principled thought, but a gist of the idea is there: and RA implies a few more ideas, namely, non-monogamy and because each relationship is independent of other relationships. Think of it as a form of polyamory. That you have two or more mates (I mean "mate" as a romantic relationship) need not mean that the two relationships leech the quality of love with both your mates. Additionally, sex between friends is morally acceptable with this view, since it rejects the norm that sex ought to be between mates only - or only with your "highest value" in Objectivist parlance. Clearly, RA is not an Objectivist view, at least regarding sex. To be clear, the rest of my post assumes selfishness as a virtue and all that good stuff, I'm discussing this on questioning Objectivist views of sex and romance. Let's make the Objectivist view about romantic relationships clear: A lot more can be said, but I chose these points because I think they are the most essential. As for sex: This last quote is from the Playboy interview, and I think it is a source at least reliable as most of Rand's non-fiction for portraying Objectivist philosophy. These quotes open questions for me. For one, why is romantic love the "most exclusive" form of love? I read lines like this before, but it seems to come out of nowhere while not making a lot of sense considering the points like love is an unlimited response to be earned. So how can romantic love be "more exclusive"? I suppose it means a sharper focus and more intense love, but I'm still not seeing why exclusivity matters other than how it is a standard view. RA, and polyamory in general, both reject exclusivity. Additionally, I don't see exclusivity as an Objectivist view if we look at Rand's overall message, that love is an unlimited response to values and sense of life. My other question is why sex is only proper with regard to highest values as opposed to sufficiently high? Let me take an arbitrary value ranking of people as follows: Philip, 7; Kate, 9; Rick, 1; Gina, 5. Suppose 7 is a sufficiently high valuation to warrant sex, assuming the feelings involved are still a notable response to values. That means it is proper to have sex with Philip and Kate. Rick is perhaps equivalent to a one night stand where sex happens once but not contact again. Gina is a good friend, but there isn't a great deal of intensity despite an enjoyable friendship. Philip is "just a friend", while Kate is a mate. Yet why would Objectivism say sex is only proper with Kate? RA goes further than simply saying sex doesn't need to be with highest values - it says that sexual/romantic relationships don't have to be more important than non-sexual/romantic partners. To begin, I want to pay attention to the difference between friendship and romance. Some would say they are a difference in kind, except when I take into account all that Rand wrote on love, I don't see how even Objectivism properly justifies that conclusion. Take this line from ITOE: Somehow, romantic love is incredibly unique, all while Rand is saying here that romantic love is more intense than liking, not a concept with a different genus. Love versus hatred is an example of two concepts of consciousness with a different genus. I prefer to get more precise than this, though. I say romance and friendship share many dimensions and vary on a dimension of intensity of loving feelings. What kind of feelings does friendship cause if not just a reduced intensity of loving feeling? It doesn't seem like there's a reason to preclude loving acts like sex in friendship if love should not be purely platonic. If romance shares dimensions A-D with liking, but primarily differs along E, intensity, then it would make sense to say that in principle sex is proper in greater degrees of E. Furthermore, the degree of E doesn't mean always that the relationship is more valuable. In my mind, it is epistemologically important to define relationships in terms of maximizing values rather than holding romantic love as the "be-all end-all" form of love. Otherwise, it compartmentalizes thinking in unnecessary ways. ((All quotes about Objectivism I got from the lexicon.))

Why are you asking me? Clarify it yourself. I can't get more precise until you make counter-arguments. I'm not sure what you oppose. That the proper role of government is to protect rights in no way change or contradict what I said. Harrison, it wouldn't be thought-crime, because I'm talking about people who have shown themselves as animal abusers and is itself a threat. Verbal threats aren't thought-crime, and the threat in an animal abuser is more demonstrable than that even.

Not exactly. For Objectivism, your stance as an observer cannot be disregarded. Concept formation and knowledge is dependent upon you as an observer and what you can grasp about the world. In some sense this is "subjective" i.e. observer-relative, but it doesn't deny that the nature of reality is independent of your wishes and desires. What you know about tables has to do with your attitude/stance towards things that express characteristics of tables. There is no "Absolute Table" in reality, but what you refer to as a table, to be objective, should be characteristics that are measurable, even if that measure is relative to you as an observer. In the case of tables, it will be relative to the function an object serves for you, namely, a flat surface on which to place objects.

