DonAthos

Yes, I agree. I think that effective communication is a skill, and potentially worth developing for those who choose to spend their time discussing and debating ideas. I think it is at least worth while to think about the practical difference between potential approaches; to recognize that your choice of approach might affect how the content of your communication is received.
 
I enjoyed that and found it charming. It may not be the primary goal for many debates, but I far prefer it when I and my "opponent" walk away both having enjoyed the experience. I think that polite conversation stands a better chance at also being pleasant conversation. It might also stand a better chance at being effective conversation, if one's goals in engaging in conversation include persuasion.
 
I believe that there are even better alternatives potentially available. For your last paragraph, I would personally strike "how can you raise such an asinine topic"; it adds some vitriol certainly, but I don't know what else it accomplishes. That kind of thing makes me feel defensive and might inspire me to respond with venom, such as by saying something like:

"It certainly might appear asinine to someone who doesn't know very much about communication."

In my experience, these kinds of flames tend to feed on one another; I would expect the conversation to degenerate further from there. And you'll notice that my response is directed towards you rather than the topic. So now we're talking about me (how can I do such a thing as raise this topic) and you (your knowledge about communication) and your evaluation of my choice in presenting my argument, when instead we could be talking about the ideas themselves. IMO, not ideal.

Furthermore, I've seen it argued before that "attacking ideas," in the manner you've suggested, is acceptable over "attacking people," because you're not technically talking about the person himself. I don't know that I agree. When I see the word "asinine" used in relation to what I've said, I'm apt to take it as applying to me in some fashion, if attenuated. For after all, what kind of person would raise an asinine topic in the first place...?

I think that the constructions "you are an idiot" or "what an idiotic thing to say" or "only an idiot would say such a thing" all serve to insult, but again, I don't know what good they do.

For myself, I'd rather just be shown the errors in my arguments, rather than anyone's evaluation of those same arguments (which don't seem to have any value without support anyways). Perhaps both can be done? Perhaps. But I believe I've found an informal correlation between those who resort to such tactics and those who cannot make a compelling case for their arguments otherwise.
 
When that base level of respect is missing, I don't know that there is much to be hoped for or accomplished in discussion. Or at least, I don't see any point in participating personally. Time's too short and there's too much to get done.
 
The same goes for this -- intellectual honesty. I believe that you and JASKN have identified two keys for productive discussion: respect and sincerity. (Frankly, given these two things in a discussion on both sides, I don't expect there to be many insults.)

I'd like to explore this topic further. How do we assess someone's intellectual honesty or sincerity? How do we identify evasion versus an honest mistake? And when someone is being evasive in a discussion... is there some good way of helping bring that to their attention? Or is it an insurmountable obstacle?

Relatedly, if someone is accused of being evasive, how should they process that accusation/respond? Due to the nature of evasion, I don't know how well-equipped most people are to identify it within their own thoughts, should it exist. If a person is doing his best to approach a topic sincerely, yet is accused of being evasive, is that a cue to walk away from the discussion? Or is there a better response available?
 
Agreed.

How ought we talk to one another?

This is a question that I believe sometimes gets short shrift, not only among Objectivists but in the wider world. When someone has a good idea, or the right answer to a question, how does he best communicate that idea/answer to other people?

Perhaps some would contend that it does not matter. That it is enough to be right, and if there is to be any communication of a right idea at all it is wholly the recipient's responsibility to understand, so no further thought needs be given to the method of delivery. But I disagree that this is true in all situations -- the ability to communicate one's ideas to others in an effective manner is sometimes important. For instance, if you were in the backseat of a car, and you saw an upcoming obstacle that the driver did not yet see, you would want to communicate this information effectively; "being right" will not itself save you from impact.

Recently, in another thread, a forum member raised the question as to whether or not satire is the best means of addressing irrational points of view -- or whether making reasonable arguments are superior. I think that this is a question worth discussing. In this forum (as in life), I have had to contend with people who are insulting, and I have sometimes engaged in that sort of behavior myself, usually to my own regret. When, if ever, is it proper to resort to insults? When insulted, should one respond in kind? Is there any good to be gained in so doing, or are there better alternatives available?

I'd like to explore these sorts of questions. Speaking personally, how we answer them matters to me. I am often quick to take offense, and quick to anger (and to respond in anger), and so it has led me to reflect on my own approach to discussion and disagreement. I know that I still have much yet to improve. But I also think that, beyond my personal context, there's potential for a greater application of the answers to these questions. I believe that I have observed many discussions on this forum which have soured, which perhaps could have been more fruitful for all involved -- I think that this could be a more productive and enjoyable community, through greater attention paid to how we discuss ideas, even (especially) when we disagree. I also believe that Objectivists could potentially do a better job in communicating our ideas to reasonable people who are not yet Objectivists, and that we could work more quickly and easily to achieve the kind of society we'd like to create, if we're willing to pay greater attention to our means of communication.

A quote which has resonated with me recently is "tact is the art of making a point without making an enemy."

Ironically with respect to this quote, I'm unsure of the means by which I can raise this topic, or discuss it in detail, tactfully. But I would like to try.

Any thoughts on this general subject, or answers to the two specific questions I've initially raised (when is satire appropriate? when are insults appropriate?) are welcome. Otherwise, I'm happy to have carved out a small area to discuss these kinds of topics when they occur to me, and others should feel free to make use of it as well.

How ought we talk to one another?

This is a question that I believe sometimes gets short shrift, not only among Objectivists but in the wider world. When someone has a good idea, or the right answer to a question, how does he best communicate that idea/answer to other people?

Perhaps some would contend that it does not matter. That it is enough to be right, and if there is to be any communication of a right idea at all it is wholly the recipient's responsibility to understand, so no further thought needs be given to the method of delivery. But I disagree that this is true in all situations -- the ability to communicate one's ideas to others in an effective manner is sometimes important. For instance, if you were in the backseat of a car, and you saw an upcoming obstacle that the driver did not yet see, you would want to communicate this information effectively; "being right" will not itself save you from impact.

