Pragmatism

[hernan]

You deny that reality is real, and then deny that it matters. But the denial that reality is real is a contradiction, and upholding a specific contradiction means that you see no problem with upholding contradictions in general. If you uphold one contradiction, why should you not uphold another?

Fine, but who here is denying reality is real? (BTW, this does seem to me close to a proof if not a proof.)

[SkyTrooper]

By "debate" I meant among ourselves. As I've noted countless times already, we agree that reality is real but apparently I'm not sufficiently certain about it though I can't see how.

This is an old philosophy question on "Right Opinion" and honestly you have my deepest sympathy that you keep wanting to talk about things that to you "matter" and all the annoying Objectivists you are talking to try to convince you about antecedent (earlier) knowledge that seems "trivial." Take the "Road to Lassira" example given by Plato:

Socrates asks Meno if it is possible to have wisdom without possessing knowledge. He gives the example of a man taking the road to Lassira (a greek city). A man might give accurate directions to Larissa if he had traveled to Larissa before and had learned the path, or had seen a map showing the correct route. However, a man would also give correct directions if he merely had the right opinion, without any basis for possessing this opinion. Socrates points out the difficulty with an unfounded opinion is that there is no reason for one to preserve, or indeed to acquire it in the first place.

Plato would say the man who had taken the path or had seen a map would have "knowledge" while the man who knew the correct route, possibly by guessing it or by finding it easiest to believe that it was the best route, would have "true opinion." By this definition, until you understand the basic axioms and Rand's solution to essences you have "true opinion" that reality exists, but not "knowledge." I know that existence exists, while you believe that existence exists.

Its kind of a waste of time to convince someone of a ethical conclusion, like that looting is actually harmful to the looter (which rests on epistemological and metaphysical conclusions), if someone else can come along and take the foundation out from under it (say, by convincing you that reality is unknowable).

Edited March 19, 2007 by badkarma556

[hernan]

This is an old philosophy question on "Right Opinion" and honestly you have my deepest sympathy that you keep wanting to talk about things that to you "matter" and all the annoying Objectivists you are talking to try to convince you about antecedent (earlier) knowledge that seems "trivial." Take the "Road to Lassira" example given by Plato:

Socrates asks Meno if it is possible to have wisdom without possessing knowledge. He gives the example of a man taking the road to Lassira (a greek city). A man might give accurate directions to Larissa if he had traveled to Larissa before and had learned the path, or had seen a map showing the correct route. However, a man would also give correct directions if he merely had the right opinion, without any basis for possessing this opinion. Socrates points out the difficulty with an unfounded opinion is that there is no reason for one to preserve, or indeed to acquire it in the first place.

Plato would say the man who had taken the path or had seen a map would have "knowledge" while the man who knew the correct route, possibly by guessing it or by finding it easiest to believe that it was the best route, would have "true opinion." By this definition, until you understand the basic axioms and Rand's solution to essences you have "true opinion" that reality exists, but not "knowledge."

Its kind of a waste of time to convince someone of a ethical conclusion, like that looting is actually harmful to the looter (which rests on epistemological and metaphysical conclusions), if someone else can come along and take the foundation out from under it (say, by convincing you that reality is unknowable).

I see the same themes playing out again here:

1) The fear that any uncertainty, however slight, might lead to nihilism ("why acquire it in the first place", "take the foundation out from under").

2) The purpose of argument ("to convince someone of a ethical conclusion").

Perhaps we really have hit here upon the critical difference between Pragmatism and Objectivism.

[SkyTrooper]

I see the same themes playing out again here:

1) The fear that any uncertainty, however slight, might lead to nihilism ("why acquire it in the first place", "take the foundation out from under").

2) The purpose of argument ("to convince someone of a ethical conclusion").

Perhaps we really have hit here upon the critical difference between Pragmatism and Objectivism.

There are plenty of other logical errors that will lead you to bad philosophies besides "nihilism." Plato wasn't a nihilist, but because he made bad metaphysical and epistemological conclusions (the Forms and 'Rationalism', respectively) he developed his ideal government as a totalitarian dictatorship. Osama bin Laden isn't a nihilist, but because of the metaphysical and epistemological conclusions (mystical future paradise and truth implanted in one's head by God, repectively) he decided to send planes into buildings and murder thousands. I can go on.

