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I studied physics in college 40 years ago.  I would like to read comments, by people familiar with Objectivism and quantum mechanics, concerning the more obvious contradictions between Aristotelian metaphysics and several aspects of quantum theory.  Things like an electron (?an object?) can exist in multiple locations at the same time - or, can move from one location to another without transiting the intervening space?

 

My uneducated guess is, if the data shows these statements to be true, and discounting a flaw in the experimental method, that the definition of an electron as a particle (object) must be re-examined.  Txs for your attention.

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Hi Jack. There is also a discussion here. I have a first degree in physics from back in those days, your days. And I had some courses in classical and quantum mechanics and in electrodynamics at the graduate level.

 

It has seemed to me that there is no need for Objectivist metaphysics to identify Rand’s basic category entity with only particles or particle-like things, when it comes to thinking about entities making up the entities that are baseballs, people, and living cells. An electron could be an entity having particle-like attributes in certain situations and wave-like attributes in other situations and links between the two, such as we learn from quantum mechanics. And offhand I also don’t see any reason to insist in the Objectivist metaphysics, which aims to be pretty minimalist, that relationships of the entities that are macroscopic objects to the entities (and relations) that are a vacuum space or field space in which those objects are situated must be the same relationships to be found between electrons and the physical spaces in which they are situated. Concerning the specific ways in which quantum indeterminacy enters mechanics and field theory, I think it requires modest adjustment in some of the Objectivist metaphysics in conception of identity and causality (as expressed by Rand and by Peikoff in coordination with Rand) for accommodation, but the categories of entity, attribute, relation, and action will still suffice, and the axiom “Existence is identity” will remain standing and working.

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Boydstun is perfectly correct.

 

 

Those who exaggerate the implications of QM to mean contradictions exists in reality are just as wrong (and they are) as Objectivists who jump to the same conclusion in order to "doubt" QM's formulations (the science not the flakey interpretations of that science). 

 

I have seen nothing from the math, imply anything that contradicts the law of identity. 

 

The issue that arises, and many have difficulty with, is just "what" has identity and what is the "nature" of that identity.

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Boydstun said:

I think it requires modest adjustment in some of the Objectivist metaphysics in conception of identity and causality (as expressed by Rand and by Peikoff in coordination with Rand) for accommodation, but the categories of entity, attribute, relation, and action will still suffice, and the axiom “Existence is identity” will remain standing and working.

Actually it would require serious adjustment to Oist epistemology because there is no way to do what you propose with the concept entity without abandoning the Oist theory of meaning and reduction.

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Boydstun said:

Actually it would require serious adjustment to Oist epistemology because there is no way to do what you propose with the concept entity without abandoning the Oist theory of meaning and reduction.

 

Please explain.  Recall sometimes "extrapolation" or analysis of logical implications from certain premises can be to various degrees incorrect, due perhaps to relying upon other additional premises unstated or subconscious etc.

 

In this particular instance we need to look at the principles and their implications not who said what in the past.  I ask you to indulge in this kind of exercise Plasmatic.

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Plas,

 

Concerning #5.

 

In our modern-physics picture of the world, we work to discover how the classical macroscopic objects and phenomena emerge from the elementary forms of matter and energy composing them, and with this we work at how quantum-mechanics principles yield classical principles of mechanics that we use every day, use explicitly or use implicitly in our skills. The dynamical equations for quantum mechanics were of course gotten to in part by correspondences between the way various fundamental physical quantities are mathematically represented in quantum mechanics and the different sort of way those same physical quantities are mathematically represented in classical mechanics (including notably Lagrangian and Hamiltonian classical mechanics). That is the famous Correspondence Principle of Bohr. But through the decades, the physicists have worked for ever more detail in the way the quantum regime gives rise to the classical regime. With some success.

 

The order of the genesis of our knowledge runs form the world we can experience with our natural sensory instruments. But material and efficient causality can run in the opposite way. I don’t see a conflict with the Objectivist idea of epistemological reduction here. We can extend our natural instrumentation with artificial instrumentation, partly with the help of understanding causal relations in the world we cannot experience directly with our natural instruments. All of the physics can hang together, and all of our knowledge of things remote from our direct sensing can be traced to our knowledge of things we sense directly.

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SL said:

Please explain. Recall sometimes "extrapolation" or analysis of logical implications from certain premises can be to various degrees incorrect, due perhaps to relying upon other additional premises unstated or subconscious etc.

