Eiuol

Not necessarily. Broken unit applies to units that lack an essential feature, as well as units that lack features that they are supposed to have, teleologically speaking. In the thread Dante linked: Later on in the thread, "deaf man" is an example of a broken unit, so in some sense, medicine largely involves the study of broken units. Any person should be able to hear, in terms of biology. I believe part of the justification for the idea of broken unit is that attributes cannot be separated from a unit. If you split a rock in half, you can say that you have two rocks, or that the rock is split. If you split a computer into many pieces, you can't say there are many computers. As a unit, there is no more computer. Lacking a motherboard, though, would not mean there is no computer. The point here is that even if a computer lacks things it really should have that impact its functioning as an entity, it's still a computer. Lacking essentials always impacts functioning, while nonessentials might, or might not. Hair color has no bearing on the functioning of people, so varying hair colors won't lead to brokenness. I agree, though, that attributes themselves cannot be broken. That really depends on the causal relationship between sex and gender. Anyone who takes the view that there is a causal relationship between sex and gender probably would say that sex is the encompassing concept while gender would be a resulting psychological attribute. Some may say that. being male leads to certain levels of testosterone, which leads to masculine behavior. If it is true, then [blank] gender would be an example of a broken unit, caused by a lack of testosterone (or whatever leads to genderized behavior). Whether or not this ought to be fixed depends upon if the consequences have a negative impact on one's life. I'd bet there would be no negative consequences, so it wouldn't need to be fixed. Still, the question matters to the extent of whether or not there are negative consequences. Part of the reason I think there is no causal relationship between sex and gender is the variation I've seen in how strongly people identify with their gender. I usually think of myself as having a weak gender identity, while some people have a strong gender identity, but neither type of person is impacted much in terms of how they function. The only impact gender seems to have on functioning is with how values are pursued.

Having thought about the idea of "broken unit" more, I do not think it would apply to attributes that are due to choice. Being a Marxist is a choice, as is being a Christian or even a Scientologist. What would a "broken unit" of a Christian be? A Mormon? We can argue into the finer details of conceptual hierarchy about whether or not Mormon is properly a species of Christian, but the point I'm making is that for chosen viewpoints and/or non-concrete abstractions (i.e. justice) don't have broken units. Lacking some important features seems to really only move the concept around in hierarchy, or modify the concept's definition. Broken seems to only be relevant in the cases where choice is not directly part of the equation (e.g. tires, apples, genetic traits, some psychological disorders/problems, medical conditions). My reasoning is that concrete entities or anything close to concrete is meant, by nature, to function a particular way. Certainly, philosophical concepts have a nature and function, so my point is that variation may be more acceptable and even epistemologically necessary in order to interact with physical entities on a direct level. Trying to consider any person with a medical flaw as inhuman would be an epistemological nightmare, as would a dog with three legs being declared a "nondog". Or that a flat tire is a "nontire". Those types of aspects can be theoretically fixed, like if someone discovered a cure for diabetes. Even if fixing is impossible, all of these entities still maintain clear semblance to what they are supposed to do in normal circumstances. Perceptually, there is enough to not establish a whole separate category for these broken units. With psychological traits/personal aspects, this is difficult to break apart. Personal aspects are anything like choosing one's moral code, while psychological traits are things like cognitive ability. Personal aspects on their own may be immoral, as anyone here would say about choosing an altruistic morality. But psychological traits are not immoral on their own because they are largely not up to choice; cognitive ability caused by certain psychological traits isn't immoral on its own. A person with dyslexia, for example, is not inherently immoral. If that person fails to take into account their dyslexia into their life and doesn't make proper considerations for their circumstance, then that is immoral. Is a moral code of altruism a "broken unit" of a proper moral code? I say no, as treating altruism on its own terms is epistemologically important. Is someone with bipolar disorder a "broken unit"? I'd say so, because for all intents and purposes, a person with dyslexia is as human as anyone else for interaction, yet dyslexia is an abnormal condition, in the same way a physical disability is an abnormal condition. As was said earlier, thinking about people on an individual level is what's important, not whether or not they conform to the statistical norm. But figuring out cases of a "broken unit" is important to figuring out what actions a person can take in order to be moral. A dyslexic would value knowing they are dyslexic for purposes of adaptation. The "brokenness" isn't immoral, though. An on the other hand, one can help being altruistic, so it's possible to condemn that choice for being totally up to individual choice. At the same time, it's possible to praise choosing egoism. Where does gender fall? I think it primarily falls under individual choice, so "broken units" in gender don't make sense. Any justification I've seen for masculinity/femininity have been based on someone being male or female, which often seems like begging the question. If gender falls in the other category, then it is still treated like any "broken unit": becoming fixed isn't always obligatory, but making one's life as good as possible given the circumstances is. (I think from now on I'll say "deviant unit", I don't like the connotation of broken when it involves people.)

