What is O'ism's view on Existensionalism?

[Prae]

I was just wondering if Ayn Rand had an opinion on Existentialism that she wrote down. Also if any of you have opinions of Existentialism I'd like to read them.

[Bold Standard]

I don't have the text at hand, but I remember there is a passage in _Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology_ where she discusses Existentialism. She identifies the fundamental flaw of that philosophy as being dependent on what she calls "Reification of the Zero." In other words, treating nothingness as though it were a something, with specific attributes. The supposed attributes of Nothingness are then used by the Existentialist to try and prove God, or whatever dogma they are trying to push at the time.

There is another passage, I believe in _Philosophy: Who Needs It_, in which she acredits Existentialism with the destruction of modern philosophy in the schools and in popular understanding. For the exact references, and further information, I suggest looking up "Existentialism" in _The Ayn Rand Lexicon_. That's just the sort of thing that book is most usefull for.

My personal opinion of Existentialism is that it's frustrating and diffucult to pin down to one view point, kind of like Post Modernism or Feminism. I've even heard Ayn Rand refered to as an Existentialist philosopher before, on the grounds that her philosophy dealt with reality ie "existence". But in the traditional meaning of the term, as being applied to Kierkegaard, Sartre, etc, I've found Ayn Rands insights very helpfull and enlightening and, as usual, right on the money.

Leonard Peikoff discusses it a little in _The Ominous Parallels_ too, I think. At least, he discusses Neitche and Kant as they relate to the developement of German philosophy. I don't know how relevent that is, but it's such a good book, it's hard to turn down a chance to recommend it to someone.

[unskinned]

Let me know if this sounds right. I am taking (and as most of you know this also means waging an inner war with) this existentialism class. It is excruciating to read these writers "for some reason." I have to write a paper on a topic of my choice and I have been wracking my brains because somehow I can't figure out what these philosophers are saying and why I disagree. Then, all of the sudden, just when I was about to give up thinking it through and just hand something in, it hit me.

Existentialism has a main tenet which is written "existence precedes essence." "That-it-is" precedes "what-it-is." First we sort of realize something exists, then we classify it somehow. Aristotle "proceeded to put things in a box" as an existentialist teacher once put it to me. He categorized them after he knew of their existence.

There is also this quotation that I have been really struggling with, in light of Martin Heidegger's support for and eventual but puzzlingly soft core rejection of Nazism. Here it is. “Agriculture is now a motorized food industry—in essence, the same as the manufacturing of corpses in gas chambers […]” (Rockmore, 266). (this is considered Heidegger's most explicit condemnation of nazi actions after the war)

How in the hell can Being, or existence, be abstracted from beings (which are characterized by essence)? That is the question. How can you equate human beings with soil, as above. He is trying to say that the gas chambers and mechanized agriculture represent the same action: the mal treatment of Being. This is a violation of proper thinking of Being, to Heidegger, Being precedes all individuations. But would you say that, as Heidegger did, a human being still "is" even after it's essence has been removed: living, breathing, consciousness. No, this no longer IS a human being, it is a corpse. The soil is and the human being is, but you cannot abstract either from their essence and so you cannot speak of any "community of Being"being violated by agriculture.

So the conclusion I am drawing here is that, Eureka, Existence doesnt precede essence. Existence IS essence and essence is existence. When I prescribe essence I am describing reality, aspects of existents that can be boiled down to the ultimate "whatness" AND "thatness," that it exists. More specifically, existence, consciousness, and the perfect relationship between the two, identity! More simply, Existence exists.

I thought Ayn Rand was exaggerating when she was talking about these bastards and "the equality of the hangman's noose." The "community of Being" is the equality of the non-living. Martin Heidegger's support for Nazi Germany and his comment (who could possibly ask for a better alarm bell?) that we can still "be" with our loved ones after they are dead.

If you made it through this, please tell me what you think.

Edited April 7, 2005 by unskinned

[Dominique]

So the conclusion I am drawing here is that, Eureka, Existence doesnt precede essence.  Existence IS essence and essence is existence.  When I prescribe essence I am describing reality, aspects of existents that can be boiled down to the ultimate "whatness" AND "thatness," that it exists.  More specifically, existence, consciousness, and the perfect relationship between the two, identity!  More simply, Existence exists.

