The problem of libertarianism and the NAP

[secondhander]

This argument is nothing particularly new to objectivists, but I found this article by JULIAN SANCHEZ clear and illustrative of problems with the NAP in a vacuum. I don't know Sanchez well enough to know if he is coming from an objectivist perspective, but the argument he makes is essentially the argument made by objectivists against libertarianism: Saying that aggression against rights is bad is meaningless until you know what rights are and how they are established. It's like saying that the ultimate rule for all morality is to not do anything bad. Well, of course. But this is nothing but a tautology until you define what is bad and how it is determined.

 

I don't know if this article was already posted here, so I hope I'm not needlessly making a repost. 

 

Some of the salient excerpts: 

 

The appeal of the NAP lies in its apparent simplicity and intuitive plausibility (tautologies tend to be intuitively plausible), but it’s typically deployed in a way that amounts to a kind of shell game: I argue that socialism must be rejected on the grounds that it violates this one simple moral principle, and hope my interlocutor doesn’t notice that I’ve essentially begged the question by baking a theory of strong property rights incompatible with socialism into my conception of “aggression,” when of course libertarian property rights are ultimately backed by the threat of (individual or state) violence as well. 

 

Suppose I tell you that I have, at long last, discovered the simple principle from which all morality derives. Assuming you suppress your initial skepticism about this bold claim, you are likely to be disappointed if I then reveal that my principle is something like “One ought not to commit wrong actions,” or “Never violate the rights of others.”

 

A “right” is a claim that you are justified in ultimately resorting to (direct or indirect) force to make effective; whether or not a particular act counts as “aggression” or “initiation” of force depends on whether the right enforced is a genuine one. But all the real action is in the definition of rights; invoking the NAP adds nothing.

 

[secondhander]

One of the questions I'd like to raise and get comment on is this reader-comment response to the article, and whether you think it's a valid critique of the article or not:

 

The non-aggression principle is not an empty tautology like "don't violate rights." It's "don't initiate force." It's the recognition that any peaceful cooperation, trade, civilization, society, etc., is based on the agreement to not bring scarce goods into violent conflict, and it automatically implies the "first user" principle of property rights.

[Nicky]

whether or not a particular act counts as “aggression” or “initiation” of force depends on whether the right enforced is a genuine one.

The non-aggression principle is not an empty tautology like "don't violate rights." It's "don't initiate force." It's the recognition that any peaceful cooperation, trade, civilization, society, etc., is based on the agreement to not bring scarce goods into violent conflict, and it automatically implies the "first user" principle of property rights.

Hard to say which of these statements is worse.

Regarding the first one: I disagree with the so called "non aggression principle", but the notion that the definition of "initiation of physical force" depends on any moral concept (rights, or anything else), rather than just the most basic concepts of Physics, is just dumb. However, I can see why someone who doesn't pay attention to the original source of most of these claims (Rand's words), but instead goes by what Libertarians and novice Oists have to say, would make that mistake: more often than not, people who argue for a free society in terms of physical force (rather than rights) call all kinds of actions that aren't physical force, initiation of force. They do so because they like a society built on rights, but wish to explain such a society in terms of initiation of force. It can't be done.

Also, the suggestion that "one ought not to initiate force", backed by nothing (this is the "non aggression principle"), is just an arbitrary statement.

Objectivism of course suggests no such thing. Objectivism suggests first that a rational egoist ought not violate other people's rights (and proves that, no empty tautology here - no, rational egoism isn't an empty tautology either, but I won't go into why), then suggests that the only way to violate rights is through the use of physical force, direct or indirect (and proves that too; like I explained in Bogdan's thread about violence by proxy, Objectivism does not define the initiation of force as violation of rights, or vice versa: it leaves the definition of force to Physics, and proves that that physical force is logically connected to Rand's definition of individual rights as stemming from the right to self sustaining action). Finally, Oism also suggests that, because of these two proven facts, in an ideal society (ideal because it allows people to be rational egoists, if they wish to be) the initiation of force would be outlawed. That is not the non-aggression principle. That says nothing about the morality of being an initiator of force in a society that isn't free. It also doesn't say that "don't initiate force" ought to be the fundamental guiding principle of a free society. It merely says that initiation of force would be outlawed, as a consequence of this society being built on the principle of individual rights.

