secondhander

I'm a little bit confused, Eiuol, with your responses to me. In your last two responses you seem to be repeating the arguments I've made and affirming them as true and as thoughts you share, but then saying I've gotten things wrong somehow. It seems like you are misunderstanding my points, or taking sentences out of context of the surrounding argument, or perhaps I am not yet grasping the points you are arguing of where I've gotten things wrong. What I'm arguing about the nature of objective values and rights is, as far as I can tell, exactly the same thing Rand argues in "Man's Rights." Let me take your responses a line at a time and try to clarify my argument and make sense of yours. I addressed this in a response above, but in recap and clarification. I argue that the basis for moral value is the properly basic and a priori belief that life is better than non-life for a living being. From that objective truth, moral value is revealed, as are rights and the nature of rights. So it is not that rights exist first, logically, and define morality. It is that the objective truth that life is better than non-life is established first, logically, and from that moral value and rights follow. I'm not sure what you disagree with about my argument, that you can't truly have life if you don't have the freedom to possess your own life (it's really tautologous if you think about it). That's the same as what Rand argues: You said: Yes, exactly. And that's what I argued, and yet you seem to think I argued something different. I may misunderstand you here, but Rand's point was not that rights are a requirement for the existence of social contexts, what she said was that rights define a man's freedom to act in relation to other people "social contexts." You said: I argued the same thing. Another example of where we agree, but you seem to think we don't. Ok, I think this is the crux of where we really are not connecting and differ. Again, I think you've misread what Rand said about social contexts in that quote from Man's Rights. She does not say rights exist because they are a requirement to exist in social contexts (I don't believe). She says man's rights exist because they come from a right to exist. Her words: "The right to life is the source of all rights." Now, where does the right to life come from? They come from the objective truth that life is better than non-life, as I said. And this is exactly what Rand said, as well: You quote me as saying: "... your right to life exists because any act that takes life from you is objectively bad." And yes, that's true (I encourage you to reread the full context of what I said.) What I am saying here is that because we can establish that objective morals come from the objective truth that life is better than non-life, therefore it is objectively immoral to take away life from a life, or to take it away in part by enslaving a life. Therefore, the individual right to be free from death or enslavement is a right that naturally follows from that objective value. Rand says the same thing: But after you quote me, you say: No, that's not quite getting it, and not quite what I said. Again, I did not say a right to life exists because bad actions can be done to you. How would you know that those actions done to you are bad in the first place? No, a right to life exists a priori because life is better than non-life, and the destruction or enslavement of life is therefore objectively bad, therefore you have a right to not be destroyed or enslaved because it's an objectively bad thing to do. So it's not that bad actions done to you create rights ... it's that you can know the actions done to you are objectively bad or good by the same reason that you can know what your right is -- that life is better than non-life as an objective truth, and that the destruction of life in total or in part is objectively bad. A lot of the other things you said I agree with you, and you seem to be merely restating the positions I already affirmed. I ran out of time for this response, but I hope this clears up my position.

No, I'm saying the opposite. I'm saying that any violation of your right to life is an immoral act. That's the basis upon which you determine whether something is immoral or not. If I were to say what you claim I say, that an "immoral act done against you is a violation of rights," then I would need first to explain how I determined what the basis for morality is. That's why you must first recognize the objectively true value statement that life is better than non-life, and then having that moral foundation in place you can then recognize what rights are. Lying is bad because it is knowingly supplying untrue information that could negatively affect a person's life and decisions regarding the pursuit of a good life. And it is a contradiction to the objective law of logic of non-contradiction. To contradict reality is objectively wrong; to knowingly contradict reality is objectively immoral (unless there was an overriding moral cause to do so). You have "rights" objectively. Those rights exist regardless of your knowledge or acknowledgment of them. They exist even if someone violates them. In fact, that's why it can be said that rights can be violated, because they exist objectively even if someone wants to prevent you from utilizing those rights.

The answer seems simple to me, and is exactly what Rand argued. There is an objective right to life. It is objectively true that life is better than non-life when it comes to a conscious, living being. Therefore anything that destroys life, in total or in part, is objectively bad. Therefore, your right to life exists because any act that takes life from you is objectively bad. And you have a right to live your life freely the way you see fit because any act to enslave you or control you by the use of force is taking away your life, because integral to the definition of a person's life is the ability for that person to possess his own life, and enslavement takes away your ability to possess your own life. All rights flow from that one primary, objective moral value judgment that life is better than non-life (or said another way, existence is better than non-existence for a rational, thinking being).