Recently, in another thread, a forum member raised the question as to whether or not satire is the best means of addressing irrational points of view -- or whether making reasonable arguments are superior. I think that this is a question worth discussing. In this forum (as in life), I have had to contend with people who are insulting, and I have sometimes engaged in that sort of behavior myself, usually to my own regret. When, if ever, is it proper to resort to insults? When insulted, should one respond in kind? Is there any good to be gained in so doing, or are there better alternatives available?

I'd like to explore these sorts of questions. Speaking personally, how we answer them matters to me. I am often quick to take offense, and quick to anger (and to respond in anger), and so it has led me to reflect on my own approach to discussion and disagreement. I know that I still have much yet to improve. But I also think that, beyond my personal context, there's potential for a greater application of the answers to these questions. I believe that I have observed many discussions on this forum which have soured, which perhaps could have been more fruitful for all involved -- I think that this could be a more productive and enjoyable community, through greater attention paid to how we discuss ideas, even (especially) when we disagree. I also believe that Objectivists could potentially do a better job in communicating our ideas to reasonable people who are not yet Objectivists, and that we could work more quickly and easily to achieve the kind of society we'd like to create, if we're willing to pay greater attention to our means of communication.

A quote which has resonated with me recently is "tact is the art of making a point without making an enemy."

Ironically with respect to this quote, I'm unsure of the means by which I can raise this topic, or discuss it in detail, tactfully. But I would like to try.

Any thoughts on this general subject, or answers to the two specific questions I've initially raised (when is satire appropriate? when are insults appropriate?) are welcome. Otherwise, I'm happy to have carved out a small area to discuss these kinds of topics when they occur to me, and others should feel free to make use of it as well.

I believe that there is an as-yet unresolved tension between "life as survival" being the standard of value, versus some other vision of "life," as played out in conversations such as these.
 
If survival is truly the standard of value, then I think it follows that one should never be willing to go down with the ship.  Valuing the ship -- or "freedom," or an ideal, or a romantic partner, or a child -- such that one would be willing to die (or risk death to some great degree) for its sake, must itself be irrational, for it would inspire these kinds actions which are ultimately self-destructive in the literal sense.
 
However, if "life" is not mere survival, if it is more than that, then it perhaps becomes either more reasonable or at least more understandable when people make choices -- fighting in the name of what they value -- which yet wind up costing them even their actual lives.
 
Searching for "Eddie Willers," I found this quote (though I'm not double checking, so I cannot vouch for its accuracy, or for that which was elided):
 
"n the name of some victory that he could not name, he had to start the engine moving....Don't let it go! his mind was crying....He was pulling at coils of wire, he was linking them and tearing them apart....He heard himself crying soundlessly – Dagny, in the name of the best within us...I must now start this train!"
 
I don't know about y'all, but this reads to me like a heroic sentiment, and I suspect it was meant that way.

I believe that there is an as-yet unresolved tension between "life as survival" being the standard of value, versus some other vision of "life," as played out in conversations such as these.
 
If survival is truly the standard of value, then I think it follows that one should never be willing to go down with the ship.  Valuing the ship -- or "freedom," or an ideal, or a romantic partner, or a child -- such that one would be willing to die (or risk death to some great degree) for its sake, must itself be irrational, for it would inspire these kinds actions which are ultimately self-destructive in the literal sense.
 
However, if "life" is not mere survival, if it is more than that, then it perhaps becomes either more reasonable or at least more understandable when people make choices -- fighting in the name of what they value -- which yet wind up costing them even their actual lives.
 
Searching for "Eddie Willers," I found this quote (though I'm not double checking, so I cannot vouch for its accuracy, or for that which was elided):
 
"n the name of some victory that he could not name, he had to start the engine moving....Don't let it go! his mind was crying....He was pulling at coils of wire, he was linking them and tearing them apart....He heard himself crying soundlessly – Dagny, in the name of the best within us...I must now start this train!"
 
I don't know about y'all, but this reads to me like a heroic sentiment, and I suspect it was meant that way.

Well, I have roughly two ways of handling it. If I do engage, I do so in a quite detached way. I make sure not to feel angry or frustarted. I accept that I won't be able to change anyone's mind, so I only do it as an exercise in fleshing out my own understanding. If the person is clearly irrational or emotion or angry or abusive, then I simply stop. I have no interest in going further, I don't feel frustration. If I felt frustrated, it meant I thought they should change their mind and that they have to and I can't make them. That's totally wrong. Just live your life, don't worry about them. Their not getting it doesn't change you, your life, or how you live. Be content with your own understanding of reality. And occasionally, someone will point out a lacuna or contradiction in your thoughts, and that is a real delight!
 
And secondly, I simply avoid it or I talk around it. That is what I do 95% of the time. I just don't care. People will believe what they believe. I have mentioned only briefly to my own girlfriend my own interest in philosophy and objectivism. Even she has really very little idea about it and about my interest in it. She was surprised, after two years dating, when I said the point of life is to be happy. She had not imagined I would think that, and she was very pleased. I found that amusing.
 
I'm an individualist in every sense. I want to understand reality. I don't care about others. Write a blog post if you want to get your ideas and arguments out of your head. Writing is really the best way to spread your ideas because people who are interested will read, agree or disagree, respond or not, and that's that. Release them into the aether, and leave it. Polemics sucks.
 
I have occasionally felt guilty that I have exactly zero interest in engaging in politics. But it soon disappears into contempt for the whole thing. My life is too short to spend any minute of it on politics. I will donate some money to people who like doing that kind of thing when I'm able to, and that will be my futile contribution. Besides, I'm much more interested in how people can find happiness, a career they love, joy, pleasure, interesting careers and that sort of stuff. I'm a firm believer that people should just focus on themselves.
 
Most people don't want to be right. They want to win the debate. They have their self esteem wrapped up in their ideas and so being corrected is an attack on them personally, that is why they get angry and will not see clear contradictions in their own arguments. Most people were raised in public schools that fail to teach children proper methods of thinking and of arguing. Moreover, many, many people are second handed and care about appearances rather than reality. Once you identify a person is like that, just stop. Smile, stop talking, and move on.