The misunderstandings stem from people (especially Libertarians, many novice Objectivists) failing to understand the difference between the definitions of concepts like force in Physics and rights in Objectivism, and various other true statements one may make about these concepts after they are defined. The non-aggression principle, as formulated by Libertarians, has not basis in reality. Like the OP's article points out, you can't just say things that sound like a good idea, and treat them as principles. Principles are statements about reality, not things that sound good. The NAP is very, very far removed from physical reality, and not a proven fact. The only logical connection between the idea that in an ideal society aggression would be outlawed, and pysical reality, that I ever heard, is the philosophy of Oism.

based on the agreement

What agreement? I never agreed to anything. Now what?

Edited April 15, 2013 by Nicky

[Hairnet]

Excellent response Nicky. 

 

I would like to add that I find the whole idea of socialist property rights is ahistorical. The first problem with this is that historically, socialists have not produced societies based off of the political structure of liberalism. Socialists put their system in terms of nationalism (even the so-called Anarchists Proudhon & Bakunin had nationalist strains).  When socialist and fascists started taking political power in the 20th century neither side respected human dignity or rights.

 

Some property rights may be illdefined, but that is a matter of legal philosophy, not radical politics. 

[2046]

: Saying that aggression against rights is bad is meaningless until you know what rights are and how they are established. It's like saying that the ultimate rule for all morality is to not do anything bad. Well, of course. But this is nothing but a tautology until you define what is bad and how it is determined.

So which libertarians say this? Which libertarians say that there is no rationale for what rights are and how they are established? All of them? No? Okay then, this critique would be apt for those that say such things, but the whole thing is a strawman for those that don't.

[secondhander]

Great response, Nicky. However, I don't believe Sanchez was referring to "physical" force alone in the first quote you posted and responded to. The example he follows up with is this:

 

To establish your right over (say) your car just is to establish that I ought not to take or use it without your permission (perhaps barring extraordinary circumstances, the parameters of which will tend to be implicit in the argument establishing the right). It is neither necessary nor illuminating to add the additional premises that taking what you have a right to counts as “aggression,” and that one ought not to aggress.

 

I think the point he is trying to get at is to ask the question: How do you know, after seeing a car sitting there and seeing keys nearby, that getting into the car and driving off with it is aggression, unless you have a system of rights established already? Nothing was physically done to another human being. In order to show that taking that car was an act of aggression, you first have a system of property rights. So the real issue is the property rights. The act of aggression is defined by the underlying system of ethics and rights. Without that underlying system, the non-aggression principle is a tautology -- it says nothing.

 

Even with physical aggression, the same problem is true. It comes back to the is-ought problem. If I punch you in the face, you can observe the "is" of what happened -- I swung my fist, it connected with your face, you suffered damage, my hand suffered less damage. I have physically injured you. But that's still an "is." It's a statement of fact. A libertarian, with the NAP, can say "don't injure anyone except in self-defense or in retaliation to an initiation of an injurious aggression." But why? Where does that moral claim come from? What is its foundation? The NAP in a vacuum doesn't provide the "why." 

 

What you need first is a moral backing. The libertarian is reduced to either saying moral value is subjective, and therefore the NAP, though defined by the objective reality of physical injury in most cases, is still subjective in terms of its moral backing and claims. Or the libertarian must establish an objective moral value. This is what Objectivists have long said.

