"One Problem With Objectivism"

[brian0918]

HB is back in action with three new posts.

[John Donohue]

"Ayn Rand identified the "fallacy of the 'stolen concept'" in the early 50s, ...It is based on the idea that concepts are not "givens" not just "there" but are products of conscious activity. And concepts are not a separable product, like a car that comes out of the car factory, but an outgrowth--like a hand--that remains dependent on the activities of consciousness required to sustain it. For concepts to remain concepts, rather than meaningless sounds, one can't take the Wittgensteinian approach of pulling up the ladder from under oneself. The "stolen concept" fallacy occurs when one "makes off" with a concept, taking it away from its rightful origin, cutting it off from the mental content and mental processes that, so to speak, give it life. " -- Harry Binswanger

This is one of the most penetrating explications of concept formation and anti-rationalism while explaining the fallacy of the Stollen Concept that I have ever read. I am going to use that from now on.

I mean, talking about 'holding someone's feet to the fire,' this holds your feet to the ground.

And there's that Danial Barnes again. I hope HB smacks him.

John Donohue

[Plasmatic]

Binswangers comments on ;

"Physical object" has several contrasts--things in the other Aristotelian categories (non-ousiai) and mental objects. So I don't see why "physical object" was even used as an example.

As well as the comment by D Barnes :

"However, I do agree with him that there are mental (ie non-physical, or abstract) objects as well as physical objects, ie that we are dealing with a dualism at least. Rand herself is unclear on the issue, and that lack of clarity pervades Objectivist debate. Mr Binswanger is to be applauded for taking a much less equivocal line here, as he has done for some time.

"

Remind me of the thread on "The locality of abstractions" I started here:

http://forum.ObjectivismOnline.com/index.p...c=14272&hl=

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

There seems to be some confusion as to what I mean when I say that a non-true premise is already violating logic, according to Objectivism, so that even if you do deductive reasoning from an untrue premise (modal logic) it is logical in the modal sense but not logical according to Objectivism. Ayn Rand's definition of logic as non-contradictory identification is at the root of both induction and deduction; and induction comes first, or is prior to deduction. In other words, to form a concept, one must use a process of non-contradictory identification (i.e. logic in the Objectivist sense).

To verify this, take the concept "chair" and realize that one is pointing to something in reality that has (to keep it simple) "(a man-made object with) four legs and can be sat upon". In the formation of this concept, non-contradictory identification is used because one is NOT including things like spiders, apples, rocks, and horses. If one were to form a concept without the implied logic involved in organizing similarities into a concept, then what the concept refers to in reality would chairs and everything else within one's field of vision. This would not work as a concept as one would not be able to keep track of what one means by the concept "chair."

What I'm getting at is that induction precedes deduction, and the logic of induction must be applied before one can do any deducing. That is, one must already have used logic to form the concepts and to form sentences, and to form premises. One cannot form a premise out of the blue with no content. And the content is derived from observation and non-contradictory identification.

Saying something like "All pigs can fly" contradicts the identification of pigs, so one is violating non-contradictory identification of the facts of reality by saying something like "All pigs can fly," because they can't.

It's basically an issue of context. In the broadest context of your knowledge, "All pigs can fly" is a logical violation; i.e. it is not logical. So, in my view and understanding of logic, one is not being logical already when one says, "All pigs can fly." Putting it into a syllogism doesn't make it logical. In other words, putting it into a syllogism doesn't make it non-contradictory identification. In the very narrow context of "a syllogism is a logical statement" it is logical to form a syllogism with an untrue premise in the sense that the conclusion must follow from the premises. However, that is dropping the context of what logic means, as in non-contradictory identification; and it is dropping the broader context of what "pig" refers to in reality.

If the method of non-contradictory identification is logic, then violating non-contradiction is not logical, no matter what form a statement has -- even if one puts a contradiction into a syllogism. So I would say the following is dropping the context:

All pigs can fly

George is a pig

Therefore George can fly

And I would say that it is not logical in the broadest meaning of logic, precisely because it has an obvious contradiction. For someone to be logical, all of one's knowledge must be non-contradictory. If you introduce a contradiction, then you are not being logical.

[adrock3215]

If the method of non-contradictory identification is logic, then violating non-contradiction is not logical, no matter what form a statement has -- even if one puts a contradiction into a syllogism.

I have read and understood your post I think. To summarize: putting the statement "All pigs can fly" into a syllogism puts the statement within the realm of logic, but doesn't make the statement logical. And this is premised on Rand's definition of logic as "non contradictory identification." Logic is used to form concepts from percepts, such as the chair you brought into the discussion. Fair enough. But isn't reasoning from percepts (i.e. the particular) to concepts (i.e. the general) essentially an inductive process? In so far as it is, one is only talking about induction. Deduction involves reasoning from the general to the particular, and that's the issue at hand.