Well, I just finally got going in OPAR, and I had this moment reading the first chapter on the plane, much like what you describe. It's much like the moment I finally *got* that contradictions *do not exist*.

It's a beautiful moment ey?

It meant alot to me, though I'm still processing and can't offer you much here, just a shared *eureka* moment.

I think it's the same because I think I *was* essentially an existentialist (pun?). Peikoff puts it so clearly, maybe it will enhance for you to re-read it? (or is that how you came to this as I did?)

Anyway, it sounds right to me

[unskinned]

*BUMP*

Edited April 8, 2005 by unskinned

[Evangelical Capitalist]

So the conclusion I am drawing here is that, Eureka, Existence doesnt precede essence.  Existence IS essence and essence is existence.  When I prescribe essence I am describing reality, aspects of existents that can be boiled down to the ultimate "whatness" AND "thatness," that it exists.  More specifically, existence, consciousness, and the perfect relationship between the two, identity!  More simply, Existence exists.

You're absolutely correct. Existence is identity ("Identity" being Rand's term for "essence" or "whatness"). To exist is to exist as something. An entity cannot exist as nothing in particular. Since the Objectivist theory of concepts holds that the meaning of a concept lies in the set of entities which it subsumes, it is impossible to separate the concept of existence from any particular existents, as you correctly point out. (I would suggest reading ITOE for more on this, except that I haven't read it myself. I have read Dr. Peikoff's essay, "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy," which covers, at least implicitly, much of the Objectivist theory of concepts. So I can recommend that.)

This does not mean, however, that we cannot know that something exists prior to learning what it is. In fact, we must know that something is, before we can discover what it is. Our knowledge of any particular entity, or of existence, does not come in a single, blinding flash of intuition. Learning and discovery are not automatic processes; they are volitional. Since Objectivists hold to the primacy of existence, and not of conciousness, we do not confuse the operation of our consciousness with the nature of the reality which our conscioiusness perceives. That we are aware of an entity's existence prior to our discovery of the particulars of its identity, does not mean that existence precedes identity.

[punk]

Let me know if this sounds right.  I am taking (and as most of you know this also means waging an inner war with) this existentialism class.  It is excruciating to read these writers "for some reason."  I have to write a paper on a topic of my choice and I have been wracking my brains because somehow I can't figure out what these philosophers are saying and why I disagree.  Then, all of the sudden, just when I was about to give up thinking it through and just hand something in, it hit me.

Existentialism has a main tenet which is written "existence precedes essence."  "That-it-is" precedes "what-it-is."  First we sort of realize something exists, then we classify it somehow.  Aristotle "proceeded to put things in a box" as an existentialist teacher once put it to me.  He categorized them after he knew of their existence. 

There is also this quotation that I have been really struggling with, in light of Martin Heidegger's support for and eventual but puzzlingly soft core rejection of Nazism.  Here it is. “Agriculture is now a motorized food industry—in essence, the same as the manufacturing of corpses in gas chambers […]” (Rockmore, 266).  (this is considered Heidegger's most explicit condemnation of nazi actions after the war)

How in the hell can Being, or existence, be abstracted from beings (which are characterized by essence)?  That is the question.  How can you equate human beings with soil, as above.  He is trying to say that the gas chambers and mechanized agriculture represent the same action: the mal treatment of Being.  This is a violation of proper thinking of Being, to Heidegger, Being precedes all individuations.  But would you say that, as Heidegger did, a human being still "is"  even after it's essence has been removed: living, breathing, consciousness.  No, this no longer IS a human being, it is a corpse.  The soil is and the human being is, but you cannot abstract either from their essence and so you cannot speak of any "community of Being"being violated by agriculture.

So the conclusion I am drawing here is that, Eureka, Existence doesnt precede essence.  Existence IS essence and essence is existence.  When I prescribe essence I am describing reality, aspects of existents that can be boiled down to the ultimate "whatness" AND "thatness," that it exists.  More specifically, existence, consciousness, and the perfect relationship between the two, identity!  More simply, Existence exists.