 

Sanchez's point, and I think it is a good one, is that if you have established a moral value (whether it's subjective or objective), all the non-aggression principle really says is "It's bad to do a bad thing." That's tautological and really says nothing at all. In essence, libertarians beg the question. They begin with the notion that initiation of aggression is morally wrong. And then they say "it's wrong to initiate aggression." They need to show why initiation of force is morally wrong. But once (and if) they do that, then there's no reason to say more. The line about "you shouldn't initiate force" is redundant and meaningless from a logical standpoint (it may still have a benefit in terms of explaining the relation of force and the right to individual life). 

 

To use an analogy: Libertarian says, "No one should be prevented from wearing any particular color of shirt." To which Subjectivist says, "Why not?" Libertarian has assumed, but did not establish, that people should be free to wear whatever color of shirt they want. And Libertarian didn't explain why people have that right and why it is an objective right and not a subjective idea. If Libertarian were to make the argument that all people have a right to wear whatever color of shirt they choose, then it's unnecessary to say, "No one should be prevented from wearing any particular color of shirt." It would be a redundant restatement of the right to wear any color shirt, which has already been established. 

 

To simplify further:

 

Let "A" be an objectively true right of an individual to not have "C" done to them.

Let "B" be the statement "You should not do C to an individual." 

 

A libertarian says "B" without establishing "A."

 

An Objectivist says and establishes "A." 

 

If "A" was established, then then "B" becomes redundant, because it is a necessary result of A.

[2046]

Great response, Nicky. However, I don't believe Sanchez was referring to "physical" force alone in the first quote you posted and responded to. The example he follows up with is this:

 

 

I think the point he is trying to get at is to ask the question: How do you know, after seeing a car sitting there and seeing keys nearby, that getting into the car and driving off with it is aggression, unless you have a system of rights established already? Nothing was physically done to another human being. In order to show that taking that car was an act of aggression, you first have a system of property rights. So the real issue is the property rights. The act of aggression is defined by the underlying system of ethics and rights. Without that underlying system, the non-aggression principle is a tautology -- it says nothing.

 

Even with physical aggression, the same problem is true. It comes back to the is-ought problem. If I punch you in the face, you can observe the "is" of what happened -- I swung my fist, it connected with your face, you suffered damage, my hand suffered less damage. I have physically injured you. But that's still an "is." It's a statement of fact. A libertarian, with the NAP, can say "don't injure anyone except in self-defense or in retaliation to an initiation of an injurious aggression." But why? Where does that moral claim come from? What is its foundation? The NAP in a vacuum doesn't provide the "why." 

 

What you need first is a moral backing. The libertarian is reduced to either saying moral value is subjective, and therefore the NAP, though defined by the objective reality of physical injury in most cases, is still subjective in terms of its moral backing and claims. Or the libertarian must establish an objective moral value. This is what Objectivists have long said.

 

Sanchez's point, and I think it is a good one, is that if you have established a moral value (whether it's subjective or objective), all the non-aggression principle really says is "It's bad to do a bad thing." That's tautological and really says nothing at all. In essence, libertarians beg the question. They begin with the notion that initiation of aggression is morally wrong. And then they say "it's wrong to initiate aggression." They need to show why initiation of force is morally wrong. But once (and if) they do that, then there's no reason to say more. The line about "you shouldn't initiate force" is redundant and meaningless from a logical standpoint (it may still have a benefit in terms of explaining the relation of force and the right to individual life). 

 

To use an analogy: Libertarian says, "No one should be prevented from wearing any particular color of shirt." To which Subjectivist says, "Why not?" Libertarian has assumed, but did not establish, that people should be free to wear whatever color of shirt they want. And Libertarian didn't explain why people have that right and why it is an objective right and not a subjective idea. If Libertarian were to make the argument that all people have a right to wear whatever color of shirt they choose, then it's unnecessary to say, "No one should be prevented from wearing any particular color of shirt." It would be a redundant restatement of the right to wear any color shirt, which has already been established. 

 

To simplify further:

 

Let "A" be an objectively true right of an individual to not have "C" done to them.

Let "B" be the statement "You should not do C to an individual." 

 

A libertarian says "B" without establishing "A."

