What is a good example of an objective law?

[softwareNerd]

... It seems to me (for no known reason in the world ) that the greatest emphasis for philosophy and science of law should be on objective expression.

I think that the study of actual laws (call it "legal history") should be a big part of the science. For instance, what constituted a binding offer under various legal systems -- old and modern -- and what are the pros and cons of the different approaches? Or, what constituted evidence? Or, in what ways did people attempt to corruptly influence various legal systems, and what checks against such abuse worked best. Or, what were the results from trials by jury versus by judge? From the past, one can induce principles of what types of laws best protect individual rights.

... reduces to asking whether the ... the law ... "protects the rights of individuals against initiation of force". (emphasis added)

While that's the starting point for the law, I think the detailed study should answer the question: "what best protects the rights of individuals against initiation of force?"

[Old Toad]

Hello David,

All I was suggesting is that “objective” as an adjective for “law” could be taken in the sense of objective in derivation or objective in expression (or both).

I think that in approaching the philosophy of law there should not be any kind of dichotomy or difference in emphasis between these. A law should be objectively derived, not based on subjective favoritism. A law should be objectively expressed, not subject to subjective application. Both are required, neither one more than the other.

[EC]

Okay, it's probably a symptom of my OCD that has me worrying that I might have been wrong about a basic principle of Objectivism not a concrete example (which would bother me less), but, anyway, here's Mr. Odden's definition of "objective law":

Try this: "An objective law is a law which defines in a manner that is defineable and graspable by a rational consciousness what constitutes a crime or what is forbidden, and the kind of penalties that a man would incur if he performs the forbidden action."

Last night I looked in the index of OPAR under "objective law" which lead me to the section on it, therein, which lead me to footnote #19 which, evententually, lead me to VOS pages 128-129...

All laws must be objective (and objectively justifiable): men must know clearly, and in advance of taking an action, what the law forbids them to do (and why), what constitutes a crime and what penalty they will incur if they commit it.

Bold mine.

The above quote is directly from Miss Rand, and supports my version of this disagreement. I am slightly embarassed that I backed off my original statement at first, but that was just because of the respect I have for Mr. Odden's posts on legal matters.

Edited June 18, 2008 by EC

[EC]

OTOH, in the context of a particular view of the purpose of law (for example "protects the rights of individuals against initiation of force"), then the problem of validating a law mostly (perhaps entirely) reduces to asking whether the objective interpretation of the law does describe an instance of the moral concept "protects the rights of individuals against initiation of force".

This is what I'm getting at (and what I think Miss Rand stated) when I say "objective law"-- not just objectively or clearly stated but law based on objective moral priciples.

[ruveyn ben yosef]

Chops gives the correct answer from the Objectivist perspective. See the interview "Objective Law" at 2:25.

An objective law is a law which defines objectively what constitutes a crime or what is forbidden, and the kind of penalties that a man would incur if he performs the forbidden action. "Objective" means defineable, graspable by a rational consciousness.

There is a distinction between a just law and an objective law, and laws should be both just and objective.

Am I correct in saying the objective law is unambiguous law? A law stated so clearly with such well defined semantics that there is no doubt about how to apply it to actions in its intended domain of application? And with a domain of application that is totally clear.

If I may be permitted a parable and an analogy I am thinking of robots like Gort in -The Day the Earth Stood Still-. Gort is one of a race of robots that enforce laws. They are machines governed by the programming, they are without rancor or bias and what is more important once they are empowered to enforce the rules, that power cannot be rescinded, even by their creators. Since the power to enforce cannot be taken back (under this hypothetical) one can bet the creators of the Gort race were damned careful in how they formulated the rules.

This definition of objectivity or unambiguity is one thing, as you point out. Now can we do a similar thing with justice? Can justice be so well defined that there is no doubt in the mind of any rational person, what is just, what is anti-just and what is neither just nor anti-just?