I thought Ayn Rand was exaggerating when she was talking about these bastards and "the equality of the hangman's noose."  The "community of Being" is the equality of the non-living.  Martin Heidegger's support for Nazi Germany and his comment (who could possibly ask for a better alarm bell?) that we can still "be" with our loved ones after they are dead.

If you made it through this, please tell me what you think.     

I'm getting a certain confusion as to what Heidegger meant by "being" (Dasein) here. In English "being" comes to mean something like the substance or goo which things are comprised of. Heidegger is using "being" in a sense meaning the "action of being", as in the expressions "being a human", "being a dog", "being a plant". The immediate experiences that go along with being that thing. So "being" (Dasein) refers to all the experiences a person has that make them a person. It is the human experience of an individual. It is the some total of experiences the individual has to make sense of.

Ayn Rand comes closest to existentialism in "Philosophy Who Needs It?". She talks there about an astronaut landing on an alien world and having to use reason to appraise and deal with the situation. This is a variation of the existentialist/Heideggerian notion of "thrownness" (Geworfenheit). That is that the individual is thrown into a world and has to make sense of it. The (existential) choice open to the individual of how to go about doing this. Ayn Rand has here solution, Heidegger has his.

But as in the idea of the alien world the individual is faced with surroundings unknown and alien. His experience at that point is pure "being" (Dasein). He now has to learn and adapt to the situation (i.e. find the essence of things, and incorporate them within his "being in the alien world"). In this sense existence (being, Dasein) precedes essence (which must be learned by the individual).

[Hal]

I would generally agree with the 'existence precedes essence' line, but I think that 'essence' here is being used in a slightly different way from how Ayn Rand used it. She made it clear that she was using it to refer to main thing(s) about objects which identify them within the context of our knowledge at any given time, rather than about something 'within' the objects which causes them fit into universal ontological categories existing apart from humans. There is no 'essence of cathood' by virtue of which some things are cats and not dogs; rather we identify certain objects as cats and dogs on the basis of the similarities and differences which we observe in our perceptions, and eventually sum this up into a contextual definition which isolates the properties which we find most important.

I think the Objectivist conception of 'essences' is valid, but this isnt really what Sartre etc are talking about. To better understand what they are rejecting, I'd advise you to look at how phrases such as 'human nature' and 'the essence of humanity' are actually used. When people talk about 'human nature', they are normally trying to either a) justify an existing state of affairs by pretending it is necessary because 'that is just how humans are', or trying to justify some failure or moral fault ("yes he messed up, but its not really his fault - it's just human nature!").

Edited April 9, 2005 by Hal

[Hal]

This does not mean, however, that we cannot know that something exists prior to learning what it is.  In fact, we must know that something is, before we can discover what it is.  Our knowledge of any particular entity, or of existence, does not come in a single, blinding flash of intuition.  Learning and discovery are not automatic processes; they are volitional.  Since Objectivists hold to the primacy of existence, and not of conciousness, we do not confuse the operation of our consciousness with the nature of the reality which our conscioiusness perceives.  That we are aware of an entity's existence prior to our discovery of the particulars of its identity, does not mean that existence precedes identity.

Well, an individual object is whatever it is. But that isnt really saying much. I suppose you could say that this constitutes its essence, but this isnt how the phrase has traditionally been used and it isnt what the Existentialists are opposing.

When we talk about identifying objects, it normally involves putting them into certain categories - such as classifying them as 'cats' or 'tables'. The classic idea of an 'essence' stems from the belief that we can identify necessary properties which are common to all cats or tables, without which they would cease to be cats or tables. This is the core of the 'essential vs accidental' properties distinction made by Aristotle, which Ayn Rand rejected. A thing is whatever it is, but that doesnt mean that there is an essence of 'doghood' or 'manhood' which is possessed by all dogs or men.

[JMeganSnow]

Is the term "essence" being used metaphysically or epistemologically here?

A metaphysical "essence" is an object's identity, as is referenced in the first part of the thread.

An epistemological "essence" is, I believe, an Aristotolean invention; it was his method of solving the "problem of universals". In Objectivism, the essence to which a universal (a concept) refers are those facts in reality that define its characteristics, omitting the measurements.

