Prerequisites for the Concept of Knowledge

[Vik]

What must we know before we can have a concept of knowledge? (The Objectivist definition of "knowledge" can be found below)

We can have mental contents. Perception can provide some of that content. Content can be derived from other content. Beliefs don't always match reality, marking the boundary between a mental grasp of reality and the production of fantasy, wish, arbitrary speculation, etc.

What else?

the concept "knowledge" is formed by retaining its distinguishing characteristics (a mental grasp of fact(s) of reality, reached by perceptual observation or by a process of reason based on perceptual observation) and omitting the particular fact(s) involved.

Ayn Rand, ITOE, pg. 35

[Mindy]

I find this question interesting, but I don't fully understand what you are getting at. It is the "must," I think, that throws me off. Can you clarify?

--Mindy

Edited July 2, 2010 by Mindy

[A is A]

What must we know before we can have a concept of knowledge? (The Objectivist definition of "knowledge" can be found below)

We can have mental contents. Perception can provide some of that content. Content can be derived from other content. Beliefs don't always match reality, marking the boundary between a mental grasp of reality and the production of fantasy, wish, arbitrary speculation, etc.

What else?

Ayn Rand, ITOE, pg. 35

Many other things we'd know by implication to grasp the concept. We'd have to know that our minds don't create reality (rejection of subjectivism) and that our minds are not passive perceivers of reality (rejection of intrinsicism) and that we can't accept ideas on faith without evidence (rejection of mysticism).

[Vik]

Mindy,

I mean that the concept of knowledge didn't spring out of perceptual experience. We can't point at knowledge like we point at computer screens.

In order to form the concept of knowledge, it is necessary to have already formed a set of concepts about things we can perceive.

Also, it took a long chain of reasoning to get to the concept of knowledge. We first had to know a chain of facts terminating in the evidence of the senses.

[Vik]

"Many other things we'd know by implication to grasp the concept. We'd have to know

• that our minds don't create reality (rejection of subjectivism) and
  
• that our minds are not passive perceivers of reality (rejection of intrinsicism) and
  
• that we can't accept ideas on faith without evidence (rejection of mysticism).
  

"

1 depends on a concept of error. The concept of error depends on the recognition of accidental wrong action or false statement. That in turn depends on distinguishing actions of consciousness and comparing mental content against perceptual evidence.

2 depends on a concept of mental processes, which can be formed by isolating the fact that consciousness can act while omitting the particular contents involved.

3 is a heuristic and depends on a lot of advanced knowledge.

[Mindy]

Many other things we'd know by implication to grasp the concept. We'd have to know that our minds don't create reality (rejection of subjectivism) and that our minds are not passive perceivers of reality (rejection of intrinsicism) and that we can't accept ideas on faith without evidence (rejection of mysticism).

The logical relation between these positions and an explicit knowledge of what is and isn't knowledge is undeniable. But that doesn't mean we reach these positions prior to developing a full-fledged understanding of knowledge, or even a mature concept of it.

-Mindy

[Mindy]

Also, it took a long chain of reasoning to get to the concept of knowledge.

OK, I get you now. I would suggest, though, that it wasn't "a long chain of reasoning," but, rather, a long process of conceptual development.

The earliest, most rudimentary form of this is probably the voluntary orientation of sense-organs, which goes very far down the evolutionary scale. Organisms that have the capacity to orient their sense organs put a premium upon doing so. They will interrupt most activities to try to see/hear/smell, etc. something already intimated by sense-perception. The point is that they utilize a form of criterion for "knowing well enough." Such a functional equivalent of a concept of knowledge isn't what you are interested in, I realize. But it is interesting, no?

The concept of knowledge is a product of introspection. Obviously one must have a good deal of knowledge before the opportunity to conceptualize it as such arises. So the question becomes, what variety of instances of knowing must be manifest to introspection, in order to support the abstraction of the differentiating characteristics of the concept, "knowledge?" And this leads to the question of where introspection starts, and how it occurs. Which I bring up to impress you with the complicated nature of your question.