What do you propose the purpose of philosophical argument should be, other than to answer questions like "should I steal from my friends or not?" (ethics) and "how can I learn how to cure cancer?" (epistemology)

Edited March 19, 2007 by badkarma556

[mrocktor]

hernan,

If you cannot accept the application of reason, the method we are using, in discussing something as trivial as reality - in which our conclusions agree - it is pointless to argue with you about other higher level abstractions. We are trying to point out to you that Pragmatism is utimately useless in achieving long term happiness because it is rooted in worthless epistemology, but if you are not interested in understanding the necessary preceding concepts and the method by which they are derived, discussion is futile.

[hernan]

There are plenty of other logical errors that will lead you to bad philosophies besides "nihilism."

I didn't mean to be so literal but ok.

What do you propose the purpose of philosophical argument should be, other than to answer questions like "should I steal from my friends or not?" (ethics) and "how can I learn how to cure cancer?" (epistemology)

But now you have changed horses.

My interest in philosophy is strictly for making better choices. But an emphasis on philosophical argument often devolves into a pursuit of making other people's choices, something that interests me less.

It is plausible that Objectivism is better suited to convincing others of its merit. That would be a consequence of "right thinking". I'm not convinced but it's plausible.

I doubt anyone is ever persuaded of Pragmatism by its argument but rather by its results. When I look at successful people, by and large, I see Pragmatists.

We are trying to point out to you that Pragmatism is utimately useless in achieving long term happiness because it is rooted in worthless epistemology...

Interestingly, your claim that Objectivism is superior to Pragmatism in acheiving long term happiness is a Pragmatic argument, one which emphasises consequences.

[SkyTrooper]

My interest in philosophy is strictly for making better choices. But an emphasis on philosophical argument often devolves into a pursuit of making other people's choices, something that interests me less.

The purpose of the ethical branch of philosophy is to answer the question "how should I live my life." Unfortunately ethics cannot be well understood without first understanding the antecedent branches.

It is plausible that Objectivism is better suited to convincing others of its merit. That would be a consequence of "right thinking". I'm not convinced but it's plausible.

Nothing is more convincing to a rational person than the truth. However, the purpose of philosophy is not (primarily) to convince others of anything. Choosing your philosophy based on 'what will best convince others that I'm right?' is essentially living your life for others, and your best choice would probably be Sophism/Machiavelli to accomplish that (who happen to be philosophical train wrecks).

I doubt anyone is ever persuaded of Pragmatism by its argument but rather by its results. When I look at successful people, by and large, I see Pragmatists.

The problem is that a Pragmatist would judge "success" as a Pragmatist, because your concept of "success" is based on your philosophy. Try an experiment: ask a priest who he thinks is successful, then ask a socialist, then ask a neo-con. I guarantee you that you won't get the same answer. You could try asking a Pragmatist if he's happy, but he would only answer truthfully if it was "pragmatic" to do so.

Interestingly, your claim that Objectivism is superior to Pragmatism in acheiving long term happiness is a Pragmatic argument, one which emphasises consequences.

This is because if you have a proper morality, than the moral is the practical. The purpose of morality is to achieve happiness (true happiness, not Hedonist whim-worshiping happiness). The moral vs. practical dichotomy came about when thinkers denied either reality(Kant et. al) or denied the mind (Heraclitus et al).

Edited March 20, 2007 by badkarma556

[hernan]

The problem is that a Pragmatist would judge "success" as a Pragmatist, because your concept of "success" is based on your philosophy. Try an experiment: ask a priest who he thinks is successful, then ask a socialist, then ask a neo-con. I guarantee you that you won't get the same answer.

Believe it or not I agree. However, I find it quite ironic that you want me to trust the observation of reality but not to trust the observation of successful people.

Interestingly, the idea that happiness cannot be pursued directly is a theme I've seen in other philosphies as well. I'm not quite sure what to make of that observation but the call for "right thinking" is not unique to Objectivism.

[SkyTrooper]

Believe it or not I agree. However, I find it quite ironic that you want me to trust the observation of reality but not to trust the observation of successful people.

Interestingly, the idea that happiness cannot be pursued directly is a theme I've seen in other philosphies as well. I'm not quite sure what to make of that observation but the call for "right thinking" is not unique to Objectivism.

I don't feel inconsistent making the claim that reality is self-evident while success is not because reality, as an axiom, is self-evident. Both "happiness" and "success" are high level concepts and are therefore not self-evident. Note that this is not the same as saying that it is not possible to know that a person is successful, or deduce that a person is happy, or that because there are many different views of success that there isn't one right objective view of success.

