Invention and measurement omission

[John McVey]

From the concept-of-the-universe thread...

Yup. That is the essential difference between the proper name "The Solar System" and a concept "Solar System".

This actually reminds me of a question I have had in the back of my mind for a long time. I have a rough answer, but I never got around to dealing with it properly.

Someone came up with the idea of a solar system, conceptualising it, long before there was proof that planets outside our system existed. Accordingly, it had long been a staple of science-fiction. There was a valid concept before there were known two or more actual instances to omit the measurements of (which, specifically, would be the actual nature of the planets etc on around their respective stars). There is a parallel to this phenomenon in another branch of science: invention of new devices. A concept for a class of existents is created before there are two or more instances of it, often before there are any instances at all. How, then, is the concept validly formed?

This question has been almost-asked here before, but RSalar's question wasn't directly about the process of concept-formation in regards to an invention (it is merely asserted in post 56 that it is a concept). So, that thread doesn't real with the particular issues I have in mind.

Consider RSalar's inventor of the screw and the screwdriver, as written up by Featherfall:

When the screwdriver inventor was busy making this new tool, she would have had to first have a goal: Creating a new object that drives a spike like object into another material. Alternately, find a way to hang a picture without a hammer. Her creation in progress can be crudely tagged (named), "the means to my end."

She would go about creating it by systematically working with the different parts of the means to the end on a perceptual level; It needs to drive a spike into wood, if it used direct force to drive the spike it would be a hammer, a different way to drive the spike would be to alter forces through rotational leverage, the spike needs to have a spiral outer structure to accommodate this...

While she is thinking, she will begin to redefine her terms. Because this "spike" is significantly different than a nail, it deserves its own name. She calls "the means to her end" by a new name, "screw." She continues to think:

Once the screw is spinning it can drive itself in with a spiral structure, it is too small for me to spin it alone so it needs its own version of a hammer.

She again redefines her terms. Because the screw is different than a nail, the new tool will necessarily be different than a hammer. She begins to call this new tool in progress by its defining characteristic "screwdriver." This is included with the other new concept "screw" as the replacement for "the means to her end."

In order for the screwdriver to spin the screw they must interface somehow, they can interface through interlocking structure in the screw head and object point, in order to do this both materials must be more durable than the objects they penetrate, etc...

She again redefines her terms. This time she does not need to re-label them, because nothing essential has changed, only the shape of the dual means to her end.

All that is well and good, but refers specifically to the particular objects she is making and thinking of. The issue is not the one object she is making but her potential realisation that what she has invented is an entire class of objects. During the process of making her new nail-replacement device to hang a picture up with she may well realise that there is an entire class of ends that can be served by the same rotational-leverage principle she is making use of. She can think of the same principle applied to nail-replacements of different sizes, different thread dimensions, different materials for different applications, and so on, all while as yet not even finished making the first concrete instance to serve her end of the moment. If she doesn't have that realisation then the other posters are right to say that the name she gives to the object she creates is not a word designating a concept but just a proper name - but what if she does realise the potential? Is that a concept, and if so, where is the measurement omission prior to there being any concrete instances having measurements that can be omitted?

The answer I have come up with so far is that it is a special case of measurement omission, where the difference lies in the source of the measurements thus omitted. The inventor has not just a specific task in mind to be performed by the invention, but an entire class of those tasks. The inventor can create a valid concept for a whole class of objects, even before any instances are produced, because he knows in advance what is essential and what is not, using the needs of the task as the standard of measurement. Instead of looking at the concretes, measuring them and then omitting the measurements, the inventor instead looks at concretes, measures them, formulates other measurements based on the first measurements, and then those formulated measurements are omitted as required. In this fashion, for instance, the inventor of the screw can validly form the concept of the screw because she omits the measurement of the kind of materials from which a screw could be made or the various dimensions of threads etc, but validly makes those measurements to be omitted because she draws them from real measurements of the materials involved as she finds them in reality.

