The Fallacy of Composition

[Anti-Toohey]

*** Merged with an ongoing discussion on free-will. -sN ***

I have been wrestling for some time with the issue of free will as presented by Rand. Basically, I cannot decide whether or not she has committed a fundamental error, because I cannot decide whether or not I understand what she means. I know there are a number of threads on this topic already, but none of them seemed to me to put the issue as clearly as I would like to begin with, which corrupted subsequent discussion. Below, I try to explain myself as clearly as possible.

Human beings exist, but their existence is not a primary. Humans can (and do) both come into and go out of existence. Both of these events are contingent on the nature of things which are non-human. I acknowledge volition as a human attribute, but it is an attribute contingent upon the attributes of other entities and, ultimately, the contingencies can be traced back to the nature of inanimate matter. Thus, volition itself is contingent, through a causal chain, on the nature of inanimate matter. If inanimate matter is capable of producing, through a particular causal chain, only one series of events, then it seems volition itself should be capable of producing only one series of events. Inanimate matter cannot suddenly acquire a new identity when it is organized into a particular system, such as a living organism. So, it seems to me that one would have to acknowledge that a given human being's behavior is part of a series of events that is uniquely determined by preceding events. If Ayn Rand denied this, I am convinced that she was guilty of a serious error.

But, I am not sure Rand would have denied this, and I will explain why. The fact that volition itself is determined does not imply the conventional perspective adopted by determinists, particularly in regard to moral responsibility. When we say that moral responsibility attaches only to chosen actions, we mean only that it attaches to those events contingent upon a human being's particular volitional nature. Whether that volitional nature is itself determined by other factors is quite beside the point. To put it another way, one could regard moral judgment as an evaluation according to a particular code of values of a human being's particular volitional nature, which is simply an attribute of that particular human being. I see no problem here for the Objectivist theory of morality or for the Objectivist use of terminology, because I think that "free will", "choice", "moral responsibility", etc. are concepts that pick out things which really do exist, though contingently upon the nature of more fundamental attributes of inanimate matter.

Which is not to say that everything should be analyzed in terms of its inanimate causes. That would be hopelessly inefficient and it would defeat the purpose of concept formation. To deal with human beings, it is not especially useful to examine the complex causal chain behind volition; volition can be treated as simply an attribute about which we can say certain things and act accordingly. The fact that it could be explained through other things is quite beside the point.

In addition, I quite agree with Rand's objections to many schools of determinism, which seem to argue that, on the macroscopic level of human beings, what is most relevant is not the volitional attributes of the person, but their social background or some other influence outside of the particular person in question.

So, can anyone offer clarification, or perhaps indicate a way I might clarify what issues need clarification?

Thanks.

Edited July 10, 2009 by softwareNerd
Merged topics

[DavidOdden]

Human beings exist, but their existence is not a primary.

What do you mean by "a primary" here? It is "the fundamental fact" that is the foundation or Objectivism (thus "a primary") but it is not an "absolute" (only certain humans exist).

Both of these events are contingent on the nature of things which are non-human.

They are partially contingent.

I acknowledge volition as a human attribute, but it is an attribute contingent upon the attributes of other entities and, ultimately, the contingencies can be traced back to the nature of inanimate matter.

I don't see the logic here. The attribute is an objective fact about the identity of man, which is not contingent on something else. Volition is not contingent in man; but the existence of a specific man is partially contingent on inanimate matter (as well as animate matter).

If inanimate matter is capable of producing, through a particular causal chain, only one series of events, then it seems volition itself should be capable of producing only one series of events.

But inanimate matter alone cannot create a man, so your inference about volition (through "what creates a volitional being") does not logically go through.

Inanimate matter cannot suddenly acquire a new identity when it is organized into a particular system, such as a living organism.

What is the import of "suddenly"? Over eons, animate matter did develop from inanimate matter, though we do not know exactly how. Perhaps it was indeed "sudden" in the sense of lightening striking non-living matter and giving rise to animate matter. That's well beyond our current scientific knowledge.

[nanite1018]

Actually you can always find just such an explanation traceable in the trajectories of particles, but only in hindsight. But explanations are not causes, they are the story of what happened. What you will not be able to do is project forward in the manner of a prediction.

Well here is the thing that bugs me. To me, if I can explain your actions in terms of the interactions of particles, and its all physics, then why talk about volition at all? You simply did what physics worked out to have you do, and even if on some level it is stochastic and so I cannot actually know what you will do in the future, it still doesn't mean that you have "volition". Do you understand what I'm saying, I'm afraid its difficult to make myself clear in this instance.

Ultimately what enables you to know that you are adhering to reality is the evidence of the senses, but you have to choose to make that comparison between an idea and the evidence of the senses.