It sounds like the problem these Existentialists were having was attempting to merge metaphysics and epistemology; that reality is the same as knowledge of reality, which is inaccurate.

[unskinned]

Well, an individual object is whatever it is. But that isnt really saying much. I suppose you could say that this constitutes its essence, but this isnt how the phrase has traditionally been used and it isnt  what the Existentialists are opposing.

When we talk about identifying objects, it normally involves putting them into certain categories - such as classifying them as 'cats' or 'tables'. The classic idea of an 'essence' stems from the belief that we can identify necessary properties which are common to all cats or tables, without which they would cease to be cats or tables. This is the core of the 'essential vs accidental' properties distinction made by Aristotle, which Ayn Rand rejected. A thing is whatever it is, but that doesnt mean that there is an essence of 'doghood' or 'manhood' which is possessed by all dogs or men.

Certainly Ayn Rand rejected "doghood" and "cathood" but would she reject identifying man as the "rational living being?" That he is essentially a "rational life form." That being rational and alive is his essence?

[unskinned]

Certainly Ayn Rand rejected "doghood" and "cathood" but would she reject identifying man as the "rational living being?"  That he is essentially a "rational life form."  That being rational and alive is his essence?

Forget that, I understand you. They are not talking about identity so much as responding to determinists. Existence precedes essence, people change (for example).

Thanks to all three of you, EC and especially Punk and Hal. You can't even know how valuable your help has been.

If you will bite again... The existentialists do not deny that a thing is what it is. Yet they seem to deny that identity is an axiom. Objectivists would say "that there is something and not nothing" IS identification wheras Heidegger seems to subordinate identity as something not just "after" but seperate. Science wants to know nothing of the nothing but depends on it for essences, Heidegger wrote. First we are conscious THAT it is, then we identify WHAT it is, Heidegger wrote. So identity is not exactly an axiom for existentialists? Existence ("Being") and consciousness are axiomatic, but not identity? (for existentialists)

Edited June 4, 2005 by unskinned

[JMeganSnow]

I hinted at this a little in my previous post.

Existentialism, from what I can tell, tries to move Identity over into epistemology; it says that SOMETHING is (being) but WHAT it is is (identity) some matter of our perception. So, Identity isn't an axiom in the way that we mean.

[unskinned]

I hinted at this a little in my previous post.

Existentialism, from what I can tell, tries to move Identity over into epistemology; it says that SOMETHING is (being) but WHAT it is is (identity) some matter of our perception.  So, Identity isn't an axiom in the way that we mean.

That's not how I read it, at all. It seems to be the reverse. While we may have different sections of knowledge because we are finite consciousnesses, Existentialists don't deny that a thing is what it is, to everyone. So what-it-is would not be some matter of perception to them. It is that the MEANING of beings, on a personal level, is inspired by consciousness that there is something as opposed to nothing. It seems to me they are saying that meaning comes from revelation, not identification, and therefore reason/identity is the handmaiden of consciousness of existence. Consciousness of existence, (as axioms?), inspire "wonder at the world," that there is something and not nothing. In a nutshell, "it is so wonderful that there is at least something, and not nothing, now let's write some poetry!" (and reason/identification is just a tool for dealing with neccessities, it should not be used to pollute the meanings revealed to us by consciousness)

"Though he has to earn a living,

Man dwells poetically on this earth." -Holderlin

"Hölderlin is one of our greatest, that is, most impending thinkers," wrote Heidegger, "because he is our greatest poet. The poetic understanding of his poetry is possible only as a philosophical confrontatoion with the manifestation of being in his work." (http://www.mythosandlogos.com/Holderlin.html)

Edited June 4, 2005 by unskinned

[JMeganSnow]

Okay, so what you're saying is that they equate consciousness with feeling, and that reason, logic, what have you aren't part of consciousness in their thinking, they're some kind of base process to enable men to go on feeling the wonder of existence?

It sounds like just another effort to detach reason from reality.