Far from being an exception to the normal process of concept formation, conceptualisation of inventions is utterly dependent on that process and its proper enactment: the inventor has to at one stroke identify a valid conceptual common denominator as a basis for differentiation and integration, identify two or more valid potential measurements that actually exist in reality that are then to be omitted, imagine not just a concrete prototype for a concrete end but recognition of it as a unit, imagine additional units that can exist in reality and so do the job where that can-exist part comes from their imagined measurements' relationships to the actual measurements of real applications, integrate those units into a concept by omitting the imagine measurements prior formulated on the basis of the actual measurements of applications and integrating the units into a concept on the basis of the CCD, and then create a word (or a few words) to signify that concept. Again, what differs is only that the actual measurements of reality involved are of the applications of the invention rather than units of the invention. The difference is one of content, not method.

The need for the full concept formation process holds not only for the particular concept of the invention but in the formulation of the theory behind the task and of every crucial concept that went into it - that holds all the time, of course, but for an invention this is critical if the formulated measurements and imagined additional units are to be grounded in reality. A breach of strictest rationality and reality-adherence at any point would totally invalidate the concept and the invention would be a failure: for instance, failing to consider the strength of a given material from which a screw to suit a given application can be made, might lead to collapse of what is held up by it. Similarly, the concept of a solar system could be valid before knowing of the existence of others besides our own only after scientific investigation of how that the sun is is in fact just one star among many rather than something sui generis as had previously been thought, how our solar system and its constituents were formed, how since the laws of nature are universal there's no reason why the same laws could not have also been at work with the same types of materials we know to exist elsewhere, and so on.

Are there any errors or deficiencies to point out, has someone already said this, or are there other general comments?

JJM

[brian0918]

How do you then go back and apply what you've said to your original situation - the concept of a planetary system before other planetary systems were discovered? You've written the whole thing in the context of an "inventor" with "intended purposes" in mind. But that makes no sense to an astronomer trying to understand the universe. Surely there was a concept of a "planetary system" even though we only had our one system to measure. We could imagine systems with more or fewer planets. Is this the same as "intended purpose" though? What is the intended purpose of forming a concept of a planetary system when you can't be the inventor of one? Some of the systems we have discovered since, I don't know that people ever imagined - such as gas giants with orbits smaller than Mercury, circling their stars every few hours.

[D'kian]

This actually reminds me of a question I have had in the back of my mind for a long time. I have a rough answer, but I never got around to dealing with it properly.

Someone came up with the idea of a solar system, conceptualising it, long before there was proof that planets outside our system existed.

The existence of planets outside our soalr system isn't necessary.

Let's go back a bit. Before we even knew what the Soalr System was like, people knew about the motions among heavenly bodies. The Sun and Moon are the most easily noticed, but then they are the only heavenly objects that show as more than pinpoints of light to the naked eye. The stars are fixed. There were also five "stars" that moved against the background of fixed stars. The Greeks called them "wondering stars" (aster planetes; therefore the term planet), and anmed them after various Greek gods (Hermes, Aphrodite, Ares, Zeus and Chronos). Along with the Sun and Moon, they are known as the "Seven Traditional Planets," that si the seven wondering heavenly bodies visible to the naked eye (that's why the week has seven days, BTW, each named after one of the Traditionals, but I digress).

And that's the oldest notion of a solar system we have.

Of course the Greeks, along with everyone else, thought these all revolved around the Earth (in various complex fashions that included perfectly transparent spheres, but that's not relevant right now). Eventually science developed a true picture of the Solar System as the various planets revolving around the Sun. Eventually more planets were found, too, thanks to the invention of the telescope and Newton's development of the theory of universal gravitation.

But centuries ago we knew what the Soalr System looked like.

Then science found out stars were objects like the Sun, but much farther off. Therefore we see them like pinpoints of light, although they are, like the sun, gigantic spheres of hot gas.

Science also found that the laws of physics are universal. That is, they apply to all things in all places.

Combine the three, and it makes sense to suppose there exist other solar systems around other stars, even if you don't know for certain there exist planets around other stars.

Of course astronomers have by now found planets around other stars. Very odd planets that are nothing like the ones in the Solar System we call home. But there's a perfectly logical explanation for that as well.

Accordingly, it had long been a staple of science-fiction. There was a valid concept before there were known two or more actual instances to omit the measurements of

There are many staples of science fiction. Some were bound to be possible if only because there are so many. I love SF, but chance explains most of the correct predictions. Not all, though, as some authors are rigorous about how they apply science, at least in certain works (Clarke and Niven to mention two).