I said "deeper", not "beyond". Less than a paragraph is shallow and rationalistic (If I don't directly harm you, I should legally be allowed to do whatever I want, QED). Deeper is actually talking about the purpose of rights. So far, I don't think you're being Socratic, if you have a reply, type it out. I don't wanna chase you to find your argument. I'm not talking yet about what the punishment should be. Read my reductio argument carefully, it is a chain of reasoning that seems to be the best I have to say we may do ANYTHING we wish to animals.

Nope, it's totally impossible that I can think about a topic without thinking deeper about individual rights. Obviously there is nothing to say about wanton destruction except it is their legal right to annihilate anything. Nothing else at all. I have the right to buy dogs then proceed to drown them just as I can burn all my books if I wanted - it may be dumb, but animals are equivalent to objects. Therefore there ought to be no legal repercussions for using property as I wish. After all, there is nothing threatening about torturing animals for fun and has no impact whatever on our rights-respecting society. The ability to choose to abuse or not abuse animals is much like racism: it is irrational, but it is important that we all are able to deem to be rational, save for initiating force. Indeed, it is up to each of us individually if grabbing a brick and beating a friendly dog to death is rational. No person should make that decision for us regarding animals, land, or objects. Clearly, the choice to kill animals depends on how you want to run your life. Astounding response Nicky, I realize my error now. *** Come on, really, it's only wrong to blow up the moon if it rains fire on Earth? It's okay if I managed to divert the debris? The point is that the act of destruction is at a level beyond even regular criminal behavior. Someone willing to destroy for mere entertainment is in fact a threat even in this unusual and improbable case that doesn't involve rights. It involves the foundation of rights where we establish what is necessary to live in a society. Abuse and torture of animals I propose is a threat to us with the sort of irrationality involved. Government protects rights, yes, but I don't think it precludes some psychological cases of violent behavior towards living things that are intelligent enough, like orcas, intentional or not. Remember, we're talking about harming animals for pleasure/enjoyment, not for consumption or medical experiments. It is possible to kill and torture animals, but not objects. At the least, the legal topic of animal abuse ought to be treated differently than self-abuse or damaging one's own objects.

I said borderline for property. Not borderline for rights. I SAID that my reasons were NOT that animals have rights. To consider a "borderline" case of property that does not involve right violations in the thing harmed may be something as extreme as blowing up the moon to see the pretty fireworks. No owns the moon but I'm inclined to say it is proper to forcibly stop that destruction. People can own animals, but I think it is fair to say that legally speaking we can't use the same rules as we would for owning objects. Please read carefully, don't go off thinking I'm advocating animal rights. I was careful to say borderline about treatment as most property is treated.

Whether compensation justifies an action is a weird distinction. It'd make more sense to say that the return on value being sufficiently high makes some actions moral. If, for instance, you had skills as a doctor but were not given a sufficient trade, treating someone would be immoral and unjust to yourself. Other actions aren't a matter of a sufficient trade as some are against one's nature. Peter Keating is a great example of someone seeking material gain at the cost of acting against the nature of man, reason and independence! Nothing is "worth" that cost unless you forgo that nature. Is there a "sufficient" trade for animal torture or mistreatment, or even a positive pay off in some way? I'd say it is against the nature of man to abuse animals in ways that abuses the animal's nature. It is destruction for its own sake, which is only a disvalue if compared to any sensible value. The question is then what one ought to do in regards to moral transgressions. I'm kind of unsure how to treat it legally, but I'm partial to saying animals that people abuse may be forcibly taken from them. Not because animal rights per se are violated, but because it is a quality of destruction unlike someone breaking their own property. That is, animals are a borderline case of what is property or not, so in the case of pets, we can treat the destruction differently.