Edited March 20, 2007 by badkarma556

[y_feldblum]

Fine, but who here is denying reality is real?

To a Pragmatist, is might be 99% likely that reality is real. But the concession that reality might not be real amounts to nothing less than an absolute, flat out, total denial of its reality. Either it is real, or it isn't - but it's not a probability flux between real and unreal.

(BTW, this does seem to me close to a proof if not a proof.)

As a technical point of Rand's method of philosophy, axioms cannot strictly speaking be proven because they are self-evident primaries of extrospective sense-perception. In other words, you look out at the world, and the first thing you notice is that there is something out there - something exists - and there is no denying or getting around this basic fact because you notice it again and again, every single time you open your eyes; the idea that something exists is equivalent to reality is real, since reality is nothing more than the sum total of everything which is real, or which exists. Proving some concept requires showing how it reduces to the self-evident primaries of sense-perception; so for example, one could prove that 1+1=2 by showing how it reduces to apples, bananas, and pecans; but the idea that reality is real or equivalently that something exists is already a self-evident primary of sense-perception. When Rand defended the idea that reality is real, her defense was a validation of the idea, even though it was not a proof.

[hernan]

I don't know that this is conclusive in any direction but an odd coincidence. From today's WSJ:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1174258880...;ojcontent=otep

[hunterrose]

You can get the useful result of cooperation and obtain the "useful" result of preying on friends as well, so long as you aren't caught in the act.

Sure, if you are willing to accept the risk. But one way to define "friend" is that group of others whose cooperation you value above the value of cheating and risking getting caught.

Hmm. Can there, according to pragmatism, be such a "friend" that no prey-reward is high enough and no prey-risk low enough to merit preying on them? I personally think not, as no matter how valuable a friendship is worth, friendship+friend's loot is still more valuable to the pragmatist.

But then is it possible for the pragmatist to derive (from pragmatism) principles such as "it is virtuous to prey on enemies" or "it is virtuous to not prey on friends"?

[SkyTrooper]

I looked up pragmatism in Peikoff's "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand" and saw only a paragraph devoted to it:

The cumulation of this approach [subjectivism] is pragmatism. Pragmatism holds that the concept of "reality" is invalid; that the quest for absolutes is a perversion; and that truth is not correspondence to fact, but rather "that which works." "Works" here means "satisfies for the nonce the arbitrary desires of men." (pp. 146)

Obviously this explanation rests on the previous 145 pages of the book, but this clarified the issue for me. I also remember reading a lot about the results of pragmatist thought in "The Ominous Parallels" so I might flip through it again later.

But then is it possible for the pragmatist to derive (from pragmatism) principles such as "it is virtuous to prey on enemies" or "it is virtuous to not prey on friends"?

Now I know pragmatist epistemology would work differently (if at all), but if I was a pragmatist as defined by Dr. Peikoff above I think I could determine this principle very easily. However, as a pragmatist I don't think I would be able to properly define "friend." A pragmatist will think

1) "I have a desire (an arbitrary desire) to gain X, how do I gain X?"

2) "The people that will help me attain my goal are my 'friends' and those who will hurt me in attaining it are 'enemies'"

3) "I should help my 'friends' and hurt my 'enemies' (to obtain my goal)"

4) "I don't really know why I wanted X in the first place, and think I would rather have Y."

5) "My old friends wanted X too but are actually preventing me from obtaining Y, they are now my enemies!"

etc..

Edited March 20, 2007 by badkarma556

[y_feldblum]

It is impossible for a pragmatist to derive any principles whatsoever.

A pragmatist would prey on enemies if it "satisfies for the nonce [his] arbitrary desires", and would prey on friends if it satisfies them. A pragmatist would hold reality as contradictory if it works for him, and would hold reality as absolute (for the moment) if that works.

[hernan]

I looked up pragmatism in Peikoff's "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand" and saw only a paragraph devoted to it:

The cumulation of this approach [subjectivism] is pragmatism. Pragmatism holds that the concept of "reality" is invalid; that the quest for absolutes is a perversion; and that truth is not correspondence to fact, but rather "that which works." "Works" here means "satisfies for the nonce the arbitrary desires of men." (pp. 146)

This, as it turns out, is not Pragmatism but Radical Empiricism (see above). An understandable confusion given the intertwined history of the two but nevertheless, an error.