You are right on that, so to rephrase: I am not aware of any evidence that suggests autistic people are prone to extreme bouts of violence (i.e. a shooting spree) by nature of autism. I am indeed aware that some autistic children are aggressive and/or violent, but that's different than the violence we are discussing.

It's fine to wonder if prematurity leads to autism, but that has nothing to do with this shooting because autism isn't associated with violent behavior at all.

Are you suggesting that prematurity may lead to autism, which then leads to acting violent?

I wasn't refrering to this case specifically. I realize he took his mother's guns, so gun regulation is a moot point. I notice now my error about semi-automatics, I somehow in my mind got mixed up, but in any case, I still doubt teachers would be carrying around guns in an elementary school. Who gets to decide the purpose for a nuclear weapon? Or any government? Implicitly, with your reply about nukes, you are saying that some weapons may be regulated. My previous post was only pointing out why I believed your argument was no good. It failed to account for the fact that guns are tools of force, so your argument is at best incomplete. Tools or methods of force (i.e. private defense firms) ought to be regulated because no one has a "right" to use force as they please. Self-defense is the only time force should be permitted. Consider linking this discussion on gun control to discussions on anarchy. Why can't I just run a private defense firm? I don't think it's possible to argue for absolutely no regulation of weapons without accepting that in principle you'd be accepting anarchy. All I'm really asking for is what principle you are using to determine that a private citizen should not own nuclear weapons, and why guns are excluded. Is it the level of potential damage, or something else?

Definitely, that was the point the sentence following the one you quoted. For the most part, I see "broken units" as an aspect of variability within concepts which for people results in different conclusions to make for ethical decisions. I can apply principles, but the particulars are unique. Of course the primary concern is as an individual, yet categorizing can help make decisions about life. A diabetic is classified as such so that he knows that insulin is an ethical need to the extent insulin maintains his health. I doubt though that gender is even an important attribute, and might be better left as a cultural concept, just as a subculture works. For some people, a broken unit wouldn't apply to them if gender is left as a cultural concept, because they were never part of the concept in the first place. You personally wouldn't be a broken unit of Marxist, because you aren't some altered form of Marxist - you're simply not a Marxist in any sense.

Against semi-automatics? Doubtful, and I would wonder if adults would just be carrying around guns in an elementary school. I would actually avoid bringing a gun to an elementary school in case a *child* gets hold of a gun accidentally. Just to be clear though, I don't have anything against concealed weapons really, provided that a person passes background checks or any regulations. Not very well, apparently. Stop at premise 1 or 2. You must consider the purpose of guns in particular, which is killing. For most forms of property, the purpose isn't for killing or other actions that may be an initiation of force. The purpose of a car is transportation, despite the fact it can be used to kill. A person ought to have a right to dispose of their car in any manner, as long as it's not an initiation of force. The issue with guns is that they are built for force, the very thing that is often a rights violation. Considering that government ought to have a monopoly on force in the name of protecting rights, along with disallowing vigilantism, guns pose a unique issue. Self-defense is proper, but on the other hand, it is not proper to wield weapons in an identical manner as other property given what weapons *are*. Different considerations must be made for the methods of using force, including guns, nuclear weapons, tanks, rocket launchers, etc. Even considerations for private defense agencies are quite similar to the use of guns I find. Do you agree that private citizens should not be allowed to own nuclear weapons? If so, why should government be allowed to regulate nukes, but not guns?