 

An Objectivist says and establishes "A." 

 

If "A" was established, then then "B" becomes redundant, because it is a necessary result of A.

Again, what libertarians say that? What libertarians do this? Which libertarians have no backing for the NAP? Surely there are subjectivist libertarians out there, and they're bad, but do all libertarians do this? Then why do you make such statements? You do understand that without specifics this argument is entirely hollow?

[FrolicsomeQuipster]

Environmentalist: We're totally cool with your principle guys, don't initiate physical force against nature, we get youuu.

Anarchist: We're totally cool too, theft is force and property is theft, so we're the guys who don't use force.

Religious: Hmmmn I wonder if I can claim any insult to my creed to be force, won't hurt to try...

 

Thats what you get for trying to take an epistemological short cut, a conceptual short circuit.

[secondhander]

Again, what libertarians say that? What libertarians do this? Which libertarians have no backing for the NAP? Surely there are subjectivist libertarians out there, and they're bad, but do all libertarians do this? Then why do you make such statements? You do understand that without specifics this argument is entirely hollow?

 

Individual libertarians may have some backing for the NAP. But I'm talking about libertarianism as a worldview and philosophy. To the degree that individual libertarians have a metaphysical-epistemological-ethical foundation for the NAP they may find themselves becoming objectivists, given that their foundation is correct and not skewed. 

 

But libertarianism as a worldview and philosophy posits the NAP as though it's an axiom without need for any further support or explanation.

 

And I did already tacitly address this in my previous post:

 

The libertarian is reduced to either saying moral value is subjective ... (or) must establish an objective moral value. This is what Objectivists have long said.

Edited April 18, 2013 by secondhander

[Hairnet]

   There is no such thing as a world view without a viewer. If we want to talk about justifications for the NAP (or similar ideas) we should talk about specific people.  The article  posted in the OP was attacking a monolith, which is essentially attacking a strawman. So who has posited the NAP without justification? 

 

    Sure we can all agree that Natural Rights or Utilitarianism are incorrect, and thus not ultimately good justifications for the NAP, but its unfair to not give libertarian authors credit for their own ethical ideas on property rights. The author was of the article posted was wrong to not have looked at Ayn Rand's, John Stuart Mills, Herbert Spencer's, or Murray Rothbard's ethical arguments. 

[DonAthos]

I fear that this subject is complicated by a horrible tangle of language, for one.  There is libertarian as a descriptor, libertarianism as a "philosophy," self-described libertarians who may or may not partake of that philosophy (or whose beliefs might otherwise make them "Objectivist," whether they recognize that term), and an official Libertarian Party.  And then there is a history fraught with seemingly personal arguments also weighing the subject down... it makes this subject difficult to deal with reasonably.

 

Objectivism is not contra libertarianism, no matter what some Objectivists believe or have written.  Objectivism is libertarian in the same way that Objectivism is atheist.  (That fact does not connote philosophical agreement with any other atheist group.)

 

The reason why libertarianism seems to be such a shifting "philosophy," with no particular argument to back up its many claims, etc., is because it is not a philosophy as such, strictly speaking.  It is a reference to certain political stances -- with room for divergence -- that may be a part of one or more philosophies.  Please see Wikipedia on "libertarianism" for more detail.  When you know that someone is "a libertarian," you don't know whether they are moral or immoral, objectivist or subjectivist, but you do know that they likely favor a reduction in government, such as an ending to the war on drugs.  Any given libertarian still must have certain beliefs with respect to Metaphysics, and etc.