All of the quotes below are from the OP, CptnChan
 
 
Consider a couple things here:
 
1. I'm not actually sure that you're correct that these are more prolific than people who create "new" content.
2. Critics, reviewers, and game-streamers are delivering an actual product/service. They are content creators. The fact that you don't like their content doesn't actually mean anything - they are delivering value to someone. 
 
 
 
Except you're wrong here. That streamer is delivering content. People watch his channel, as opposed to other channels, because they enjoy watching him play, they enjoy listening to him talk as he plays, they enjoy the content he has created. What he has created is separate from the game he is playing - and it is content that clearly a lot of people enjoy.
 
Just because you don't like it, does not mean it is not content or that value has not been created.
 
I personally enjoy watching game streams. I've done it a lot lately, in fact, because I don't have time to play a lot of video games, but it's quite fun to watch them being played while I do my work. When I was a kid, I used to watch my friends play games more than I played them myself - that was enjoyable for me. That's how it is for a lot of people. So these game streamers are creating content, both by doing what they're doing, and by adding value in the form of the commentary and such that they add to their streams and their videos.
 
 
No, but judging by the rest of your post, you sure would like it to.
 
 
 
These reaction videos get millions of views usually because they're funny or because the people involved have personalities that people enjoy listening to or watching. It's literally the same thing as morning talk shows. People tune in because the reactions are funny, the conversations are interesting, and the personalities are fun to listen to/watch.
 
This type of entertainment is highly accessible. It doesn't require a lot of time - so there's a low barrier to entry, a low up front cost - and it's usually humorous, entertaining, enlightening, easily understandable, et cetera, so a high amount of value is obtained from it. The fact that you characterize this kind of entertainment as having nothing of interesting and contributing nothing doesn't make it so - it could very well be that you've seen a few videos and simply generalized. 
 
Keep in mind here - if value was not being gained by watching the videos, they would not be getting watched so much. People are mostly rational actors, if simplistic ones. Viewers tend to go for entertainment that has a low barrier of entry, and a high payoff. Which explains your next contention:
 
 
Historically, art has a high barrier of entry. It takes a lot of work to get into it. This isn't a new phenomena - it's ages old. Did you ever learn about Shakespeare? One of the reasons we discuss Shakespeare still today is because he wrote plays that were easily accessible to the general public. Low barrier of entry, with a fair amount of very low brow wit - some of it was frankly even slapstick. So, low barrier of entry, high entertainment value. 
 
That is how it has always been. The most complex art historically has been reserved mostly for nobles, the rich, the clergy, and various other people who had the time and money to kill to appreciate it, while lower entertainment was preferred by the masses - because it had a low barrier of entry, and a high payoff. 
 
This doesn't mean that one is better than the other, nor does it indicate anything particular about people. The fact is, everyone has their passions and their interests - and outside of their passions and interests, they're not likely to invest a whole lot of time into something. Why would you expect a creative work of art to have millions of views? Of course it wouldn't. Because the ONLY people who gain something from it are people who are passionate about art in the first place - so people who are passionate about, say, plants or math (me!) would spend hours on plant videos, but they wouldn't spend hours on creative, artistic videos - rather, I'd be likely to watch a low brow video that has a high entertainment pay off and a low barrier to entry, or else spend my time on the things I actually care about. 
 
 
 
 
The reason most people don't care is because you're stating the blatantly obvious.
 
What you've said amounts to this:
 
People, in general, won't put in the time and energy to understand and appreciate things that they don't have any previously existing interest in, and would rather enjoy something that doesn't demand so much of them.
 
This is obvious. Why would people - the majority of whom have working lives, passions, interests, and goals which they are already putting a significant amount of time into - spend extra time on something that isn't their interest? Just because you think something artistic on youtube is worthwhile doesn't mean others will. Yeah, a lot of work went into it - and that work pays off to the people who have an existing interest in it. But for everyone else, there's just a high barrier of entry and something that's demanding a lot more time from them than they have to be spending, for a minimal payoff.
 
 
 
Nobody is living off of other people's content. You're creating an issue where none exists. Just because you don't like some content, doesn't mean that the people who made that content are parasites. 
 
 
 
 
 
Beyond ALL of that, consider this:
 
https://www.youtube.com/user/1veritasium
https://www.youtube.com/user/AsapSCIENCE
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=DIY

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCduKuJToxWPizJ7I2E6n1kA

 
 
This is just a very small sampling of original content on youtube with hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of views. Your notion that people aren't paying attention to original content is patently wrong - they're just not paying attention to the content you care about. Which makes sense. You pay attention to that content because it's of value to you, so the barrier to entry isn't a big deal. But for people who have no interest in it? The barrier to entry IS a big deal, so they're naturally gonna pay attention to things that either A. are of interest to them or B. have a low barrier to entry (cat videos, reaction videos, et cetera)

Hey Plasmatic,

I've been waiting for your continued response before replying; hopefully that's still forthcoming, but it has been long enough that I figure maybe I should pop back in, just in case you've forgotten about me.

While I'm here, I'll mention that I don't disagree with any of the quote you've provided... nor do I honestly see how it contends with the post to which you're replying. But perhaps you can help me to understand how that quote relates to what I'd said?

If/when you do reply more substantively, I would also really appreciate your analysis of the example I'd provided, if possible. As a reminder:
 
Isn't that important? Isn't that right?

And...

I suspect that maybe your response would be something like this (though please correct me, if need be): that yes, this guy should be willing to reexamine his concept of "free will" in the face of apparently contradictory evidence or argument -- because he's got it wrong.

But I should not be willing to do the same thing, because as an Objectivist (insofar as I am one), I have the axioms correct, and therefore I know that they cannot be modified or contradicted by any possible evidence or argument.

Is that your position?

Sorry, I just remembered you'd asked this. What I was thinking of was "ambition vs. acceptance".
 
Whatever human beings say is their explicit philosophy, the bulk of us actively pursue values. In this pursuit, we have to figure out what values we aim for, and we have to deal with the negatives of underachievement and loss. An Epicurean may advise men not to be too ambitious, but rather to be happy with the simple pleasures of life. A Stoic may advise him to go full steam ahead, but to see achievement as a duty with limited personal investment in the outcome. The Gita can combine these both, telling people to renounce this world, but -- as long as they do not -- to pursue work as duty, not for personal reward. The Buddhist may say that all sadness comes from loss of values, and advise avoiding all worldly ambition. A Christian may rationalize acceptance by saying God has a deeper plan. A pagan may figure he just didn't offer up a good enough sacrifice this year.
 