Hmm. Can there, according to pragmatism, be such a "friend" that no prey-reward is high enough and no prey-risk low enough to merit preying on them? I personally think not, as no matter how valuable a friendship is worth, friendship+friend's loot is still more valuable to the pragmatist.

Obviously the answer to that would depend on reality and given our reality, the answer happens to be yes.

But then is it possible for the pragmatist to derive (from pragmatism) principles such as "it is virtuous to prey on enemies" or "it is virtuous to not prey on friends"?

This is a slightly different question. Is it possible to construct a hypothetical alternate reality where Pragmatism would lead to all enemies and no friends? Perhaps in theory if one desired nothing that others could freely give (men like Hitler and Stalin probably come closest).

But even God desires the love of mankind.

[hernan]

1) "I have a desire (an arbitrary desire) to gain X, how do I gain X?"

2) "The people that will help me attain my goal are my 'friends' and those who will hurt me in attaining it are 'enemies'"

3) "I should help my 'friends' and hurt my 'enemies' (to obtain my goal)"

4) "I don't really know why I wanted X in the first place, and think I would rather have Y."

5) "My old friends wanted X too but are actually preventing me from obtaining Y, they are now my enemies!"

One of the key elements you left out of your analysis is irrational emotional attachments. Think of irrational emotional attachments as voluntarily donning handcuffs of a sort.

Pragmatists take advantage of the full human cognitive/physical stack.

One of my favorite books in this regard is:

The Art of Living Consciously by Nathaniel Branden

[hernan]

To a Pragmatist, is might be 99% likely that reality is real. But the concession that reality might not be real amounts to nothing less than an absolute, flat out, total denial of its reality. Either it is real, or it isn't - but it's not a probability flux between real and unreal.

This is, at best, a concession that reality might not be real in the same sense as the concession that the earth might not be round.

As a technical point of Rand's method of philosophy, axioms cannot strictly speaking be proven because they are self-evident primaries of extrospective sense-perception.

We are both sorting claims crudely into buckets of logical and empirical. Even you hesitate to categorize your claim as a logical proof.

The property of the emprical bucket, in its crude genralization, is that it is subject to revision by new experience. But clearly we can, and do, differentiate between those empirical facts that we are unsure of and those we don't think merit further thought.

There is no Pragmatic value in exploring the possibility that reality is not real. That's good enough for me. I'd sooner test my knowledge that the earth was round.

As for "self-evident" axioms, this is either a rhetorical flourish, a circular argument of the shortest form, or a Pragmatic recognition that some claims don't merit proof. As you probably know, Euclidian geometry also rests on "self-evident" axioms which can be changed to produce different geometries.

[knast]

This, as it turns out, is not Pragmatism but Radical Empiricism (see above). An understandable confusion given the intertwined history of the two but nevertheless, an error.

That is not true. That is, in fact, only your own incorrect understanding of Pragmatism. "Radical empirisim" (or whatever you would like to cal it) is implied by the Pragmatic concept of truth. In other words: the Pragmatic concept of truth more or less supposes the doctrine of "Radical Empiricism".

Just think about it for a moment. What is "true" according to Pragmatism? It's that which "works". "Works", in the Pragmatic sense, mean: "that which satisfies the desire of the group or the individual". So, if I get something out of believing in the existence of God, then it is "true" that there is a God. However, if I don't get something out of it, then it is not "true".

Now notice: whether or not something is true according to Pragmatism does not depend upon whether or not it corresponds to the objective reality. I.e., it does not work because it is true, it is "true" because it "works". And what works depend, ultimately, on my feelings, whims, wishes, emotions, etc. So truth and therefore, by implication, reality is whatever you want it to be, provided one gains something from it. And this is, in essence, of course Subjectivism.

You should really read what Dr Leonard Peikoff write about the philosophy of Pragmatism in The Ominous Parallels.

Edited March 21, 2007 by knast

[hernan]

The cumulation of this approach [subjectivism] is pragmatism. Pragmatism holds that the concept of "reality" is invalid; that the quest for absolutes is a perversion; and that truth is not correspondence to fact, but rather "that which works." "Works" here means "satisfies for the nonce the arbitrary desires of men."

That is not true. That is, in fact, only your own incorrect understanding of Pragmatism. "Radical empirisim" (or whatever you would like to cal it) is implied by the Pragmatic concept of truth. In other words: the Pragmatic concept of truth more or less supposes the doctrine of "Radical Empiricism".