There is a specific technique available to verify a concept is not a floating abstraction but instead adheres to reality. It is called "reduction" and fulfills the role of a proof for induction by tracing an idea down through its hierarchically prior components all the way down to the perceptual level. It is a tremendous obstacle to this conversation that there is no presentation in writing of the Objectivist theory of induction and its validation, but I intend to do what I can about that by posting my notes on Peikoff's audio course on "Induction in Physics and Philosophy". Reduction appears in chapter 4 of OPAR and Rand reduced "justice" in ITOE, and there are additional examples in the "Art of Thinking" course (notes for that are linked in my sig).

Yes, I read ITOE and OPAR, and I'm familiar with reduction. But I'm afraid you didn't describe in the above where volition is necessary. I mean you said "you have to choose to make that comparison" but that really seems to mean that in order to have knowledge you have to make the comparison, and if you don't you do not have knowledge. My question is very specifically: Where in the process of gaining any sort of knowledge does the requirement to have made a different decision enable the gaining of knowledge? Its the thing I haven't been able to pin down, and it seems vital to the volitionist insistence that it is only volition which enables knowledge.

[nanite1018]

I don't think you have considered all of the possibilities in the crystal ball experiment. Rather than something being wrong with the experiment, it is much, much more likely that the problems are with your view of reality and man's nature. This experiment highlights those problems. You see, you know that there is something wrong with your theory because notice, you aren't arguing that you can't avoid the bus (which would be a determinist's position) because you know that you would avoid it, because you know that you have free will. So instead you change your stance (of which you were once so certain) or call foul. You are trying hard to evade those problems and when someone evades reality that hard they are either afraid of reality or they are playing a joke. Which is it?

Given your stipulations for the thought experiment that I am forced to conclude that there is no way you can avoid the bus. By the way, that is exactly what I have been saying all along, I was simply describing the difficulties with such a device and why I think it is impossible. If the crystal ball actually can know what the future will be, and more importantly know what you will do after hearing any given prediction, and has then found a prediction which will occur even after your actions change due to the knowledge, then you will be hit by the bus whether you like it or not.

You mean to say that potentially if some quark had interacted differently with a positron in alpha centauri I might have chosen chocolate instead of vanilla? It had nothing to do with my preference?

Your preference is what made you do it, but it was made up of the interactions of the particles in your brain, which (if certain interpretations of quantum mechanics are correct) could have turned out differently and so you may have had a different preference.

Here is another chink in the armor: you acknowledge the presence of the "mind", hooray. In the other thread all you talked about was the brain/body dichotomy, you never acknowledged the mind. But considering some of the other things you say in this post can you tell me what your conception of the mind is? From whence does it come? What is it made of?

The mind is the experience of the interactions of the particles in your brain. Essentially, it is a model of external reality which has grown so complex that it actually includes a model of itself, creating self-awareness and then expands to include the senses and memories. Your mind is basically your brain, its just how you experience the actions of your brain.

Your senses aren't lying to you, they don't have that ability. You are sensing the hallucination and it is telling you something about your brain, something very important. Hallucinations don't seem real at all, that is why they are scary and that is your signal of danger. Your senses are telling you that there is something really wrong with your brain, it is real. Would you call the bent pencil in water a hallucination?

They only don't seem real because your senses almost always aren't lying to you, and it seems extremely out of place. They don't necessarily tell you something about your brain, not directly. Its not like a sign flashes and says "hey, this isn't real, its just your eyes telling you that your going crazy." You have to figure out that your senses are fooling you. What does it matter if your senses can lie to you only when you are under the effects of drugs or if your brain is diseased? It doesn't say anything about the proper functioning of the senses, and it isn't overly difficult to tell when your senses are screwing with you. The only thing that matters is that your senses are almost always right and when they aren't it is fairly obvious. If that is the case than sense-perception is still perfectly valid.

[Anti-Toohey]

What do you mean by "a primary" here? It is "the fundamental fact" that is the foundation or Objectivism (thus "a primary") but it is not an "absolute" (only certain humans exist).They are partially contingent.I don't see the logic here. The attribute is an objective fact about the identity of man, which is not contingent on something else. Volition is not contingent in man; but the existence of a specific man is partially contingent on inanimate matter (as well as animate matter).But inanimate matter alone cannot create a man, so your inference about volition (through "what creates a volitional being") does not logically go through.What is the import of "suddenly"? Over eons, animate matter did develop from inanimate matter, though we do not know exactly how. Perhaps it was indeed "sudden" in the sense of lightening striking non-living matter and giving rise to animate matter. That's well beyond our current scientific knowledge.

By a 'primary' I mean in this case a fact on which all other facts are contingent. I am using it in a metaphysical, rather than an epistemological, sense.

What do you mean by 'partial' contingency?

I do not recognize 'animate matter', unless you mean by that term a system of inanimate matter with particular macroscopic properties, such as how the matter is arranged in space. I grant that inanimate matter can only become part of an animated system if certain events occur, but each of those events is an event involving inanimate matter, and nothing else. So the existence of animated systems is contingent upon the nature of inanimate matter.