In our personal lives, we're each well advised to be ambitious to a point, and yet to be accepting of the realities of the world and ourselves.... even of the man-made things which we cannot change, and which may as well be metaphysical as far as the context of our lives are concerned. Aiming too low and aiming too high both have their drawbacks. 
 
A more complete treatment would probably need a thread of its own.

The Atlas Society recently published a blog post about Objectivism and the family, in response to a Salon article that referred to Objectivism as anti-family.  The salon article can be found here, and the TAS response here. This prompted me to read the original TAS article that the Salon guy linked to, found here. I found the account of Objectivism and family relations highly unsatisfactory, particularly as applied to sibling relationships, and I decided that I wanted to write up the response below.
 
In her article on family relations and Objectivism, Malini Kochhar attempts to lay out a view of familial relationships based on Ayn Rand's trader principle: "This principle holds that we should interact with people on the basis of the values we can trade with them - values of all sorts, including common interests in art, sports or music, similar philosophical outlooks, political beliefs, sense of life, and more. Trade, in this broad sense, is the only proper basis of any relationship—including relationships with members of our families."  However, in her application of the principle, she fails to consider several highly significant sources of value in family relationships.   I will focus mainly on critiquing her comments from the perspective of sibling relationships, although many of my comments also apply to the parent-child case.  In her article, she states the following:
  Thus, in her view, it would be extremely unlikely for one to have the same kind of deep relationship with a sibling that one would have with a very close friend. This is because we cannot choose our siblings the way that we can choose our friends, and therefore it would be mere coincidence if we happened to be close.  However, this is emphatically not the only possibly application of the trader principle to sibling relationships, and in fact it is highly rationalistic and ignores the most common factors that create strong bonds between siblings.   The core of many sibling relationships, including my own, is shared experiences. Growing up in the same household strongly lends itself to a high level of mutual understanding among siblings.  I have two sisters, and we all grew up under the same roof.  They've seen some of my worst moments, and some of my best.  They've seen my growth, all the way from elementary school to the person that I am today.  They understand me like almost no one else does.  In Objectivist terms, they provide me with a kind of psychological visibility that only they can.  Certainly, as we've moved out of the house and away from each other, we are no longer intimately involved in each others' day to day lives, and there are others who know aspects of me and my life much better than they do.  However, their particular understanding of me is extremely important to me.  And of course, this understanding runs both ways, with me providing this particular kind of understanding to them as well.  Thus, the value provided by this sort of understanding is mutual, as per the trader principle.   Despite this understanding of one another and our shared experiences of childhood, we have grown up to be very different people.  If you were to list our core values explicitly, you would probably conclude that we don't have many in common.  Our adult interests are extremely varied, and even as kids we clashed like only siblings can.  We each care about very different things, and even have quite different explicit philosophies (leading to some strong political disagreements).  In fact, if I were to walk into an Objectivist convention, I could probably randomly pick someone out of the crowd whose explicit list of 'core values' would be closer to mine than those of my sisters.  That kind of similarity is simply not what our sibling relationships are based on.  Nevertheless, they completely exemplify Rand's trader principle, in every aspect.  Unchosen family obligations play no part whatsoever.   This is the problem with clinging to 'shared core values' as the one and only indicator of a true and deep relationship between people. It overemphasizes explicit philosophical convictions and interests over other important aspects of relationships, such as mutual understanding and shared experiences.  It allows Kochhar to set up a false dichotomy between a relationship based on shared core values (which he describes as a 'rare coincidence' when it happens to occur among siblings) and a relationship based on familial obligation.  It is indeed unlikely that two people who didn't choose to be siblings would share the same explicit philosophical convictions or the same list of core values.  If this is the sum of one's measure of an appropriate relationship, then one is forced to describe strong sibling relationships as 'coincidence.'  If the relationship does not fit this description, it must then be based on a reification of blood relation and familial obligation.  But the value that I get from my relationship with my sisters is not simply a coincidence, and neither is it an expression of duty that we feel.  It is precisely because we are siblings who grew up together that we have this sort of bond.  It was their role in my childhood, and in my life since then, that is the source of the value that I gain from them, and them from me.   Now certainly, none of this is a necessary consequence of being siblings.  There are numerous situations where siblings will not have this kind of relationship (most notably, when they don't grow up together).  However, the factors that lead to such strong sibling relationships are much more common than Kochhar's 'rare coincidence' type of relationship will allow.  The trader principle's application in this case is much broader than he paints it to be.  It is sad to me to see Rand's trader approach to human relationships, which I believe to be the correct one, artificially limited by the kind of values that can be traded.  Doing so excludes some of the most important relationships in life, and gives credence to the viewpoint that Rand's philosophy as a whole doesn't have room to accommodate these relationships.  In my view, it does; when these relationships are healthy, they are indeed based on the trader model, where both people get true value from the relationship.  The limitation comes simply from an excessively narrow conception of what kinds of values are in play.

Objectivism requires, in a nutshell, that you do not attempt to gain values through dishonesty. This means more than simply ensuring that what you say isn't technically a lie; it requires that you endeavor to appeal to others' reason and intelligence rather than their stupidity and gullibility. In both of your examples cited above, the person is clearly behaving dishonestly, and in both cases it comes in the same form.  The person is failing to disclose a fact that they know will be material to the decision of the person that they are tricking.  In your original example, the guy clearly knows that he's going to leave this girl as soon as he sleeps with her, and he also knows that she wouldn't sleep with him if she knows this.  He's deceiving her by withholding this fact and pretending that he has the intention of dating her.  Similarly, the fact that some part will soon go out at great cost is a fact that is material to the buyer's decision to buy.  Withholding it is fraud, and clearly dishonest.
 