I should have been more precise. The idea that the concept of reality is invalid and that the quest for absolutes is a perversion is Radical Empiricism. The claim that Pragmatic definition of truth implies that is an unsubstantiated claim of dubious merit.

Just think about it for a moment. What is "true" according to Pragmatism? It's that which "works". "Works", in the Pragmatic sense, mean: "that which satisfies the desire of the group or the individual". So, if I get something out of believing in the existence of God, then it is "true" that there is a God. However, if I don't get something out of it, then it is not "true".

Unfortunatley you've substituted "get something out of it" for "that which works".

I noted previously the example of Quantum vs. String theory. If ever String theory ever becomes accepted as the preferred model of Physics it does not change reality and Quantum theory will work no less well than it ever did. Or take the case of Newtonian and Relativity theory where the latter has become accepted. Newtonian remains the preffered model for most cases.

Are these violations of truth and reality? Hardly.

[hernan]

Let me add one more thought that I hope will lead in productive direction.

There is one element of Pragatism vs. Objectivism that I mentinoed previously by way of a quote of Dewey (or was it James?) that Pragmatism emphasizes the restoration of usfule philosophy.

One way to state that is that Pragmatism places philosophy in service to desires which is somewhat backwards to Objectivism.

I noted previously also that Pragmatism is incomplete, that it relies on out precedent understanding of what works which most Pragmatists gloss over but which I have always noticed.

One way to look at Peikoff's reasoning is by analogy to an automobile. One can use an automobile to go to the store to get groceries or to mow down pedestrians in the crosswalk. Peikoff is essentially criticising Pragmatism on the theory that it is going to be used for the worst purpose whereas I focus on my own use of it for my own purpose which is, of course, the best purpose.

I, and I would hazzard to suggest most Pragmatists, take the goals of survival and flourshing mostly for granted (like the reality of reality). It's interesting that even so Pragmatism and Objectivism diverge in some key ways.

[knast]

Hernan wrote:

The claim that Pragmatic definition of truth implies that is an unsubstantiated claim of dubious merit.

Is it? I just showed you how and why it follows logically from the Pragmatic concept of truth. Even though it seems useless, since you seem to ignore everything I write, I am going to quote from some articles which deals with Pragmatism. Hopefully you will, from these quotations alone, see why you are wrong and I am right. I will begin with Radical Academy:

He considered pragmatism to be both a method for analyzing philosophic problems and a theory of truth ... Theories, he felt, are "instruments" that humans use to solve problems and should be judged in terms of their "cash value" or practical consequences for human conduct.

He developed the notion of truth as a "leading" that is useful: it can change as human experience changes. The morality, as well as the truth, of an idea or action should be judged, according to James, in a similar way -- in terms of its outcome in human experience. In The Will to Believe (1897) and The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), James examined the problem of belief in cases in which no immediate evidence exists on which to base one's belief. He concluded that in the area of religious commitment, belief can create its own truth through the effects created in the experience of the believer by his "willing nature." Belief in God is thus pragmatically justified if it makes a positive difference in the experience of the believer. (My italics.)

Now you accused me of misinterpreting what James meant: "Unfortunatley you've substituted "get something out of it" for "that which works"." But as you can read for yourself I am not misinterpreting anything. And if you can see that, why can you don't see the implication of this? Namely that reality is whatever you want it to be? And that, therefore, Pragmatism is nothing but Subjectivism? After all: "Reality is ever in the making, growing where thinking beings are at work." That is to say: since reality, according to Pragmatism, has no identity, i.e., is nothing in particular, but is instead provided with one "where thinking beings are at work".

Not "working" for you? Let me quote from another article: ""Pragmatism", according to James, "is a temper of mind, an attitude; it is also a theory of the nature of ideas and truth; and finally, it is a theory about reality" (Journal of Phil., V, 85). As he uses the word, therefore, it designates ( a ) an attitude of mind towards philosophy, ( b ) an epistemology, and ( c ) a metaphysics." And:

The attitude which he calls Pragmatism he defines as follows: "The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our lives, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one" (Pragmatism, p. 50). Thus, when one is confronted with the evidence in favour of the formula "the human soul is immortal", and then turns to the considerations put forward by the sceptic in favour of the formula "the human soul is not immortal", what is he to do? If he is a Pragmatist, he will not be content to weigh the evidence, to compare the case for with the case against immortality; he will not attempt to fit the affirmative or the negative into a "closed system" of thought; he will work out the consequences, the definite differences, that follow from each alternative, and decide in that way which of the two "works" better. The alternative which works better is true.