Hi, Nicky. I didn't mean to go this long without replying, and I don't want to belabor a point or resurrect an disagreement that is past its time. But it's important to clarify where I believe you've misunderstood my position. My position is that while Rand lived most of her life consistently with her philosophy, when it comes to the Branden incident she did not, particularly in terms of how she viewed the ownership of another person in a relationship and how jealousy played a part in that. That's not an ad hominem. An ad hominem is when you attack someone's argument by highlighting an unrelated personal failing (real or imagined) of the person making the argument, and then try to say that the argument they are makign is somehow false or invalid. I'm not attacking her argument. In fact, I am saying her argument is true, but that she did not live up to it in an area of her life. The contradiction she makes in writing comes from her writing in her personal journal (although it was never meant to be published). Her stated philosophy in the works she did mean to be published however, is not contradictory. But even without her journal writing, the public knowledge of the way she handled the Branden incident, or at least what seems to be the case of what was reported, does seem to me to contradict her philosophy. My argument is that jealousy in a relationship is at odds with objectivism. That's because the underlying cause of jealousy is a subconscious belief that another person should be owned by you without regard to their free-will desire; Jealousy plays out in attempts to convince a person against their free will and personal desires to stay with you, because of your fear of loss. Once you fully embrace the truth that everyone owns themselves, and that you cannot demand emotion or command a contractual relationship from a person who is free to own themselves, then there is no place for jealousy. And that is precisely because love (as Rand rightly pointed out) can only exist in the free exchange between two (or more) free people. That not only means that you afford other people the freedom and space to choose you freely or to not choose you, but further that you would actually not want or desire them to stay with you if they didn't freely choose to do so without constraint and without a feeling of altruistic relationship obligation. You may still feel loss, but that's a different emotion than jealousy.

Why? The only reason why sex with someone has greater psychological consequences than tea is because of social convention, as influenced by evolutionary psychology (i.e., if the woman gets pregnant, can you be sure who the father really is if she has had casual sex with multiple partners, and if you can't, then no man will feel obligated to help spend resources on raising the child). But once you factor in modern technology, like birth control methods and safe sex practices or technology to limit STI transmission, then all you are left with are the psychological remnants of the perceived consequences, and thus only left with social conventions that are not based in rationality, but only the evolutionary psychological whispers of the past. If you can eliminate the possibility of pregnancy, and STI contraction, then the "psychological consequences" are ghosts and irrational fears. But as you say, this does venture into other territory, so I will start a new thread if I feel like carrying it further.

I don't believe I've committed ad hominem at all in my posts. Even if I were to personally attack Rand in an immature way (I haven't), that wouldn't be ad hominem. An ad hominem is when you say something like, "your argument is wrong, because you are stupid." I haven't done that at all, and I surely don't think Rand is stupid. Also, my contention is in fact that she hasn't lived up to her own views in a slight way, in terms of seemingly not allowing a former sexual/romantic interest of hers make his own decisions based on his own self-interest. When she fell victim to the emotion of jealousy, and it colored her response, she did not live up to her views. That's the very point I am making.

Yes. And this is where I think I disagree with Rand to some degree. She seemed to want to find an objectively rational reason for every action, and didn't allow any kind of subjective desire to be a reason for any action. I agree with her that subjective "whim worship" is a poor reason for actions when they contradict fundamental and objective standards, however I allow for there being some subjective desires that do not contradict other objective and fundamental desires. In those cases, doing something because you want to, simply for pleasure, is perfectly acceptable, as far as I can tell. I'd love to hear if I've misunderstood her on these points or the points below. Rand didn't seem to oppose pleasure: She just believed pleasure should not be standard of morality (I agree) or a guide to action (I disagree). Confusingly, she did say that pleasure was the ultimate goal. I'm unclear on how the purpose of morality is to teach you to enjoy yourself and live, and yet pleasure is not supposed to be a guide to action. It seems wrong to say that life is for surviving simply for the sake of surviving; instead, life is for surviving for the purpose of enjoying life, but you can only achieve that enjoyment if you pursue your enjoyment with the means of rationality. Rand seemed to believe that the concept of a "standard of morality" was the same as the concept of "a guide to action," and I think those are two different things. Sometimes, doing something for the pure enjoyment of it is fine, so long as it doesn't violate a rational standard of morality. So, if you are on a cruise ship, and decide to buy a frozen daiquiri just because you want to sip it under the sun on a deck chair for the pure enjoyment of it, then that is perfectly fine, because it is in no way violating a standard of morality. If you want to go eat lunch with a friend and spend time with them socially, for the pure enjoyment of it, there is nothing wrong with that as well. And by extension, if you want to have sex with someone, for the pure enjoyment of it, there is nothing wrong with that, so long as it does not violate the rational standard of morality, which is survival as a means to enjoy your own life.