To be clear, I'm not blaming guns per se, I'm saying regulation of guns may be justified on the premise that guns are intended to kill another person. The beneficial purpose of killing is only in self-defense, but another reasonably possible way to use a gun is to initiate force. The bottom line is that guns are tools of force, and force is actually the only type of thing that may be regulated in an Objectivist society. Government would essentially be in charge of how force may be used, and self-defense is a proper way to use force. Regulation to the extent of certification after a psychological evaluation may be proper, or whatever system is decided upon. Other weapons would be outright banned, like nuclear weapons.

Obesity isn't ever an initiation of force. Killing people can be.

One other comment... This comparison is bad. Spoons are made in order to eat, which by nature isn't an initiation of force. Guns are made in order to kill, which is either self-defense or initiation of force. Someone buying a gun in order to initiate force is a realistic possibility, as is the possibility of buying a gun for self-defense. Buying a spoon in order to initiate force is totally implausible. Guns make violence possible, and without a gun, a person is severely constrained. My idea here is that guns should be regulated, and semi-automatics probably should be banned except for rare circumstances. By regulation, I mean oversight of who can and cannot purchase guns to assure that person's purpose for the gun is explicitly self-defense. Guns are tools for *killing* people.

Heh, when I first noticed the thread, I thought how seeing the word gender in a thread title is like a signal for me to post. "If there is any truth to the contention that certain things are generally true for the member of a gender (i.e. Poison X is bad to drink, and women ought not seek the Presidency), don't we counsel our own destruction when we continue to apply this derivative thinking to individuals to whom these things do not, in reality, apply" Sure, but before talking about what is true for gender at all requires specifying what gender means, and proposing essentials to the concept. Ethics have to be applied to personal circumstances through principles, so for gender to be part of developing any ethical principle depends upon knowing what gender specifically refers to. A lot of the time I think culture has a massive influence on raising kids, and leading them to adopt genderized behavior. While that may be interesting sociologically speaking, in terms of ethics that is mostly irrelevant - society isn't a basis for ethical principles. Anyone who accepts Objectivist ethics wouldn't care if their behavior conforms to society, only if it conforms to pursuing values and one's own life. For psychological interpretations of gender, that requires expertise or background, and evidence. Studies are even better. Dante stated a similar idea, I think, by saying that simply theorizing is insufficient. That's true for any statement regarding reality, whether its physics or psychology. I should say that some studies are questionable because of poor statistical methodology that generalizes far too much, and extends too far. Are there differences between genders for spatial processing? Perhaps; I haven't seen many studies. Even if there are, how significant are the differences in daily life? The differences might not be noteworthy, even if statistically significant. There is likely more overlap than people on average care to acknowledge, but I need to read more on the subject. There are scientific questions that need to be answered. Suppose a fundamental characteristic of gender (i.e. masculinity, femininity) was discovered. Whatever it could be still doesn't quite warrant ethical considerations about what behaviors to take, because broken units exist. A person has to be established as a non-broken unit before anyone can make a proclamation of immoral behavior. For instance, I think of how telling someone in a wheelchair to work out more to be able to walk again has moral weight to it if the person can be expected to recover, but it is meaningless if the person is that way due to genetic disease. DonAthos, I think you misunderstood the point of a "broken unit". Changing the terminology to "abnormal unit" may make more sense, it really doesn't matter. A person being born diabetic is a broken unit to the extent any human should be able to produce insulin, but this individual does not. The difference isn't enough to suggest a diabetic is inhuman, but enough of a difference to be diagnosed with a disease that negatively impacts survival/existence. In the case of gender, "survival" of the unit as it doesn't have to do with dying per se, only whether or not a person has even the non-essential characteristics. If someone is a broken unit for whatever reason (e.g. transgender because of XXY chromosomes), then different behaviors become necessary than would normally be expected of anyone else.