Incredible. That was exactly what I said in my last post. Whether or not it is true that the soul is immortal is not a factual question, but a question of how the two possible answers ("yes" or "no") will make me feel. If it makes me feel bad, then it doesn't work for me and is thus false. If it, however, makes me feel good, then it does work for me and is thus true. Reality is whatever I want it to be. Whatever "works" better, regardless of the facts and the demands of logical thinking.

Coming to think about it. What you are doing right now, as a pragmatist, is precisely what pragmatism is all about: if you don't want pragmatism to be an irrational and false philosophy, then it's not, and in that case, everyone who claims otherwise just have to be wrong. No matter what. No matter what William James and John Dewey said. Why? Because that apparently "works" for you and therefore it must be "true".

[hernan]

Reality is whatever I want it to be. Whatever "works" better, regardless of the facts and the demands of logical thinking.

I reread your quotes several times to try to follow your reasoning. The citations consistently refer to "what works" not to "get something out of it" as if any ancillary effect of a theory could be deemed "what works."

I can see from the earntestness with which you put forward an argument that you mean to be serious about this but you have failed to at this crucial point.

Perhaps the source of confusion is between "reality" and "theory"?

I can only scratch my head in wonder.

[hernan]

Let me try one last time to jerk this thread back to reality:

Suppose I have two theories: T1 and T2.

Suppose that they both are equally accurate in predicting phenomemon P.

But suppose that these theories do not otherwise correspond to one another. Each uses a different method to predict phenomenon P.

In this case, T1 and T2 are both Pragmatically true.

And while we may not know if either (or none) is correspondingly true, we can be certain that at least one of them is correspondingly false since they do not correspond to one another.

But here is the thing: even in this situation there is no claim that, nor support for the claim that, P is not real. This situation is perfectly compatible with a real P.

All it suggests is that correspondence is not a Pragmatic test of truth and if predicting P is our meaning of understanding, which is the case in science, then correspondence is irrelevant.

On the other hand, if you value correspondence (setting aside the question of how it is obtained) then you will never be satisfied with Pragmatism.

And Pragmatism will be of no use if your objective is to badger people about "right thinking" to claim that either T1 or T2 is the sole true theory.

[hunterrose]

Can there, according to pragmatism, be such a "friend" that no prey-reward is high enough and no prey-risk low enough to merit preying on them?

Obviously the answer to that would depend on reality and given our reality, the answer happens to be yes.

But how can that be? Say the value of a specific friend is X, and the value of a successful looting of said friend is 2 (in this case, a number I'll assume is less than whatever X represents.) X+2 is more useful than X, and if the chance of getting caught looting is sufficiently negligible, it's more pragmatic to earn the better consequence (looting + friendship). Which would mean that no friend is so valuable that a pragmatist wouldn't at least consider looting from them?

I can see "looting from this friend isn't worth the risk in this or that particular instance" to be a pragmatic statement, though it's obviously not a principle. But how could you pragmatically come to a blanket statement that it is never useful to prey on this friend, no matter how low the prey-risk?

This seems (to me) to be a failing (lack of useful principles in addition to being anti-friend ) that Pragmatism can't possibly answer.

[hernan]

But how can that be? Say the value of a specific friend is X, and the value of a successful looting of said friend is 2 (in this case, a number I'll assume is less than whatever X represents.) X+2 is more useful than X, and if the chance of getting caught looting is sufficiently negligible, it's more pragmatic to earn the better consequence (looting + friendship). Which would mean that no friend is so valuable that a pragmatist wouldn't at least consider looting from them?

The question, as I understood it, was whether a Pragmatist would have no friends. For that to be true the above would have to hold generally. The reality is that it does not. It is not generally the case that for every person P the value of looting that person (taking risk into account) is greater than not. Indeed, this is what makes the progress of civilization so interesting.

I can see "looting from this friend isn't worth the risk in this or that particular instance" to be a pragmatic statement, though it's obviously not a principle. But how could you pragmatically come to a blanket statement that it is never useful to prey on this friend, no matter how low the prey-risk?

The general principle is don't loot from people were the expected value is less than zero. It's a principle, just not the one you prefer. (Again, I have to note, you are not considering irrational factors.)

Here is a list of books of similar principles of a more realistic nature:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/listm...-/291EGOCQGKRMB