Objectivism holds that this method for gaining values will not serve your life and happiness in the long term. Relying on dishonesty to gain values requires that you seek out the dumbest and most gullible people to deal with, rather than the most intelligent and perceptive.  It institutionalizes a fear of certain facts, namely the facts that will expose your lies, rather than encouraging an attitude of unreservedly confronting all facts of reality, which is the policy that one needs in order to be successful over the long term. Furthermore, relationships founded on dishonesty cannot become the kind of deep relationships that are integral to one's happiness, where another person truly sees and understands you. No short-term gains of one-night stands or car sales are worth this kind of life.

@Castor #13
 
"Any statement about my table is only objective when it concerns true facts that can be verified empirically by all reasonable and competed men."
 
What if you are stranded on a desert island?  Is objective knowledge impossible because there are no other reasonable and competent men around to verify what you believe to be true?  Is learning to survive impossible then?
 
You need to appreciate how radially individualistic Objectivism is.  While it is nice to exchange information and learn from others, it is not absolutely necessary in order to obtain objective knowledge.  We are all epistemic islands.  We are all individuals. Information received through communication with others is no different, metaphysically, than information gained from your senses when you plant a seed and watch it grow or learn to drive a car.  Words spoken or typed by others are just sensory input to you.  YOU must determine if what they say is true or not.  What they believe to be true has no bearing on whether it is true -- and their belief should never serve as a substitution for your own judgment.
 
This fact that it is existentially impossible for one person to think for another is the basis for Objectivist Ethics.  No one can force you to believe something to be true and you cannot force someone else to believe something to be true.  We each must think for ourselves and draw our own conclusions.  Will we be wrong on occasion?  Absolutely.  We're probably wrong more often then we are right.  But we can learn from our actions including communicating with others.

I don't know whether this will speak to the questions being raised with precision, but when I speak of my consciousness, I mean my "first person experience."

I may and do infer that others have similar experiences. Others make the same sort of inference, though people can sometimes mistake in so doing. Early, people granted a consciousness to the moving planets and other natural phenomena, and in the future it's possible we will have advanced simulacra capable of "appearing conscious" to most observers. (I've heard that some program recently passed someone's administered "Turing test," but what I saw of that program was not impressive, imo.) As to whether -- and when -- such things are judged to actually *be* conscious...? I do not know. Usually when I think about this subject, I think about ST:TNG's Data. Was he a conscious entity (in the same way that I am, possessed of this kind of "first person experience")? I do not know.

Speaking of Star Trek, I also sometimes think about their teleporter technology and its implications for my concepts of self and personhood. While I don't see any real potential for "beaming" as such...

Given that my consciousness and all that it entails (i.e. "the first person experience") is certainly a product of the physical state of my body... I could imagine a technology eventually that could breakdown, analyze, store, and replicate "me" (meaning: replicate the physical state of my body which would then produce a consciousness like my own).

Yet any person so-created would have an experience completely separate from my own. And were I deconstructed in the manner of Star Trek's teleporter and later reconstructed (whether in the same place or elsewhere), it would appear to the rest of the world as though I had been recreated...

But I think that I would actually be dead (meaning that this "first person experience" typing this here and now would no longer exist), and that there would be another new person (who would, confusingly, believe himself to be me just as much as I do).

Oh Science Fiction! -- you are full of such entertaining and provoking vexations!

Before I make my bigger post, I am wondering, would you agree that even if we're in some simulation like the Matrix, it is still reality that is all around you? There is nothing about a simulation that is "unreal" other than being artificial. Of course even tools are real, even if artificial. Similarly, whether something is tangible is not important for what is real or not. For Objectivism "real" means tied to reality in some manner. Insofar as you perceive, reality is what you perceive - HOW or WHAT you perceive doesn't matter. Existence exists still applies. Even in Plato's Cave, everything in the cave is real: the shadows, the fire, the walls, the chains.
 
Although a simulated reality is arbitrary to assert, it's not really a fallacy unless you use it as proof of something. Depending on how you imagine it, like all thought experiments, you may reach useful conclusions or ideas.

I think (though he may correct me if necessary) that StrictlyLogical is not attempting to lay out a full theory of valuation, but just observing that in general it is not enough to base ones values on life-as-bare-physical-survival; that the quality of life is also a vital factor.

Come to that, I think he's correct. And while I wouldn't personally attempt to plot out my values on a graph, and don't take that as a serious suggestion, I think that's a valid way of looking at the reasoning involved, metaphorically. Much as one may try to find the most profitable point on a supply and demand curve, we seek to maximize our experience of life -- even if that may mean losing a few years on the back-end for a richer experience throughout.

The actual means by which an individual determines his own values and subsequent decisions (down to eating a bowl of ice cream) are complex and depend on a lot of context and specific information. But the point is that we do not decide whether or not to eat ice cream alone according to whether it is judged to extend or shorten one's years on the planet; the quality of the years we live, quality experienced in part at least as physical pleasure (such as ice cream may provide, according to one's own taste), is highly important to ethical reasoning.

I think I get where I was having trouble now.
 
I was under the impression that definition produces the concept. Under that view therefore it was hard for me the imagine a concept coming directly from precept.
 
After reading:
http://www.proctors.com.au/mrhomepage.nsf/985f14ab922be306482577d5003a2040/4864f5fe3809763a4825789c000dc50a/$FILE/The%20Analytic%20Synthetic%20Dichotomy.pdf
 
the idea seems to be that definition is just the unique universal characteristic chosen from all of the known characteristics of the concept to best distinguish it from other known concepts. If more new facts are observed that makes the said characteristic no longer universal to all the existent of the concept, or new concept created that makes the said characteristic no longer unique, then new characteristic would have to be chosen as the definition to better serve the identity tag job.
 
If table is defined as a surface with legs, newly designed table without legs (characteristic no longer universal) or newly created items that have surface with legs but are not table (characteristic no longer unique), would necessitate a change to the table's current definition.
 
So it's the concept that produces the definition, not the other way around. Now I can see how concepts such as table can come directly from percepts.
 
And as for logical truth then, it isn't so much as whether or not the definition of a concept adheres to the dictionary, but whether or the definition does its job well as the identity tag for the concept in a given context of knowledge.