A metaphysical possibility is different than a metaphysical impossibility. Generally, both are arbitrary insofar as we can't evaluate the truth of either statement. I'm not going to go off and say The Matrix is an arbitrary movie, but simulations exist as well as computers. So although it is arbitrary to say it is a true, we can imagine such a scenario and talk about it, even if we well know that the actual scenario is invented. I am not saying we ought to make any evaluations of how the world is from imagination, but in the process of discussing the scenario we may incidentally think of a real-world question to ask, especially things that are metaphysically possible. Haven't you ever had cool ideas stimulated by thought experiments without evaluating if the experiment is a real situation? It goes into the topic in the sense anything I think about should have some practical or pragmatic element to it. If fictional scenarios motivate your creativity, go ahead, just don't start thinking fiction itself tells you how reality works or is an actual fact of reality. Otherwise, I'd be unable to distinguish pure imagination from how the world is. There is nothing practical about saying imagination is maybe real; some philosophers have thought that if you can imagine something, it must be real because <insert bizarre arguments>.

The plan is 12 noon somewhere in the Central Park area of the city. No exact location yet, I'll do some research on a spot. Still August 16th, Saturday.

Before I make my bigger post, I am wondering, would you agree that even if we're in some simulation like the Matrix, it is still reality that is all around you? There is nothing about a simulation that is "unreal" other than being artificial. Of course even tools are real, even if artificial. Similarly, whether something is tangible is not important for what is real or not. For Objectivism "real" means tied to reality in some manner. Insofar as you perceive, reality is what you perceive - HOW or WHAT you perceive doesn't matter. Existence exists still applies. Even in Plato's Cave, everything in the cave is real: the shadows, the fire, the walls, the chains. Although a simulated reality is arbitrary to assert, it's not really a fallacy unless you use it as proof of something. Depending on how you imagine it, like all thought experiments, you may reach useful conclusions or ideas.

I think the point is that moral sanction doesn't matter - either it has rights, including self defense, or no rights at all. If it has no rights, sanction doesn't matter. If it does have rights, your sanction is irrelevant to whether or not it defends itself. Whether you ought to respect its rights, if it has any, is a separate question.

Oh I meant to say that in general, you sound relatively correct for once. =P That is, to differentiate, we need to observe non-conscious things and other conscious things. When the concept is formed, the definition and word are necessarily part of the concept, with many other aspects that are non-essential. Indeed third-person consciousness, seeing others as conscious, doesn't conflict with first person consciousness. But we mustn't forget that cause is not equal to effect; the cause of consciousness is not the same as the effect, which is consciousness, the first-person point of view or faculty of awareness to use Rand's terminology. Perhaps it sounds minor, but I am absolutely saying consciousness is only a first-person experience. SL began with the opposite claim.

Fair enough. After thinking about it more, the only thing I opposed was defining what it means to assign value to something. A circular explanation can grow unwieldy and lead to weird ideas if not pointed out. Besides that, I think there is a lot more to be said about preferences and options than the general point that values properly understood are about maximizing your values in time and quantity.

Huh? Please don't be cryptic.

Disagreeing about what consciousness refers to means we disagree about what is happening in reality.

Then all you ended up saying is "measure values according to the value they provide", which is question begging. "Things have value, you evaluate value of things based on the values they provide". Paraphrased by mixing up the syntax. It's more like "things have value or disvalue, and once you discover what standing it holds in your life, you finally determine if it has value". In other words, EVERYTHING is a value or disvalue, to some degree in context, nor is there an eternal context where we already know something has value. You agree I think, but what you said doesn't quite add up in total, and the topic is more specific than what is the standard of value. I don't disagree that your method is sufficient, but it's just way too generalized I think.

I don't think so. You claimed that consciousness is something but as a something totally different than what I am claiming. We only agree that consciousness is real. Past that, I don't see a similarity.

No, the answer is fine - if you already determined in general the value of some set of items. The issue is question begging. How do you determine what values to pursue? Look at the quality and quantity they provide. How do you determine the quality and quantity they provide? Look at what your values are. Make as many graphs as you want, but you need to establish your normative claims first. With two flavors of ice cream to choose from, I need a more definitive method to establish the value of something before (abstractly) making my graphs (caveats for how people don't literally graph this out).