I include this latter category to cover -conventions- such as driving on the left or driving on the right. Right hand driving is neither more nor less "just" than left hand driving. Since roads are essentially narrow linear entities, one must chose a convention or have a lot of collisions. Once the convention is chosen (arbitrarily or on the basis of habit), it must be uniformly enforced, else traffic chaos ensues.

ruveyn

[DavidOdden]

Am I correct in saying the objective law is unambiguous law?

Yes.

Now can we do a similar thing with justice? Can justice be so well defined that there is no doubt in the mind of any rational person, what is just, what is anti-just and what is neither just nor anti-just?

Yes, to the extent that the relevant facts can be known. Convicting and punishing a guilty person for violation of someone's rights is an instance of "justice" (idem the acquittal of the innocent), but in a specific case it may not be possible to have the factual knowledge leading to a just conviction or acquittal. The statement of law is conceptual (so it can be revised when errors are detected) but a finding of fact is highly concrete, and not always subject to open-ended revision in pursuit of justice.

[Qwertz]

I don't see what the disagreement is. Everyone appears to be saying the same thing: just laws must be objectively justified and objectively constructed. Neither is sufficient; both are necessary. Is anyone arguing to the contrary? If not, what am I missing?

~Q

[Old Toad]

Q, I think the disagreement was in this response to EC above:

I take it then you also disagree with Rand on what objective law is, and in the context of a question about Rand's emphasis on government supporting and enforcing objective law, we have to construe "objective law" the way Rand did. But supposing this were not a question about Objectivism, and were just a general question "What is objective law"; do you have an argument to support your conclusion?

The difference was not regarding "just laws" but the meaning of "objective law."

Edited June 18, 2008 by Old Toad

[Chops]

The above quote is directly from Miss Rand, and supports my version of this disagreement. I am slightly embarassed that I backed off my original statement at first, but that was just because of the respect I have for Mr. Odden's posts on legal matters.

It's important to note the way that that was presented. That all laws must be objective and objectively justified. The usage of "and" means that they are actually seperate concepts.

Had she stated "All laws must be objective (objectively justified)..." you would be correct. The lack of an "and" in that example would serve as an implied "by which I mean..." which would support your statement that an objective law is is also a just law.

But because she uses "and", she's effectively saying that laws must be both objective AND just (something we can all agree on), and that the explicit distinction serves as a reminder that they are indeed separate concepts.

I think that Toad's post pointing out the distinction that some folks are making in that typically "objective" (with it comes to Objectivism) implies "moral" while in the case of "objective law" as Rand defines it, it means more "clear, unambiguous, with well defined lines" and does not actually require morality. I think Toad is right on there. (I, too, found it a little odd that "objective law" did not also imply "just law").

I don't see what the disagreement is.

The debate is primarily on the definition of "objective law" and whether or not "objective" in that context implies "just."

Edited June 18, 2008 by Chops

[EC]

I think you are wrong, Chops, man I wish we Peikoff or someone here to settle this.

Edited June 18, 2008 by EC

[DavidOdden]

I think you are wrong, Chops, man I wish we Peikoff or someone here to settle this.

Why aren't you willing to take Rand's statements as dispositive of what, in Objectivism (the Philosophy of Ayn Rand), "objective law" refers to?

[~Sophia~]

The debate is primarily on the definition of "objective law" and whether or not "objective" in that context implies "just."

Justice is a category of objective judgment - the one which deals with violitional matters. So yes just implies objective and objective implies just when the issue is man's character and actions.

Why aren't you willing to take Rand's statements as dispositive of what, in Objectivism (the Philosophy of Ayn Rand), "objective law" refers to?

From IOE:

Yes, “objective judgment” is one of the wider categories to which the concept “justice” belongs.

What distinguishes “justice” from other instances of objective judgment? When one evaluates the nature or actions of inanimate objects, the criterion of judgment is determined by the particular purpose for which one evaluates them.