As for 'suddenly', I simply meant to indicate that at some point in time inanimate matter would need to violate its own nature in order for a system composed entirely of inanimate matter to behave in a manner not determined by the nature of inanimate matter (in which I include the way inanimate matter interacts in systems).

My main question is this: does Objectivism hold that, if I started the universe from the same initial conditions more than once, could the outcome ever be different?

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

My main question is this: does Objectivism hold that, if I started the universe from the same initial conditions more than once, could the outcome ever be different?

You are smuggling in a whole lot of premises, such as the assumption that the entire universe was not in motion at some point in the past and thus needed to be started; you are also assuming that if the Big Bang occurred that some minor fluctuation in the initial conditions could not have led to a different type of universe.

But, to answer the question as if it were possible, once man came on the scene his history did not have to unfold the way it did, since his history was a matter of choice on the part of the individuals involved. For example, European man did not have to go into the Dark Ages, he was clearly presented with a choice by the Roman Catholic Church to turn towards earthly things or heavenly things -- he chose to turn to heavenly things, thus bringing about the Dark Ages. The President did not have to drop an atom bomb on Japan, thus ending the second World War. You did not have to get involved in this discussion, you had a choice in the matter.

[DavidOdden]

What do you mean by 'partial' contingency?

That the existence of a man is contingent up both facts of non-volitional existents (living or not) and volitional existents (man).

I do not recognize 'animate matter', unless you mean by that term a system of inanimate matter with particular macroscopic properties, such as how the matter is arranged in space.

When you spoke of "inanimate matter", I assumed you were distinguishing inanimate matter from some other kind of matter. I have nothing invested in the term "animate matter", which would refer to "the matter which forms the ultimate constituents of an animate being".

So the existence of animated systems is contingent upon the nature of inanimate matter.

But also upon the nature of an animate being, since ordinarily, an animate being is required to bring into existence another animate being.

As for 'suddenly', I simply meant to indicate that at some point in time inanimate matter would need to violate its own nature in order for a system composed entirely of inanimate matter to behave in a manner not determined by the nature of inanimate matter (in which I include the way inanimate matter interacts in systems).

I see. That would not happen. However, an inanimate existent could interact with some other existent (a force or chamical, for instance) and create a new existent, which is animate.

My main question is this: does Objectivism hold that, if I started the universe from the same initial conditions more than once, could the outcome ever be different?

Setting aside the problems with "starting the universe", I don't believe that Objectivism has a position on that, since that is a scientific question, not a philosophical one. I think there's a problem with the notion of "same initial conditions...twice". As far as I can tell, this presupposes the "existence" of time separate from existence (I assume you can see why that's a major philosophical problem). The notion of "twice" presupposes continuity of time, and reifies time as separate from entities. But time depends on motion, which requires entities -- it is a complex relationship between entities. So a notion like "each time" can't apply to "the initial state of the universe" or "starting the universe".

[Anti-Toohey]

Thomas, you write:

"You are smuggling in a whole lot of premises, such as the assumption that the entire universe was not in motion at some point in the past and thus needed to be started; you are also assuming that if the Big Bang occurred that some minor fluctuation in the initial conditions could not have led to a different type of universe."

Something could simply have a state of motion at the starting point; that is entirely unobjectionable, unless you adopt the view that motion presupposes some initiating force. But you are right that I have assumed the universe has a beginning, which is reasonable so long as it is reasonable to claim that the past is non-infinite. As far as I am aware, Objectivism does not acknowledge the metaphysical existence of the infinite, so this assumption is quite reasonable indeed. As to the second assumption, you seem to have misunderstood my question. If the initial conditions change, I think it would result in a different universe, but in only one different universe, not an entire set.

You then write:

"But, to answer the question as if it were possible, once man came on the scene his history did not have to unfold the way it did, since his history was a matter of choice on the part of the individuals involved. For example, European man did not have to go into the Dark Ages, he was clearly presented with a choice by the Roman Catholic Church to turn towards earthly things or heavenly things -- he chose to turn to heavenly things, thus bringing about the Dark Ages. The President did not have to drop an atom bomb on Japan, thus ending the second World War. You did not have to get involved in this discussion, you had a choice in the matter."

If I understand you, your answer to my question would be: yes, the initial conditions of the universe do not uniquely determine the behavior of the universe. If this is correct, what other factors determine the behavior of the universe? We know of only one, after all.

David, you write:

"But also upon the nature of an animate being, since ordinarily, an animate being is required to bring into existence another animate being."

But this is false unless animate beings have always existed. Is that your claim? If not, then the existence of the first animate beings, and thus ultimately all animate beings that followed, was contingent upon something inanimate.

