Questions -- Chapter 1 of OPAR

[dondigitalia]

Per my resolutions, I'm digging into OPAR, and I have some questions about Chapter 1.

I do not understand the steps to this conclusion. Earlier (p.14) Peikoff says that the child's desires do not affect entities' actions, but that seems quite different from demonstrating that no consciousness can affect any entity's action. How is this conclusion reached as a metaphysical fact?

I think you might be unclear about what Peikoff means there. He doesn't mean to say that no consciousness can affect any entity's action (in fact, a little later, he describes human volitional consciousness as being a type of causation). What he means to say is that entities act in accordance with their nature, regardless of any consciousness willing it to be so.

When he says that order in the universe is not due to the will of God or to some cosmic consciousness, he means to further stress that causality is self-evident once one grasps identity; that an orderly universe is necessitated by identity--that God had no hand in it.

In essence, his statement isn't that consciousness can't be the cause of actions, just that it is not the cause of causality.

Does that help?

[hunterrose]

It does, actually.

A couple of other questions, if I may:

1)Causality doesn't itself eliminate the possibility of consciousness causing action on other entities (e.g. matter,) but it does say that such action would be a result of both the entity's and the consciousness's specific natures?

2)Wouldn't it be more accurate to say "primacy of causality" instead of "primacy of existence?" If every consciousness is, by definition, a part of existence, then wouldn't primacy-of-consciousness viewpoints potentially violate causality moreso than existence?

[DavidOdden]

2)Wouldn't it be more accurate to say "primacy of causality" instead of "primacy of existence?"

How do you define 'causality' if it isn't with reference to 'existence'? Causality presupposes existence.

[hunterrose]

The basic fact implicit in such observations is that consciousness, like every other kind of entity, acts in a certain way and only in that way. In adult, philosophic terms, we refer to this fact as the "primacy of existence..." [Emphasis mine]

Granted causality is a corollary of existence, but wouldn't "primacy of existence" thus be dependent on the causality arguments (and not just the axiom arguments?) Not intending to nitpick, I am just trying to understand the logical order of the arguments.

My main question though was 1), as I'll try to elaborate further.

Existence, [primacy of existence] declares, comes first. Things are what they are independent of consciousness - of anyone's preceptions, images, ideas, feelings. Consciousness, by contrast, is a dependent. Its function is not to create or control existence, but to be a spectator: to look out, to perceive, to grasp that which is.

What here is meant by "independent of consciousness?" I see two possible meaning, though I don't assume these are the only possible meanings.

*A consciousness might be able to affect existence, but only in ways prescribed by its particular nature e.g. consciousness A can cause action B on entity C under circumstances D. Such would subject consciousness A to causality, as I understand it.

*Consciousness cannot affect existence. This would seem to be the intended meaning according to the last quoted sentence, but I don't understand how this conclusion is reached.

[dondigitalia]

Granted causality is a corollary of existence, but wouldn't "primacy of existence" thus be dependent on the causality arguments (and not just the axiom arguments?) Not intending to nitpick, I am just trying to understand the logical order of the arguments.

Both logically and metaphysically, existence holds primacy over causality. Metaphysically, in order for entities to act in accordance with their nature, they must first exist. Logically, existence is self-evident acontextually, whereas causality is self-evident only once one has grasped identity. To use causality to prove existence would be begging the question.

*A consciousness might be able to affect existence, but only in ways prescribed by its particular nature e.g. consciousness A can cause action B on entity C under circumstances D. Such would subject consciousness A to causality, as I understand it.

This is true, but it's not exactly the point he is making in that excerpt.

*Consciousness cannot affect existence. This would seem to be the intended meaning according to the last quoted sentence, but I don't understand how this conclusion is reached.

In a sense, this is the point he is making, but you have to be very careful to recognize the context. I am part of existence, and my consciousness definitely affects me, so there is some part of existence that consciousness can affect. Later in OPAR, Peikoff shows that he does not disagree. But I am a very small part of existence (and only a small part of me is caused by my consciousness), so in general, it's entirely proper to say that consciousness cannot affect existence.

Here, he is underscoring the primacy of existence, and the identity of consciousness. A consciousness can't control whatever it wishes, but only those things which existence allows.

[Marc K.]

I think you guys are making this sound too complicated.