In this particular instance we need to look at the principles and their implications not who said what in the past. I ask you to indulge in this kind of exercise Plasmatic.

Don't worry, I don't have a problem with appeals to authority. I have thought on this for a long time and i know you are sincere. I consider the description above to be the exact problem in the opposite direction for those struggling to integrate previously learned premises with Objectivism. We have discussed this very issue when you first came here. I will find those discussions for context before I explain. It is a strain because I have put off several other responses for need of being productive elsewhere.

But briefly, it is not even an Objectivist idiosyncrasy that the epistemology behind the postulation of theoretical entities involves a criteria for meaning and justification to be laid out. Whats more it is not even exclusive to Oist that physicist who are educated on what their science pressuposes have pointed out that the hypothetical imperceptibles must correspond to a general theory of meaning. Hertz, for example criticized theories of force that didn't use concepts that "meant the same thing" as the context we derived the attribution from in the first place. The issue I'm pointing at is related to context dropping and its deployment in the Philosophy of Science to account for "Conceptual Change" as well.

I can name the principles that I am calling on to found my position and they don't require "modifications" to Objectivist view of the science of metaphysics and epistemology. The most relevant here is that Philosophy is the foundation for the special science and a top down approach to meaning is invalid. No exceptions.

Incidentally anyone who doesn't know what is meant here about the epistemology of theoretical entities who is criticizing Objectivist for rejecting special science encroachments has homework to do. In philosophy of physics texts you will find such topics as "The epistemology of geometry" etc.

There is no special pass for concepts in the special science that do not pertain to and derive from the foundational science of epistemology.

Edited by Plasmatic
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Txs to each poster for your time and knowledge.  I posed this question, over the last several years, on several general philosophy and physics website.  This time I was given information that motivates me to study this issue.  I will go to the forum archives and read the threads from the past that you referred to.  Txs.

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I'm carrying over my position from the other post to this one.

 

An electron could be an entity having particle-like attributes in certain situations and wave-like attributes in other situations and links between the two, such as we learn from quantum mechanics.

 

My position is that when we formulate our description of an electron as a "particle" we do so by subjecting it to certain particle-type tests.  And the particle-likeness is implicit in the mathematics/units used in these tests. The same (if opposite) is true for when we subject an electron to tests for "wave-likeness".  This also happens at the macro level.  There is no quantum boundary.

 

My view is that this way of testing corresponds to Rand's "Measurement Omission" idea when applied to scientific/engineering models.

 

My understanding of the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM is that it is trying (unsuccessfully) to carve out an "observer independent" model of atomic particles.  This approach appears very Kantian at it's roots.  That is, trying to define "a thing in itself" not influenced by an observer (whether instrumental or human).

 

I recently came across this QM Relational Interp

 

Boyd, what is your view on this?  I admit that my background is architecture/engineering so I'll try to not overreach.

Edited by New Buddha
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Budd, you might like to check out my post on some very recent new tests pertaining to wave-particle duality.

 

Measurment-omission is something we do with higher-order consciousness, one able to conceive of things in terms of shared dimensions and set membership of items having those dimensions and having various (or the same) measure degrees along these dimensions (which are understood to come in various magnitudes). Talk about set membership and about measure values and their omission are talk about abstractions that are realized concretely only in whatever brain processes we use in supporting such thought. Dimensions and multiple items having them and magnitude relations along dimensions are all things that exist concretely in the world, not just in the concrete brain processes by which we think about those concretes. Not so with such things as set membership and measure values and omissions; they are themselves not concretes in the world (outside brain processes), even though they are effective ways of thinking about and remaking the concrete world.

 

The experimental setups for observing particle-like aspects of an electron are all purely physical. They are wholly concrete. Likewise for observing wave-like aspects of an electron. Not only do the results come only as concretes, they come independently of any consciousness, independently of even the consciousness that is sensory perception. The results of an experiment can be recorded by a camera, say, and they are there on the film, whether or not any consciousness ever view the film.

 

In a quick look at your link on the relational interpretation of QM, I would say it could be on to a good way, or perhaps on to the best way, provided that talk about observation and relations of object to observer in quantum phenomena are understood to be talk about only physical process in the world having no dependency on the presence of consciousness in the physical process we are calling observation in quantum theory and in this (or any) interpretation of quantum mechanics. Likewise, with the frames in special relativity and talk about observers attached to frames, to which the article makes reference. Those too are purely physical. We have intimate experience of such frames because our living body is always such a material frame. (Sorry about the run-on sentence, but I gotta rush.)

 

Things as they are in themselves are things that can be discovered by our rational minds, discovered as exactly that way things are in themselves. Kant was right not to want to jettison the concept of things in themselves as underlying things in the various forms with which we perceive and conceive them. His error was in creating a divide in which all basic form one knows about, some of which one would have thought belongs to the world as it is in itself, comes from our conscious (unconscious) minds; and things in themselves have whatever forms they have, but these are entirely unknown and unknowable to us. His arguments for such a divide fail.

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I understand that "Observer" in QM is not equated with "consciousness" per se, and that it can be film, a Geiger counter, retinas, etc.  This brings to mind what I've been thinking about lately:  For an Observer to gain information about something other than itself (ie and Object) there are, at minimum, three (3) necessary ingredients.

 

1) An Observer.

2) Some thing, an Object, to observe (a car, a tree, star, a cat, etc.).

3) A medium in which information is carried between the Object and the Observer.

 

When I look out my living room window at my car parked out front, I don't "see" my car per se:  I see the photons that have been absorbed and readmitted by my car.  The photons are the medium in which information about my car are carried to me.  If it were night time, I would received less, or at least different, information about my car than during day light hours.  When I sit in front of my speakers listening to music, I don't "hear" my speakers, per se: I hear the sound waves of the intervening medium (air) between the speaker and my ears.  If I were in a vacuum, or a helium filled room, the information conveyed, to me, the Observer, would be altered from that of normal air.

 

This is the central dilemma of QM (imho).  How do we observe (or at least mathematically formulate) the "medium" itself with out an intervening "medium"?

 

When a photon is emitted into a double slit experiment, it convey's information about the element from which it was emitted.  By this, I mean that the photons emitted from a fluorescent light fixture, an LED light fixture, an incandescent fixture, a ruby laser - or the sun for that matter - are distinctly different.  But without a spectroscope, how would we be able to determine the nature of the source?

 

The desire to apprehend "things in themselves" independent of an intervening medium - whether photons or eyes - is implicit in some, if not many, interpretations of QM and stems directly from the Kantian noumena/phenomena dialectic.

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"The desire to apprehend "things in themselves" independent of an intervening medium" was exactly what Kant repudiated and why he came up with this distinction in the first place. The Kantian premises in the quantum mechanics of Bohr and Heisenberg is the very opposite of what you're saying.

Edited by Plasmatic
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"The desire to apprehend "things in themselves" independent of an intervening medium" was exactly what Kant repudiated and why he came up with this distinction in the first place. The Kantian premises in the quantum mechanics of Bohr and Heisenberg is the very opposite of what you're saying.

Kant posits the existence of a priori knowledge (theoretic knowledge, independent of experience) as the means of overcoming the supposed "limitations" of knowledge gained through experience (a posteriori knowledge).  Man, according to Kant arrives at "truth" (albeit subjective truth) through dialectic reasoning between the two types of knowledge.  He saw the (supposed) gap between Object and Observer (as proposed by Hume) as only ever subjectively bridgeable -- and therefore knowledge is always to remain uncertain.

 

This is what Rand means in her critique of Kant's preposterous notion that  "because I have eyes, I am blind" , and she repudiates Kant's idea that man must rely on any form of a priori knowledge that somehow "mystically" comes to exist in the mind independent of experience.  She repudiates the existence of a priori knowledge (as I'm sure you do too) or that any type dialectic reasoning between Object and Observer is necessary.  We gain objective knowledge through the evidence of the senses.

 

The parallels behind some interpretations of QM is that some physicists are perplexed that they have to actually physically interact with particles to know their state (frequency, location, spin, etc.).  They believe that, independent of an observer (instrumental measurement), it should be possible to construct first principle models, based on a priori reasoning and know these states beforehand.  In my mind, this is analogous to being perplexed that, in order to listen to a radio broadcast, you need a radio.

 

The link above to Relational QM Interpretation, offers a more objective interpretation of QM.

 

Add edit.  As I've posted before, my interest lately has been the nature of scientific/engineering models and how Objectivism mighty apply.  Are models constructed from First Principles and inform us of experience? I say no.  I say that models are abstracted experience.

Edited by New Buddha
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Buddha said:

Kant posits the existence of a priori knowledge (theoretic knowledge, independent of experience) as the means of overcoming the supposed "limitations" of knowledge gained through experience (a posteriori knowledge). Man, according to Kant arrives at "truth" (albeit subjective truth) through dialectic reasoning between the two types of knowledge. He saw the (supposed) gap between Object and Observer (as proposed by Hume) as only ever subjectively bridgeable -- and therefore knowledge is always to remain uncertain.

This is what Rand means in her critique of Kant's preposterous notion that "because I have eyes, I am blind" , and she repudiates Kant's idea that man must rely on any form of a priori knowledge that somehow "mystically" comes to exist in the mind independent of experience. She repudiates the existence of a priori knowledge (as I'm sure you do too) or that any type dialectic reasoning between Object and Observer is necessary. We gain objective knowledge through the evidence of the senses.

But all of those things are not what "The desire to apprehend "things in themselves" independent of an intervening medium" constitutes. Kant's whole construction of the Apriori was because knowledge of the object was mediated. It is exactly the fact of mediation that gave rise to everything else your talking about. The Copenhagen interpretation is adopting the fact that consciousness is mediated as the cause of the state measured. Bohr's Kantian skepticism follows the fact that perception is mediated. It is the measurements themselves that cause the actual state measured.

Also Kant himself did not see the categories as mystical to my knowledge.

Edit: I realize that here you are trying to point out that the categories themselves are a type of unmediated knowledge.

Edited by Plasmatic
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From Post #16

 

I'm not sure I agree with your interpretation of Kant.

 

In my mind, Kant inhabited a Universe not much different than the Universe of the Medieval Scholastic's in which they could believe that the Universe was 4,264 years, 23 days and 11 hours old, and that every species of plant and animal that now exists, has always existed and will always exist.  That matter was composed of divine substance and accident, and that everything began and ended with the will of God.  Since  Newton was able to reduce all of Celestial Mechanics into a few, simple and elegant statements, Kant (troubled by Hume's skepticism) felt justified in stating that "a priori" truths are valid truths, and that, like Newton's, a few a priori truth lie at the heart of the Universe and could explain all things.

 

When German Idealism talks about "a thing in itself", they are not saying something to the effect that, "When I look away from the moon, it continues to exist."  Idealism is more like this:  Knowledge of a "Tree" is a priori, knowledge of an elm tree, oak tree, willow tree, etc. is a posteriori.  To German Idealist (very much influenced by Religion) a "tree" is an ontological classification, and trees have always existed and will always continue to exist (do to the will of God).  The a priori/a posteriori was a pseudo-moderation of Platonic thought.  Objectivism regards genus/species classification as epistemological and that it is derived from concept formation via evidence of the senses.  The fact that trees did not exist 3 billion years ago, and probably won't exist 3 billion hence, poses no problem.  The fact that mountains decay, buildings collapse, people die, new species evolve, etc., is also not a problem.

 

It was Darwin and other scientists of the 1850, etc. that began to see the cracks in the "Newtonian" clockwork Universe.

 

Gotta go for a run before it gets to stinking hot.....  I don't have air conditioning and I'm sweating.....  90+ here in Portland today.

Edited by New Buddha
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Buddha said:

When German Idealism talks about "a thing in itself", they are not saying something to the effect that, "When I look away from the moon, it continues to exist."

That is a similar error discussed recently here http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=13204&page=3&hl=realist#entry335120

in a discussion with Louie and Boydstun. Kant was a realist about the "things in themselves"

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While searching for "a thing in itself", this result captured a rather succinct statement on the matter.

the intellectual conception of a thing as it is in itself, not as it is known through perception

 

To arrive at an intellectual conception of a thing as it is in itself, not as it is known through perception, is, by definition, a sense-less approach.

Is this essentially what Kant is trying to bury underneath all his verbiage? If so, it is senseless as well.

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The interesting debate that occurs in the last 4 or 5 posts is settled in the study and understanding of the first 3 chapters of Ms. Rand's IOE.  My years of posting on philosophy websites has caused me to conclude that participation should require a test - all posters should be able to prove that they understand (not agree with) the nature of concept formation in epistemology as described by Ms. Rand in the IOE.

 

There is very little we can debate with any value for anyone, unless the participants understand abstraction - and the mathematical metaphor for the basis of concept formation developed by Ms. Rand in IOE.

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After plugging "metaphor" into the Objectivism Research CD, Miss Rand even comments on "a thing in itself", or more specifically, using "reality in itself" in the ITOE appendix Measurement, Unit, and Mathematics <ITOE2, pg. 194>

Everything that we discuss, everything, is done from the human viewpoint and has to be, because there is no such thing as "reality in itself." That is one of the concepts of Kant's that we have to be very careful of. If we were omniscient like God, we would still have to perceive reality by our God-like means of perception, and we would have to speak of exactitude from that viewpoint. But "things in themselves"—as separated from consciousness and yet discussed in terms of a consciousness—is an invalid equivocation. That would be my widest metaphysical answer to any construct à la Kant and Bergson.

 

One mathematical metaphor she uses is conceptual awareness is the algebra of cognition. The process of reducing concepts back to their basis in perception would be akin to checking the math.

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Greg said:

While searching for "a thing in itself", this result captured a rather succinct statement on the matter.

the intellectual conception of a thing as it is in itself, not as it is known through perception

To arrive at an intellectual conception of a thing as it is in itself, not as it is known through perception, is, by definition, a sense-less approach.

Is this essentially what Kant is trying to bury underneath all his verbiage? If so, it is senseless as well.

Note that the statement you are quoting is about how an unnamed party relates a statement about how that party conceives of the process of knowing of a so called "thing in itself". That is not synonymous with what it means to believe that Kant said about "things in themselves", that they are ontologically real-mind independent.

One does not commit themselves to such a nonsensical view as Kants formulation of the apriori categories by affirming ontological realism.

Greg said:

After plugging "metaphor" into the Objectivism Research CD, Miss Rand even comments on "a thing in itself", or more specifically, using "reality in itself" in the ITOE appendix Measurement, Unit, and Mathematics <ITOE2, pg. 194>

Everything that we discuss, everything, is done from the human viewpoint and has to be, because there is no such thing as "reality in itself." That is one of the concepts of Kant's that we have to be very careful of. If we were omniscient like God, we would still have to perceive reality by our God-like means of perception, and we would have to speak of exactitude from that viewpoint. But "things in themselves"—as separated from consciousness and yet discussed in terms of a consciousness—is an invalid equivocation. That would be my widest metaphysical answer to any construct à la Kant and Bergson.

One mathematical metaphor she uses is conceptual awareness is the algebra of cognition. The process of reducing concepts back to their basis in perception would be akin to checking the math.

I don't know exactly why you are quoting these things but to be clear I have said nothing that repudiates what Mrs Rand says here. If you think so It would be useful for you to point out what statements stimulates your thinking so that I can respond directly to them.

Edit:

Remember also that the above does not contradict the statement Ms. Rand made in ITOE regarding form and object:

Now, you can distinguish that which in the object from the form in which you perceive that quality

An important nuance.

Edited by Plasmatic
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Jack said:

The interesting debate that occurs in the last 4 or 5 posts is settled in the study and understanding of the first 3 chapters of Ms. Rand's IOE. My years of posting on philosophy websites has caused me to conclude that participation should require a test - all posters should be able to prove that they understand (not agree with) the nature of concept formation in epistemology as described by Ms. Rand in the IOE.

There is very little we can debate with any value for anyone, unless the participants understand abstraction - and the mathematical metaphor for the basis of concept formation developed by Ms. Rand in IOE.

While I agree with your conclusion that understanding of concept formation is essential to any philosophical discussion I don't see why you are relating that to the posts you are referring to. The exchange between Buddha and I on Kant is about Kants personal philosophy and whether one claim about it is accurate. Unless you are referring to Buddhas claim about measurement omission being similar to the claims he made about models. Would you clarify how you think the discussion on the actual position Kant held and its influence on QM is answered in the first 3 chapters of ITOE?

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I don't know exactly why you are quoting these things but to be clear I have said nothing that repudiates what Mrs Rand says here. If you think so It would be useful for you to point out what statements stimulates your thinking so that I can respond directly to them.

The first one is trying to figure out what it is that Kant means by it. The source selected was because it resonated with my essential take on the matter.

 

The second was after looking up metaphor, after Jack's post. I've read this before, and perhaps that is why the definition resonated with me.

Of what has been discussed so far, is what you are getting at with delving into "a thing in itself"?

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Greg said:

The second was after looking up metaphor, after Jack's post. I've read this before, and perhaps that is why the definition resonated with me.

Of what has been discussed so far, is what you are getting at with delving into "a thing in itself"?

I don't understand what you are saying-asking here.

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