 

If we ascribe a "philosophy" to libertarianism which holds that such political beliefs are divorceable from philosophy more generally, then that philosophy is mistaken and self-contradictory.  Politics relies upon Metaphysics, Epistemology, and (yes) Ethics.  It is not enough to know, for instance, a few rules of physics to implement a sound political philosophy (or even to consistently advocate for one).  A consistent defense -- or even understanding -- of laissez-faire requires an understanding of man's rights and all that they rest upon.  It is not possible to remove Rand's prohibition against the "initiation of force" from those foundational beliefs of Objectivism which give rise to it, and still have it make sense.  Those who contend that it is possible make the same mistake as the so-called libertarians who are supposed to believe that the "non-aggression principle" is the one philosophical belief that they need.  (Yet, in the full context of Rand's writings, a person can understand that a prohibition against the "initiation of force" is Objectivsm's defining political principle, and within a conversation among Objectivists, reference to such should be sufficient.)

 

That said, the clerk counting votes on a ballot measure does not necessarily need to know one's stance on measurement omission when asking whether marijuana ought to be legalized.*  Thus it makes sense that a political party such as the Libertarian Party would be organized around one's position on such political issues (i.e. its "platform") rather than uniform philosophical agreement on every conceivable issue, including the status of whether architecture is properly art.  Even Objectivists who disagree on whether homosexuality is immoral can agree that there ought not be anti-sodomy laws.

 

Lastly, I should take a moment to note that Rand's prohibition against the initiation of force is not solely within the context of a "free society" (from The Objectivist, March 1969, emphasis in original):

 

The moral absolute should be: if and when, in any dispute, one side initiates the use of physical force, that side is wrong—and no consideration or discussion of the issues is necessary or appropriate.

 

 

 

 

 

* We take certain basic philosophical agreements with others for granted in having such votes at all, or in being willing to participate in any political process, but that is rather beyond the scope of my case which concerns disagreements on a "higher level."  It could be, in the context of another society where even such basic agreements do not generally exist, that one shouldn't even bother to vote.  Likely such a society would have such deep problems that the legalization of marijuana wouldn't even be a blip on the radar.

[2046]

Environmentalist: We're totally cool with your principle guys, don't initiate physical force against nature, we get youuu.

Anarchist: We're totally cool too, theft is force and property is theft, so we're the guys who don't use force.

Religious: Hmmmn I wonder if I can claim any insult to my creed to be force, won't hurt to try...

 

Thats what you get for trying to take an epistemological short cut, a conceptual short circuit.

Who is taking an "epistemological short cut" here? This is the first mention of specifics, and even then only semi-specific claims are presented. What does the argument above, that "libertarians have no backing for the NAP" have to do with the claims you make here? In fact, the claim you make here squarely contradicts that argument.

 

You are criticizing environmentalist libertarians, anarchists (or really some confused guy, I'm not sure what your quote is saying, perhaps socialist, mutualists, or leftwing anarchists?), and Christian libertarians for having differing applications of the NAP, but if the claim is that libertarians don't have a backing for the NAP, that would seem incompatible with the existence of environmentalist libertarians, leftwing anarchists, and Christian libertarians, all who have specific philosophies backing their application of the NAP. It is because of the specific philosophies differ in substantial ways that leads to differing applications of the NAP. So despite your confused claims, your beef is with different groups of libertarians for having the, in your view, wrong backing philosophy, not none at all.

 

Either you can argue someone has no backing philosophy, or you can argue their backing philosophy is an incorrect one, but you can't argue both without violating the law of excluded middle. You have to make up your mind.

Edited April 18, 2013 by 2046

[2046]

But libertarianism as a worldview and philosophy posits the NAP as though it's an axiom without need for any further support or explanation.

Says who/what? You just made that up didn't you?

 

Does atheism as a worldview and philosophy posit the non-existence of God as though it's an axiom without need for any support or further explanation?

 

No, atheism is not an entire worldview or completely philosophy, and doesn't claim to be. It is just one principle (the nonexistence of God.) Same with, say, vegitarianism. Vegitarianism doesn't claim to be a full worldview or philosophy, and neither does libertarianism.

 

Sure, you can have some extreme subjectivists I suppose, who claim to be libertarians and might say something like "I don't have any support for the NAP, I just believe in it," but really, who in the world says that?