I'm curious what leads you to believe that colleges with government funding provide crap education. I'm all for trying to find free market alternatives to things... but many of the brightest minds in the world attended or currently work at publicly funded universities. Just because someone's philosophy disagrees with yours doesn't mean they have nothing worthwhile to say. A person can be a brilliant physicist and have differing philosophical beliefs from your own.
 
Go to the best place that you can. Learn from the best people that you can. There's nothing immoral about picking the best possible option of schooling. We work to change the culture and the world that we live in - but unfortunately, even when our philosophical beliefs are at odds with the culture and world we live in, we must still live in it, and make the best of it. So make the best of it.

No, there is no bomb that will kill only adults. Nor a bomb that will only kill the guilty and spare the innocent. I'm resigned to the fact that these bombs, which will kill indiscriminately, must be dropped in times of war. I'm even resigned to the innocent dying and children, too, though I account such as tragedies and argue that they should be minimized as much as reasonably possible.

But our specific point of departure is a question of whether or not it is moral to *target* the innocent.
 
I would ask that you try to start thinking of people fundamentally as individuals, not as "populations." I think that it will help you to treat them as individuals, which is what I believe justice demands.
 
Innocence is not "inconsequential"; it is that which makes the crucial difference between the initiation of force, which is immoral, and the use of force in self-defense, which is moral. Your conflation of these two states, and subsequent dismissal of it as being unimportant altogether, is what *I* believe lies at the heart of our disagreement.

"Kill them all, and let God sort them out," is not, in my view, a moral sentiment. Kill the people who deserve to die, and only those, is.
 
This does not sound simple to me at all. This sounds like a huge contention (or number of contentions) packed into a very small sentence, possibly reductive to a dangerous degree, lacking utterly the explanation, evidence and discussion needed to understand all of what it might mean and imply.

Here's a small quote from Rand on "war," with a curious aside on the nature of dictatorship:
 
Generally speaking, do we regard the citizens of a dictatorship as slaves who must be liberated? Or as the true monsters who must be crushed? If you find these questions complicated (as I do), and not easily answered, and not answerable at all without recourse to specifics and real world context, then perhaps your "simple fact of war" is not a simple fact of war.
 
And again, this is just a tremendous statement. The "entire history of war"? That's... a lengthy history, you know?

I'll assume that you don't mean that the entire history of war supports bombing civilian populations; bombings, such as we're discussing, being still rather a recent innovation...

But do you mean that we can expect that the intentional slaughters of civilian populations have been required throughout history to achieve the removal of "a threat"? And truly with respect to "any war," as you've proposed? What does "the removal of a threat" entail, anyways? Are we talking about salting the earth, like Rome did for Carthage? Was the American Revolution successful on these terms, in throwing off the royal yoke? Or not, given the War of 1812? What about thereafter? Did we need to perhaps decimate London to achieve our just ends at that time?
 
I don't know whether I've accurately identified the point of our disagreement, whether it remains hidden, or whether there are several, but I can tell you that I do not consider the life of a two-year-old in Iran to be "diametrically opposed to my own."

Please think about what you're saying; think about it critically, as befits your handle, and deeply. You're saying (or at least so it appears to me) that my life requires the death of some two-year-old somewhere. That it's either him or me. This is not true. It is not only a horrific sentiment, but it is (thankfully) false.
 
Someone does indeed have to die: those who initiate force, as here through warfare, must pay for their crimes. But I do not achieve this end by targeting the innocent. Will innocents die regardless, whether by collateral damage or accident or the aggression of the initiators of force? Absolutely. That's why war is disgusting. But I do not punish the guilty by attacking the innocent. I only make myself guilty as well. (It is by attacking the innocent that we come to recognize the guilty.)
 
A general 2,000 miles away from the front may plan a bombing run and then go out at night for a steak dinner. I do not think that in describing emergencies, such as one's immediate scramble to escape a burning building, Ayn Rand meant to include professionals who make decisions in an air-conditioned office and then dine at Outback.

But let's say you're right. Should this same rationale not also apply to police action? Since police chiefs are making decisions which deal with the life and death of police officers, then perhaps there are no reasonable moral limits on what police officers might do, per policy, in the name of justice?

But no, this is not what's meant by "emergency" -- not in Rand's use, and not in reason. It's not "anything which has to do with life and death, even remotely, and even if these general situations are commonplace and eternal," as both crime and warfare are. Though specific situations may well arise, for police officers and soldiers both, which are legitimate life-or-death emergencies -- true lifeboats, where moral reasoning no longer applies -- the initial policies and conventions, strategy and tactics, that we adopt in order to fight back against the guilty and protect the innocent are not formed under emergency conditions.

Thus we have the time to consider the consequences of our decisions, and we may (and must) consider their morality. We institute things such as warrant protections and limits on searches and seizures, and we forbid ourselves the use of certain torture methods, and we prescribe treatment for prisoners of war, and so forth, because we recognize that even while acting in self-defense -- against domestic criminals or foreign combatants -- we must act morally, for our own sake.

May I also add, as perhaps an aside which you'll not find relevant, but I find this compelling myself...

Here's Rand on the draft:
 
Consider this if you would? Here is war as a "metaphysical emergency" in its starkest form, is it not? This is not alone Korea or Vietnam or either of the Persian Gulf Wars, where we could perhaps argue about whether US involvement was strictly justified. This is a "free country attacked."

And yet, Rand presumes that those so attacked still do not have the right to violate the rights of others. Being attacked in the manner of a war does not give the injured party some sort of moral carte blanche. It does not render any action they might take in response "moral," and it does not give them the right to violate the rights of others, not even under the guise of "self-defense."

Marc K. had it right when he said:
 
But he might have done even better to include the word "only," which is a word Ayn Rand appeared to be fond of when discussing retaliatory force, as for instance here (from "The Objectivist Ethics," emphasis in original):
 
If we mean to use physical force only against those who have initiated its use, does that include targeting innocents such as the two-year-old child who happens to live in the wrong country? I do not believe so.

No, there is no bomb that will kill only adults. Nor a bomb that will only kill the guilty and spare the innocent. I'm resigned to the fact that these bombs, which will kill indiscriminately, must be dropped in times of war. I'm even resigned to the innocent dying and children, too, though I account such as tragedies and argue that they should be minimized as much as reasonably possible.