And:

"However, an inanimate existent could interact with some other existent (a force or chamical, for instance) and create a new existent, which is animate."

What would be the nature of this other existent? If it is not inanimate, doesn't it follow that it is animate? Or are you using terms in some special way?

As to your response to my main question, your objections are correct. The scenario would need to be modified somewhat to be entirely clear and coherent, but I hoped that it would give the sense of my basic issue. To rephrase the question somewhat: does Objectivism hold that the conditions of the universe at some point in time uniquely determine the conditions of the universe at some later point in time? The alternative would be a view that the conditions of the universe at some point in time do not uniquely determine conditions at a later point, but then what does? Because, as I mention above in responding to Thomas, we only know of one set of conditions corresponding to any given point in time.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

The alternative would be a view that the conditions of the universe at some point in time do not uniquely determine conditions at a later point, but then what does? Because, as I mention above in responding to Thomas, we only know of one set of conditions corresponding to any given point in time.

Man has free will, so his actions are not determined by past events. Some of the higher-level animals may also have some form of selection abilities, so their actions are not necessarily determined by past events. In cases where choice is possible and acted upon, the action taken was not necessitated in the same way that, say, the creation of our own solar system was necessitated by that nova exploding approximately 8 billion years ago.

Your premise is faulty to say that the entire universe is determined; the entire universe is causal, but efficient causation doesn't cover every sort of action. Man definitely has free will so final causation is involved (a man chooses what he is going to do). The conception of causality or causation is that an entity is what it is and does what it does because it is what it is.

Get over it....you have free will, as spooky as that comes across to you and yours.

Edited July 10, 2009 by Thomas M. Miovas Jr.

[Anti-Toohey]

Man has free will, so his actions are not determined by past events. Some of the higher-level animals may also have some form of selection abilities, so their actions are not necessarily determined by past events. In cases where choice is possible and acted upon, the action taken was not necessitated in the same way that, say, the creation of our own solar system was necessitated by that nova exploding approximately 8 billion years ago.

Your premise is faulty to say that the entire universe is determined; the entire universe is causal, but efficient causation doesn't cover every sort of action. Man definitely has free will so final causation is involved (a man chooses what he is going to do). The conception of causality or causation is that an entity is what it is and does what it does because it is what it is.

Get over it....you have free will, as spooky as that comes across to you and yours.

I'm afraid you haven't answered my question. Why, in your view, do people only behave in the particular way they behave? What determines them to behave that way? And 'free will' cannot be a response, because free will has not always existed, unless human beings (or some analog) have always existed.

I would not classify the notion that the universe can proceed along more than one course as 'spooky'; rather, I would say it violates the law of identity and is therefore irrational.

[Eiuol]

I'm afraid you haven't answered my question. Why, in your view, do people only behave in the particular way they behave? What determines them to behave that way? And 'free will' cannot be a response, because free will has not always existed, unless human beings (or some analog) have always existed.

I'm not sure if that is the right way to look at it. It's not exactly that free-will determines how someone behaves. Saying it that way seems to mean "willing to fly will determine your ability to fly". It should be "how does one determine what choice to make?" Free-will is what allows you to make a choice, but it is not the reason you make a particular choice. Most people, from my observation, behave in certain ways based on their evaluation of a situation. This will usually involve a reason, whether or not it is rational. The environment affects my actions but doesn't exactly determine them, nor does everyone respond identically.

[Grames]

Where in the process of gaining any sort of knowledge does the requirement to have made a different decision enable the gaining of knowledge?

Thought is integration, and there are always options about what to integrate, or whether to do it at all. Peikoff's "Art of Thinking" course is mainly spinning out how thought is different ways to integrate. Peikoff's next book is entirely about integration, misintegration and disintegration. Integration is bringing together parts to form a new whole, in epistemology it is bringing together observations, abstractions, concepts, premises, memories and all else that is a mental existent. Integration is induction, deduction, concept formation, abstraction, and any act that manipulates two or more mental existents to form a third.

All forms of integrating concepts are volitional, but not all integrations are of concepts and it is not the case that all integrations are volitional. Sensations are integrated automatically into percepts and are not volitional. An emotional reaction can be an involuntary response to a volitional integration.

My previous post had quoted from my notes how a single table is an unintelligble concrete so long as it is unique in one's experience. Against a background of other tables and chairs and beds the pattern that is table can be discriminated, grasped, named and understood. But there are options, things that are shaped like tables can be integrated with the chair shapes and the bed shapes to come up with a valid concept of furniture. Ordinarily we identify tables as hierarchically simpler and prior to the idea of furniture, but a baby raised in a furniture store has direct perceptual access to the referents of the concept furniture and so has the option of forming that concept first. A child raised in a jungle can form the concept for plants before learning which ones are which for eating, building, weaving etc.