 

Again, your beef is with other libertarians over their incorrect justifications. And, as it turns out, contra anti-intellectuals like Peter Swartz (who I guess is the orginator of this claim?), who has no degree in philosophy, and has no academic credentials at all, and has written no peer reviewed papers on these topics, libertarian scholars are light years ahead of Objectivists in explaining different kinds of "thick" libertarianism, the integration of different value systems with the NAP, and highlighting the leading groups of thick libertarians out there today that integrate a broad range values and a strong philosophical foundation with the NAP and private property rights, foremost of which are Christian libertarians, left-libertarians, and Objectivists.

Edited April 18, 2013 by 2046

[Hairnet]

  The extreme subjectivists in the movement even provided reasons for why they support "liberty" (Benjamin Tucker comes to mind). 

[secondhander]

   There is no such thing as a world view without a viewer. If we want to talk about justifications for the NAP (or similar ideas) we should talk about specific people.  The article  posted in the OP was attacking a monolith, which is essentially attacking a strawman. So who has posited the NAP without justification? 

 

    Sure we can all agree that Natural Rights or Utilitarianism are incorrect, and thus not ultimately good justifications for the NAP, but its unfair to not give libertarian authors credit for their own ethical ideas on property rights. The author was of the article posted was wrong to not have looked at Ayn Rand's, John Stuart Mills, Herbert Spencer's, or Murray Rothbard's ethical arguments. 

 

I mean, I think I mostly already answered this. I said that, "To the degree that individual libertarians have a metaphysical-epistemological-ethical foundation for the NAP they may find themselves becoming objectivists, given that their foundation is correct and not skewed."

 

The article's argument is that the NAP is tautological, because aggression can only be understood through an understanding of what rights are. So if you have a concept of rights already established, then the NAP isn't saying anything new. When saying "don't initiate aggression," it's really only saying, "don't violate rights."  You haven't addressed that aspect, I don't believe. The NAP may be helpful in describing what rights violations may look like, but it is only sensible to people who understand what rights are and where they come from in the first place.

 

I know that individual libertarians do have various arguments for the foundation of rights. And as I said, to the degree that they do, and to the degree that their understanding of rights is correct, they may find themselves being more of an objectivist, even if not by name. And to answer one of your questions, because libertariansim is such a large tent, and allow for very different views of philosophy of ethics and the genesis of rights, the one concept that forms the large tent for them all is the NAP, even if individually they have different views of rights and ethics. In addition, some libertarians do say that the NAP is an "axiom." http://www.lewrockwell.com/block/block26.html

 

For those two reasons, I don't see the issue of addressing libertarianism as a worldview that has the NAP as it's connecting principle, and showing that the NAP itself fails to be meaningful apart from a concept of rights.

[2046]

 

The article's argument is that the NAP is tautological, because aggression can only be understood through an understanding of what rights are. So if you have a concept of rights already established, then the NAP isn't saying anything new. When saying "don't initiate aggression," it's really only saying, "don't violate rights."  You haven't addressed that aspect, I don't believe.

Well... okay... It's unclear what you mean by this. Yes, the NAP says "don't violate rights." And "don't violate rights" is tautological... with itself. I mean, everything is tautological with itself, so why is this a "problem" as the title suggests? Not being tautological with itself would be impossible, so it's unclear why this is a criticism at all. The point of the non aggression principle is to be a normative principle for interpersonal conduct, not to not be tautological with itself, if that were even possible.

 

But let's try to interpret this criticism as charitably as possible. It seems like you may want to say something like, well look, we have this non-aggression principle, but all it says is "dont aggress." It doesn't say what aggression is. Unless we come up with a coherent theory of rights as the foundation for the NAP, it doesn't get us anywhere. It "fails to be meaningful apart from a concept of rights."