But how does one determine a criterion for evaluating the character and actions of men, in view of the fact that men possess the faculty of volition? What science can provide an objective criterion of evaluation in regard to volitional matters? Ethics. Now, do I need a concept to designate the act of judging a man’s character and/or actions exclusively on the basis of all the factual evidence available, and of evaluating it by means of an objective moral criterion? Yes. That concept is “justice.”

[Chops]

I think you are wrong, Chops

Since the evidence you provided was a direct Rand quote, I'll try to elaborate the syntax of the statement with a parallel statement.

Let's say I said the following:

"The food at Applebee's is tasty (and fatty)."

In that statement, "and fatty" is not an attribute of "tasty", but an attribute of "the food at Applebees."

If I were to revise that statement, and say that "The food at Applebee's is tasty (fatty)", then "fatty" would indeed be an attribute of "tasty" (the implication in my statement would be that all tasty food must also be fatty).

This is the mistake you're making in parsing the quote presented.

In the Rand quote, "and objectively justified" is an attribute of "law" rather than an attribute of "objective."

The conjunction is the key to the misunderstanding here, at least in regard to the provided quote.

[EC]

Why aren't you willing to take Rand's statements as dispositive of what, in Objectivism (the Philosophy of Ayn Rand), "objective law" refers to?

I am, but the passage from VOS (Objectivism, directly written by Miss Rand) supports what I'm saying and for the reasons I've previously stated.

[DavidOdden]

I am, but the passage from VOS (Objectivism, directly written by Miss Rand) supports what I'm saying and for the reasons I've previously stated.

As Chops says. In fact, in the "Nature of Government" quote, by juxtaposing law which is "objective and objectively justified", and by parenthesizing the part "(and objectively justified)", the evidence is clear that when she speaks of "objective law", that idea that does not entail "objectively justified", otherwise she would not have redundantly said "and objectively justified". "Objectively justified" is a separate fact, to be distinguished from "objective law". My position is that when Ayn Rnad actually says, quote

An objective law is a law which defines objectively what constitutes a crime or what is forbidden, and the kind of penalties that a man would incur if he performs the forbidden action. "Objective" means defineable, graspable by a rational consciousness

then we kind of have to take this statement at face value. Rand's definition, uttered in her own voice, is right there.

[Old Toad]

Hello EC,

I understand the quote you cite from Ayn Rand this way:

All laws must be objective [i.e., objectively expressed] (and objectively justifiable): men must know clearly, and in advance of taking an action, what the law forbids them to do (and why), what constitutes a crime and what penalty they will incur if they commit it.

For what's its worth, I also agree with Chops. The literal language and rules of grammar supports that Ayn Rand is using the word “objective” in this sentence to refer to the expression of the law, not the justifiability of the law.

Actually, in regard to “objective law,” I think this would be the correct understanding -- even without the parentheticals clearly differentiating "and objectively justifiable." The reason is that a “law” -- in most abstract terms -- is a kind of communication, i.e., it is a kind of expression of an idea (like "art.")

In contrast, for example, when one uses the term “objective value” (“value” in the sense of that which one acts to gain or keep), I think the correct understanding would be -- in the absence of other context or clarification -- that “objective” refers to the rationale for the value, not to the expression of a particular value such as “$27”. The reason is that a “value” -- in most abstract terms -- is the object of human action, i.e., it is a kind of choice.

Edited June 18, 2008 by Old Toad

[~Sophia~]

An objective law is a law which defines objectively what constitutes a crime or what is forbidden, and the kind of penalties that a man would incur if he performs the forbidden action.

"Objective" means defineable, graspable by a rational

consciousness.

(bold mine)

I don't think this can be taken as an exhostive definition because Rand defined objective as much more than just graspable in every other context. I don't think it needed to be repeated every time what she meant metaphysically and epistemologically by the concept objective. Here she stressed out what also an objective law should be - graspable.

[Qwertz]

The difference was not regarding "just laws" but the meaning of "objective law."

The debate is primarily on the definition of "objective law" and whether or not "objective" in that context implies "just."

Okay, but why does it matter one way or the other? What difference does it make to someone trying to formulate/enact/follow/interpret a law?