[brian0918]

The existence of planets outside our soalr system isn't necessary.

Let's go back a bit. Before we even knew what the Soalr System was like, people knew about the motions among heavenly bodies. The Sun and Moon are the most easily noticed, but then they are the only heavenly objects that show as more than pinpoints of light to the naked eye. The stars are fixed. There were also five "stars" that moved against the background of fixed stars. The Greeks called them "wondering stars" (aster planetes; therefore the term planet), and anmed them after various Greek gods (Hermes, Aphrodite, Ares, Zeus and Chronos). Along with the Sun and Moon, they are known as the "Seven Traditional Planets," that si the seven wondering heavenly bodies visible to the naked eye (that's why the week has seven days, BTW, each named after one of the Traditionals, but I digress).

And that's the oldest notion of a solar system we have.

Of course the Greeks, along with everyone else, thought these all revolved around the Earth (in various complex fashions that included perfectly transparent spheres, but that's not relevant right now). Eventually science developed a true picture of the Solar System as the various planets revolving around the Sun. Eventually more planets were found, too, thanks to the invention of the telescope and Newton's development of the theory of universal gravitation.

But centuries ago we knew what the Soalr System looked like.

Then science found out stars were objects like the Sun, but much farther off. Therefore we see them like pinpoints of light, although they are, like the sun, gigantic spheres of hot gas.

Science also found that the laws of physics are universal. That is, they apply to all things in all places.

Combine the three, and it makes sense to suppose there exist other solar systems around other stars, even if you don't know for certain there exist planets around other stars.

Of course astronomers have by now found planets around other stars. Very odd planets that are nothing like the ones in the Solar System we call home. But there's a perfectly logical explanation for that as well.

There are many staples of science fiction. Some were bound to be possible if only because there are so many. I love SF, but chance explains most of the correct predictions. Not all, though, as some authors are rigorous about how they apply science, at least in certain works (Clarke and Niven to mention two).

I think the point John McVey is trying to make is that, if "measurement omission" is the only means to form a concept, then how were all these concepts of which you speak formed, since there were not two existing examples of any of them. Rand's "measurement omission" visual works fine as long as you're talking about comparing physical objects, and creating a concept from them. But is that the only way concepts can be formed, and if so, how do you account for everything you've said about the history of astronomical research?

The same goes for atomic research. We have a concept of a Higgs boson, despite never finding one, right? If we ever do find a particle that fits all of the predicted measurements of a Higgs boson, we will then apply the label "Higgs boson" to that. But is it a concept yet if we've only managed to produce one such example of the particle in reality.

Edited July 25, 2008 by brian0918

[DavidOdden]

Someone came up with the idea of a solar system, conceptualising it, long before there was proof that planets outside our system existed. Accordingly, it had long been a staple of science-fiction.

The term seems to have originated in the beginning of the 18th century, but I think the Halley-type identification was purly a proper name concrete, and the generalized solar system comes from the discovery that stars are suns like ours (in the 19th century, due to spectroscopic comparison of sun and star light).

There was a valid concept before there were known two or more actual instances to omit the measurements of (which, specifically, would be the actual nature of the planets etc on around their respective stars).

It would be valid to combine the knowledge that our sun has planets and comets, that there are other suns out there, that there is a law-like causal relationship between the sun and the stuff orbiting it, and that physical laws are not locally-arbitrary. This grounds the existential claim about other systems like but different from our system in reality. Now comes the "edit".

Instead of looking at the concretes, measuring them and then omitting the measurements, the inventor instead looks at concretes, measures them, formulates other measurements based on the first measurements, and then those formulated measurements are omitted as required.

I want to see the word "law" in this discussion. Specifically, I'm looking for the part where an inventor takes a law of reality plus a concrete observation and creates a consequence. We can ground the invention of the light bulb in Davy's creation of a platinum filment lamp, which unites the idea of stored electricity, ancient concepts of heat / light relation, and grasping a connection between heat and electricity. Omission of measurements is implicit in the most important concept behind any invention, namely "law", which is a specific statement of "causality". Therefore I think notions of measurement omission are less obvious (and massively pervasive) in an investigation of invention because inventions rely on causality (which is really hard to do without).