You wrote "one cannot form a premise out of the blue with no content. And the content is derived from observation and non-contradictory identification." This is not necessarily so. I can form a premise with content that is derived from observation and contradictory identification. Most people make this mistake, don't they?

The next question is, logically (no pun intended), why is "non-contradictory identification" the definition of logic? There have been many definitions of logic given by various and sundry philosophers. What makes Rand's definition the correct one? Keep in mind I am not, and have not been, taking a stand on the right and wrongness of Rand's claim, I am just trying to understand how she got there.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

There seems to be some confusion as to what I mean when I say that a non-true premise is already violating logic, according to Objectivism, so that even if you do deductive reasoning from an untrue premise (modal logic) it is logical in the modal sense but not logical according to Objectivism. Ayn Rand's definition of logic as non-contradictory identification is at the root of both induction and deduction; and induction comes first, or is prior to deduction. In other words, to form a concept, one must use a process of non-contradictory identification (i.e. logic in the Objectivist sense).

I managed to post the above reply to Maverick Philosopher's blog replies. I don't know if it will stay up there or whether it will receive additional comments. I guess I need to subscribe to those comments to keep track of it.

http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/mav...age/3/#comments

[brian0918]

The next question is, logically (no pun intended), why is "non-contradictory identification" the definition of logic?

OED gives the history of the word. According to them, "The definition formerly most commonly accepted is ‘the art of reasoning’." Another informative bit: "Used by translators and expounders of Hegel for: 'The fundamental science of thought and its categories (including metaphysics or ontology).'" And a quote from one of those sources: "logic [is] the science of the idea in and by itself".

So it seems, as normally understood, this word "logic" refers to the science or art of thinking/reasoning.

Rand then makes the connection from thinking/reasoning to non-contradictory identification:

All thinking is a process of identification and integration. Man perceives a blob of color; by integrating the evidence of his sight and his touch, he learns to identify it as a solid object; he learns to identify the object as a table; he learns that the table is made of wood; he learns that the wood consists of cells, that the cells consist of molecules, that the molecules consist of atoms. All through this process, the work of his mind consists of answers to a single question: What is it? His means to establish the truth of his answers is logic, and logic rests on the axiom that existence exists. Logic is the art of non-contradictory identification. A contradiction cannot exist. An atom is itself, and so is the universe; neither can contradict its own identity; nor can a part contradict the whole. No concept man forms is valid unless he integrates it without contradiction into the total sum of his knowledge. To arrive at a contradiction is to confess an error in one’s thinking; to maintain a contradiction is to abdicate one’s mind and to evict oneself from the realm of reality.

--Galt's speech

So, if there's any doubt about Rand's definition, it's not in the connection of "logic" to the "art of thinking/reasoning", but in the connection of thinking/reasoning with "non-contradictory identification".

What is identification? Here are relevant definitions from OED:

1. The making, regarding, or treating of a thing as identical with another, or of two or more things as identical with one another.

2. The determination of identity; the action or process of determining what a thing is; the recognition of a thing as being what it is.

And what is a contradiction? Well, many of the definitions from OED refer to "logic":

1. Logical inconsistency or incongruity.

2. A statement containing propositions one of which denies or is logically at variance with the other.

So it's clear that there's a long history of direct connection between the words "logic" and "non-contradiction". Whatever "logic" means, it involves non-contradiction. Logic requires non-contradiction. The art of reasoning requires non-contradiction. What's left is showing that reason is a process of identification. OED calls "reason" - "the guiding principle of the human mind in the process of thinking." So, to reason is to thinking logically, in a non-contradictory way.

I'll leave it to someone else to connect my definitions of "identification" above to the definition of "reason". I will however submit this post as evidence of that connection. This post involved identification every step of the way, so if you consider what I have done here to be "reasoning", then identification is at least one type of reasoning. Is it the only type?

Edited February 20, 2009 by brian0918

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

I would also add that non-contradictory identification is what makes a syllogism work. In other words, necessity, in the syllogism sense of one premise following another out of necessity is based upon non-contradictorily identifying what the first premise means and why it implies the second premise (for both true and non-true premises).

All fish can swim

A carp is a fish

Therefore a carp can swim

One has to grasp the necessity of this overall statement by affirming in one's mind that fish (as in A carp is a fish) doesn't contradict what fish means in the first premise (all fish can swim). So what Miss Rand has done is get to the essential issue of why logic works; i.e. what is behind or underneath the necessity of a proper syllogism. It also applies to inductive logic; so it is the best definition of logic, in terms of fundamentals and applicability to all cases of logic.

[brian0918]

Your post was deleted. You can still see evidence that you posted, if you go to the blog's front page and scroll down on the right side, under "Recent Comments". However, if you click on your name there, it just brings you to the post's page, not to your reply, because your reply no longer exists.