Integration has rules must be understood volitionally, and adhered to volitionally. OPAR has the example of a improper integration of sex, cigars, and Jesus Christ into the idea "encirclist". Concrete bound mentalities avoid performing integration in practice, philosophical skeptics avoid integration on principle, rationalists integrate in disregard of hierarchy in knowledge.

Knowledge is the result of choosing what and even whether to integrate and that choice is the exercise volition.

[Anti-Toohey]

I'm not sure if that is the right way to look at it. It's not exactly that free-will determines how someone behaves. Saying it that way seems to mean "willing to fly will determine your ability to fly". It should be "how does one determine what choice to make?" Free-will is what allows you to make a choice, but it is not the reason you make a particular choice. Most people, from my observation, behave in certain ways based on their evaluation of a situation. This will usually involve a reason, whether or not it is rational. The environment affects my actions but doesn't exactly determine them, nor does everyone respond identically.

You are right that free will is not what makes the choice; it is a statement about the thing that makes the choice, the will. 'Willing to fly' does not determine your ability to fly, but it determines whether or not you choose to fly.

I agree that it is reasonable to model people's choices in terms of evaluations of situations, I agree that the choice a person makes is not determined by their environment (or, to be more precise, it is not completely determined by their environment; what one is making decisions about, generally one's environment--to speak loosely--certainly influences the content of the decisions), and I agree that different people will respond differently to the same situation. None of these concessions affects my position, which is that a person's choices are determined by some part of the person's nature, which I would call their 'will' or 'volitional faculty' or something along those lines. Further, this part of their nature is determined by outside factors. But that doesn't mean it is incorrect to morally evaluate such a person's actions, as it has no bearing on whether their actions should be classified as volitional. It would be incoherent to expect volition to somehow determine its own nature, for it would need a nature to effect such a determination.

[DavidOdden]

"But also upon the nature of an animate being, since ordinarily, an animate being is required to bring into existence another animate being."

But this is false unless animate beings have always existed. Is that your claim?

No, only that the creation of a living being from non-living stuff is rather rare, but it happens. Note my use of the word 'ordinarily'.

"However, an inanimate existent could interact with some other existent (a force or chamical, for instance) and create a new existent, which is animate."

What would be the nature of this other existent?

That's a scientific question that we cannot answer at present. An electrical force, in one form or the other, is the most likely explanation.

The scenario would need to be modified somewhat to be entirely clear and coherent, but I hoped that it would give the sense of my basic issue.

Alright, but with just a "sense" and not a precise argument, I see no lurking problem for Objectivism. The devil is in the details.

To rephrase the question somewhat: does Objectivism hold that the conditions of the universe at some point in time uniquely determine the conditions of the universe at some later point in time?

Not directly (more specifically, Objectivism does not directly say, one way or the other). Ayn Rand did not develop a theory of physics or cosmology, and I think the question you're asking is fundamentally about the laws of nature. One can certainly imagine a universe where Planck's constant is 5*10^-34 J s or the speed of light in a vacuum is 300,000,000 m s-1. But such imagination is just that: baseless imagination. From what I can see, it would make no more sense for Objectivism to have a position on the consequences of the initial state of the universe than it would for Objectivism to have a opsition on the consequences of specific values for the speed of light or Planck's constant.

[hunterrose]

If every interaction between every particle and every other particle in the universe can be described by a set of deterministic equations, then there is only one possible future.

I agree.

Let's say that this set of equations predicts that I will do X tomorrow, and I subsequently don't. Do you agree that this would be evidence that I have volition?

#101If inanimate matter is capable of producing, through a particular causal chain, only one series of events, then it seems volition itself should be capable of producing only one series of events.

Do you have scientific proof that inanimate matter is capable of producing, through a particular causal chain, only one series of events? Or is this one of your axioms?

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

None of these concessions affects my position, which is that a person's choices are determined by some part of the person's nature, which I would call their 'will' or 'volitional faculty' or something along those lines. Further, this part of their nature is determined by outside factors.

The choice to focus one's mind and to consider one's options based on the facts of reality as one understands them is a primary choice. Your past experiences do not determine what choices you will make, once you are in focus you can take a look at your options, and then make a decision; but there isn't anything about human consciousness that will determine this to happen -- it is done by you directing your own consciousness, which is free will.

[Anti-Toohey]

One more post before I go to bed (and away to visit relatives, so please don't think I'm blowing you off if I don't reply very promptly in the immediate future).