But our specific point of departure is a question of whether or not it is moral to *target* the innocent.
 
I would ask that you try to start thinking of people fundamentally as individuals, not as "populations." I think that it will help you to treat them as individuals, which is what I believe justice demands.
 
Innocence is not "inconsequential"; it is that which makes the crucial difference between the initiation of force, which is immoral, and the use of force in self-defense, which is moral. Your conflation of these two states, and subsequent dismissal of it as being unimportant altogether, is what *I* believe lies at the heart of our disagreement.

"Kill them all, and let God sort them out," is not, in my view, a moral sentiment. Kill the people who deserve to die, and only those, is.
 
This does not sound simple to me at all. This sounds like a huge contention (or number of contentions) packed into a very small sentence, possibly reductive to a dangerous degree, lacking utterly the explanation, evidence and discussion needed to understand all of what it might mean and imply.

Here's a small quote from Rand on "war," with a curious aside on the nature of dictatorship:
 
Generally speaking, do we regard the citizens of a dictatorship as slaves who must be liberated? Or as the true monsters who must be crushed? If you find these questions complicated (as I do), and not easily answered, and not answerable at all without recourse to specifics and real world context, then perhaps your "simple fact of war" is not a simple fact of war.
 
And again, this is just a tremendous statement. The "entire history of war"? That's... a lengthy history, you know?

I'll assume that you don't mean that the entire history of war supports bombing civilian populations; bombings, such as we're discussing, being still rather a recent innovation...

But do you mean that we can expect that the intentional slaughters of civilian populations have been required throughout history to achieve the removal of "a threat"? And truly with respect to "any war," as you've proposed? What does "the removal of a threat" entail, anyways? Are we talking about salting the earth, like Rome did for Carthage? Was the American Revolution successful on these terms, in throwing off the royal yoke? Or not, given the War of 1812? What about thereafter? Did we need to perhaps decimate London to achieve our just ends at that time?
 
I don't know whether I've accurately identified the point of our disagreement, whether it remains hidden, or whether there are several, but I can tell you that I do not consider the life of a two-year-old in Iran to be "diametrically opposed to my own."

Please think about what you're saying; think about it critically, as befits your handle, and deeply. You're saying (or at least so it appears to me) that my life requires the death of some two-year-old somewhere. That it's either him or me. This is not true. It is not only a horrific sentiment, but it is (thankfully) false.
 
Someone does indeed have to die: those who initiate force, as here through warfare, must pay for their crimes. But I do not achieve this end by targeting the innocent. Will innocents die regardless, whether by collateral damage or accident or the aggression of the initiators of force? Absolutely. That's why war is disgusting. But I do not punish the guilty by attacking the innocent. I only make myself guilty as well. (It is by attacking the innocent that we come to recognize the guilty.)
 
A general 2,000 miles away from the front may plan a bombing run and then go out at night for a steak dinner. I do not think that in describing emergencies, such as one's immediate scramble to escape a burning building, Ayn Rand meant to include professionals who make decisions in an air-conditioned office and then dine at Outback.

But let's say you're right. Should this same rationale not also apply to police action? Since police chiefs are making decisions which deal with the life and death of police officers, then perhaps there are no reasonable moral limits on what police officers might do, per policy, in the name of justice?

But no, this is not what's meant by "emergency" -- not in Rand's use, and not in reason. It's not "anything which has to do with life and death, even remotely, and even if these general situations are commonplace and eternal," as both crime and warfare are. Though specific situations may well arise, for police officers and soldiers both, which are legitimate life-or-death emergencies -- true lifeboats, where moral reasoning no longer applies -- the initial policies and conventions, strategy and tactics, that we adopt in order to fight back against the guilty and protect the innocent are not formed under emergency conditions.

Thus we have the time to consider the consequences of our decisions, and we may (and must) consider their morality. We institute things such as warrant protections and limits on searches and seizures, and we forbid ourselves the use of certain torture methods, and we prescribe treatment for prisoners of war, and so forth, because we recognize that even while acting in self-defense -- against domestic criminals or foreign combatants -- we must act morally, for our own sake.

May I also add, as perhaps an aside which you'll not find relevant, but I find this compelling myself...

Here's Rand on the draft:
 
Consider this if you would? Here is war as a "metaphysical emergency" in its starkest form, is it not? This is not alone Korea or Vietnam or either of the Persian Gulf Wars, where we could perhaps argue about whether US involvement was strictly justified. This is a "free country attacked."

And yet, Rand presumes that those so attacked still do not have the right to violate the rights of others. Being attacked in the manner of a war does not give the injured party some sort of moral carte blanche. It does not render any action they might take in response "moral," and it does not give them the right to violate the rights of others, not even under the guise of "self-defense."

Marc K. had it right when he said:
 
But he might have done even better to include the word "only," which is a word Ayn Rand appeared to be fond of when discussing retaliatory force, as for instance here (from "The Objectivist Ethics," emphasis in original):
 
If we mean to use physical force only against those who have initiated its use, does that include targeting innocents such as the two-year-old child who happens to live in the wrong country? I do not believe so.

I've been giving more thought to this topic (or at least the topic of "targeting innocent civilians" as moral), and it has struck me that it incites a lot of passion in me.

Now this comes as no great surprise to me. I cannot speak for others, but for myself I have to tell you that discussions here are often very emotional for me. I have met people in my life who treat philosophical discussion as a kind of game (and some who have even admitted such)... but for me, ideas matter greatly. Ideas have consequence. I am not content to just consider them abstractly, but I try to imagine their real world application, if followed. I take them personally and apply them to my own circumstances, if possible, so that I may truly understand their effects.

As I've made reference to them before, and thus perhaps have already made clear, when I think of "innocents," my first thought is of my wife and daughter. Much of their protection in this world, which is a dangerous world, lies in the fact that they have not initiated the use of force against any other soul. They have caused nobody harm, and therefore I do not expect that anyone should wish harm upon them. Not in reason.