I propose that invention works roughly like this. Start with some known laws and observations; add a curious instance (the warmth of a lightning rod after it has been struck); notice a possible cause (lightning just hit); suppose that the change in temperature was caused (axiomatically) and integrate that with lightning, leading to a possible generalization about lightning and heat; integrate that with other laws about the relationship of lightning and electricity and propose a specific regarding electricity and heat. (This is fiction here -- I don't know how these relationships were actually discovered).

My main point is that the idea of physical law subsumes measurement omission, and that physical law is mandatory for there to be such a thing as an invention.

[brian0918]

It would be valid to combine the knowledge that our sun has planets and comets, that there are other suns out there, that there is a law-like causal relationship between the sun and the stuff orbiting it, and that physical laws are not locally-arbitrary. This grounds the existential claim about other systems like but different from our system in reality. Now comes the "edit".

I think that's an accurate analysis. I just don't see how that relates to what I understand to be a strict explanation of concept formation - measurement omission from two or more existing objects that are to become part of the concept.

Edited July 25, 2008 by brian0918

[D'kian]

I think the point John McVey is trying to make is that, if "measurement omission" is the only means to form a concept, then how were all these concepts of which you speak formed, since there were not two existing examples of any of them.

Oh, well, the Greeks thought they were describing the Universe (or the Kosmos). They thought the stars were luminous points stuck on a transparent sphere, with the Seven Planets moving on spheres of their own, each eprfectly transparent, about the Earth (which they knew to be round). This idea persisted for a very long time, even after the invention of the telescope.

I forget exactly when other galaxies were discovered, but it must have been less than 150 years ago. Until then it was thought the Milky Way was the totality of the Universe (IIRC an American astronomer actually discovered the Andromeda Nebula was a far away galaxy rather than a nearer dust cloud).

But even before then, the notion of other solar systems was a natural one given the knowledge of what stars actually are. That happened shortly after the invention of the telescope and Newton's discovery of light spectra.

The same goes for atomic research. We have a concept of a Higgs boson, despite never finding one, right? If we ever do find a particle that fits all of the predicted measurements of a Higgs boson, we will then apply the label "Higgs boson" to that. But is it a concept yet if we've only managed to produce one such example of the particle in reality.

Yes. We call such concepts hypothetical.

[DavidOdden]

I just don't see how that relates to what I understand to be a strict explanation of concept formation - measurement omission from two or more existing objects that are to become part of the concept.

It allows you to infer the existence of multiple instantiations of the law. It would not be necessary to observe two instances of "conservation of charge" to form such a concept (were you to actually wish to form an actual concept "Graldax" meaning "conservation of charge"). It would suffice to make a single observation and combine that with causality to arrive at a law, which is that concept. The various laws of physics that give rise to our solar system are not expressed in very specific "this is true here and only here" terms, so from those laws, you can compute that the existence of other stars means the existence of other planets or comets. If we had no knowledge of laws of physics or had no reason to think that there are other suns out there, then "solar system" as a concept would be like "gremlin" as a concept.

[brian0918]

Yes. We call such concepts hypothetical.

But what are these pictures in my head - of Higgs bosons, of other planets sustaining life - if not concepts? What's the word for them?

It allows you to infer the existence of multiple instantiations of the law. It would not be necessary to observe two instances of "conservation of charge" to form such a concept (were you to actually wish to form an actual concept "Graldax" meaning "conservation of charge"). It would suffice to make a single observation and combine that with causality to arrive at a law, which is that concept. The various laws of physics that give rise to our solar system are not expressed in very specific "this is true here and only here" terms, so from those laws, you can compute that the existence of other stars means the existence of other planets or comets. If we had no knowledge of laws of physics or had no reason to think that there are other suns out there, then "solar system" as a concept would be like "gremlin" as a concept.

From this then we must conclude that either these "concepts" that we are forming from hypothetical instances are not concepts - but something similar -, or that the measurement omission explanation of concept formation is incomplete or wrong.