 

And sure, true enough. And you link to an article by the Austro-libertarian economist Walter Block. But... that's the entire point of the very article you linked. Did you even read it, or just read the title and decry it for using the word "axiom"? (Surely you must realize not everyone in mainsteam academics follows Rand's idosyncratic use of the word "axiom"?) This is getting rediculous, this is the exact same incredibly embarrassing mistake committed by Hardin here.

 

Prof. Block explains, "If the non-aggression axiom is the basic building block of libertarianism, private property rights based on (Lockean and Rothbardian) homesteading principles are the foundation. For if A reaches into B's pocket, pulls out his wallet and runs away with it, we cannot know that A is the aggressor and B the victim. It may be that A is merely repossessing his own wallet, the one B stole from him yesterday. But given a correct grounding in property rights, the non-aggression axiom is a very powerful tool in the war of ideas."

 

In other words, Block is saying that we don't know what actually counts as aggression unless we have a theory of rights as the foundation for the non-aggression principle, that is why states "private property rights based on (Lockean and Rothbardian) homesteading principles are the foundation [of the non-aggression axiom.]"

 

In fact, Block's example about stealing a wallet closely mirror's your example about someone stealing a car in #6. And yet this is supposed to be held out as an example of a libertarian that "posits the NAP as though it's an axiom without need for any further support or explanation."?

 

So... again... what are you actually criticizing? What is the "problem of libertarianism and the NAP"?

[secondhander]

But let's try to interpret this criticism as charitably as possible. It seems like you may want to say something like, well look, we have this non-aggression principle, but all it says is "dont aggress." It doesn't say what aggression is. Unless we come up with a coherent theory of rights as the foundation for the NAP, it doesn't get us anywhere. It "fails to be meaningful apart from a concept of rights."

 

Your "charitable" way of interpreting my argument is exactly what I've been saying (consistently, I hope) through this thread. So, thank you for being charitable? 

 

 I mean, everything is tautological with itself, so why is this a "problem" as the title suggests?

 

You're confusing the issue. Everything is tautological with itself, yes. But that's not what the charge is. The charge is that the NAP is "meaningless apart from a concept of rights."

 

A person can say "a rooster is a rooster." And that would be tautological. And of course, all A's are A. But saying "that thing with feathers over there is a rooster" is not tautological. You're making an argument, or providing new information. 

 

What I'm saying in this thread (or positing for discussion/argument) is that all the NAP is saying, is: "You should not aggress against rights." But that's meaningless without a knowledge of rights. And once you establish what rights are, then you could say "don't aggress against them," but it doesn't add anything new. 

 

I'm not even sure the idea of "initiating" aggression is particularly meaningful apart from an understanding of rights. Let's say that someone pulls out a gun to murder me, and I pull a gun in self-defense, but while I hit the murderer and kill him, one of my bullets hits a bystander and kills them. I initiated force against the bystander, but it was in the context of my right to life and self-protection of it.

 

 And you link to an article by the Austro-libertarian economist Walter Block. But... that's the entire point of the very article you linked. Did you even read it, or just read the title and decry it for using the word "axiom"? (Surely you must realize not everyone in mainsteam academics follows Rand's idosyncratic use of the word "axiom"?)

 

Yes, i did read it. Let me say a couple of things, but first make this quick point. The meaning of "axiom" was not defined by Rand. The meaning is "a self-evident truth that requires no proof." In Math, its meaning is "a proposition that is assumed without proof." It's not idiosyncratic of Rand or objectivism. Maybe Block means the term in some slightly different sense. That's fair, although I think he should stay away from calling it an axiom.

 

To the article itself (and I don't really mean to contain this conversation to Block's article. It was meant as a passing, and maybe imperfect, example): Block does say that the NAP is based on private property rights. But that still doesn't WHY there is private property rights, or explain the ethical philosophical justification for private property rights. Block says nothing more about it, and then goes on in the article to address a particular attack against the NAP (one based in utilitarian welfare).  

 

Block actually says:

These arguments implicitly assume that libertarianism is a moral philosophy, a guide to proper behavior, as it were. Should the flagpole hanger let go? Should the hiker go off and die? But libertarianism is a theory concerned with the justified use of aggression, or violence, based on property rights, not morality.