Fine, but you haven't backed up your assertions or answered several questions addressed at your posts.

I'm sure you meant this, but I think you meant to say they believe it absolves them of personal responsibility. But as far as I know, the people who take medication usually take it as a matter of personal responsibility because they are able to think better, alongside seeing a psychologist. Indeed, some psychiatrists fail as doctors, and just give any med that seems to treat the symptoms, which is bad medical practice! You don't have any evidence that psychotropics *frequently* make things worse. I'm really surprised Grames posted that video, because the source is terrible.

I'm not sure what it is that you're missing in what I said. You're saying that the solution is not a drug alone. This is true. Drugs alone aren't a solution, but they can be part of the solution. I don't advocate non-adults from taking psychiatric meds, but some psychological problems can be in large part due to a real problem in the brain. I don't know if you've known anyone bipolar, but that's a kind of issue where medication is needed on top of psychological treatment. By needed, I mean without which they may actually harm themselves or others. In most cases, that harm will be immoral. So, part of fixing the problem is taking some medication to better control the harmful thoughts or obsessions, just as the psychological treatment that goes with it is for helping to control those thoughts. I said doctors aren't after fixing the moral problems of a person, because part of their job is to just fix the problem. Fixing problems helps a person to get on the road to moral and personal success, by enabling them to be healthier. That isn't to say all psychiatrists are good doctors, though.

What I mean is that I can't tell if you're saying drugs for treating psychological medical conditions are across the board bad, or if you are saying failing to use psychological treatment in conjunction with medication is bad. I agree with the latter, but not the former. Psychological issues do not necessarily represent a failed education of morality, or even a person failure of being moral. Medication is not supposed to be a chemical solution to immorality, because psychological problems are not considered moral problems by a doctor. A doctor should care about treating a disorder, not about fixing moral failings. Anything related to morality is an individual issue. However, maladaptive thinking patterns interfere with self-improvement, thinking patterns that require further treatment along with medication. That doesn't excuse the shooting, but mental health is too often ignored by doctors who fail to do their due diligence for treating their patients.

Taking drugs for mental conditions is no problem, the problem is if he may have taken medication *without* proper psychological treatment at the same time. Even still, what does that have to do with what led him to go on a shooting spree? I don't see how too much reliance on drugs led to this event, unless you mean some doctors may have thought "he's medicated, my job is done".

I agree with your points overall, but no, I don't think Darrel is thinking of "Going Galt" as a collective decision. The first line you quoted doesn't seem to be an argument at all, just a statement of opinion. Actually, that sounds like Dagny's reasoning in Atlas Shrugged about why she refused to ever give up on Taggart Transcontinental. Her attitude was "try harder if things get bad" probably in part because of a belief that it's bad to ever leave anything before its last moment. Of course, she learned otherwise over time. I wouldn't consider moving to Singapore "going Galt", though.

Why do you want to qualify for a better job?

You could also say "there would be no reason for the state to kill a killer". I think the point of Kate's question is why should enacting justice include subjecting a criminal to the same act they committed.

Like breaking up with anyone: being openly honest, explaining the sufficient reasons to break up. This doesn't have to involve totally excising the other person from your life at all, even if the one being broken up with would be sad for a while. John could remain friends with Maggie if he so chose, and given that you proposed no notable relationship problems in the scenario, I have no reason to suppose a lasting friendship would be impossible. Preference for exclusivity isn't important here, though. I'm assuming that whatever the preference is, the difference in value between Maggie and Anna is so significant that John would find breaking the romantic relationship with Maggie as the most honest action to take. Hairnet, I understand you spoke of potential. I took that into account earlier by saying that a great value can be attained by pursuing a potential, even if it's a risk to some extent. So many things are potential values in life that if all one ever pursued is guarantees, no grand values can ever be attained. John pursuing Maggie at first would have been a potential as well, just like any relationship. John deciding to pursue Anna would be equally a potential, except that considerations mentioned in FeatherFall's post would have a heavy weight on how to consider new potentials. When there are long-term joint activities, there is a lot more to lose out of being mistaken, so if two people buy a house, that probably reflects a degree of valuation. It reflects a degree that a relationship is viewed to be long-term. Having children is another way to reflect degree of valuation in a relationship, where there is a considerable amount of integrated values. There are other ways to reflect degree of value. FeatherFall, I don't follow what you mean by asking if there are times when the introspection I mentioned is inappropriate. I read that as "are there times when thinking is inappropriate" to which I'd reply "No."