Integrity--> <---Vallicella

Edited February 20, 2009 by brian0918

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Your post was deleted. You can still see evidence that you posted, if you go to the blog's front page and scroll down on the right side, under "Recent Comments". However, if you click on your name there, it just brings you to the post's page, not to your reply, because your reply no longer exists.

Integrity--> <---Vallicella

Yep, I just noticed that. I wasn't really following the more recent discussions, but he definitely doesn't want to converse with Objectivists. I don't know how longer others will attempt it, but I don't think he wants to understand Objectivism, he just wants to criticize it. I suppose I should have posted earlier regarding that thought, but the comments really blossomed after a few days. Before that there were only a few comments.

I don't know that the issue is integrity per se, I mean I realize I am using the term logic differently than him and other rationalists, so to him I might be speaking gibberish (although I'm not).

Oh Well.

[John Donohue]

Thomas and others, I am a little surprised you are of the opinion that he does not want to understand.

I think he understands very deeply and has so from almost the start.

He has been part of the attack on the Ayn Rand article in Wikipedia. He has launched a long and intense running 'discussion' on Objectivism.

If he did not understand, since he is a major academic philosopher, then that could only be that Objectivism was not worth understanding and made no credible sense whatever. If that were true, why would he expend this much time and effort?

No, he gets it. He has looked right down the barrel of the atheistic, primacy of existence metaphysics of Ayn Rand. He probably realizes it is the ONLY system of thought extent in the world that actually challenges his world-view. He is capable of putting himself -- in a theoretical way -- on the other side. Once there, he would "get" everything you are saying about the need to deploy induction, even though it is so poor compared to God, to identify the reality and truth of existents before deducting anything. He would get everything about Objectivism.

It's just that he is a warrior for the other side. He does not accept it. That is my opinion.

John Donohue

[brian0918]

Vallicella has yet another blog post (YABP) on Objectivism today, in which he quotes FTNI and ITOE: Consciousness and Existence: Is Every Consciousness a Consciousness of What Exists?.

[John Donohue]

It's just more of the same.

Notice how he attempts to shame the Objectivists at the end into answering through the mouth of an AP/Kantian and not the "holy scriptures" of Ayn Rand?

About this time I'd think HB is ready to thump him with the Bible: AS.

John Donohue

[softwareNerd]

Vallicella has yet another blog post (YABP) on Objectivism today, in which he quotes FTNI and ITOE:

Interesting that he's spending so much time on Objectivism. I haven't read the posts, but this kind of attention from a non-Objectivist/non-Rand Fan is rare.

Perhaps a few professional Objectivist philosophers should start a web site like "Philosopher Answer Critiques of Objectivism".

[KendallJ]

Notice how he attempts to shame the Objectivists at the end into answering through the mouth of an AP/Kantian and not the "holy scriptures" of Ayn Rand?

It's interesting. His point seem amateurish to me....

[John Donohue]

His point seem amateurish to me....

Hmmmm...I get just the opposite. This is the way professional Analytic Philosophers think and talk. They call Ayn Rand amateurish left right and center, every chance they get. Except they say "She is a hack."

Meanwhile, why is he spending so much time? Well, he is part of the vandalism of the Ayn Rand article at Wikipedia. That is a specific new fight. I won't try to build a conspiracy theory beyond that. I agree something is pushing him.

John Donohue

[brian0918]

Perhaps a few professional Objectivist philosophers should start a web site like "Philosopher Answer Critiques of Objectivism".

simplyCapitalism for professional philosophers!

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Vallicella has yet another blog post (YABP) on Objectivism today, in which he quotes FTNI and ITOE: Consciousness and Existence: Is Every Consciousness a Consciousness of What Exists?.

He's discussing objects of the imagination and whether objects of the imagination exist as objects independent of consciousness. Obviously, they don't exist independent of consciousness, but they are formed from the awareness of objects independent of consciousness. For example, for this To, me, to imagine the perfect woman, I can take elements from various woman and combine them together into my ideal woman. Granted this woman of the imagination may not exist external to consciousness, but the elements where put together by consciousness being aware of aspects of woman that I find desirable. Likewise for all other aspects of the imagination -- they are formed by combining together objects of awareness that were external to consciousness by the act of imagination.

I may or may not post something to that effect, but the problem is the primacy of consciousness approach that he is engaged in from the get-go. He is trying to deduce that existence exists, and trying to deduce that objects given to awareness by perception exist independent to consciousness.This is where it becomes important to realize that without induction there is no deduction and no imagination. However, since he deleted several posts of mine along those lines, I may not try to enlighten him.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

For example, for this To, me, to imagine the perfect woman, I can take elements from various woman and combine them together into my ideal woman.

I meant for this particular Tom, me....I tried to edit the previous post, but the board wouldn't let me even though it was before the hour deadline of posting.