 

So Block says that libertarianism is not a moral philosophy, and is not concerned with morality. The flaw I find in this is, how can you determine what property rights truly are, or what rights are altogether, without an understanding of morality? Without it, any view of property rights or the NAP is in danger of subjectivism.

[2046]

Yes, i did read it. Let me say a couple of things, but first make this quick point. The meaning of "axiom" was not defined by Rand. The meaning is "a self-evident truth that requires no proof." In Math, its meaning is "a proposition that is assumed without proof." It's not idiosyncratic of Rand or objectivism. Maybe Block means the term in some slightly different sense. That's fair, although I think he should stay away from calling it an axiom.

Why? Because Rand wouldn't approve? In modern philosophy, an axiom is just a starting point of reasoning. It doesn't say whether or not that point self-evident or is to be justified on some other basis. Rand's use is idosyncratic because most people don't use it the way she did. But why she he stay away from using it, because then you could make a straw man argument based on equivocating his words for some other meaning that he doesn't intend for a critcism that would then be invalid? But why do this?

To the article itself (and I don't really mean to contain this conversation to Block's article. It was meant as a passing, and maybe imperfect, example): Block does say that the NAP is based on private property rights. But that still doesn't WHY there is private property rights, or explain the ethical philosophical justification for private property rights. Block says nothing more about it, and then goes on in the article to address a particular attack against the NAP (one based in utilitarian welfare). 

So what? Why is Block expected to explain why there is private property rights, or explain the ethical philosophical justification for private property rights in this paper? I don't understand how you can make such a rediculous requirement of him.

 

In the second parahraph, Block states "If the non-aggression axiom is the basic building block of libertarianism, private property rights based on (Lockean and Rothbardian) homesteading principles are the foundation." So, obviously, Block believes there are answers to your questions: Why is there private property rights? What is the ethical justification to private property rights? Obviously he favors the Lockean and Rothbardian traditions, so one would have to consult those works. The present paper, as you yourself state, however, is an article about rebutting some utilitarian arguments against libertarianism. It is not a treatise about the foundations of natural rights. A writer has got to draw a line on his efforts somewhere and can't reasonably be expected to attempt to explain everything at once. Isn't it enough that he mentioned in an article addressed to a different topic, that the foundation of the non aggression principle, to him, is Lockean-Rothbardian philosophy to rebut your entire gripe here? So again, what is the "problem of libertarianisn and the NAP"? What are you arguing against? Who are you arguing against?

 

So Block says that libertarianism is not a moral philosophy, and is not concerned with morality. The flaw I find in this is, how can you determine what property rights truly are, or what rights are altogether, without an understanding of morality? Without it, any view of property rights or the NAP is in danger of subjectivism.

You totally misunderstand Block here. Block is not saying he is not concerned with morality, and he is obviously not saying there is some way to determine what property rights truly are (since he explicitly said the opposite.) He is saying the legal code of a libertarian society is not concerned with personal morality. He is saying exactly what Objectivists say, which is that there is a difference between ethics and politics, between rights and morality, between vices and crimes. It might be wrong for me to do something, but it doesn't follow that it should be illegal for me to do some thing. How holding such a view, which Rand herself held, is in danger of subjectivism, escapes me.

 

Edited April 21, 2013 by 2046

[mdegges]

...That is not the non-aggression principle. That says nothing about the morality of being an initiator of force in a society that isn't free. It also doesn't say that "don't initiate force" ought to be the fundamental guiding principle of a free society. It merely says that initiation of force would be outlawed, as a consequence of this society being built on the principle of individual rights.

 

Isn't it implied that initiating physical force is morally wrong because it violates an individual's rights?:

"The moral absolute should be: if and when, in any dispute, one side initiates the use of physical force, that side is wrong..." CUI

"Man’s rights can be violated only by the use of physical force." VOS