I disagree with this point. The first type is the more dangerous of the two. Both are problems. The last type is more closely related to a problem of self-approval (although both types are really self-approval problems). The reason you would want to have the personality, or other traits, of the man is because you subconsciously are seeking approval from other people, and think that you can't get it with the traits you currently possess. You wish to have some other traits that you don't have, but the real problem is that you are seeking approval from other people to begin with. You can't solve this problem until you realize that there is only one person's approval that you should be concerned with -- your own. If you decide that you like who you are and what you believe in and your personal ethic, then you can also be empowered to grant self-approval, and free yourself from the self-made prison of seeking approval from outside sources. But overall, this is a less dangerous problem than the first type you mentioned. In the first type, a person actually believes that in some way they can own people, or that they want to own people. That they want to have a particular person for themselves, irrespective of that person's desires. This kind of thought-process is dangerously close to having a disregard for someone's right to own their own self, and their own emotions and desires, and it is blind to the fact that true love can't be an obligation kind of love. If you are unable to grant people the freedom to choose whom they spend time with or form relationships with, without being pained over their decisions, then that can lead to some very unpleasant and dangerous thought processes and actions on your part. Good luck resisting the temptation to respond.

I think the answer will come after you decide whether a convicted felon's punishment ends after released from incarceration, at which all rights are restored, or if there can be additional punishments that extend beyond incarceration.

The reason you want to reproduce is because it's built into your DNA, through evolution, to do it. There is no ethical or moral component to why you desire that. Just as there is no ethical or moral component to the law of gravity. Just because that ball you dropped from a third-story window went down because of the force of gravity, doesn't mean it ethically SHOULD go down. This is the famous "is/ought" problem, or "natural law fallacy" problem. People see an "is," and then they jump to an "ought." The desire you have to put your semen in a place closest to an ovulating egg is just reaction created by the fact that you come from a long line of people who have done that same thing, and therefore that desire is also written into your DNA code as well. Rand was a little off in the quote you posted, and slightly off (but only slightly) in general with her philosophy precisely because she didn't understand (no one did at that time) evolutionary psychology. I think her philosophy is only improved when adjusted for the fact of evolutionary psychology. She was correct in understanding that the only objective moral value is that to live is better than to not live, and therefore anything that destroys an individual's life is objectively morally wrong. And any other moral value is simply an offshoot of that primary moral value.

May aim is to talk about jealousy as an emotion, but I'm particularly looking at Rand's response over the Branden affair and arguing that, without realizing it perhaps, her reaction was in opposition to her own worldview concerning individual liberty and her belief about discarding deontological ethics. So a discussion of casual sex I think can be included in any discussion about jealousy, as well as a discussion about other viewpoints on various kinds of sex/relationship structures. With regard to deontological ethics, what I mean is that Rand argued that we should not be bound by what others tell us we "ought" to do, as though we are enslaved by some ethic of social oughtness, but instead we should seek our own rational self-interest. I agree with that. But in order to hold to that, we should also not try to push a social oughtness onto other people. Jealousy often leads to that in relationships. In Rand's case, she seemed to believe Branden had an obligation (deontological ethic) to be a relationship contract with her, regardless of his own desires or self-interest. She attacked his decisions on the grounds that he wasn't being rational in his choice of a particular romantic/sex interest. As though she knew which choice is rational for him better than he did. In truth, what she failed to see (because jealousy so often blinds us) was that she was reacting out of her hurt, jealous-tinged emotions. But to be consistent (and rational) when granting other people freedom to seek their own self-interest without trying to hold them to someone else's feeling of what they are obligated to do, then you must grant people the freedom to choose whom they are interested in, no matter what kind of relationship it is, be it casual friendship, romantic love, or sexual interest. Jealousy (defined as wanting what someone else has, or losing what you had to someone else) is irrational for a host of reasons. Primarily, it is irrational in terms of human relationships because it presupposes that a person is a thing that can be owned by another person. It assumes that with a person whom you want to keep for yourself, their self-interest and personal desire suddenly don't matter. It irrationally supposes that so-and-so should be with you irrespective if they desire to be or if it satisfies their self-interest. It irrationally supposes that a robotic love, devoid of desire, is sufficient ("I don't care if you want to or not, you have a relationship contract to stay with me, and you must keep yourself from relationships with other people who you do desire a relationship with, if I don't like the nature of that relationship."). Even if a person did stay with you out of a relationship contract obligation, is that what you really want? Is that love? No, love can ONLY exist, as Rand said herself, if it is in accordance with self-interest. Love does not exist in obligation. Rand was so clear on that, and yet with Branden she seemed to forget it, or not apply it consistently. She did. I'm not sure how you can read Man's Rights, or The Virtue of Selfishness, or any of her works really, and fail to see the conclusion that we fundamentally have a right to self-ownership. From Man's Rights:

Some of her statements show her inconsistencies on being able to understand what I said above: "that love can only really exist when it is freely given." In other words, if someone does not love you, then you cannot make them love you if they are to be truly free and have ownership of their own lives. So it is meaningless to be jealous, and meaningless to try to punish someone with vindication, or to demand someone share your views on the virtues (or lack of them) in another person. The entire issue simply is driven by jealousy, that should be clear. And if Rand were consistent on this issue, she would not have said and done some of the jealousy-laden things she has said and done. I'm speaking mostly of the Branden affair. Her journal entries, as quoted in The Passion of Ayn Rand’s Critics, show her jealousy. They show that the jealous way she handled Branden's attraction and relationship with another woman revealed that Rand was unclear how her philosophy should work in the area of love, sexual attraction, and relationships. She should have realized (and some of her writings do seem to show that on a certain level she did) that giving people the freedom to own themselves, instead of placing social moral obligations on them, also means allowing people to choose for themselves whom to associate with, have sex with, or have a relationship with (whatever the level of that relationship is). Instead, Rand didn't seem willing in her personal life and in her personal statements to grant Branden that freedom over his own life. Jealousy controlled her in that moment of her life, and jealousy is always a nasty emotion. In her journals she wrote of the prospect of ending her relationship with Branden: Rand assumes that the rational reasons for attraction must be something that she herself can see, and since she can't see the reasons for Branden's attraction to Patrecia, then he must not be operating objectively. Part of Rand's problem in this regard is that she believes the only objective virtues a person can rationally be attracted to are character qualities. And at that, she doesn't allow for the possibility that there are some character qualities someone might have that she is unable to see, or hasn't yet seen. But sometimes what we are attracted to sexually are not "character" qualities alone.Rand would have benefited in understanding more about evolutionary psychology, which has shown us that our sexual attraction often has "objectively" to do with procreation: Hip to waist ratio, reproductive potential, capability, genetic resistance to disease, social approval, etc. Because Rand is unaware of those kinds of evolutionary sexual attraction switches, she writes things like this: So part of Rand's problem is she is holding to a view that if sex is for the sake of pleasure itself, then is not rational; it is nothing more than some kind of whim worship. But all she's really doing is being limited on what is rational, or perhaps said a better way, her judgment on what constitutes rational virtues is incomplete. Would Rand say that having tea and conversation with some friends, for enjoyment purely, is irrational? My guess is that she would not. I bet she would say this: So I bet an evening of tea and conversation with friends, for pleasure, would be considered a "reality of a man's values," to Rand. Why would Rand feel differently about sex for pleasure's sake? Well, it's because she views it as "too important" for "promiscuity." Here Rand is not being rational. She is a woman of her time, with that statement. Sometimes enjoying time with people, whether it be for tea and conversation, or whether it be for sex ... and conversation, is completely rational, and a celebration of the reality of one's values. But why would Rand (and others in general) be sensitive and wary of casual sex? Not because of rationality, but because of social convention, and traditional relationship constructs. That was what fed Rand's jealousy regarding Branden, and that's what caused her to cling to traditional conventions regarding "casual sex" and "promiscuity," and it isn't rational.

If he had an unflawed specimen, then he would know that his thesis that "everyone is flawed" was incorrect, right?

*** Mod's note: Merged with an earlier topic. - sN *** I was reading a recent thread about the Branden/Rand affair and fallout. I didn't want to take the thread off topic. As brilliant as Rand is in so many areas, she was not consistent with her philosophy when it came to certain areas, particularly the areas of romantic love, sex and relationships. In short (and I can expand on my belief on this topic more later), jealousy is not a rational emotion. She betrayed her own philosophy of allowing others to pursue their rational self-interest, when she showed jealousy and anger over Branden choosing to spend time with someone beside her. It was as though she believed he had an obligation to her, regardless of his own true emotions. But to demand love from obligation, is not true love, as Rand herself wrote so clearly about numerous other times. jealousy in a relationship is based on the notion that you somehow have ownership of another person. It is a reluctance to allow a person to choose for themselves whom they love. It is the idea that a person should discard their self-interest in order to maintain a relationship obligation you believe they owe you. It is the failure to understand that you can't hold the heart captive, nor should you want to. It is the failure to understand that love can only really exist when it is freely given. Some of Rand's statements on sex and love show her inconsistencies on this issue. I'd be glad to hear your thoughts.

As brilliant as Rand was so many things, this is one of the issues where I think she was a woman of her time, and where she didn't consistently apply her philosophy in the realm of relationships. Rand argued that men should be free from the evil of altruistic obligations, and instead seek their rational self-interest. That's the only way that true love can take place. And yet, when Branden's own desires changed, and he found romantic and sexual interest in another, Rand wanted to hold him to some kind of obligation, instead of allowing him the freedom to pursue his own interests, whatever they may be. Instead of accepting that his interest may be in someone other than her, Rand (somewhat egoistically) argued that Patrecia had lesser qualities than her, and that it was irrational for Branden to be attracted Patrecia over her. Part of the problem for Rand, it seems to me, is that she didn't seem to allow any kind of seeming subjectivity of emotions and desires at all. (I would argue perhaps that our attraction to people isn't actually subjective, but is actually rooted in evolutionary psychological reasons that Rand didn't understand at the time, but I digress.) So, I love Rand's ideas, but not Rand herself as some sort of perfect icon. She had faults. And she wasn't consistent with her own philosophy when it came to this issue with Branden. To hold someone to some kind of relationship contract or obligation is no better than telling someone they have an obligation to their "fellow man" because of altruism. No. You must allow people to pursue their own self-interest. And, contrary to Rand's thought, sometimes the reasons for a person's desires aren't clearly defined by a comparison of character traits between people. Sometimes, when it comes to recreational sex, pure pleasure is itself rational. And when it comes to deeper relationships of close friendships or romantic love, there is actually no rational reason for exclusivity. Rand and Branden both seemed to be operating under the assumption of exclusivity. That he could only be interested in a sexual friendship/relationship with Rand or Patrecia, but not both, even though curiously Rand didn't have that problem regarding her husband, not Branden with his wife. It boggles me then why they couldn't accept that one or both of them could also find an additional person interesting, attractive, appealing. Jealousy is not a rational emotion.

Secondly, I find that objectivists are well aware of the extreme poverty that exists in parts around the world. We are very aware of the reality of the world. It's often other types, particularly liberals, who are often oblivious to the realities of the world, including the extreme poverty. They know it exists in theory, but they haven't dealt with it very consciously from a worldview perspective. So when they see it, they are shocked. Instead of trying to understand the true causes and ethics behind poverty and government intervention, the shocking sight of poverty causes them to think that even MORE government intervention is needed, along with more resources and money and property given to the poor (they rarely think about the fact that it must be taken away from others first). And those same people, when they are shocked by the sight of reality, then think that they are the only ones who have ever considered that reality or are aware of it. It's ironic and naively egotistical. Sirota was (self-admittedly) oblivious until his trip to China, and then he climbs on a high horse and assumes that he's the only person who has been awakened to the truth of extreme poverty. He should get a clue. Objectivists have been aware of the realities of the world for ages. Maybe he should read about the Great China Famine, and examine the causes behind it. Millions of deaths by starvation is reality, too. The difference between Sirota and objectivists, is that we know the true causes behind poverty and starvation.

His argument boils down to personal attacks and name calling, without any kind of actual argument. He essentially says that an objectivist is someone who is immature, who hasn't grown past high-school mentality, who isn't widely read, and who is naive about the world and hasn't traveled enough to see extreme poverty first-hand. Notice that all of those are personal insults and assumptions about people based on bias. Not a single actual argument that can be examined based on rational logic of empirical data. And I can prove his bias wrong to my own satisfaction, though his bias would not allow him to accept it. I am mature in my thoughts, which in part I take to mean an ability to question the status quo and think for yourself. I am more mature than when I was in high school. In fact, most of the people (and myself to a degree) thought along Sirota's lines in high school. Most of the high schoolers I knew then, and know today, would whole-heartedly agree with Sirota. But I grew past those views. I am well-read. I've read lots of philosophy, and theology, and science, and history. I have a master's degree in theology from a seminary when I was once religious. (I'm now an atheist.) You don't get that degree (or any upper level degree really) without having to be well read, whether you retain it or not. And I have seen extreme poverty. When I was in Thailand once I was walking with a half-Thai, half-white girl. A woman who had a baby must have thought we were a married couple. She tried to hand us her baby, and wanted us to keep it. She was that destitute. This was in Pattaya where prostitution is rampant. And having seen the things I've seen, read the things I've read, and grown to be more mature than Sirota, I am more convinced than ever that Rand was right, and objectivism sound. To make assumptions that objectivists are immature people who must have never done any traveling and seen real poverty, is truly immature.

Sorry guys, most of you are wrong. And Kate, you get it right up until the end. I'd suggest consulting the Chicago Manual of Style or the AP Style Book for reference. But in general, philosophies are lower-cased unless they are formed from a proper noun, like the name of a person the philosophy is named after. So, to use Kate's examples, Libertarian would be capitalized if it is referring to the specific political party (a proper noun), but it would lower-cased if it is referring to the philosophy (a common noun). Marxism would be capitalized because it is formed off the name of Karl Marx, which is a proper noun. But objectivism would be lower-cased across the board. Here's the AP Style rule: Here is the Chicago Manual of Style rule: "Objectivism" (capitalized there because it's the start of a sentence) is never capitalized, the same way that communism is never capitalized, or fascism, or existentialism. You can think of it this way: The default is that philosophies are common nouns and are lower-cased. The default is overridden when a proper noun comes into the mix, like when the philosophy is derived from someone's name (Darwinism) or when you are talking about a particular political party (the Libertarian Party).

It's clearly a misunderstanding of Rand. She was not saying that we should live independently, an island unto ourselves. She was saying that our social interactions should be voluntary. It's as though these evolutionary psychologists (and I value greatly the field of evolutionary psychology) believe Rand was against distribution of goods in any form. She was not. She was absolutely in favor of distribution of helpful goods in a society, but done on a voluntary basis, where a maintains a right of self-ownership. And this is good, because when you consent to the concept of altruistic communal deontological ethics (obligation), then that perspective will inevitably extend to more than just economic goods of survival. That altruistic deontological ethic will extend to personal life decisions, to the point where you are not free to make decisions over your own life, and essentially do not own yourself. That's immoral, in Rand's thought. Rand's ethic of self-ownership will in no way prevent social interaction. On a quick reading of the articles you posted, it seems to me that they are committing a sort of is ... ought fallacy. They are pointing to how societies have historically suppressed self ownership and liberty, and then seem to say that therefore it's morally preferable to suppress self-ownership and liberty. As though they are not considering the possibility that humans may find better, more moral ways to organize themselves socially. And it's here where I think Rand's argument prevails. She argues not only that societies based on the morality of self-ownership are practical, but that they are moral. I don't see that the "is" that evolutionary psychology points to necessitates an "ought."

But what if you didn't have a firm -- decided not to pay the dues or whatnot? then presumably any other person's "security firm" could simply arrest you without arbitration, and enact their own punishment and rule over your life. I know you aren't defending the position, just explaining it to me. But it seems like these are real problems with the anarcho-capitalism viewpoint. The problem I see with it from my limited perspective so far, is that it treats justice as subjective in theory, if not also in practice (even if Rothbard didn't believe natural rights were subjective). In other words, one security firm could enact its own laws that are contrary to the non-aggression principle, and they would have to be deemed in theory as just, and another security firm would possibly argue against those violations of the non-aggression principle, and then some arbitration would be relaized that may or may not ultimately honor the non-aggression principle. But justice with regard to man's rights IS a monopoly. And there should be a consistent defense of those rights across the board. To put it another way, I can envision two concepts: Man's rights as one concept, and the entity of justice that enforces the means of protecting man's rights on the other hand. If man's rights is a monopoly (in other words, there is an objective understanding of what man's rights are), then wouldn't there need to be a monopoly on the entity that protects man's rights? If it were left up to a set of multiple entities, each with various views toward justice, then there seems to be an interjection of subjectivity in enforcement into the concept of objectivity in justice theory, thus destroying the goal of objective social justice in practical living. Here's an example of what I'm thinking of. One "security agency" has clients that agree that prostitution is criminal. Further, the agency agrees to work toward removing prostitution from the society where its clients reside. So, the agency finds a female prostitute, and arrests her, knowing that her security agency will come and arbitrate for her release. Well, even before the arbitration, her rights have already been violated. This is because by having multiple different security agencies with different aims and subjective justice values, the claim to an objective natural right of man is nullified, or at least thrown to the mercy of arbitration. Another problem I see with it is that certain security agencies will become prevalent along geographical lines, and eventually you will be right back to small nation states, where within those nation states people are back at square one in terms of fighting for their natural rights in presence of an oppressive security agency government. It seems then that, justice is not a commodity like goods and services are on the free market. Justice (in reference to the right to one's own life) is an objective fact, and therefore a monopoly. Allowing any government, whether a security agency among many others, or a single "monopolistic" government to violate man's rights is evil and should be opposed. So it does not really matter with whether you are dealing with a multiplicity of competing governments, or a single government. The fight is still the same, and in fact may be an easier fight when you are dealing with a monopoly of a government.

This seems easy to me. I would explain to the donor that it is wrong of them to think they had some obligation to give me their organ, especially at the cost of their life. If I clearly explained it, and yet the person insisted, and the person was a stranger, I would say, "OK, thanks." If the person was someone I knew and cared about (a family member, perhaps), then I would refuse. All these decisions would come from my rational self interest. (I am self-interested in having a life, but also having a life with people I care about in it.) I don't see the contradiction.

Thanks. But can you do your best to address my particular example? Is the example itself badly misunderstanding the issues? What if, in the case of a minor dispute (where I would be largely free from social ostracism if I declines to abide by some private law demand), if I refused to comply with a demand of justice (repaying for a window that I broke while playing baseball, for another example), what would make the private security firm's private law demand for justice "stick" if I refused to comply? It seems to me that force is the only final arbiter, or final means to make a law "stick." But how is a private market force justifiable in anarchism if I simply refuse to comply?

This may be a very simple question that shows my limited knowledge of anarcho-capitalism, but how can laws, even laws developed by private justice firms on a free market, have any force in an anarcho-capitalist society? In other words, let's say I accidentally run over my neighbor's cat. He demands I pay or spend 10 days in prison, or something, and his security firm that he subscribes to backs his claim. And I simply say, "Uhhh ... no thanks." How could the security firm use "law" against me if law is really a form of archy? I realize I might be missing huge parts of the puzzle here, so enlighten me?

Thanks, Dormin111, for your reply. I have a few questions about it, with the consideration that my knowledge of Rand and objectivism is a little bit better than my knowledge of Rothbard and anarcho-capitalism. So could you help me clear up my understanding? As I understand it, your Point 2 about Rothbard's worldview seems a little off (and maybe your Point 1, as well). It seems to me, in my scant reading so far, that Rothbard would agree with Rand on all the points you listed for her (with the exception of Point 4), particularly that the right to life is the first foundational right, and that it's not merely a political right, but that it is in fact a "natural right." And: I don't believe Rothbard would say people "purchase" rights to life or liberty on a free market. While I think I agree with your perspective in general, I think you may have mischaracterized anarcho-capitalists when you said things like this: "none of us have the right to pick up a bunch of guns and arbitrarily declare ourselves to be enforcers of justice unless we are permitted to by society in some manner." To my understanding, anarcho-capitalists would never say that a person can claim to be an "enforcer of justice" over someone else, because that negates the very thing they are against, anarchism (no ruler, or ruling body over other people). As soon as you take up a gun and force people to adhere to your own concept of justice, then you are in effect declaring yourself to be a ruler over those people, without their voluntary consent, and to my knowledge Rothbard was in no way advocating that. I don't really know what his concept is of how justice is administrated, and I hope to read more from him and the likes of Hans-Herman Hoppe to learn. But am I wrong in thinking Rothbard and anarcho-capitalists do not advocate the kind of vigilante justice you describe?

Someone helpfully sent me a message saying it has been discussed many times, and I think I realized what I was doing wrong with the search function. I'll read the other threads, but feel free to respond here if there is something particular about my question that hasn't really been addressed elsewhere, or if you want to.