[Hal]

If you will bite again... The existentialists do not deny that a thing is what it is.  Yet they seem to deny that identity is an axiom.  Objectivists would say "that there is something and not nothing" IS identification wheras Heidegger seems to subordinate identity as something not just "after" but seperate. 

I'm not entirely sure what you mean here, can you clarify?

One of Heidegger's fundamental claims is that the world exists for us as a human world. When we come across objects in day-to-day life, we dont encounter them in the detached way that a scientist might study them them in a laboratory, or as how we might think about them while doing abstract philosophy - we encounter them in terms of what they are for us - not in terms of their concrete properties, but in terms of the functions which they play in our lives. In other words, the question isnt "what an object is", it is more "what it is - FOR ME".

To take a concrete example, I used a train to get to college this morning. When it arrived at the station, I didnt take any notice of its physical properties (its 'material' identity) - I cant remember what colour it was, how many windows it had, or what pattern was on the seats. All that mattered to me was the role the train played in my day - I encountered it as being something that would take me to college, and everything else abuot it was irrelevant. What matters about the train is not any of its physical properties, but rather that it exists as part of a railway system, which in turn exists as part of a transportation network which in turn serves the purpose of getting me to college on time. This is what Heidegger would call the 'for-sake-of-which' of the train - ie the purpose it serves in the human/social world. Heidegger refers to objects considered in this sense as being 'ready-to'hand' - they are defined not primarilly by their raw physical properties, but by how they integrate into our lives as a whole - by their place in our 'referential totality'.

Now imagine that I was a railway engineer, and had arrived at the station to fix a broken train. My experiece of the train would be completely different - it is no longer the trains functional/relational properties that matter to me. It doesnt matter that it is part of a railway network, nor that people use it to get to work. All that matters is the individual physical train itself - it is broken and I need to fix. I will 'take notice' of its properties in a way which I would not do in normal life - suddenly the physical nature of this particular train becomes important - its structure, its engine, its movement, its bent wheels, and so on. Heidegger claims that this apprehension of objects, as raw 'present-to-hand' physical material stripped of all their human 'meaning', constitutes world of the scientist. This is generally how scientists treat objects - as raw physical material, indepedent of any human purpose.

Heidegger then goes on to claim that Western philosophy after Aristotle considered this second way of considering objects, as 'present to hand' and existing independently of their place in a referential totality, as their primary mode of being. It has been thought that objects have "raw existence", and any human meaning is simply a gloss on top of this - like a painted layer which science can strip off to investigate them 'as they are' in themselves. This reached its peak in Descartes, and remains today as the dominant scientific/philosophical paradigm. Heidegger reverses this, by claiming that it is the ready-to-hand nature of objects that constitutes their primary being.

Does this help?

[Hal]

I hinted at this a little in my previous post.

Existentialism, from what I can tell, tries to move Identity over into epistemology; it says that SOMETHING is (being) but WHAT it is is (identity) some matter of our perception.  So, Identity isn't an axiom in the way that we mean.

Heidegger spoke of identity in a completely different way from Rand, it would be very difficult to translate their thoughts on the subject into each others vocabulary. I'll adapt an example from Wittgenstein to try and highlight what I think hes getting at.

What is the identity of a broom? Heidegger would answer that any statement of its primordial identity ("mode of being") must be based on its role in human reality - the fact that it is an instrument used for cleaning, that it was designed to stop houses getting dirty, and so on. A scientist might argue that none of these properties are fundamental to the broom itself - the broom could be defined purely in terms of atoms and molecules moving in space. He would say that although we might use the broom in certain ways, its REAL 'identity' is a lot of quarks interacting with one another. But without taking the human factors into consideration, there is no meaningful way in which the broom is even an object, let alone one with "identity". Why do we treat the broom as being one object rather than 2 - the stick and brush? Why not say it is a million and one entities - the million individual hairs on its end, and the wooden part? Why not as 3 entities - wood, hair, and the colour brown? The only reason we take the broom as being one integrated entity is precisely because we use it as an integrated entity in our day to day lives - when sweeping our floors and cleaning our houses. Once you have stripped the broom of these functional properties, what you have left is quite literally not an 'object' or 'entity'.

Edited June 6, 2005 by Hal