Plasmatic

It makes absurd the notion that this sense of "mental entity" is a ontological distinction justifying dualism. It makes no sense to say that perceptual concretes must be used in order to treat a concept as a concrete and thats what makes concepts "mental concretes" in a metaphysical sense. Mental entities are epistemic but we can treat them "as if" they were concretes by substituting real concretes in language. We can treat concepts "as if" they were concretes only because we use concretes to symbolize them.

I am not attacking mental causation as such. Your formulation of mental causation as performed by some set of mental entities within the physical entity possessing consciousness is what I object to. Also, you are dropping the context of the absolute necessity of using words as "perceptual concretes" in order to transform concepts into mental entities. This is what enables us to treat concepts as though they were perceptual concretes, without forgetting that they are not, that the words are nearly symbols that are substituted for all of the concrete units in the class. Abstractions do not happen to man. Man performs abstraction. ITOE: "In order to be used as a single unit, the enormous sum integrated by a concept has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete, which will differentiate it from all other concretes and from all other concepts. This is the function performed by language. Language is a code of Visual-auditory symbols that serves the psycho-epistemological function of converting concepts into the mental equivalent of concretes. Language is the exclusive domain and tool of concepts. Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, ie, that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind. [...]Words transform concepts into (mental) entities; definitions provide them with identity. " Don't forget that "concepts serve as units and are treated epistemologically as if each were a single (mental) concrete—always remembering that metaphysically (i.e., in reality) each unit stands for an unlimited number of actual concretes of a certain kind. " ITOE You are treating the epistemological sense of concepts as though this is a metaphysical status apart from the concretes they are substituted for.

Here it is laid out. There is no such thing as a mental concrete. You fundamentally misunderstand the role of words/language as providing concepts with concreteness. Introspection without language/concepts is limited to animal level consciousness. (And I mean language above first-level concepts and into abstractions) Seriously, answer my first question in this thread clearly and you should see a problem for your formulation.

Consciousness is spatially located in the human body/brain. Are you saying that mental phenomenon are a separate ontological realm inhabited by mental entities but that is causally dependent on the physical? Or do you think that the mind is ontologically separable from the physical?

Be careful to note that this can be taken as meaning substance dualism. Particularly in the context of a conversation with someone who is expressing a dualist ontology. Hope I don't sound like I am beating you up.

I think you interpreted "meaning" in my comment in a way I didn't "mean"..... I wasn't talking about meaning itself, the subject of semantics.

Yes, what you are referring to is called the first person nature of consciousness. I explicitly accept that as true. However, swig has attached something else to this premise which is false. I am sure of it. Perhaps reread his comments?

My point is very simply that actions are actions of entities that entities are their attributes. We dont need a seperate metaphysical realm to except that man does what he does consciously, because of what he thinks.

Did you mean to direct this at me? I don't see how you could derive this from what Ive said.

Here is the fundamental mistake swig is making. Oism is not a metaphysical dualist philosophy. There is no "mental realm" if you intend to mean by that a ontological category apart from concretes. Even the linguistic tools used that transform concepts into "mental entities" are concrete physically causal aspects of the only metaphysical realm there is. Yes swig is presenting a platonic view in his ontology of consciousness. It follows from swig's view that abstraction is a taking out from the physical into a platonic, spiritual realm. Swig, do you also think that the self, or will, inhabits the physical body like a soul but is not causally derived from it?

I don't think that the primary axiomatic concept of entity changes with context.... I think we have all the info we need to understand how concepts are only entities in a derivative, non primary sense.

Where she mentions abhorring neologisms she specifically says that she doesn't mean mental "entity" in the sense of primary substance qua Aristotle. Meaning its not the kind of thing that constitutes a cause.

Remember that what exists in the primary sense are entities. The category "existent" is cognitively useful to differentiate manmade, abstract phenomenon from metaphysical primaries.

No, a feeling qua experience, is not an entity at all. The concept of a feeling is only a mental entity by the device of concrete substitution in language via a word.

SL (good to talk to u) You do realize though that Ms. Rand herself qualified this sense of entity as precisely not what swig wants it to be in the appendix of ITOE? Concepts are only entities in as much as we use concretes to symbolize them. And that in a substitution sense.

Strictly, the first person nature of conscious awareness is not an argument for "non-physical" causation, or treating concepts as causal agents.

I hesitate to log in to post in this thread because I have temporarily tabled this very topic with some Oist Academics.... Mr Swig's position on mental entities is wrong and fundamentally misunderstands a very simply aspect of the process of abstraction. Anyone can reduce this treatment of "mental entities" as causal agents of some non physical kind to absurdity by asking themselves "what final act in the process of abstraction "transforms concepts into mental entities"?

Don, conspiracy theories are subject to the same justification process as any other truth claim. Many folks behave as though a conspiracy is species of logical fallacy. Whats funny is that I find within short order these types actually assert a conspiracy to dismiss one. "This video is a fake contrivance to prove the claim X". Dont get me wrong, I generally don't waste time investigating C theories but I don't then claim they are false without having checked the claimants evidence.

Everything you say here pertains only to a single persons context. Kaladin is referring to both a general concept of value and a disagreement between Kaladin and another's particular values. The referents of the teleological differences between Kaladin and this other persons particular value judgements are not the same at all. Therefore, this "principle" does not apply. Louie said: And that specific difference negates the equation of Kaladins specific ethical premises with this other persons as an instance of this "principle", as I understand it. Also, any definition of value that does not root itself in the rational self interest of live preserving action is false. This is true along with the fact that there is a general concept of value as against the particular context of ones personal value choices.

Louie said: Which is the "other definition" you are referring to? This whole thread is confusing because Kaladin is pointing at two different sets of values from two different teleological measurers. The "two definitions" are from completely different ethical contexts and therefore it does not seem relevant to Dr. Peikoff's "principle" (from what I can derive from Grames notes and comments from his older thread on the same topic) : When Ms. Rand discusses definition change in ITOE it is from within a single persons framework and their context of knowledge. So far I don't see this "principle" as even necessary epistemologically. I'll download the lecture to make certain.

Mike, its not clear who and what you are responding to.

Kaladin said: I dont see this as an instance of the "principle of 2 definitions". I see this as simply a context of a general instance of a concept and a particular instance of the same concept. A value is something one acts to gain and or keep. To satisfy this range of measurents one must have something one acts to gain and keep but may persue anything as an object to be gained and kept. Your particular values have specific measurements that fall within the general range of value as such. Understanding this will help to avoid the fallacy of the frozen abstraction. http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/frozen_abstraction,_fallacy_of.html

Rand defines measurement it the section of ITOE titled "Cognition and Measurement". I don't see anything there that would require her to define beyond what any dictionary could provide one about what a quantity is, or a relationship.

I'm curious Mike, are you interested in Objectivism as a system of factual identifications, or are you just working to obtain ideational fluency? Either way, your doing a good job.

SK said: Why should anyone "suppose" any of this? What philosophical principle leads one to do so? What evidence is there that it is "possible" one can decompose any entity into a shapeless boundary that acts? I have a bunch of catch up posts to do. Particularly about mischaracterizations of my 5 answers. I will try to do so tonight.