Maybe the argument is over whether objective justification is a prerequisite for objective construction (or vice versa)?

~Q

PS: I mean, I think "objective law" can refer to slightly different aspects of the same integrated concept, depending on context. It can refer to objective construction, objective formulation, or both. What I need to know is: 1) in what context has it been used where we disagree on its meaning, and 2) what is it about the way "objective law" is treated in that context that makes the disputed question a relevant or important one?

[Old Toad]

Hi Q,

When two people are talking to each other using different words in different languages, at least they know they are not communicating.

When two people are speaking the same words in the same language, each thinking they are using the words and language correctly but each meaning different things, they cannot understand how the other could possibly come to a particular conclusion. Then it usually devolves into accusations that the other person is an idiot.

Edited June 18, 2008 by Old Toad

[DavidOdden]

Okay, but why does it matter one way or the other?

The basic difference has to do with whether we're operating within the context of Rand's philosophical views, or some other set of views. I'm not suggesting that other views are unworthy of discussion, merely that when someone asked about "objective law" especially with reference to Rand's view of what "objective law" means, then the objectively correct answer has to be Rand's view. If you remove the particulars about the subject matter and the author, this reflects a methodological principle which is worth defending. The question is not "what should the law be", it is "what is 'objective law', in the view of Ayn Rand". The question "what should the law be" would include the answer "objective(ly stated) law" as well as "the purpose of protecting rights". The question "what epistemological theory would be essential to a theory of objectively stated law" would include "an objective theory of concepts" and would not include "a theory of rights".

What difference does it make to someone trying to formulate/enact/follow/interpret a law?

A person attempting to draft legislation has to have a grasp on the purpose of the law which he has been charged with writing (and I have no idea how that actually happens -- that's on my to-do list). The purpose may be to stop certain forms of commerce, or to encourage certain forms of commerce, or to protect certain property rights, or prohibit some form of behavior constitutionally permitted by state employees. That person needs to translate the goal into some linguistic form that, if enacted and then interpreted objectively, will bring about that goal. The person enacting that would-be law has roughly the same goal (or the opposite goal, if he opposes enactment) but then again he may not -- his purpose is maybe consistent with or not highly antithetical to that purpose. We can assume that the sponsor's view is reflected in the bill, and that the "yea" votes reflect a range of inaccessible political facts, nominally packed as "support" but realistically meaning "I can live with that".

Do or should judges ignore what the language of the law actually, objectively says in favor of how they subjectively feel the particular case should be decided? Should they do this when they disagree with the motivation for and purpose of a law? We know that they do ignore the actual law; my position is that this is wrong and reprehensible behavior for a judge, at least as long as judges only have toe power to interpret rather than write the law. If the literal result of the law is absurd, the absurd part of the law should be struck down. If the Constitution contained the Purpose Clause which stated, at a fundamental and constitutional level that laws are not just arbitrary declarations but that they must serve the purpose of protecting individual rights, then there would be clear constitutional grounds for overturning a vast heap of unjust laws. But they left that clause out, for some reason.

My point here is that "objective statement" and "just purpose" are two very different concepts, even though both of them are good things. And yet, we see a widespread confusion (in the world at large) over the difference between what the law actually says, objectively speaking, and what would be a just and fair law on the topic. Thus I think that anything that treats just purpose and objective statement as in any way interchangeable has to be argued with.

Maybe the argument is over whether objective justification is a prerequisite for objective construction (or vice versa)?

There is a connection, that construction is really hard if you don't have a known intent (and as Tony is frequently at pains to point out, you don't). But even without a clear grasp of what the legislature was trying to do, it's still possible to just look at what the statute says and see in Ohio, "Inciting to violence" does not have to actually result in commission of violence.

[~Sophia~]

My point here is that "objective statement" and "just purpose" are two very different concepts, even though both of them are good things.