This is the battle between Objectivism and Kantism

Objectivism says existence is primary. That things are what they are independent of consciousness. That reality exists independent of our ability to perceive it. That reality exists.

Kantism says consciousness is primary. That things exist dependent on consciousness. That our consciousness creates reality. That reality exists only in the mind.

The primacy of existence is a basic thruth, the first in a line leading to a rational epistemology and moral life. The denial of it can only lead to error and evil.

[hunterrose]

Some of that seems to be a bit of an exaggeration.

At any rate, I believe that all of my fundamental questions have been answered through Chapter 1. Thanks to you all for the help

[Marc K.]

Some of that seems to be a bit of an exaggeration.

At any rate, I believe that all of my fundamental questions have been answered through Chapter 1. Thanks to you all for the help

There is no exaggeration. We are talking about two different philosophies, the most basic premises of which lead to radically different epistemologies and codes of ethics. One has led to the greatest evil and destruction the human mind can dream up. The other has led to the greatest explosion of human ingenuity and progress the world has ever seen. No exaggeration at all.

So does the fact that your questions have been answered mean that the truth has been proven to your satisfaction and that you now accept as true everything Leonard Peikoff has said in chapter one?

[FeatherFall]

You might have all of your questions answered, but I would still like to chime in.

*Consciousness cannot affect existence. This would seem to be the intended meaning according to the last quoted sentence, but I don't understand how this conclusion is reached.

When you refer to consciousness here, it is correct that consciousness does not effect reality... Well, it does, but only in the sense that it provides thinking entities with the data necessary to function. It's volition that would be effecting reality in the sense that I think you mean, volition being an aspect of some consciousnesses.

[dondigitalia]

I think you guys are making this sound too complicated.

It is complicated. I think you're oversimplifying.

Hunterrose is on the right track by asking these questions. It shows that he is really making an effort to understand OPAR with the greatest precision possible.

Kantism says consciousness is primary. That things exist dependent on consciousness. That our consciousness creates reality. That reality exists only in the mind.

That isn't want Kant said. I disagree with him on almost every point, but that's not what he said. It is however, a common misconception of his philosophy, especially among Objectivists. It's nowhere near that cut and dry. This isn't really the place for a discussion of Kantian subjectivism, nor am I inclined to dig into that mammoth of a book again anytime soon, so I'll just leave it at that.

[hunterrose]

Okay, a few more questions.

The idealists regard reality as a spiritual dimension transcending and controlling the world of nature...

Essential to all versions of the [idealism] creed, however is the belief in the supernatural.

"Supernatural," etymologically, means that which is above or beyond nature.

[The idea of the supernatural] represents a rejection of the basic axioms of philosophy.

This can be illustrated by reference to any version of idealism. But let us confine the discussion here to the popular notion of God.

• Is God the creator of the universe? Not if existence has primacy over consciousness.
  
• Is God the designer of the universe? Not if A is A. The alternative to "design" is not "chance." It is causality.
  
• Is God omnipotent? Nothing and no one can alter the metaphysically given.
  
• Is God infinite?...An infinite quality would be a quality without identity... Every entity, accordingly, is finite; it is limited in the number of its qualities and in their extent; this applies to the universe as well.
  

1) Is every version of a spiritual being or dimension a rejection of the basic axioms? That is, does any spiritual being/dimension have to be supernatural, or might it not necessarily violate the axioms, causality, PoE, and the idea of the metaphysically given*?

2)PoE eliminates god qua creator of the universe, but would it eliminate god qua creator of matter?

3)*"Metaphysically given," as I understand it, means any fact that is not dependent on human action - does this say that facts that are metaphysically given are so regardless of whether they were dependent on a non-human action (e.g. If a god volitionally caused gravity to be, would gravity be metaphysically given?)

4)Given that human volition over their own actions does not violate causality, what would be the response to an argument that a spirit's volitional acts on matter do not violate causality?

5)Why would an infinite ("of no specific quantity") quality be a quality without identity?

Hopefully these will be the last ones on chapter 1

[dondigitalia]

1) Is every version of a spiritual being or dimension a rejection of the basic axioms? That is, does any spiritual being/dimension have to be supernatural, or might it not necessarily violate the axioms, causality, PoE, and the idea of the metaphysically given*?

What do you mean by "spiritual being/dimension"? Can you define them using genus and differentia? I would consider myself a spiritual being, since I have a mind, but I suspect that isn't what you mean.

