y_feldblum

You are avoiding the answer. 1. Varying and cyclical natural climate trends, on a vast scale, have been going on continuously since the birth of the planet. 2. Human activity affects the general climate on a scale so very, very small, compared to (1). E.g., human production of carbon dioxide affects global temperature trends only to a very, very small degree, compared with the natural phenomena which affect global temperature trends. 3. If life with plenty of place to live and work, with a month's worth of clothing in the wardrobe, with grocery stores stocked with everything one can imagine, with personal transportation at 80mph wherever you want to go (so long as it has an exit number), with the ability to sit in one's living room and engage in nearly any kind of business transaction via networked computer, with medication or surgical procedures for nearly any kind of ailment, and with many of the cruder ailments nearly wiped out, etc., if that sort of life means that the environment must change ... then it's worth it a million times over.

Note that tax cuts are good so long as they are accompanied by spending reductions (on anything but the institutions necessary to protect individual rights). They are meaningless otherwise, since the deficit will be made up for by deficit spending: ever more taxes in the future, or inflation in the present.

The argument is unsound for two reasons: its premises are false, and its logic is flawed. That the premises are false is obvious to us, though Heretic as accepted them without ground. Demonstrating their falsity is of no point, because we already know it, and he's already rejected in advance any such demonstration. But that the logic is flawed is not as obvious, neither to us nor to him, so it's what I focused on. For us, it's an interesting exercise in analysis, and for him, it's something to think on which he hasn't already rejected out of hand.

The old monkey in the sky?

Recklessly supposing that debating reason vs faith is possible, and that the concept of contingent is valid .... That various existents are contingent means they are contingent on other existents. Some parts depend on other parts. But that in no way implies a sum total which is dependent on a different sum total (ie god). The sum total of things is dependent only on itself, ie, on the parts within it, where the parts within it depend on other parts within it; but it is not dependent at all on anything outside of itself, outside of the parts composing it, such as god. The cosmological argument from contingency falls for a fallacy of logic similar to the fallacy of composition, and is thereby rejected.

Then you have earned a high rate of return on capital invested, which you promptly turned into additional capital invested.

Minimum requirements differ vastly from recommended specs.

I would say that success as a business owner requires earning a rate of return on invested capital greater than the market rate. One is not necessarily losing money if he earns a lesser rate of return, but liquidating one's assets and putting them into an index fund would be a better way to invest one's money.

Because chi forfend they sport differing lucky numbers.

The benevolent universe premise is "I am volitional: capable of rational thought and efficacious action". It is not "the universe cares for me."

Objectivists hold one's own life as his own most fundamental value, that value which makes possible and which is therefore superior to all other values. Firstly, an Objectivist believes in nothing whatsoever. While you may not specifically have meant to invoke knowledge as the opposite of belief, or knowledge as true justified belief, at least say what you mean. Secondly, an Objectivist holds others' lives as very important to his own for a very specific reason: an Objectivist lives as a trader, and he values those with whom he does or can trade because they are, in part, what makes possible his own happy life. Those who does not live as traders but, instead, as parasites, as murderers, are hostile to one's own happy life, and are decidedly not of value to an Objectivist.

There are two questions. Should we attempt to change certain specific government policies via an Objectivist political party? Absolutely. How efficacious will an Objectivist political party be in changing for the better the dominant ideas of American culture? Very minimally. I would not dismiss a party supporting specific Objectivist political positions. But I would not expect it to get very far, insofar as the American culture is hostile to rights.

Because neither of the above ways is how it works. Not on principle, and not practically. The form of government in effect ultimately depends on the dominant ideas of the culture. Take a lesson from the Ayn Rand Institute's approach, the ultimate purpose of which is to convince. The ARI spends its efforts on educating people: on publishing essays, on sponsoring public talks, on promoting and subsidizing Ayn Rand's novels for high-school students, on giving Objectivists advanced training in philosophy, and on helping to place Objectivists at universities. The ARI is attempting to change the American culture by expose people to reality-based philosophy, both in general and, specifically, in university.

What is that qualification? Under what circumstances do concepts refer to nothing, or to something other than concretes?

That's why they call it "trolling."

That's what my middle school English teacher claimed to be, if only over her classroom.

Doubtful if they teach the law of non-contradiction, except as a discredited rule from old-school Aristotelian logic.

The planet has undergone countless thousands of warming and cooling trends since its formation, many occurring on scales far beyond anything the craziest of the saner ecopanickers are warning of. Nature has certainly survived. There are countless rocks, countless insects, countless lakes, countless species still around after five billion years of thermal ups and downs. The real questions are: how do slow, minor deviations in planetary temperature affect us, and what ought we to do? The real answers are: they affect us very slowly and very minorly, and we ought to carry on as normal.

You mean: convincing people of the reality of reality, of the power of reason, and the worth of the self - by forming an organization dedicated to opposing zoning, tax hikes, and public schools?

How much of Ayn Rand's work have you read? Have you read either of her two long novels? Materialism holds that the mind does not exist; positivism holds that knowledge isn't real, that it's just language, just sounds; empiricism holds that abstract knowledge is not possible, and that causality is a myth. Objectivism is very different, and highly critical, of each of these schools you mention, and on very fundamental terms, far more fundamental than the question of belief in or the existence of god. The law of identity, the second axiom of metaphysics, says: to be is to be something in particular: something bounded and finite, something with certain attributes and no others, to certain finite degrees, neither more nor less, able to act in certain ways and not in others. God is held to be boundless and infinite, in violation of the law of identity. He is held to have no attributes at all, or all attributes imaginable, etc. He is held to be capable of every kind of action. To be but to be nothing in particular, or to be but to be unbounded or infinite, or to be but to have all properties to infinite degree, or to be but to be capable of anything at all - The law of identity says that those are all contradictions. There are no arguments for the existence of god.

You induced and trust in the concepts of "trust" and "induction". Induction is the primary method of gaining conceptual knowledge from perceptual observation. Just as the formation of a statement denying the axiom of existence implicitly upholds and assumes the axiom of existence, any question of trust in induction implicitly assumes the trustworthiness of it. You formed the concept "induction" by induction, by means of observing and integrating many examples of the operation of your own mind and that of others. Denying the trustworthiness of induction in effect denies the trustworthiness of one's own denial. (Note that I don't say induction is axiomatic, since it's not a perceptually self-evident primary.)

The explicit, conceptual form of any axiom is derivative, a product of induction over a vast number of observations. But the implicit, perceptual form of any axiom is self-evident in every act of consciousness, including every act of induction. The explicit philosophical defense of induction requires the explicit, conceptual forms of the axioms. But the method of induction is the primary means of gaining knowledge, even before the conceptual forms of the axioms are known.

[1] What do you think of libertarianism? [2] How are libertarians devoid of principles to back up their beliefs? Libertarianism is a political philosophy - a philosophy of moral action, and the requirements of moral action, in a social context. It asserts that morality in a social context is the principle of liberty (however nebulously it defines the term), and that a minarchist government - or a total socialist government - or many mutually competing anarchist governments -, is a requirement of liberty. But is there any basis for a political philosophy of liberty? Is there any basis for this particular philosophy of moral action and its requirements in a social context? Such a basis would have to include an ethical philosophy, a philosophy of moral action in general, in other words, a philosophy defining a fundamental standard of good and evil - a standard which, when placed in a social context, leads to the principle of liberty. Libertarianism does not assert any such moral philosophy: it does not tell us what is the good and what is the evil, only that liberty (however nebulously it is defined) is what the good is in a social context, and that its absence is what evil is in a social context. Libertarianism asserts that liberty is the good applied to society as a whole, and that its absence is the evil applied to society as a whole, without ever explaining what the good and the evil are in the first place. One can inquire more deeply into the philosophical basis of libertarianism. What kind of theory of reality does it assert, and what kind of theory of knowledge, and what basic facts about the existential and cognitive nature of humans leads to its theory of morality? Answers are necessary to all of these questions. For example, one is bound to ask how one knows the principle of liberty to be true. But then one has to have a theory to explain how one learns principles, and how one checks their truth. Libertarianism does not address any of these questions. It does not tell us whether reality exists at all, whether there is a transcendental superreality, or whether things just are what they are. It does not tell us whether knowledge is possible at all, whether knowledge is possible but that its source is a transcendental superreality, or whether knowledge comes from observation of of the things in this world. It does not tell us whether men have volition. It does not offer us a guide for action: whether to act range-of-the-moment, by pure whim, taking what one wants by force and destroying what one cannot take; whether to act for the benefit of others, offering them whatever one owns, whatever the cost to oneself; or whether to act toward one's own happiness over the course of one's whole life. It tells us that, even if reality doesn't exist, even knowledge is not possible at all, even if the good consists of taking whatever one wants by force - it is a fact of a reality which doesn't exist, and a principle we ought to know although knowledge is impossible, that while one ought to take what one wants by force, one ought to allow others to live in liberty. Libertarianism neither accepts nor rejects any theory of reality at all, any theory of knowledge, or any theory of morality at all, even theories consistent with or contradictory to it. How, then are we to know that liberty is the good, when libertarianism will not accept any theory of knowledge which admits to the possibility of knowledge, and will not reject any theory of knowledge which denies its possibility? Or when libertarianism will not accept a theory of morality which implies liberty, and will not reject any theory which contradicts it? Libertarnianism is cognitively an impossible position. Why? Because it refuses to answer the question: why? [3] Why do you promote selfishness? I want to live a long and happy life. I know that reality exists, and that things are what they are independent of what I wish them to have been; I know that knowledge is possible and that it is objective, and that I have the power of volition, to choose to think and act. I therefore know that my ability to live a long and happy life depends on me choosing to think and to act on my conclusions; that such a life depends on me thinking how best to attain it, and that it depends on that thinking being in accordance with reality. I know that actions have consequences, and that the consequence of action (which is the product of reality-based thought) towards the furtherance of my happy life is ... the furtherance of my happy life - and that the consequence of living range-of-the-moment, taking what one wills and destroying what one can't take, is: living splendidly now but having nothing left, and being banished from society tomorrow - and that the consequence of acting to make others happy is: not making my own life happy, but making theirs happy. [4] What is the Objectivist answer to "life, the universe, and everything"? This kind of question presupposes that reality is second to a transcendental superreality, an ulterior plane of pure consciousness which gives this plane of existence purpose, often known as god, but today commonly known by the name society. But that is simply not the case: reality is primary. [5] What of Buddhism and Eastern philosophies? The ones which deny the existence of reality, or assert the existence of a transcendental superreality which gives this one meaning? The ones which deny the possibility of knowledge, or assert the possibility of knowing the things contained only in the ulterior universe? The ones which tell us to take what we can and slash and burn the rest, or tell us to give up everything we hold dear so that someone else's life can be happy? They are cognitively wrong, and morally wrong. [6] How do you feel about the subject of war? I can tell you what I think of war. A moral country, one founded on and abiding by the principle of individual rights (which is not the same as liberty, or the individual rights of libertarianism), has every moral right to defend itself from foreign aggression and even the threat of foreign aggression. A moral country ought not to hold back if its existence is in jeopardy: it ought to take any and all action necessary to overwhelm its enemies and break them utterly of their will to fight. [7] Are there any common disagreements among Objectivists? Objectivism is the philosophy of Ayn Rand. She constructed a certain consistent set of basic philosophical principles in all the branches of philosophy, and named it Objectivism. Being an Objectivist means agreeing with Ayn Rand on all of these principles, and disagreeing with her on some or all of these principles means being something other than an Objectivist. Thus there are disagreements among Objectivists, though by definition not on the principles of Objectivism. For example, there is no disagreement among Objectivists on whether this world is real, or on whether knowledge is possible, or on whether one ought to act selfishly, towards one's own long and happy life, or on whether a government ought to enforce, and not trample, individual rights.

I can't imagine Bush would set fire to the Reichstag in order to go out and ... drop care packages all over Poland, and then build up France's power infrastructure and build hospitals in Britain.

I say no. By DavidOdden's theory of possibility, "no" would win, and it would therefore not be possible for there to have been eight planets. But let me move to my theory of possibility. You take into account the referents of the laws of physics - the relationships between entities. But you fail to take into account the entities themselves (you say, "what if the entities were different?" - but they were not different). What was, was, and it was what it was. It was metaphysically impossible for the entities which existed before the solar system's to cause the creation of eight planets, because that potentiality did not exist. Epistemologically, from the perspective of now, we have full knowledge of the metaphysical possibilities of the entities before the solar system: they could and did become a solar system of nine planets, and they could not and did not become anything else. Epistemologically, supposing we had the perspective of a spacefarer before the solar system came to be, one has enough evidence that a solar system of some planets will form, but little knowledge of precisely how many planets. Then, from that perspective only, eight planets is an epistemological possibility, even if not an Aristotelian potentiality, a metaphysical possibility. (An epistemological possibility represents the degree of certainty one has regarding knowledge of a potentiality.) So no, it was never possible for there to be eight planets; and although I may not have had enough evidence to exclude the number eight back before the planets came to be, now I do have that evidence, and now I do exclude that number from the realm of possibility.