[DavidOdden]

From this then we must conclude that either these "concepts" that we are forming from hypothetical instances are not concepts - but something similar -, or that the measurement omission explanation of concept formation is incomplete or wrong.

Why? If you can imagine this and this, you have the stuff for a concept.

[brian0918]

Why? If you can imagine this and this, you have the stuff for a concept.

So measurement omission does not need to be the omission of measurement from existing things? They can be imagined things, either pictured in your head, or on paper? Doesn't that become problematic, if for example people with the same name for a concept, actually have two very different concepts in their heads?

Edited July 25, 2008 by brian0918

[D'kian]

But what are these pictures in my head - of Higgs bosons, of other planets sustaining life - if not concepts? What's the word for them?

The word is concept. You're trying to make it more complicated than it is. There are plenty of concepts that refer to things that are not tangible, or that do not yet exist (such as inventions), or that may not exist (such as a magnetic monopole), or even things that don't exist (such as phlogiston).

[DavidOdden]

So measurement omission does not need to be the omission of measurement from existing things?

Ideas exist. Ideas don't have mass. "3" doesn't have mass but it does exist.

Doesn't that become problematic, if for example people with the same name for a concept, actually have two very different concepts in their heads?

Naming is a separate problem, unrelated to having mass.

[brian0918]

Alright, then. I think that covers it.

[JMeganSnow]

If you can extrapolate the existence of a second or third or thousandth instance even when you only have one (or no) actual instances to omit measurements from, do you not, in fact, have plenty of material for forming a concept?

A child just learning their first concepts does not have the wealth of mental material to form concepts based on non-actual instances, sure, but adults sure do.

[Jake]

To answer the OP, I think measurement omission can happen in two ways:

1) You observe n widgets and omit the measurement of the number of widgets (n) by noting the similarity of essential characteristics (integration), thereby defining the concept 'widget.'

(n entities » 1 concept)

2) You observe 1 widget, choose the essential characteristics by which to define 'widget', and understand that if you were to observe other entities with the same essential characteristics, they are also widgets. The choice of essential characteristics depend on how the widget is dissimilar from other concepts/entities (differentiation).

(1 concept » n entities)

In the case of 'solar system', 'system' was already a validly formed concept; I'll define it roughly as "a group of bodies interacting according to a set of laws." Using 'system' as the genus and 'solar' as the differentia, a 'solar system' is "a group of planets (specific bodies) orbiting (specificly interacting) a sun (another body) according to gravitational (specific) laws." If we had never discovered that stars were other instances of the concept 'sun', then there would be only 1 instance of 'solar system', namely the Solar System, and 'solar system' might not be a particularly useful concept - though it would still be valid. If differentiation weren't a valid means to concept-formation, then 'I' would be an invalid concept.

Ideas exist. Ideas don't have mass. "3" doesn't have mass but it does exist.Naming is a separate problem, unrelated to having mass.

I was following up until this point. I understand '3' to be a concept of measurement, not an existent. Isn't Objectivist measurement omission the means by which the "Problem of Universals" was shown not to be a problem? Plato believed '3' existed, I don't think Ayn Rand did.

edit: typos

Edited July 26, 2008 by Jake

[DavidOdden]

I understand '3' to be a concept of measurement, not an existent. Isn't Objectivist measurement omission the means by which the "Problem of Universals" was shown not to be a problem? Plato believed '3' existed, I don't think Ayn Rand did.

Measurement exists, and measurements exist. In forming a specific numeric concept such as "3", the measurement that you are omitting is the particular existents of which there are three. You can take 3 lemons, 3 limes, and 3 oranges and omit the measurements "orange, lemon, lime", which leaves you with "3". In this respect, "3" is like "blue", a concept which exists but also has no mass (although it has wavelength). The difference is that I think that Plato held that "3" has an entity on some other plane of existence.

[John McVey]

It would be valid to combine the knowledge... This grounds the existential claim about other systems like but different from our system in reality.

It allows you to infer the existence of multiple instantiations of the law.

Excellent, thank you.

If you can extrapolate the existence of a second or third or thousandth instance...

That's a word I can use - thank you!

I want to see the word "law" in this discussion. Specifically, I'm looking for the part where an inventor takes a law of reality plus a concrete observation and creates a consequence. ... My main point is that the idea of physical law subsumes measurement omission, and that physical law is mandatory for there to be such a thing as an invention.