But a law is not primarly a graspable statement. A law is a rule. Objective refers to the method by which such a rule should be derived (just purpose fits here). Then that rule has to be communicated and thus the requirement for graspable (objective statement fits here).

If a law was clearly defined (graspable/objective statement) yet subjective in nature - are you arguing that it could be properly called an objective law?

Edited June 18, 2008 by ~Sophia~

[Old Toad]

I think David, EC, and Sophia are making this unnecessarily complicated. None of you is disagreeing with Ayn Rand’s philosophical position that a law should be both objectively expressed and objectively justified.

The difference you are having is purely definitional. As the quote from Ayn Rand cited by EC makes clear, while Ayn Rand uses “objective law” in the sense of objectively expressed, she also makes clear that a law should be objectively justified. But it would not be contrary to Objectivism to define "objective law" as requiring either one or both, as long as one agrees that both are necessary for a just law (given that lack of notice of the meaning of a law is one way a law can be unjust).

I do not see how such a definitional difference is one of “whether we’re operating within the context of Rand’s philosophical views or some other set of views.” From what I see on this thread, I have no reason to think that EC is wanting to discuss some other set of views.

And if the agreed-upon definition of "objective law" is that it must only be objectively expressed or if Ayn Rand was clear that she used the term in that sense (as she was), then yes, Sophia, "a law [that] was clearly defined (graspable/objective statement) yet subjective in nature ... could be properly called an objective law." But it would not be a just law.

Edited June 19, 2008 by Old Toad

[DavidOdden]

But a law is not primarly a graspable statement.

I agree: the general nature of law is briefly discussed by Rand in the interview "Objective Law", before she begins her more extensive comments on objective law.

Objective refers to the method by which such a rule should be derived (just purpose fits here).

No, that is not what objective refers to. In fact Rand has relatively little to say about the method of deriving just law. She does clearly identify the purpose of law, she does talk about the nature of law, but she does not offer anything that I have ever see about the method by which justice is encoded in a system of objective laws (that is, rules which can be objectively understood). For example, we can identify the fact that taking another man's property by force is a violation of his rights, and we know that the purpose of law is to protect rights, but Rand never demonstrates or speaks of a method by which a just law can be derived that will protect rights, in this one respect. The reason why she does not talk of such a method, I believe, is because it is really the domain of a specialized science, namely legal drafting.

I think you are getting confused over the real question. The question, as I believe I have made abundantly clear, is not whether laws should be just -- we all presumably agree that they should be, and we agree on what the essential characteristic of a just law is. The question is, simply, whether "objective" and "just" are freely interchangeable. Unsurprisingly, in a philosophy where the emphasis is on "existence", there is some real overlap in referents. But the bare textual facts say what Rand meant when she spoke of "objective law", and I don't see how there can be any denying of what she actually said unless you have contradictory text. Maybe you want to argue that it's just words and that it doesn't really matter, but if you assume that, they you surely must know that objective law (in Rand's sense) is impossible because words have no objective meaning and they just mean whatever the individual wants them to mean. I grant that I'm being unrelentingly obnoxious about this point, but the minute one accepts subjectivity into intrepretations of statements, then one has started down the slippery slope of subjective law-by-feeling, which would suck bigtime.

[~Sophia~]

The question is, simply, whether "objective" and "just" are freely interchangeable.

The concept of objectivity is at root a combination of metaphysics and epistemology. I am defending that. What I think you are doing is dropping the metaphysics component in this particular context. Objective does not mean understandable - it means grounded in reality (that is the essential).

[DavidOdden]

Objective does not mean understandable - it means grounded in reality (that is the essential).

That part is clear: the question is simply, when Ayn Rand speaks of "objective law", what is she talking about. I've given the evidence (well, transcribed some of it and semi-linked the remainder) that shows what the answer to that question is. If you disgree with Rand over her characterization of objective law, that's fine, but the original question wasn't "how should Rand have defined 'objective law'?", it was a question about Ayn Rand and objective law (as she characterizes it). I'm grounding my argument in one simple aspect of reality: what Rand did say.