I've just switched to Internet Explorer 8 and it has some difficulties with this website and has to refresh every time I try to post something.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

[Note: I posted the following to Maverick Philosopher's most recent blog entry. We'll see if he gets it or if he leaves it up there for further comments.]

Bill said: "Suppose Tom is in state of desire. Desire is a state of consciousness. And it is a state of consciousness that is object-directed. One cannot desire without desiring something. Perhaps it is a matter transmitter that Tom desires. Clearly, from the fact that Tom desires a matter transmitter, it does not follow that there exists an x such that x is a matter transmitter and Tom desires x. Or suppose Tom is imagining his dream lover. One cannot imagine without imagining something. The act of imagining 'takes an accusative,' has an object. We call this the intentional object of the act. But surely it is obvious that from the fact that Tom is imagining a girl of such-and-such a description it does not follow that there exists a girl of such-and-such a description!"

You are talking about objects of the imagination which do not necessarily exists as objects outside of consciousness, unless someone goes through the trouble to make them real. For example, an inventor can know about particle theory and imagine taking something a part into its constituent particles, transferring them to another location at the speed of light, capturing them, and then re-assembling them into the object that was so transferred. But notice that to do this in the imagination, one must first grasp certain things that are not dependent on consciousness and did not arise from consciousness -- i.e. matter, the speed of light, particles, and assembling particles.

On the other hand, one cannot affirm that just because someone can imagine something put together by an act of consciousness, that therefore those things of perception and extension are therefore only matters of intension -- i.e. created by an act of consciousness.

In other words, in order for me to imagine the perfect lover, I have to isolate out that which I observed that is desirable into concepts -- i.e. hair color, skin tone, personality, and sexuality-- and then re-arrange them in my imagination into a girl that has the hair color I like, the skin tone I like, the personality I like, and the sexuality I like. While it is true that this imagined perfect woman my not exist out there independent of my consciousness, it is still an object of the imagination and something I can turn my attention to intensionally. However, this object of consciousness was created by taking elements of awareness and re-arranging them in my consciousness. And without the extensional awareness of objects, my imagination would not have anything to work with. The human mind cannot create even objects of the imagination ex nihilo -- without some material to work with. In other words, there is no content of consciousness without there being something for consciousness to be aware of; this awareness can be re-arranged within consciousness, and unless it is brought out into reality -- i.e. a painting based on imagination -- then it remains solely within consciousness. However, it is still an object of consciousness, and exists in that form; but it was created out of elements perceived and conceptualized. In other words, in your terminology, objects of intension (of the mind) are dependent upon objects of perceptual awareness conceptualized by the human mind; and do not exist apart from the extensional awareness re-arranged by the human mind.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

[Note: I posted the following to Maverick Philosopher's most recent blog entry. We'll see if he gets it or if he leaves it up there for further comments.]

Well, Bill has already erased this entry

[kainscalia]

I am in awe of this man and his repeated attempts to hide the fact that his house is burning even though his own trouser legs have begun to smolder.

Well, Bill has already erased this entry

[softwareNerd]

simplyCapitalism for professional philosophers!

Ha ha! Yeah, possibly that too... but, I was thinking more of a site that would not be of interest to Objectivists so much as to non-Objectivist philosophers. More os a static site: a place where non-Objectivists come to find out: "how does Objectivism answer certain standard critiques of other schools?" Perhaps the time is not ripe, though. Perhaps one has to go through a phase of engaging with non-Objectivist philosophers "on their turf" before one intrigues them enough to draw forth critiques of varied kinds. Edited February 23, 2009 by softwareNerd

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Well, the Maverick Philosopher is at it again, trying to discredit Miss Rand's and the Objectivism claim that existence can be ostensively defined by sweeping one's arms about and saying, "I mean this!"

If someone has a problem untangling the rationalism involved, bring up a question and I will try to answer it. But this is the clearest position yet that the Maverick Philosopher is not interested in existence. I would reply to him, but he would merely delete it.

[Plasmatic]

As I said before this reminds me of my thread. Had she used "exist" consistenly [even though the context explains her meaning] this would be an easier thing to deal with. However she does make clear in other places the distinction between "existents" and "entities". This pertains to Bills comments:

How about the ruby redness of the wine which is exemplified in each of the three glasses of wine on the table. That redness is (arguably) a universal. And it is (arguably) perceivable in each glass of wine. Am I gesturing at universals in addition to spatiotemporal particulars and states of affairs when I make my grand ostensive gesture? And what about the mathematical set consisting of Peter, Phil, and Pasquale, and its eight subsets, and the power set the members of which are these eight sets, and the singleton which has the power set as its sole element, and so on? Don't these abstract objects also exist

"Redness",and "states of affairs" etc are existents. But they are attributes of entities which are primary . The only concession here is that she used "exist" inconsistently.