I will say that if something is such that it cannot be studied scientifically, then it is a violation of identity. This does not mean things which we don't currently have the means to study, but things for which no study is possible, on any level.

2)PoE eliminates god qua creator of the universe, but would it eliminate god qua creator of matter?

I don't know that PoE specifically does, but from what would he have created it? Moreover, what is god? What are his essential characteristics? How can we observe or know him?

3)*"Metaphysically given," as I understand it, means any fact that is not dependent on human action - does this say that facts that are metaphysically given are so regardless of whether they were dependent on a non-human action (e.g. If a god volitionally caused gravity to be, would gravity be metaphysically given?)

"Metaphysically given" refers to the non-man-made only because we know of no non-human volition in the universe. If some volitional alien race were discovered, I don't think it would be entirely proper to call it the Metaphysical vs. the Man-Made, but rather the Metaphysical vs. the Volitionally Made. Does that answer your question?

I refuse to discuss it in terms of a God, however, because to do so is meaningless.

4)Given that human volition over their own actions does not violate causality, what would be the response to an argument that a spirit's volitional acts on matter do not violate causality?

By what means would this hypothetical spirit be acting on matter?

5)Why would an infinite ("of no specific quantity") quality be a quality without identity?

Infinite means: greater than any quanitity, which means: no specific quantity, which means: a quantity without identity.

[hunterrose]

What do you mean by "spiritual being/dimension"? Can you define them using genus and differentia? I would consider myself a spiritual being, since I have a mind, but I suspect that isn't what you mean.

Right. I suppose my question would be whether any being of a non-material variety is automatically a violation of the axioms.

I will say that if something is such that it cannot be studied scientifically, then it is a violation of identity. This does not mean things which we don't currently have the means to study, but things for which no study is possible, on any level.

True, but there is a distinction (IMO) between that which we cannot study scientifically, and that which cannot be studied scientifically by any capacity. I would argue that anything possessing causality would be study-able by a properly equipped consciousness, but might there be things that our consciousness couldn't study that still possessed identity (e.g. an immaterial being volitionally acting on matter?)

I don't know that PoE specifically does, but from what would he have created it? Moreover, what is god? What are his essential characteristics? How can we observe or know him?

We can't under most definitions (natch.) I would presumably agree that such things could not be evidenced (no contextual proof,) but that's quite different from saying that they are a rejection of the axioms.

"Metaphysically given" refers to the non-man-made only because we know of no non-human volition in the universe. If some volitional alien race were discovered, I don't think it would be entirely proper to call it the Metaphysical vs. the Man-Made, but rather the Metaphysical vs. the Volitionally Made. Does that answer your question?

Almost totally.

By what means would this hypothetical spirit be acting on matter?

Dunno, presumably by means of some volitional causality over matter - not desires as separate from its causality, but as part of its causality.

The first is my prime question; the others are just means to sub-solutions to #1.

Rushed responses, but I gotta get to work

[dondigitalia]

True, but there is a distinction (IMO) between that which we cannot study scientifically, and that which cannot be studied scientifically by any capacity. I would argue that anything possessing causality would be study-able by a properly equipped consciousness, but might there be things that our consciousness couldn't study that still possessed identity (e.g. an immaterial being volitionally acting on matter?)

Aside from the complete arbitrariness of positing an existent for which you have no empirical evidence, have you ever considered the contradiction inherent in the unkowable?

"I can't know anything about this existent, except I know that it is unkowable, but if it has the characteristic of unkowability, then it exists, which is something else that I know about it, except I have no means of knowing it." Therein lies the problem of the supernatural.

I'm not willing to say that any non-material being is necessarily a violation of identity, since there are other non-material existents which are perfectily knowable (concepts of consciousness). It is the supernatural, not the non-material that violates the law of identity. The supernatural is, by definition, that which we cannot know, i.e. that which has no knowable identity, i.e. that which has no identity. The supernatural is not equivalent to the non-material; it's just that most of the non-material things people try to talk about are supernatural fantasy.

Edited February 16, 2006 by dondigitalia

[hunterrose]

The supernatural is not equivalent to the non-material

That's pretty much the distinction I was hoping for

I'm not willing to say that any non-material being is necessarily a violation of identity, since there are other non-material existents which are perfectily knowable (concepts of consciousness). It is the supernatural, not the non-material that violates the law of identity. The supernatural is, by definition, that which we cannot know, i.e. that which has no knowable identity, i.e. that which has no identity.