She said "that one's on me" at the end. For all I know, she paid for the doughnuts, rendering your point moot.

I do not mean to suggest "throwing" anyone away as though they lose all value entirely, nor do I like that characterization. I'll start by answering your question about the John/Maggie/Anna scenario. With that scenario, I'll be keeping in mind that you said nothing in particular is wrong with John's relationship with Maggie, and it qualifies as the relationship A in my example. So, why would John ever conceivably break up with Maggie? Well, it's rather simple - John feels a greater connection to Anna than with Maggie. Values are discovered, not decided upon, meaning that perhaps John's value hierarchy has changed. Without ever meeting Anna, how could John possibly discover a value that is significantly greater than Maggie? Sitting down and introspecting earlier about Maggie wouldn't be able to reveal much, especially since my premise is that only discovering new values will alter existing values. Another possibility is noting a mistake that John only comes to notice after meeting Anna. In either case, no one can know their needs as though it's just "out there" and nothing less than platonic perfection is acceptable. The idea of discovering values, though, is almost exactly what happened with Dagny. She was quite attracted to Rearden, clearly, and knew nothing about Galt. Introspecting wouldn't somehow indicate Rearden is not worth her time or incompatible. But then, she meets Galt! At that point, it is absolutely possible to introspect, make a comparison between values, and discover: "aha! I like Galt so much more, even though Rearden is a fantastic person." Rearden wasn't thrown to the curb as though he never existed. (I couldn't help but notice this after reading Bluecherry's previous post, and it is relevant to the point I want to make.) Going back to the Maggie/John/Anna scenario, John isn't necessarily bordering on cheating, lacking introspection, or impulsive. Go more abstract than the immediacy one relationship ending and another starting. Values as a whole should be pursued once they are evaluated to be better than an alternative. That's how any value is discovered: comparison between alternatives, and experiencing the relevant values. I'd even say not pursuing a better alternative is self-sacrificial, substituting a greater value for a lesser value. True, you said potential, that's why picking a new relationship is no simple task. Sometimes, great value can be gained from pursuing a potential. A risk, I could say (albeit, it should only be taken if it's almost a certainty it's too important to take lightly). The bottom line is that values change over the course of a lifetime.

Reading the Wikipedia suggests that you're wrong, that Rand didn't come up with the term. I'm aware that she defined it uniquely and had other unique considerations, but is it accurate to say she came up with it? Or do you mean others may have said romantic realism, but Rand spoke of a *particular* viewpoint that is more specific than others?

Suppose you are in relationship A. It's going on alright, and is actually satisfying. You see potential for relationship B that is *more* satisfying than A. Having that comparison in mind, A becomes unsatisfying to the degree that A is inferior to B. Realizing one relationship will likely be better than another can create a feeling of unsatisfaction. Satisfaction depends on both alternatives and nature of current values. I simply don't understand this part. I believe you're saying that one shouldn't be in an unsatisfying relationship. So breaking up is best in that circumstance. This is true if the relationship is relatively unfixable or not worth the effort to fix. Keep in mind, though, that unsatisfaction can be due to noting new alternatives as well, so something with greater potential ought to be pursued. If one is looking while in a relationship, that isn't necessarily dishonest - some people would say that multiple romantic relationships at once is perfectly moral. Sure, dishonest cases would involve lying and secrecy, but that doesn't have to be the case.