Sesklo

I really enjoyed this movie. Although I approached it as an amusing flick, I went away thinking hard about the theme as stated in the movie, "Oh, no, it wasn't the airplanes. It was Beauty killed the Beast." Kong was killed by his desire to protect the thing he valued most. He pursued something good in his world and was destroyed as a result of his action to pursue it- because he loved the good that he found. In this way, it's horribly tragic- pursuit of beauty leads to destruction. I haven't fully thought through this, but it's a quality that I respond to very emotionally in films. I can't think of anything I consider more tragic than someone being destroyed by his love of good/beauty/virtue. Two other places (there are more, but these are the two I thought of right after the movie) come to mind where I've found this idea explored. One is the movie Edward Scissorhands (and probably other Tim Burton movies. He seems interested in the idea of an innocent faced with a world that tries to destroy it). The other is the character of Dominique in The Fountainhead. She (for quite a while) doesn't believe that good can survive in the world, specifically because it is good. There are huge differences here, but I think that King Kong is an illustration of this belief. I don't think that Jack Black's character was a stab at capitalism. He saw greatness and believed that if he stripped it of its power and presented it as a slave, it would still maintain its value. It was not just greatness he wanted to show the world- it was his dominion of it. He was content with the faked presentation of the beast's fierceness and the awe it inspired in others. I'm not completely sure how to take this character- I suppose that the discussion of Heart of Darkness in the movie sets him up as a sort of crazed explorer who, in his exploration of savagery, becomes savage himself. Oh hell- I liked it for the action, and came away with something to think about it. It's worth seeing for both.

I hear ya, Inspector. That makes sense- I just wanted to rule out that one. I think that as long as the "rational purpose" is maintained, my main objection would be my second one I listed.

I just want to make a comment on this because it came up during a discussion with a professor. He argued that Mother Teresa achieved happiness through helping people, so she was actually being selfish. I disagree with this because I think that happiness has a specific nature, and can only be achieved in certain ways. This is the flaw in the idea of the "selfish" person who goes around stealing and killing because all he cares about is his own happiness. It's like trying to argue that you want to achieve wealth by eating alot of carrots. Even if you really feel that something would help you achieve happiness, that does not necessarily make it so. I don't think that the above quote is intended in this sort of relativist way, so I'm really not arguing against it- I just want to point out that in some circumstances, helping certain people can contribute to my happiness, but I don't think that it makes sense to generalize that it makes me happy to help other people. It seems that 'random acts of kindness' are sometimes against my interests, so I can't really count the general practice of helping people as a rational self-interested thing to do. Because happiness is specific in nature, I don't really think I can achieve happiness by doing what gives me pleasure, or whatever I choose. I think that happiness is not the goal- it is a product of success at life, so self interest is primary, happiness is secondary. I discover first what is in my interests, then I pursue that, instead of thinking of what would make me happy and then calling pursuing that self-interested. I would be interested in hearing what people think about this.

I agree with Tommy also in his view that Jefferson can be blamed for his actions. I don't like the idea that slavery was a vice of the times, not of the man. There were people who opposed slavery and were not racist during Jefferson's time. Abolition was a debate during Jefferson's lifetime. I also find it hard to believe that one could live in close proximity to slaves and be incapable of identifying them as humans. I admire Jefferson very much, but I think it is completely proper to be able to admire someone yet condemn some of his actions. The thing is, slavery really isn't an important part of the reasons we admire Jefferson. It is a contradiction in his ethics, but as with Aristotle, the mistakes don't invalidate the achievements. I definitely don't think that it is worth the time educators spend on teaching kids about Jefferson owning slaves.

I think there is a problem with torturing convicted murderers for two reasons. If it is torture for the sake of torture and is allowed because they, like animals, have no rights, then it is immoral on the part of the torturer for the same reason it is immoral to torture animals: the torturer is getting pleasure from destruction, and this just isn't a good way to spend your time because it doesn't benefit you. I'm not sure that this is a reason to outlaw it, but it is an ethical reason against it. If it is torture in the name of science, for experiments for new drugs or procedures, then it runs the same risk as the death penalty. The US doesn't have a completely objective legal system, so it is quite possible that the person being tortured is innocent. There have been people who were sentenced to death, only to be later shown innocent. I think it would be wise to refrain from allowing death row inmates to be tortured for any reason, since there is the real possibility of innocence.

The last presidential election was the first time I was old enough to vote, so I researched the candidates and decided who I wanted to vote for. For local offices, there were a few candidates that I at least felt comfortable with, even if I didn't agree with all their ideas. I did not vote for president because I found all options to be so lacking. So, this time around, I am again wondering if I should vote for president or abstain. Third parties don't have a chance (and who am I supposed to vote for- Nader? Heh). Kerry's ideas about socialized healthcare and Bush's religious fervor both scare the hell out of me. I don't like the "lesser of two evils" strategy, but I think Kerry scares me more. What do you guys think? Should a person vote only in elections when there is a good candidate? What do you think about the "lesser of two evils" strategy that so many people follow when voting? Just curious to find out what other Objectivists do on election day.

Is there anything other than physical force that the child can't undo as an adult? I suppose that this is more in the realm of psychology, but it seems that even severe emotional/mental abuse could be overcome as an adult (I think that a strict religious upbringing could be classed as this).

I don't think that giving to charity is an obligation, but I think that it falls under the category of benevolence in the exact derivation of the word. Benevolence, understood as "willing good," not some form of altruism, seems to be simply wanting good things to succeed, like cheering for a great athlete or compimenting a co-worker who does a good job. Giving to a charity which promotes good things (like a scholarship for gifted musicians) is a way of acknowledging that good. I somewhat Aristotelian in my thinking on this: you should give the right amount to the right person. I don't think it's right to give to charity if it is going to damage your own life, but only if you have such an abundance of wealth that you won't miss the money, and you find a person or foundation that supports a cause you admire. I am editing this to include my source for Aristotle's ideas on giving: Nicomachean Ethics, Book IV, section i. must...remember...to...cite...sources!

I just wanted to second Bryan's endorsement of Adaware. It is very very good - I have found it far superior to other programs of this sort for removing junk from the registry and data miners. I occasionally do computer repair as a side-business, and I install it on all the computers I fix. A note about this, however- if you have certain internet service providers, such as SBC, Adaware can interfere with some of the extra features of the ISP's software because it sees them as spyware. Just Google Adaware and you will find the free download.

Hahah. Ok- I won't associate with Hitler (even though I think that he is teaching my ethnic lit class). Unrelatedly- I just realized that I called Betsy "Betty." Erm... sorry about that.

LOL, Betty, I didn't put together the last names until now. Thanks for the response. Hmmm- that is what I thought. Also, I have read the essay which Stephen referred me to. I understand the relationship between justice and the rejection of tolerance. This essay is very helpful in understanding why ARI and TOC have so many negative things to say about each other. (Although one wonders why followers of an organization that is allegedly commited to tolerance of others would be so mean to followers of ARI, yet so nice to communists. But I suppose that question answers itself.) This essay does raise more questions for me. I have many professors who, although not Marxist scolars, do hold some very bad ideas. I have a biology professor who is, on sundays, an enthusiastic Christian, and an Ancient Greek (language and archeology) professor who teaches multiculturalist theories in her other classes (sociology classes). I have gained a great deal from listening to both of these professors in their areas of expertise, even though they hold (and teach) some terrible ideas in other areas. There are many many people who are like this. I am not sure I understand whether Peikoff suggests that good people should refuse to associate with these types of people. If I determine on the basis of some of their ideas that these people are bad, then it follows that I should avoid associating with them in any way, but if I do this, there are many people who have so much knowledge and brilliance that I will miss out on. (Bill Gates is another example of this- amazing producer, but advocate of the "Death Tax.") What should be done in regards to associating with these people? Is it hypocritical to accept benefits from bad people?

Hi Stephen- I have a question about Rand's ideas about femininity. After some thought about my disagreements with several things she has said about women, in her books and in her answers to readers, I began to wonder what part her ideas on this matter play in Objectivism. If we take Objectivism as addressing the basic areas of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and politics, then where do these sorts of Gender Studies ideas fit in there? Do you think this should be viewed as a personal preference or opinion, or as an actual part of Objectivism? It seems to me that it isn't really a part of philosophy, but should be addressed by empirical investigation of biologists or psychologists. What do you think?

Harald, I'm not really sure of what you mean. Are you asserting that all biological entities have a value structure, or that they are of value? If the former, I would say that perhaps such a structure could be thought of in terms of those entities having a telos, but I don't really see how that helps us, since they really can not be said to hold values as a human does. If the latter, then we must say that they do not necessarily have value, since value is not intrinsic, but in terms of what a human values. I already understand that, according to Rand, life is the proper standard of value, but I'm not sure that this give me the answer to my question of what is meant by the premoral state and whether this is a hypothetical thought experiement or an actual state.

Eddie, could you expand on this statement? I am not sure that I fully grasp the implications of the premoral period being hypothetical on its fact/value integration. Are you saying that if the premoral period is hypothetical rather than actual, then choices proceeding from this would not be made on the basis of empirical investigation? I understand that you are working towards a deadline, so don't feel that you need to answer this right away- it can wait. Thanks!

Hmm. It appears, according to the help article I just read, that I can no longer edit my post, due to the time restriction. Well, I apologize, but I suppose it must stay. If anyone knows how to remove it, please let me know.

Stephen, That you for taking the time to point out what you have taken offense to. I will respect your preference for the forum rather than private chat and answer you in the forum. It seems that it was not "parts of some of [my] recent posts" that upset you, but rather one post in particular. My sarcasm in that post regarding TOC and ARI was not implying that members of ARI do not respect reason. I was expressing my wish that, because the TOC and ARI Objectivists that I have met appear to respect reason, I would love it if instead of screaming at each other over forums, they would just discuss ideas using that as a common foundation. I apologize for using the word "rubbish" in characterizing a part of Ayn Rand's view of femininity. I do respect Miss Rand, and Objectivism, but I also disagree with several things that she said, as well as a number of her personal preferences. I will take greater care in the future to use language that will not be offensive to others. I will remove the offending post. (As soon as I figure out how exactly that is done). Please take the time to tell me if there were any other things that I posted that you view as offensive, and I will examine them in the light of your opinions. I would, as I am sure you would, like this to be a place where we can express ideas without offending one another.

Stephen, I have reread the posts I have made in the forum, and I'm not exactly certain what you refer to. I don't want to be perceived as making attacks. Although I do disagree with people in my posts, I did not perceive them as antagonistic. Let us resolve this in private chat instead of the forum- I don't want to take over a post with this. I will send you a private message.

Please don't get defensive- I apologize for using the bad K word. I was pointing out that Kant seems to agree. I have met several philosophy students who misunderstand his universals to be a claim for objective reality (independent of your hopes, wishes, etc.) and was pointing this out. I think that there are many examples of this sort of thing in other philosophers as well, and was merely warning that although many philosophers use the language of reason, freedom, and objective reality, they don't mean the words in their proper sense. Philosophers who were within a mile of the Enlightenment had to use those words, or they weren't taken seriously.

Feldblum, I'm not sure what you mean by understanding the contexts. My understanding of the question of what should be the highest value is defined by taking the context of categories of value that are broad in that they apply to a human being, and narrowing it down to the individual, with the understanding that the broad category of value called "work" is a prerequisite to the individual's specific value hierarchy.

Oh, Breath, I didn't take it that way at all. In fact, I took it exactly the way that sleepyop did. Actually, this very quote started a long conversation with my boyfriend last night. I was contrasting that Rand quote about her husband being her highest value to the theme in Fountainhead of work being the appropriate highest value. In alot of Objectivist literature, it seems that in a hierarchy of values, Objectivist ethics holds that work should be your highest value. I take this as meaning as a category among others like romance, leisure, etc. My point was that, if work should be an Objectivist's highest value, then why did Rand say that her husband was her highest value? The conclusion I came to was that work should be your highest value because without productive activity, you cease to live the life proper to a human, and only someone who lives that life can really hold other values. I suppose that is where self-esteem comes in. Self-esteem comes from work (meaning any honest productive activity). This doesn't mean that you should ignore your love interest all the time so that you can be at work more. I think that it is ok to value a person (your child, your spouse, etc) more than you value a certain kind of work or job, but that you can't cease being a productive person so that you can spend more time with the person. For me, it gets a little sticky there. If work as a category should be a higher value than parenthood or romance as a category, should I be able to say, "My husband/kids/wife is the most important thing in the world to me" or should I say that my particular career is? As I understand it, productive activity (work) is a prerequisite to a proper value hierarchy (and with it, self-esteem), and when you say that it is the highest value, you are just acknowledging that without it, no other values would be possible for you. In this way, I think you can say that a particular thing (a certain career, a certain person) is your highest value, because you take it as a given that to hold this as a value, you would have to be a productive human being. I think that this understanding of it fits rather well with the idea (paraphrased from Rand) that before you can say "I love you", you have to first be able to say "I". I would be interested to hear any other comments on this question of value.

There are a ton of things that people claim are virtues. Aristotle had a list (Read Nichomachean Ethics), and so did almost every other philosopher, whether they made an explicit list or not. Here's a fun exercise: without using anyone else's ideas, try to make a list of your own virtues. Then next to each, explain why they are good qualities to have. Then compare to Rand or Aristotle, or any other mind you respect. I find that to be a very good way of thinking out why those philosophers chose the virtues they did, and of finding out if they missed any

I think I'm going to employ DPW's fantasy sequence idea. It's a very appealing way to present ones thoughts! <fantasy> I walk into a room full of people. A man greets me at the door, welcoming me to the summer Objectivist Conference. He says, "Hey, we don't care if you are ARI or TOC. As long as you respect reason and appeal only to reality as your final arbitrator, then you are welcome! Please help yourself to the chocolate cake and candy and strawberry punch!" I see a man in a corner, gnawing on a banana while exclaiming, "mmm, potassium!" I strike up conversation with a man next to a punch bowl who compliments me on my "What Would Aristotle Think" bracelet. He says, "Hey, I don't care if you are a woman, I still think that you can use your mind! I DON'T think that the proper role of woman is hero worship, and I don't think that the most feminine of all looks is the look of being chained! In fact, I believe that even Rand may have said some things that were incorrect at times." I proceed to my seat, and listen to the lecture. Afterwards, I am invited out by several other people at the conference. We go out, and instead of ignoring me or saying rude things about needing to get more women to the conferences, they engage in intelligent conversation with me. It is a splendid evening, and we all agree to meet again next year. </fantasy> That was invigorating! I am relatively new to Objectivism (a little over 3 years), so perhaps I do not understand why ARI/TOC are so argumentative with each other. The points they make off one another seem trivial. It also seems that although at the conference I attended, the men bemoan the dearth of single females, they do many things to repel that very group of people. So many Objectivist men I meet seem to honestly believe the rubbish about the role of a female being hero worship, or that women are somehow weaker or want to be owned/possessed/dominated. They truly do not understand my criticisms of Dominique as a heroine. (My criticism being that she was not good enough for Roark because she was not a producer of anything.) Bah!

A critique and a few warnings about looking for Objectivism in other literature. On Goodkind's series: I thought this was okay, but he really lost me with the last one. I got sick of all the rape/attempted rape scenes in every book, and Jensen or whatever her name was REALLY got on my nerves. "Riiiichaarddd, Iiiii'm stuuuuuck!... Riiiichaaaardd, Iiii'm huuuuuungryyyyy!" Sorry, but I was just hoping for her to die. Not to mention that his last couple of books have become very derivative. So many of the things said by Richard (the main character) seemed to be copied from AS, then painstakingly subjected to a thesaurus to change the key words. I'm sorry if this seems too mean to the author, and his earlier books in the series were definitely worth reading, but it's my opinion. Warnings about looking for Objectivism: Don't look for Objectivist ethics in economics. Truly, many Objectivists embrace Mises and the Austrian Economists, but be careful- many many of these people are Utilitarians. I heard Hazlitt and Hayek mentioned earlier, so I thought this warning would be warranted. I do not say this to discredit their economics- I agree with the Austrian approach to economics, and like it very much. Their justifications for their economic views are great in terms of utility, but their moral justifications are often questionable. Likewise with Smith. Also- things that seem to agree with tenets of Objectivism can be found in many places. Portions of Kant seem to agree with Objectivist Metaphysics, portions of Aristotle and Mill agree with Objectivist Ethics. None of these people were Objectivists, and some are against what Objectivism stands for. I love Aristotle, and think it is probably the closest to Rand's approach to philosophy. Regarding Nietzsche: although an earlier poster said the similarities were superficial, I have to respectfully disagree. I think that perhaps looking at Nietzsche's slave/master dichotomy can lead one to dismiss him as accepting the premises of altruism while attempting to reject altruism. On further examination, this seems to be false- the character of Nietzsche's Master is further explored in his other works and is much more independent of the Slave. I agree that Nietzsche had many mistakes, but he is also worth reading and is, IMO, an Aristotelian at heart (I am now ducking to avoid flaming spears thrown by other Aristotelians). Thats about it

I think that Weiss has something when he speaks of keeping the full context in mind. 1. The chess match: The full context includes the fact that for a good person, his work is not chosen solely on the basis of the amount of money he will make- it is possible to make a great deal of money in almost any line of work, so one should choose their work on the basis of what they actually enjoy doing. I doubt that either chess player in question plays the game because he wants to win a million. An excellent chess player probably loves the game, and respects the intellect it takes to be good at it. In this example, it seems that each player would want his opponent to be at the absolute top of his game, so that if he won, it would be a significant victory. Because self esteem comes from acheivement, beating an opponent who is ill or distracted would not be as great for self esteem or sense of acheivement as beating one who is at the top of his game. I think that in this example, it is in the interests of both people for the other player to perform excellently. I would rather get into a boxing ring with a champion than a 2 year old. 2. The Interview: I have thought about this one before, but was satisfied by Rand's explanation, as mentioned by a previous poster. 3. The Curved Test: This also was addressed by a previous poster. I agree- the point of the test is not to make a good grade. Your interests are met by learning the material excellently. The test is only there to show whether you have done so. I personally think that curving a test is silly and collectivist (is my goal only to be better than my peers? What about an objective standard of excellence?) so the factor of the test being curved should be ignored by the student. It is second-handed to rely on the failure of others for your success- like lying or stealing, it feeds on weakness. Your interests are to achieve 100%- and this is not against the interests of anyone else, because achieving perfect score is what is in their best interests as well. Hope this addressed these ones- I think that the other ones you think of, you can think through, but always keeping the full context of the competition in mind.

Thank you very much for all of your helpful comments. Contrary to the criticism, I found Eddie's comment to be quite lucid and pertinent. Eddie points to the real issue that my question addressed: the premoral status of the choice to live. I have read the essay that Feldblum kindly pointed me to, and it went quite a ways in answering this problem. It also seems to support the idea that the choice to live is a pre-moral consideration. This does, however, create more questions for me. The pre-moral period in which one can decide whether to live, as I understand it, seems a similar device to the pre-societal "state of nature" in politics in that it may not actually exist, but is more of an expression of the initial epistemological step that must be made before one decides the appropriate political system (or in this case, the appropriate ethical code). What I mean is this: if there is an actual "pre-moral" state, it comes before we can even speak fluently. It is a helpful to think about this state when thinking about the reasons for the ethical choice, but we are not actually in a pre-moral state when we are old enough to articulately decide whether to live. So here is a related question: Can suicide be morally condemned? My thoughts on this are that morality does apply to this question- that it does not fall into the category of the pre-moral. Epistemically, yes, the decision to live seems to be pre-moral, but I am not sure that it follows that in practice, ethics has nothing to say about suicide. If one comes to the point of suicide, there must have been some original choice to live, and the adoption, at least in some part, of life supporting principles, because it is impossible to remain alive without some effort to remain so. Could it be that the decision to die can be made based on a judgment of values? It seems that if all values were stripped away, value acheivement made impossible and ones life were directed to the service of evil- let us use a Nazi concentration camp as a rough example of this- then suicide could not be condemned according even to an ethics of self-interest. While it could not be condemned, it seems that it could also not be approved in this situation, because either choice is the negation of value. Another example puts value back into the picture: an American highschool kid wants to commit suicide because he is depressed and does not think that happiness is possible. (Let us say he has just taken a class on the works of Kafka.) Surely there is some line of reasoning that could be presented to this person, culminating in a moral condemnation of his suicide. One could present the values that life can offer, and explain how death is the negation of value. Could this not be followed by something to the effect of: "Life is the standard of value you hold, and by that standard, death is not a value and the pursuit of death is not a virtue, so pursuing suicide is wrong," as a moral condemnation of suicide in this case? With this, I woud be appealing to a standard of life already adopted by the agent, so the agent is not in a pre-moral state. Sorry for the lengthiness, but I would be interested in your further thoughts on this matter. Thank you!