David, glad we got the possibility of an inanimate to animate transition clarified. I suspected that was why you included 'ordinarily', but I wanted to make sure. As to what the generation of an animated system from an inanimate matter would be contingent upon, I agree it's a question to which science has not presently furnished an answer. However, that wasn't quite what I was getting at. If you could respond to the questions that immediately followed that one (would the force be animate or inanimate or something else entirely, in which case I would want clarification on what you mean by 'animate' and 'inanimate'), it would be much appreciated. Your final point about the limits of philosophy is well-taken. I certainly would not expect an Objectivist theory about how particle physics, for instance, actually works; that would be a question for particle physics to answer. But I think a general theory of causation would fall in the scope of philosophy, as causation might very well apply to everything which exists, and then fall under metaphysics as I understand the boundaries.

hunterrose, if I wanted scientific support for my position, I need only point out that more than one outcome following a particular set of circumstances has never been observed. Ever. (This is not to say that indistinguishable circumstances cannot produce distinguishable outcomes, so long as the 'indistinguishable' circumstances are not strictly identical; ie, are not the same circumstances.) However, I do not think the question is one that requires specific scientific proof; I would place it in the scope of general philosophy, and I think the answer necessarily follows from the law of identity applied to existents over a span of time.

Thomas, 'past experiences' do not bear on my point, unless you mean past experiences occurring before a person came into existence in the first place. More to the point, I would like to draw your attention to a particular thing you wrote:

"but there isn't anything about human consciousness that will determine this to happen -- it is done by you directing your own consciousness, which is free will."

What exactly is the 'you' to which you refer? Is it the same as the 'volitional faculty' to which I have referred? If it is not, could you give a pertinently detailed account of its nature? Thanks.

[nanite1018]

Integration has rules must be understood volitionally, and adhered to volitionally. OPAR has the example of a improper integration of sex, cigars, and Jesus Christ into the idea "encirclist". Concrete bound mentalities avoid performing integration in practice, philosophical skeptics avoid integration on principle, rationalists integrate in disregard of hierarchy in knowledge.

Knowledge is the result of choosing what and even whether to integrate and that choice is the exercise volition.

I remember the discussion of encirclist as an example of a misintegration based on a non-fundamental characteristic (I think that was the point of it, if I remember correctly). I understand why that is a misintegration.

I do not understand why I must have the ability to make a different decision while trying to find knowledge in order to integrate my percepts based on a fundamental distinguishing characteristic. I understand that I must adhere to reality, check myself, and integrate all of my percepts (and later concepts) into a coherent whole but I still don't know why I must have the ability to have made a different decision in order for my knowledge to be valid.

You see this is the only stumbling block I can see for determinism, the problem of knowledge. Morality is pretty well covered as I've explained before, as are justice, etc., so long as man can still have knowledge and attaining knowledge requires certain processes, etc. So this topic is, in my mind, the central issue in the debate we are having. After all, if determinism makes knowledge impossible then obviously volition is axiomatic. But my point of contention is whether that is actually the case. I still don't see why it is the case, and the discussion in OPAR simply doesn't explain why in an objective or satisfactory fashion (more relies on using negative words and images to evoke a negative emotional response, it seems to me).

[hunterrose]

I do not think the question [whether inanimate matter is capable of producing, through a particular causal chain, only one series of events] is one that requires specific scientific proof; I would place it in the scope of general philosophy, and I think the answer necessarily follows from the law of identity applied to existents over a span of time.

When you get back: Aren't you using philosophical axioms (i.e. not using science) to defend your determinist beliefs, and then requiring that volition be scientifically proven?

[DavidOdden]

If you could respond to the questions that immediately followed that one (would the force be animate or inanimate or something else entirely, in which case I would want clarification on what you mean by 'animate' and 'inanimate'), it would be much appreciated.

Sorry; to be explicit, I presume that force or existent would be non-living, inanimate -- electromagnetic.

But I think a general theory of causation would fall in the scope of philosophy, as causation might very well apply to everything which exists, and then fall under metaphysics as I understand the boundaries.

I agree on that, and simply don't believe that a philosophical theory of causation can give you detailed physical calculations of what exists where, for all times, things and places.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

What exactly is the 'you' to which you refer? Is it the same as the 'volitional faculty' to which I have referred? If it is not, could you give a pertinently detailed account of its nature? Thanks.

You are the entity that you see when you look in a mirror -- that is you, and you have certain capabilities, such as the ability to think or not to think, which is the root of volition. One of the problems the determinists have is that they tend to think of everything as being comprised of particles, and then they cannot find the you in there, in that swarm of particles. But the point some of us are making is that you are one entity, you are not six quadrillion particles swarming around. This conception of man as being a swarm of particles is why you cannot grasp that qua man he has certain capabilities. You bring up issues, such as what is the real entity, and the real entity is you, not the six quadrillion particles swarming around.

Look at a cat, it is an entity, and as an entity it can play with a ball or catch mice or sit in your lap and purr, or eat food, etc. and none of the individual particles it is comprised of can do any of that. So your error is in thinking that the cat or yourself is not an entity.

By the way, the difference between animate matter and inanimate matter is that a living entity is capable of self-generated, self-sustaining action. A rock cannot heal itself, but a living entity can. However, I don't know that I would classify it as inanimate matter versus animate matter, because it is not as if the matter is alive, but rather the entity that is alive is alive. They are all comprised of electrons, protons, and neutrons, but these aren't the entities, the entities are humans, cats, trees, amoebas, bacteria, etc.

[Grames]

I understand that I must adhere to reality, check myself, and integrate all of my percepts (and later concepts) into a coherent whole but I still don't know why I must have the ability to have made a different decision in order for my knowledge to be valid.

The possibility of an alternative is not what makes knowledge valid. Choosing one of a set of alternatives causes a new bit of knowledge to be created. That knowledge is valid if it stands in a certain relation to existence.

For example, sense perception is automatic and has no alternatives yet is regarded as always valid and infallible because it is always going to have the correct relation to existence. The operations of conceptual consciousness are not automatized. The sense of "not automatized" is not merely "not guaranteed to be correct" but also "not going to happen at all". A particular choice caused a particular conceptual integration to come into existence, which can then subsequently be judged on the standard of validity.

If I make a choice deterministically and the result is valid then all is well. (This is analogous to perception.) If I make a choice deterministically and the result is invalid, but I also apply standards of validity deterministically (and correctly) to correct the error then all is well. If I make a choice deterministically and the result is invalid, but deterministically am unable to apply a standard of validity then the error cannot be corrected or even detected. This last scenario is what undercuts confidence in all conceptual knowledge if determinism is true.

If we were always able to deterministically apply standards of validity, then those people who were educated in proper epistemology would be infallible. But this is not what we see in life, educated people are still fallible. Therefore if determinism is true then anyone can be wrong and not know it and it is useless to educate them about epistemology, so skepticism is justified (at least for those people not determined to invalidly consider skepticism unjustified.)

What if I make a choice deterministically and the result is valid, but deterministically apply a standard of validity incorrectly and reverse myself? Stymied forever and will never know why.

And lastly, what if I am deterministically unable to make a choice at all? No error, but no thought and my mind is fundamentally out of control.

Edited July 11, 2009 by Grames

[nanite1018]

If I make a choice deterministically and the result is valid then all is well. (This is analogous to perception.) If I make a choice deterministically and the result is invalid, but I also apply standards of validity deterministically (and correctly) to correct the error then all is well. If I make a choice deterministically and the result is invalid, but deterministically am unable to apply a standard of validity then the error cannot be corrected or even detected. This last scenario is what undercuts confidence in all conceptual knowledge if determinism is true.

Ah, okay, now I understand exactly where the supposed problem comes in.

If we were always able to deterministically apply standards of validity, then those people who were educated in proper epistemology would be infallible. But this is not what we see in life, educated people are still fallible. Therefore if determinism is true then anyone can be wrong and not know it and it is useless to educate them about epistemology, so skepticism is justified (at least for those people not determined to invalidly consider skepticism unjustified.)

Okay now this simply seems silly. We know poeple are fallible, yes. But following certain standards of epistemology greatly decreases the likelihood you will be incorrect, and therefore it is still valuable. Even if you had volition and followed the proper epistemological method there is no guarantee that you are correct in your conclusion, it simply means that you are unable to find any evidence otherwise.

What if I make a choice deterministically and the result is valid, but deterministically apply a standard of validity incorrectly and reverse myself? Stymied forever and will never know why.

What if I volitonally pick the right answer, then second-guess myself and change it? Its the same thing. No one can declare that you will never again be able to look over your results and check for errors (for you will probably run into a problem, since you did make a mistake). It is equally possible that a volitional man would make a mistake and never think to go back and check for an error.

And lastly, what if I am deterministically unable to make a choice at all? No error, but no thought and my mind is fundamentally out of control.

And what if you volitionally decide to make no choice? What exactly is the difference? Doesn't seem meaningful to me, either way you have "decided" to not think, and the consequences of that will be yours to bear.

This is exactly why I thought the stress on the absolute reality of "could have done otherwise" in Objectivism is unnecessary and possibly a holdover from mysticism. I will quote OPAR p.181, he is talking about skepticism, and this is his refutation:

"Skeptic: 'Man is fallible. Even with the best of training and intentions, he is capable of error. So how can you be certain you are not wrong?'

Objectivist: 'Man's general capacity to err does not warrant a hypothesis of error in a particular case. And I have validated my conclusion; I have demonstrated that in this case I am right'

S: 'But your validation itself might be fallacious. How do you know it isn't?'

O:'Can you point to any sign of such fallacy, such as a logical flaw in my argument, or a neglected fact, or an improperly defined term?'"

And that is my reply to you, for all intents and purposes. If that is what is required for certainty, than you can still be certain of your conclusions even in a deterministic world. If you cannot point to any evidence to the contrary for your ideas (which you cannot explain), and no one can point out a flaw, then what reason could there possibly be to doubt your conclusion (beyond whatever doubt you'd have automatically since your context might grow and the conclusion might need to be modified), even with determinism?

That is why I feel there is no real conflict between determinism and the rest of Objectivism.

[Grames]

Okay now this simply seems silly. We know poeple are fallible, yes. But following certain standards of epistemology greatly decreases the likelihood you will be incorrect, and therefore it is still valuable. Even if you had volition and followed the proper epistemological method there is no guarantee that you are correct in your conclusion, it simply means that you are unable to find any evidence otherwise.

Merely decreasing the likelihood of error is not good enough. That guarantee is necessary to banish skepticism.

And that is my reply to you, for all intents and purposes. If that is what is required for certainty, than you can still be certain of your conclusions even in a deterministic world. If you cannot point to any evidence to the contrary for your ideas (which you cannot explain), and no one can point out a flaw, then what reason could there possibly be to doubt your conclusion (beyond whatever doubt you'd have automatically since your context might grow and the conclusion might need to be modified), even with determinism?

That is why I feel there is no real conflict between determinism and the rest of Objectivism.

This doubt is exactly what does not exist in Objectivist epistemology. If you follow the proper epistemological method you are guaranteed to reach a correct conclusion. That is what methods are for, to solve the problem of fallibility. Being limited by non-omniscience or in other words contextually-limited is not a type of error. Disregarding the arbitrary is a principle derived from thinking in context; if there is no evidence for an unknown and unpredictable error in a particular context then the postulated error must be discarded.

There is subjective certainty, "one cannot find any evidence to the contrary" due to deterministically being unable to find versus an objective certainty of "one cannot find to any evidence to the contrary" because there is no evidence to the contrary. Subjective certainty is not certainty about what is existential, it is a formalism about what it is permissible to claim is existential. In objective certainty, we can rely on there being no evidence to the contrary without having to inventory the universe because all available evidence and inference is reduced to the perceptual, what is perceptual is determined by the identity of the senses and the facts of existence, and by the law of identity contradictions among the facts of existence do not exist.

Perceptual determinism is necessary for objective certainty to be possible, so it is consistent that the perception of the power to choose is also valid. Determinism in rejecting the perception of the power to choose is in principle invoking perceptual indeterminism, which is contradictory.

[nanite1018]

There is subjective certainty, "one cannot find any evidence to the contrary" due to deterministically being unable to find versus an objective certainty of "one cannot find to any evidence to the contrary" because there is no evidence to the contrary. Subjective certainty is not certainty about what is existential, it is a formalism about what it is permissible to claim is existential. In objective certainty, we can rely on there being no evidence to the contrary without having to inventory the universe because all available evidence and inference is reduced to the perceptual, what is perceptual is determined by the identity of the senses and the facts of existence, and by the law of identity contradictions among the facts of existence do not exist.

Perceptual determinism is necessary for objective certainty to be possible, so it is consistent that the perception of the power to choose is also valid. Determinism in rejecting the perception of the power to choose is in principle invoking perceptual indeterminism, which is contradictory.

Okay, well first off I was invoking the possibility of any "uncertainty" because I thought you might claim it existed. I don't think it does either, I agree with Objectivism's position on certainty.

Determinism still allows that people reduce all their knowledge to the perceptual level, so your first paragraph seems to simply be addressing the question of what is required for certainty, rather than any problem inherent in determinism as a position.

So that leaves your explanation for why determinism is wrong at simply "It doesn't fit with what we see introspectively, and so by placing one form of perceptual evidence (the sciences) against introspection you are invoking perceptual indeterminism which does not allow for real knowledge." Okay, I think I can deal with this without much trouble. The trouble is simply what I have described the whole time in the above: My perception that I may have done otherwise is not actually what I perceive. I perceive that any of the courses I am considering are "possible" (since I am considering all of them as a course I might want to take), and then select one of them. I then say "well I could have done otherwise", but that simply involves me recalling the lack of knowledge I had prior to my decision, not an actual characteristic of reality.

Essentially, I am explaining why we introspectively feel we have choice in much the same way science explains why we see colors, how touch works, the workings of our sense of smell, why some thing are registered as pleasant while others painful, etc. I do not deny that we see ourselves making decisions from among several seemingly possible options, or that given our knowledge at any given state of time any of the courses of action under our consideration are in fact "possible." I explain that we would of course feel that way because we cannot ever know what we will do next (until we decide it) because our brains cannot jump in front of themselves with any accuracy. That explains why we can't know what we will be doing in the future until after we decide. That explains what we find when we introspect. We don't see anything "forcing" us to do something, because indeed nothing did make us decide what we did in any directly traceable or meaningful way, we came to the conclusion ourselves and if we had made a different decision (which is only possible if conditions were different) then we would have done something different. Introspection is not, as far as I can see, invalidated by my explanation, my explanation is a reconciliation between physics and introspection, and as such does not destroy knowledge but creates new knowledge.