Agreed.

[source]

3) What is the Objectivist definition of the Universe?

I see it clashing a little bit with the physicists' definition of the Universe. Objectivists hold (and I do not know how they can make this statement) that the Universe is eternal. But this is blatantly contradicted by the prevailing theory of the time, the Big Bang theory (which, among other things, theorizes a beginning to Time itself). I understood philosophy to take a pretty much 'hands-off' view of the sciences, yet in this situation I see it contradicting scientific evidence without any evidence of its own.

If you think about it, it's not really contradictory. If the Big Bang created time itself, then there is no sense in speaking of the time before the Big Bang, because "before" doesn't exist. So, if Objectivism states that a thing is eternal, this means that it has always been here and always will be here. In other words, it exists at all times. Since time itself was created with the Big Bang, then that's it. That's when eternity begun.

[dondigitalia]

If you think about it, it's not really contradictory. If the Big Bang created time itself, then there is no sense in speaking of the time before the Big Bang, because "before" doesn't exist. So, if Objectivism states that a thing is eternal, this means that it has always been here and always will be here. In other words, it exists at all times. Since time itself was created with the Big Bang, then that's it. That's when eternity begun.

Most Objectivists that I am aware of reject the Big Bang. Even if the Big Bang happened (and it is far from universally accepted as fact among physicists), it would not represent the beginning of the universe, but a tremendous change in a universe which existed prior to the event.

[source]

Most Objectivists that I am aware of reject the Big Bang. Even if the Big Bang happened (and it is far from universally accepted as fact among physicists), it would not represent the beginning of the universe, but a tremendous change in a universe which existed prior to the event.

Theory is theory, fact is fact. We don't know whether the Big Bang theory is correct or no, but it fits into the context of (I won't say all, but most) of the knowledge we have of the universe. I'm thinking this theory will be modified in several ways as new discoveries are made. There is a possibility also that it will be rejected. But right now we can't tell. This is the best we have, as far as I know.

Still, this is probably a better discussion for the Science or Physics forums since how the universe began is not of philosophical importance.

[dondigitalia]

Theory is theory, fact is fact. We don't know whether the Big Bang theory is correct or no, but it fits into the context of (I won't say all, but most) of the knowledge we have of the universe. I'm thinking this theory will be modified in several ways as new discoveries are made. There is a possibility also that it will be rejected. But right now we can't tell. This is the best we have, as far as I know.

There are some "theories" which are safely accepted as scientific fact. Relativity (which is entirely valid within its context) and evolution are two such theories.

Still, this is probably a better discussion for the Science or Physics forums since how the universe began is not of philosophical importance.

It is a philosophical issue. It belongs to Philosophy of Science. The universe did not begin at all--it just is. A beginning to the universe (where universe is used interchangeably with existence) presupposes one of two things:

1. A total non-existence prior to the beginning.

2. Some existent which is outside of existence.

Both are a violation of identity.

Furthermore, to talk about the universe as having begun, or having an age, places the universe "in time." But the universe is not "in time;" time is in the universe. It is a relationship between existents.

[source]

It is a philosophical issue. It belongs to Philosophy of Science. The universe did not begin at all--it just is. A beginning to the universe (where universe is used interchangeably with existence) presupposes one of two things:

This is something that has always eluded me: why is universe used interchangeably with existence?

In my dictionary, existence exists, and the universe is only the physical phenomena manifested "within" this existence during a period in time. Thus the universe is a scientific term, and existence is philosophical.

The beginning of the universe is then that point in existence when physical interactions begun, or were somehow made possible (which is what the big bang theory does not yet tell us about).

[dondigitalia]

This is something that has always eluded me: why is universe used interchangeably with existence?

In my dictionary, existence exists, and the universe is only the physical phenomena manifested "within" this existence during a period in time. Thus the universe is a scientific term, and existence is philosophical.

You're distinction between the two concepts is basically correct. I explained the relationship between the two concepts in this post from another thread.

The beginning of the universe is then that point in existence when physical interactions begun, or were somehow made possible (which is what the big bang theory does not yet tell us about).

That's what I meant when I said that if the Big Bang actually occured, it would be a change in the universe, not a beginning.