Not really. I say there are natural reasons for consciousness to exist and is essentially an abstraction to refer to our first person awareness, or subjective awareness. The mechanics and processes are not themselves consciousness, at least to the extent that each neuron is not conscious. But in total, as entities that are not merely composed of parts, we can label the total faculty that results in first person awareness as consciousness. Otherwise, it is no different than describing how a thermostat works where we know all its parts but it still isn't conscious in any sense. In fact, some philosophers go as far to say anything that processes information is to at least some degree conscious - even thermostats! While all consciousness will process information, the essential element I'm referring to is first person awareness. Consciousness is only an experience. That doesn't deny consciousness as arising from a real process, nor does that deny that consciousness can be explained. Likewise, saying that sight is an experience and only an experience doesn't deny that it arises from visual processing and eyeballs. But when I talk about sight, I mean the experience. If I say that the neurons firing ARE consciousness, then I'm already mixing up origin and result. To keep those distinct, I have to keep consciousness as a first person experience and what it *does*, and use a different concept to refer to what makes it possible. Often, this other concept is called "architecture" or "cognitive architecture". The actual mechanical makeup is not conscious, at least going on what I said so far. A functionalist would accept the term architecture, but will say mental state A is identical to neuronal activation X, and only differentiates based on one how one is concrete and the other more abstract. Sometimes, it is a form of dualism called "property dualism". This is how I understand functionalism, and it varies in the extreme people go to. Anyway, yeah, first person experience is "subjective", except only in the sense there is no absolute state of consciousness - that no one is conscious of your consciousness and able to experience it too. This is no issue, if you're concerned about objective knowledge. All you need to remember that objective knowledge is a matter of using the right methods to integrate the world around you. A total separation from the real world though is one error, but I don't think that issue comes from seeing consciousness as only an experience. Ideas to read about: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property_dualism

To me it sounded like you were asking about being conscious OF your own consciousness. I'm still not sure if you are. If you mean noting other conscious entities, that's difference. Either way the property of consciousness is a first person experience which Rand called a faculty of awareness and many philosophers say similar things. I don't know what you want to say, you said your concept of consciousness is independent of the view you happen to observe it. That's asking about consciousness apart from being conscious. The philosophers who are functionalists and say consciousness is JUST particular activated neurons that correspond to mental states, they'd claim that the brain and neurons is the independent thing you want. The problem is, functionalism doesn't CARE about first person experience. Trying to ignore it or avoiding it is a fool's errand - the mechanics are not equal to the phenomena.

I don't follow what you're saying. Most philosophers are pretty clear that how consciousness works is different than what it is like to be conscious. But yeah, consciousness IS the first person experience. When I ask if you're conscious, I'm asking if you are aware of your experiences. By the way, if consciousness is independent of any viewpoint of any observer is equivalent to asking for evidence of consciousness without using consciousness. A consciousness "outside" my consciousness such that I observe my consciousness is self-contradictory! This is one reason consciousness is axiomatic: it is senseless to talk about observing the very thing your observation depends on. We can analyze its identity and what gives rise to consciousness (the brain is part of it at least), though. The closest to "outside" I get is identifying someone else as conscious. Still, consciousness refers to my experience of the world.

I hope this is satire of rationalism. There is a grain of truth to the whole thing, but it lacks any mention of context of one's life and knowledge, while presuming an absolute measurable value of certain consequences. Yeah, all this is helpful for approaching decision theory, but any theory of decision making presumes what is deemed as valuable. If, somehow, you would rather be unhealthy, then this whole thing is a different graph. To me, the question of the OP is how we determine what values to pursue.

Okay, I just need to give another look through his book on teleological concepts. Other disagreements I have are in less substantive works like short articles.

Err, well no, those are their additions and to that extent isn't Objectivism at all. I think Binswanger is wrong more often than right even. Ideas don't die, only supporters do. And as individuals we change and grow. But specific ideas don't. Aristotle's Golden Mean is still the same. Cogito ergo is still the same. Objectivism is still the same. Philosophy doesn't stop. Also you're making bad assumptions about Objectivist thought and other people. Perhaps Russia was really that bad. Maybe Peikoff had a bad family. It happens, it really does. Rand didn't like her mother, but I think she liked her father a lot. Still, don't take Rand's personal life and import that into her philosophy.

It's "private" in a sense except also with government involvement. This isn't even on topic. No idea what you want to convey either. You called it scifi and it seems your intent was to lie to get people to watch Thrive. It just... makes no sense. You made more sense earlier on, but your positions only got into ignoring people telling you about your misunderstandings.