Yes. I had that implicit in my original exposition, and mentioned it a few times later. The reference should be in the heart of the exposition, specifically in the measurement-formulation section. Working from your proposal, Jenni's observation, and adding in what I think I have figured out for myself, how about the following:

- Start with some known laws and observations

- add a curious instance

- notice a possible cause of which the curious instance is a potentially valuable effect

- identify a way in which the desired effect could be replicated at will by enacting that cause or a similar cause through an object that introduces some part of the cause-effect chain; this is the first measurement-formulation part, and is dependent on strict adherence to the laws of nature to be a valid identification

- identify what is essential and what is not about the potential object insofaras as its ability to enact the cause leading to the desired effect is concerned; this is the first measurement-omission part

- on the basis of the above extrapolate the object's cause-effect abilities into a plurality of such objects and identify each as a unit; this is more of both measurement-formulation and measurement-omission, and likewise requires full adherence to the laws of nature to be a valid process

- carry out the rest of the concept-formation process upon the extrapolated units to form the concept of the class of object.

JJM

[John McVey]

I forget exactly when other galaxies were discovered, but it must have been less than 150 years ago. Until then it was thought the Milky Way was the totality of the Universe (IIRC an American astronomer actually discovered the Andromeda Nebula was a far away galaxy rather than a nearer dust cloud).

Wikipedia says it is circa 1920 and was a controversy was called The Great Debate. The scientist you're referring to is Heber Curtis, apparently. Some of the physicists on this forum could probably verify this, but from what I can recall of an English TV program "The Universe" (I think that's the one), the timing is about right. IIRC, the program also noted that Ed Hubble provided crucial data from red-shift observations, which Wikipedia also mentions.

But even before then, the notion of other solar systems was a natural one given the knowledge of what stars actually are. That happened shortly after the invention of the telescope and Newton's discovery of light spectra.

I was thinking in terms of David's distinction between real concepts and myth-concepts. Until it was proven that the sun was one star among many the idea of other solar systems was, at best, a myth concept, just as is today the myth-concept of multiple universes. What changed 'solar system' from being a myth-concept to a real one was identification of the sun as a star and of that there's no reason why the laws of nature that formed it and its planets could not also have been instantiated in relation to other stars as well. With that, as David points out, one can validly infer these other instantiations prior to observing them for real.

JJM

[softwareNerd]

So measurement omission does not need to be the omission of measurement from existing things?

I think it's easier to think in terms of similarities and differences, rather than measurement or measurement-omission. Just as we can figure out similarities and differences in real (existing) things, so we can do so with imagined things. For example, an author can come up with concepts like goblins and elves, and describe various specific examples of each in his novel. He is imagining some similarities between all the elves (something that makes them elves) and so too among the goblins.

Using the term "measurement" is a more formal and precise way of speaking about similarity and difference. The idea being that the similarities are not some arbitrary concoctions, but based on some real aspect. (This is true even if we do not understand how to measure -- e.g. colors, before people understood about wavelengths). When we speak of measurement, we're still talking about similarities and differences (and noting that they are measurable).

Finally, when we speak of elves, we imagine various ways in which they are different from goblins. However, no two elves are identical either. So, we realize that the measurements of what makes some entity an elf have certain ranges; as long as the entity falls within the right ranges of the right measurements, we consider him an elf. Within the range, we omit the measurement-differences as not being relevant to our cognitive purposes, and call them all elves.

[Jake]

Measurement exists, and measurements exist.

Oops, it looks like I need to repair my definition of 'to exist'. As I re-read OPAR, I've been taking 'existent' to be basically synonymous with 'entity'. Consciousness is a property of an entity, not an entity itself, but it obviously exists. I still don't think that every valid concept exists though. Infinity is a valid concept, but it doesn't exist. Does it?

I need to think about this more...

[DavidOdden]

I still don't think that every valid concept exists though. Infinity is a valid concept, but it doesn't exist. Does it?

The concept itself exists. What does not exist is an actual, concrete infinity of whatevers. Note the ambiguity of "it" in your question ("actual infinifity" vs. "concept of infinity").