Yet I take some of the ideas expressed in this thread as saying that the innocence of my wife and daughter is not, and ought not, be any moral shield against force. That other people would be perfectly reasonable and moral to initiate the use of force against them, under certain conditions, despite their innocence. What conditions? To achieve political/military ends by hurting the spirit of my countrymen. To me, that sounds like an advocacy of terrorism (not to mention treating other people, and their very lives, as legitimate and disposable means to some other peoples' ends).

Maybe only to me? I grant that this is possible. But look...

The government of the United States gets up to all sorts of things. Sometimes we bomb targets without going to war. Sometimes we go to war without clearing it with Congress. Sometimes we engage in operations secretly. In all of these cases, whether our actions are otherwise justified or justifiable, we wind up killing people (whether collateral damage or not).

When CriticalThinker2000 says this...
 
...I wonder:

Are these people, with whom we fight, also in "a fight for their lives"? By this same rationale, should they not use every available means to defend themselves as well? Should they not wish to break my country's spirit?

Now my infant daughter has surprisingly little influence over American foreign policy, and her contributions to the American military machine are minimal (mostly in the form of biological weapons material; her diapers). While she's nailed me in the face with her toys a time or two, and I'll admit that it has smarted, I don't consider her much in the way of a "fighting force." I don't see how she could be considered a legitimate military target, except that I've seen it argued that her death might strike a blow against my country's fighting spirit. Therefore reasonable. Moral.

I consider this a monstrous argument. I feel like it serves to legitimize countless people who have some beef with America to strike out, not even at military targets, but at my own family. (Or yours.)

I strongly suspect that's not how it's intended or initially conceptualized. Perhaps we view the "innocents" who might be targeted as living in other countries... perhaps somewhere in the Middle East. But the innocents with whom I am most concerned are the ones I know, and I consider that innocence to be a moral protection that must be upheld. I cannot allow that intentionally slaughtering my daughter, when she has not caused anyone else any harm, is ever a moral action. Not even by firebomb, not even by nuclear device.

Could my daughter one day be tragically caught up in events beyond her understanding or responsibility? Yes. It has happened to millions before her, and it will happen to millions to come. If is is accidental or unavoidable (such as our living next door to a weapons factory, attacked during a time of war), I can come to understand such a thing. But if she was targeted intentionally, or if due diligence were not undertaken to avoid hurting/killing my daughter, where possible, then I would not consider the agents involved to be moral in their action. I would consider them to be murderers.

IF the question (or *a* question, at least) is about the targeting of innocents during war, I begin to think about it this way...

I can imagine a situation, such as you and Eamon describe, where I would "root" against the US; where I would be pro-Canadian, for instance. After all, if we had a Hitler or Stalin in charge, I would be doing what I could to defeat him, too. I would happily welcome Canada's assistance/intervention.

And if, during that conflict, my wife and daughter were killed as "collateral damage"... I would be utterly broken, most likely, but I believe that I would understand the event as stemming from my own country's faults. I don't think I would hold Canada to blame for it. Not even if it were an accident, or if I judged that it could somehow have been avoided. War is full of such tragedy, and I understand that.

However, if I learned that my wife and child were killed by Canada intentionally, as a means of trying to "break my country's will" or something like that... well, I don't know that I could ever forgive such a thing. I might still work to take down the Hitler in my country, but I might come to view Canada as having a Stalin of her own, and work against that country, too. And if innocents are fair game to bring down such a tyrant, well, why not a few "innocent" Canadian wives and daughters to join my own?

I think that this idea of targeting innocents is the methodology of terrorists. I think it is likely to breed more terrorists and more terrorism.

And I would accept that technical challenge -- again, within reason.

But decisions must be made within a certain context, including the fact that decisions must often be made within a specific timeframe, and especially during war. Putting myself in the place of a military commander (while acknowledging my own vast ignorance on military matters), I think that I would ask my staff to find and provide me with a plan to destroy the factory without killing innocents, just as you say.

Yet at some point, if it seems that there is no sound option to do that, I might have to take the option that destroys the factory while accepting the risk (or even certainty) of collateral damage.

As for responsibility, I would of course be responsible for all of my decisions. I could imagine some oversight, perhaps after the war, where I might be questioned about other tactical decisions I might have made that could possibly have saved more innocent lives. I would have to be able to account for the decision that I'd made.

Just wanted to come in and share my two cents.  I agree with the claim that inviting someone up to your place (for coffee, or whatever) after a date carries a sexual subtext.  Furthermore, there is nothing wrong with communicating one's intentions with subtext, rather than explicitly, so long as you are committed to making sure that there are no misinterpretations between you and the other person.
 
I'll use this particular situation (from the OP) as an example.  The man is clearly trading on the ambiguity of the situation in order to get her up to his room, by any means possible.  He ignores numerous signs that she is reluctant, that she is really not interested in sex.  He pressures her into drinking more than she's comfortable with (we can leave when you take the shot).  When they're going back to his hotel, initially he just says "I know a place to get coffee," then he says it's his hotel but they have a coffee bar, and then he just leads her up to his room.  Once she clearly starts saying no, he ignores her and keeps going anyways.  In short, this is clearly not a case of honest misunderstandings.  Throughout the night he's applying as much pressure as possible to get this situation to move along as far as he can possibly get, and by the end he's just forcing her.
 
Clearly, this is not an example of an honest use of subtext to communicate one's intentions.  That requires being cognizant of the fact that the other person might not interpret your subtext correctly, and thus being attentive to any signs that miscommunication is happening.  In an actual scenario, it's not that hard to do, and it doesn't stop at inviting someone in.  If after you invite her in, she's reluctant to move the situation along, doesn't seem to know what's going on, or (certainly!) if she resists anything you're doing, those are clear signs that she's misinterpreted your 'signals,' and you need to stop and explicitly figure out what she wants and what she's expecting.
 
This is why I don't think this question of 'how widespread is this notion of coffee for sex?' is really the sticking point of the matter. If she hasn't understood your invitation in for coffee as an invitation for sex, you'll find that out pretty damn fast once you're both inside and you start trying to move things along.  If you're truly committed to clear communication, and you're attentive to signs that the two of you are not on the same page, you'll know very quickly whether or not she's also thinking sex.
 
In the wise words of Michael Scott: