Defense Is Simply The Stronger Form Of War?

[Al Kufr]

Germany’s Blunder

By William S. Lind

If there is one point on which all of America’s leaders, civilian and military, seem to agree, it is that the United States must remain on the offensive in the misnamed “War on Terrorism.” The offensive is the only form of war that offers hope for a decisive victory.

Clausewitz would disagree. In his On War, Clausewitz writes, “defense is simply the stronger form of war, the one that makes the enemy’s defeat more certain…We maintain unequivocally that the form of war that we call defense not only offers greater probability of victory than attack, but its victories can attain the same proportions and results.”

If the U.S. were to take Clausewitz’s advice, what might a defensive grand strategy look like? I answer that question in detail in the November 22 issue of Pat Buchanan’s magazine, The American Conservative. Here, I can only summarize. But the key to the answer is Colonel John Boyd’s definition of grand strategy. Grand strategy, Boyd said, is the art of connecting yourself to as many other independent power centers as possible, while isolating your enemy from as many independent power centers as possible.

What does that definition mean for America in a 21st century that will be dominated by Fourth Generation, non-state war? As I write in TAC, “it means America’s grand strategy should seek to connect our country with as many centers of order as possible while isolating us from as many centers and sources of disorder as possible.” That, in turn, leads toward a defensive, not offensive, military strategy.

In the main, connecting ourselves to other centers of order will mean maintaining friendly relations with other states, wherever the state endures. Surviving states (their number will decline as the century extends) will be centers of relative order. So may other cultures that tend toward order; here, Chinese culture comes first to mind. China, if it can hold together internally, may be the single greatest center of order in the 21st century.

For the Establishment, the hard part will be accepting the need to isolate ourselves from centers and sources of disorder. Centers of disorder will be the growing number of failed states. Sources of disorder will certainly include Islam, thanks to the concept of jihad, even if some Islamic societies are ordered internally. Isolation, I write in TAC, “will mean minimizing contacts that involve flows of people, money, materials and new primary loyalties, such as religions ideologies, into the United States.” First and foremost, that requires ending the current de facto policy of open immigration. In a Fourth Generation world, open immigration is akin to leaving the castle gate open at night when the Huns are in the neighborhood.

How does a grand strategy based on Boyd’s concepts of connection and isolation lead to a defensive military strategy? As we have seen in Iraq, if we attack another state, the most likely result will be the destruction of that state and its replacement by a region of stateless disorder. This works for, not against, our Fourth Generation opponents. If an American offensive punches into a stateless region, it works directly contrary to our goal of isolation from disorder. There is no better way to enmesh yourself in disorder than to invade it (the French are now learning that unpleasant lesson, again, in Ivory Coast). A defensive strategy, in contrast, leaves regions of disorder to stew in their own juice. In some cases, it may achieve another of Colonel Boyd’s favorite aims, folding the enemy back on himself so that he expends his energies inward, not outward against us.

As Clausewitz also argues, a defensive strategy must include a powerful counter-offensive. When Fourth Generation opponents attack us at home, as on 9/11, our response should be Roman, which is to say annihilating. But the defensive sends a strong message on the moral level of war: if you leave us alone, we will leave you alone. Fourth Generation enemies may find it difficult to motivate their people to attack us if we keep our side of that bargain.

In contrast, so long as we continue on the military and grand strategic offensive, we will be making Germany’s blunder in both World Wars. We will appear so threatening to everyone else, states and non-state elements alike, that every victory we win will generate more enemies until, fighting a hydra, we go down in defeat. Washington needs a Bismarck, but in the camp of the neo-cons, all it can find are many Holsteins

Im not sure what to think of this strategy, this kinda sounds like what Peikoff wanted us to do against Iran when 9/11 first happend, annihilate Iran. And the rest of the "defencive policy" says is to connect as much to the rest of the world as we can, for example with free trade and that also sounds like what our policy should be anyways.

[Oakes]

This is the same basic argument made by the predominantly-Catholic paleoconservatives, which isn't surprising since Lind mentioned Pat Buchanan. The argument of going on the defensive basically winds down to the belief that involvement in the middle east is futile, and will only make people angrier. It is interesting because paleocons have a pretty rational immigration idea, which I made a thread on, but many of them think it is the be-all and end-all solution to terrorism. Paleocons, then, assert not only that intervention in the middle east is bound to fail, but also that we don't need to, because ending islamic immigration will solve the problem. They are isolationists, meaning they want complete non-intervention unless directly attacked (in such cases, we can be "Roman").

Now, I've been pretty harsh on Lind in the past because this whole position seems very defeatist and appeasing to me, but after reading this article I see that Lind makes some valid points and perhaps he deserves more consideration. After all, the primary goal is success, and although Objectivists have aptly pointed out that military intervention would be completely moral, that says nothing about how effective it will be from a 4GW standpoint. The two main issues are effectiveness and necessity:

1. Is an offensive, pre-emptive strategy effective?

2. Is it necessary, or can a defensive strategy sufficiently fight terrorism?

My current answer remains in opposition of Lind: (1) Yes, and (2) yes, it is necessary. Both for the same reason: Although they use our interventions and support of Israel to recruit, their main goal is still a Global Islamic State, meaning the problem won't go away as long as the Great Satin of this-wordly materialism, America, exists. It doesn't matter what we do. That hellhole will churn out more anti-American suicide bombers the longer we let them.

[Al Kufr]

The argument of going on the defensive basically winds down to the belief that involvement in the middle east is futile, and will only make people angrier.

Yeah thats the issue i have a problem with,i think Chet Richards put it best when he said.

"The problem with military force, per se, is that there are few cases short of genocide where an established insurgency was defeated by conventional military force. "

Objectivists have aptly pointed out that military intervention would be completely moral, that says nothing about how effective it will be from a 4GW standpoint.

Yes! exactly, so what is the solution, do we just annihilate the entire popuation? and if we do, wont that isolate us from the rest of the world?

Or do we try to change them?

By the way i suggest you read this review og the "The Pentagon’s New Map" reviewd by Chet Richards (John Boyd acolyte).

http://www.d-n-i.net/dni_reviews/pentagon_map.htm

[Oakes]

After much thinking, I've finally pinpointed the problem. Even though I easily accepted the physical and mental levels of war, I couldn't understand the moral level. It's because the moral level leaves the arena of military strategy, and enters the arena of philosophy. In essence, it says that the world, including our own country, is full of altruist mentalities that will be enraged at our aggressive war, and will work to undermine it. The 4GW guys bring up the example of Vietnam, where ultimately U.S. citizens themselves brought the war to an end. The problem with this is that it accepts today's altruist society as a given. I think this is wrong. All Objectivists should uphold the moral ideal of war, rather than water it down to accomodate the current state of society.

Therefore, I will continue to promote Boyd's ideas on military strategy, including maneuver warfare and the importance of ideas, but will leave the philosophy to Ayn Rand.

By the way i suggest you read this review og the "The Pentagon’s New Map" reviewd by Chet Richards (John Boyd acolyte).

I'm glad you linked me to this, because I've been wondering what the ones at d-n-i thought of Barnett. I'm surprised Richards wasn't harsher, considering the fact that the Grand Strategy says nothing about openly invading nations and replacing their governments -- that would, after all, upset world opinion

One surprising part of Richards' review was at the bottom under "recommendations":

The tone can turn priggish and sometimes even arrogant. “I see the future worth creating and I choose to embrace it.” he announces at one point. Osama bin Laden could make the same statement—such moral certitude makes it difficult for the rest of the Core to trust that we will use our power wisely, an essential condition for success as Barnett notes many times.

Why does Richards show such resentment for moral certitude? Why would he label the confidence in the superiority of capitalism as "arrogant"? The battle lines have been drawn, and he sides with subjectivism.

[Al Kufr]

Therefore, I will continue to promote Boyd's ideas on military strategy, including maneuver warfare and the importance of ideas, but will leave the philosophy to Ayn Rand.

Me too, but how are we going to handle the issue of fightingthe war on terrorism if the right way to fight it wont be supported by americans? How can we convince americans of fighting the war morally withought being called "american nazis".

Thats why Peikoff was right, we should have annihilated Iran right after 9/11 becuase right now it would neverr be supported.

Why does Richards show such resentment for moral certitude? Why would he label the confidence in the superiority of capitalism as "arrogant"? The battle lines have been drawn, and he sides with subjectivism.

Remember, Lind and Richards are "realists" i.e. pragmatist, so you figure it out.

But its hypocritical becuase when you hear them talk about how virtues John Boyd was (and he was) they dont attack him for his moral certitude when he was going up against the defence establishment.

He never compromised, and you could hardly say that Boyd followed his own advise when he said, "Grand strategy, Boyd said, is the art of connecting yourself to as many other independent power centers as possible, while isolating your enemy from as many independent power centers as possible." When he went up against the defence establishment he made TONS OF ENEMYS becuase he wouldnt compromise!! so he disconnected himself from many power centers.

How Boyd Beat the Generals

http://www.defense-and-society.org/fcs/comments/c455.htm

And Oakes, does Barnett say that we should try to connect with the middle east? for example start trading with them? or what exactly does he say on that point?

Or how exactly do we perturb "the Gap"?

[Inspector]

After much thinking, I've finally pinpointed the problem.

Yes, you certainly have. I've been on that page, myself. I, however, am wary of trusting a pragmatist with military policy, not just with philosophy.

But, on a purely strategy level, I am surprised and concerned to see him call "defense" the stronger form of war, since that has been blatantly false since the dawn of time. The stronger form of war is, of course, one in which your side has THE INITIATIVE.

That being, specifically, the ability to decide when and how to fight the enemy. Although this can be done with specific forms of defense, it is historically the attacker who has had this ability. Even trench warfare would have given the advantage to an attacker, had the attackers been a lot more clever and a lot less gung-ho about it.

Now of course, the initiative is what Boyd wants us to have, but for him to say "defense is stronger" is not something I'll just let pass.

[Oakes]

Me too, but how are we going to handle the issue of fightingthe war on terrorism if the right way to fight it wont be supported by americans? How can we convince americans of fighting the war morally withought being called "american nazis".

Very good question. I think a similar question would be: How could an Objectivist ever win an election? The answer to both is: a cultural change must precede a political change. I'm not going to modify my views according to the current state of the electorate. That might win me an election in the short run, but it will hurt me in the long run. That, after all, is the essence of pragmatism.

In the same vain, I'm not going to modify my foreign policy according to how public opinion will take it. I am fully aware that fighting a truly moral war would result in a Vietnam-like backlash with the American public, but that won't change if I don't get the message out.

Remember, Lind and Richards are "realists" i.e. pragmatist, so you figure it out.

But its hypocritical becuase when you hear them talk about how virtues John Boyd was (and he was) they dont attack him for his moral certitude when he was going up against the defence establishment.

He never compromised, and you could hardly say that Boyd followed his own advise when he said, "Grand strategy, Boyd said, is the art of connecting yourself to as many other independent power centers as possible, while isolating your enemy from as many independent power centers as possible." When he went up against the defence establishment he made TONS OF ENEMYS becuase he wouldnt compromise!! so he disconnected himself from many power centers.

You're not kidding! The article you linked to really hammers that point home:

Boyd even advised Schlesinger and (through him) Secretary of State Henry Kissinger about the true capabilities of the Soviet Backfire bomber, allowing for a more realistic threat analysis during delicate SALT arms negotiations. ("The Backfire," Boyd appraised, "is a piece of s***, a glorified F-111.")

I haven't studied Boyd enough to know whether it's just his followers that are misrepresenting him, or whether it was Boyd himself who was hypocritical, but I do know that all the good from Boyd's ideas will never be fully realized without Objectivism.

And Oakes, does Barnett say that we should try to connect with the middle east? for example start trading with them? or what exactly does he say on that point?

Or how exactly do we perturb "the Gap"?

Yes, Barnett believes that we need to connect the Gap to the Core by invading its nations, replacing their governments with ones that will secure freedom, then letting the private sector do the rest. As long as you have stable, accountable governments providing security and freedom, you will inevitably see a huge influx of western franchises and western ideas flowing into the middle east.

[AisA]

Me too, but how are we going to handle the issue of fightingthe war on terrorism if the right way to fight it wont be supported by americans? How can we convince americans of fighting the war morally withought being called "american nazis".

Thats why Peikoff was right, we should have annihilated Iran right after 9/11 becuase right now it would neverr be supported.

I, too, wish we had acted sooner. But I don't think it is too late to act now. I believe a solid majority of Americans will support an all-out war against Iran, if we present the case for war properly, and if we conduct the war properly.

For example:

President Bush could go on national TV and show the videos of Iranian mobs chanting repeatedly "Death to America" while the Iranian leaders urge them on. He should show the videos of the Iranians displaying their long-range missiles and discussing their nuclear strategy. He could then state that in principle America will not accept the existence of a regime whose official policy calls for our destruction, particularly when that regime is building long-range missiles and nuclear weapons.

He should anticipate all the objections to such a war and answer them up-front. He should state that we cannot dismiss a call for our destruction as a mere difference in culture or opinion. He can say that we are prepared to suffer significant military casualties on our part and inflict massive casualties -- military and civilian -- on the Iranians -- if this is what is required to eliminate a regime that is openly bent on our destruction.

He should state that we will not wait for UN sanctions, arms inspectors or negotiators of any sort. Nor will the howling of the world or the disapproval of the media deter us. Saving America is worth any price and any effort and needs no one's approval.

Therefore, at the time and in the manner of our choosing, acting totally alone if necessary, we will eliminate this threat.

I believe a majority of the American people would support this approach. Americans in vast numbers are sick to death of being blamed for the entire world’s problems and being branded as Nazis and dictators. They are hungry for a proper defense of America, if we could just find someone to lead it. Is Bush that man? I don’t know.

[Al Kufr]

Very good question. I think a similar question would be: How could an Objectivist ever win an election? The answer to both is: a cultural change must precede a political change. I'm not going to modify my views according to the current state of the electorate. That might win me an election in the short run, but it will hurt me in the long run. That, after all, is the essence of pragmatism.

In the same vain, I'm not going to modify my foreign policy according to how public opinion will take it. I am fully aware that fighting a truly moral war would result in a Vietnam-like backlash with the American public, but that won't change if I don't get the message out.

Yes, and annother question ive been thinking about is, how would an objectivist Art of War look like? Who is better qualified on figuring out how to destroy another human being in war than an objectivist since we know what a human needs for survival, to KNOW reality and to think. And thats one thing i Know Sun Tzu got right when he said "war is the art of deception", if you decive your enemy he wont know reality and he wont be able to adapt in order to survive.

But people in the military rever Sun Tzu and MUSASHI but ive never seen an objectivist critique of Sun Tzus 'The Art of War' or Musashis "Book of Five Rings" and i know they must have flaws in it becuase it is based on Taoist cosmology !!

For example to the Cheng/Ch'i game that Sun Tzu and Boyd talk about which is based on Ying and Yang duailty, how can we depend on something so mystical like Ying and Yang when it comes to warfare?

And even if this idea is correct, why does it work?

If you dont know what im talking about click here,

http://www.belisarius.com/modern_business_...ng_and_chi.html

I haven't studied Boyd enough to know whether it's just his followers that are misrepresenting him, or whether it was Boyd himself who was hypocritical, but I do know that all the good from Boyd's ideas will never be fully realized without Objectivism.

I dont think he was hypocritical, he realized that making alliences is important in war but when he was dealing with people at the government but he didnt want to compromise....I guess he had principles in his personal life but not in his foreing policy. The people at D-N-I dont like looking at things in "Black & White" terms. Just like Pat Buchanan is a christian but you never see him apply his christianity to his foreing policy, he could never do it consistently.

Anyways, Oakes heres how Chet Richards thinks we should reorganize our military to make it more effective,i really like how it looks:

http://www.d-n-i.net/richards/sword_4_boyd.pdf

[Oakes]

But, on a purely strategy level, I am surprised and concerned to see him call "defense" the stronger form of war, since that has been blatantly false since the dawn of time. The stronger form of war is, of course, one in which your side has THE INITIATIVE.

That being, specifically, the ability to decide when and how to fight the enemy. Although this can be done with specific forms of defense, it is historically the attacker who has had this ability. Even trench warfare would have given the advantage to an attacker, had the attackers been a lot more clever and a lot less gung-ho about it.

I certainly agree that attackers have the advantage on the mental level of war. However, it seems as if both the physical and moral levels favor defense. The physical level is characterized by giant, lumbering forces whacking each other until one of them gives in. To this end, large stone walls can be useful.

On the moral level, the justification for defense is that offensive action will incite anger in the hearts and minds of the locals, of the world, and of our own public, which will work against us. However, as I have argued, everything about Objectivist Politics assumes that a cultural change has already taken place. We don't stray from our principles to appeal to the mainstream, and nor should our foreign policy.

But people in the military rever Sun Tzu and MUSASHI but ive never seen an objectivist critique of Sun Tzus 'The Art of War' or Musashis "Book of Five Rings" and i know they must have flaws in it becuase it is based on Taoist cosmology !!

For example to the Cheng/Ch'i game that Sun Tzu and Boyd talk about which is based on Ying and Yang duailty, how can we depend on something so mystical like Ying and Yang when it comes to warfare?

I certainly would like to see the first true Objectivist military strategist, if there hasn't yet been one. As for the Ying/Yang deal, I think it's okay to use it to symbolically represent two aspects of something, even though historically it is rooted in mysticism.

Anyways, Oakes heres how Chet Richards thinks we should reorganize our military to make it more effective,i really like how it looks:

http://www.d-n-i.net/richards/sword_4_boyd.pdf

I looked through the slideshow and am liking the reorganization ideas. It's hard to analyze it because it seems built for presentation (not too many words), but it appears he wants to get rid of the traditional split between land (army & marines), sea (navy), and air (air force). Instead, he wants them separated like this:

Strike Force - 3GW/4GW (the Marines and the SpecOps: SF, Rangers, DELTA, SEALs, etc), littoral fire support, and aerial fire support (F-15, F-16, F-117, A-10, A/MC-130).

Mobility Force - Enhanced inter-theater lift systems (Carriers, attack subs, surface ships, and the jumbo planes: C-5A/B Galaxy and C-17 Globemaster).

Strategic Force - Strategic defense systems (missile subs, B-52, B-1, B-2, and the nukes: Minuteman and Peacekeeper).

I'm not sure where he wants to put the army, but maybe he just wants to turn them all into marines. After all, if you want to make the army 3GW, that includes making them seaborne and lightly armored for increased mobility -- both traits of the current USMC. You could also do what you've suggested in the past: Make the army a maneuver force, make the marines into special forces, and make the special forces into recon/intelligence.

Now, the Strike Force can be broken down further according to the type of enemy it is striking. I first heard about this system in this slideshow, which starts talking about it on slide 25. It first divides all our enemies into two groups: high-tech and low-tech. Then it divides those two groups each into two more: brutes (if they operate primarily physically) and seers (if they operate primarily mentally). Here is the final breakdown:

Low-Tech Brutes: African rebel groups, gangs, drug traffikers.

Low-tech Seers: Terrorists, religious fundamentalists.

High-Tech Seers: Hackers.

High-Tech Brutes: Kim Jong Il, Saddam Hussein, old-fashion enemies like Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany.

Then we analyze their strengths/weaknesses and split up the Strike Force according to deal with each of them. This site does it for us:

Vs. Low-Tech Brute: Paramilitary and clandestine/indigenous variants of our Special Forces to attack and destroy selected low tech brute forces on their home ground and without necessarily having the support of local host governments.

Vs. Low-Tech Seer: Foreign area experts, ideally with ethnic roots and intuitive understanding necessary to fully appreciate the nuances of religious and other forms of low tech ideology, and to develop global or precision ideological defense and attack campaigns.

Vs. High-Tech Seer: Computer security (defense) and computer attack specialists able, with the selective assistance of tactical and strategic communications specialists to penetrate, monitor, disrupt, deceive, and dominate any computer or any communications system for any length of time, ideally without being detected.

Vs. High-Tech Brute: Expeditionary and sea-based variants of our conventional forces, able to conduct precision raids and guide precision munitions in coordination with covertly-inserted Special Forces or indigenous clandestine assets.

There is one more thing I want to add. We've restructured the military into three forces, the first one (Strike Force) being split into four further components, but there's also Tom Barnett's idea. He suggests that when fighting Gap countries, we need both a Leviathan force for the initial takeover, and a Sys Admin force that specializes with the peacekeeping, which will stick around to guide the new government to one that will respect freedom. I think that idea could also be integrated into this whole scheme, as big as it already is. What do you think?

[Al Kufr]

There is one more thing I want to add. We've restructured the military into three forces, the first one (Strike Force) being split into four further components, but there's also Tom Barnett's idea. He suggests that when fighting Gap countries, we need both a Leviathan force for the initial takeover, and a Sys Admin force that specializes with the peacekeeping, which will stick around to guide the new government to one that will respect freedom. I think that idea could also be integrated into this whole scheme, as big as it already is. What do you think?

I think we should have both,conventinal forces for wars against states and groups that are against us, and Sys Adm forces for the wars we will have to use to build up the occupied society.

But i think we will have to make tribe by tribe, block by block distinctions on which force to use when we occupy a nation.

For example, fajullah we would use the leviathan forces becuase its fundamentally against us and its a lost cause so there is no chance of ever winning the hearts and minds of the people, not that we could. So only one thing left to do, DESTROY IT. But in the calmer places that are for us we should use the Sys Adm force to mop up the small groups of fighters just like normal police would catch gang members in a city.

You wouldnt treat the kurds and the sunnis the same way now would you?

[Inspector]

I certainly agree that attackers have the advantage on the mental level of war. However, it seems as if both the physical and moral levels favor defense. The physical level is characterized by giant, lumbering forces whacking each other until one of them gives in. To this end, large stone walls can be useful.

Historically, these types of things have occured infrequently. And stone walls just means that the attacker has to think about his attacks first. They by no means have ever been, by themselves, decisive in defense. Look into the Greeks around the time of Alexander the Great, and see who wanted to build stone walls, and what would have happened if he had...

[Oakes]

Historically, these types of things have occured infrequently. And stone walls just means that the attacker has to think about his attacks first. They by no means have ever been, by themselves, decisive in defense. Look into the Greeks around the time of Alexander the Great, and see who wanted to build stone walls, and what would have happened if he had...

Oh I certainly don't advocate walled fortresses, but if both sides are fighting by attrition, and neither exploits the mental level of war, the story is much different.

[Inspector]

Oh I certainly don't advocate walled fortresses, but if both sides are fighting by attrition, and neither exploits the mental level of war, the story is much different.

Well, of COURSE walls work if your opponent is mindless! But that hardly makes defense the stronger form of war! The reality is quite the opposite, in fact!

[Oakes]

Well, of COURSE walls work if your opponent is mindless! But that hardly makes defense the stronger form of war! The reality is quite the opposite, in fact!

That's because the reality is that the mental level is stronger than the physical level I'm glad we agree then.

[Inspector]

That's because the reality is that the mental level is stronger than the physical level I'm glad we agree then.

Okay, I guess so! I was not familiar with your terms "physical level of war" and "mental level of war."