When a baby makes efforts to see something, is he introspecting? His behavior is deliberate, and aims at his becoming situated so as to "see," and in that way to know about something. Does not that qualify as a rudimentary concept of knowledge? A full-fledged concept of knowledge is probably not possessed by any but some life-long epistemologists. I do realize you mean the well-read Objectivist's grasp of "knowledge," but I'm pushing for a broad perspective on the issue.

There are logical restraints on the answer to your question, but they play a minor part in answering it. The development of knowledge is a question of cognitive development, not specifically of logical connections. I think, therefore, that while we could create scenarios for acquiring the concept, "knowledge," they would have to be regarded, at best, as conjectural. I'll take a stab at creating such a scenario, if you're interested.

--Mindy

[Vik]

OK, I get you now. I would suggest, though, that it wasn't "a long chain of reasoning," but, rather, a long process of conceptual development.

We need facts as well as concepts, but you are right to emphasize concepts. Not everyone attaches conceptual thought to "reasoning".

The earliest, most rudimentary form of this is probably the voluntary orientation of sense-organs, which goes very far down the evolutionary scale. Organisms that have the capacity to orient their sense organs put a premium upon doing so. They will interrupt most activities to try to see/hear/smell, etc. something already intimated by sense-perception. The point is that they utilize a form of criterion for "knowing well enough." Such a functional equivalent of a concept of knowledge isn't what you are interested in, I realize. But it is interesting, no?

It suggests how organisms evolved the levels of awareness leading up to concept-formation.

The concept of knowledge is a product of introspection. Obviously one must have a good deal of knowledge before the opportunity to conceptualize it as such arises. So the question becomes, what variety of instances of knowing must be manifest to introspection, in order to support the abstraction of the differentiating characteristics of the concept, "knowledge?" And this leads to the question of where introspection starts, and how it occurs. Which I bring up to impress you with the complicated nature of your question.

When a baby makes efforts to see something, is he introspecting? His behavior is deliberate, and aims at his becoming situated so as to "see," and in that way to know about something. Does not that qualify as a rudimentary concept of knowledge? A full-fledged concept of knowledge is probably not possessed by any but some life-long epistemologists. I do realize you mean the well-read Objectivist's grasp of "knowledge," but I'm pushing for a broad perspective on the issue.

The child has knowledge but not a concept of knowledge as such. That's formed much later.

Both an epistemologist and a layperson understand how knowledge differs from such things as fantasy, error, arbitrary speculation and so on.

The concepts are the same.

What's different is the level of knowledge about the nature of the units.

There are logical restraints on the answer to your question, but they play a minor part in answering it. The development of knowledge is a question of cognitive development, not specifically of logical connections. I think, therefore, that while we could create scenarios for acquiring the concept, "knowledge," they would have to be regarded, at best, as conjectural. I'll take a stab at creating such a scenario, if you're interested.

--Mindy

It isn't conjecture to grasp that a concept of knowledge isn't possible without a concept of entities. Some things are necessarily implied and don't require specialized scientific knowledge to grasp.

However, I would be happy to hear a cognitive science perspective.

Edited July 2, 2010 by Vik

[Plasmatic]

OK, I get you now. I would suggest, though, that it wasn't "a long chain of reasoning," but, rather, a long process of conceptual development........

There are logical restraints on the answer to your question, but they play a minor part in answering it. The development of knowledge is a question of cognitive development, not specifically of logical connections. I think, therefore, that while we could create scenarios for acquiring the concept, "knowledge," they would have to be regarded, at best, as conjectural. I'll take a stab at creating such a scenario, if you're interested.

--Mindy

This is a false dichotomy as far as Objectivism is concerned:

Reason integrates man’s perceptions by means of forming abstractions or conceptions, thus raising man’s knowledge from the perceptual level, which he shares with animals, to the conceptual level, which he alone can reach. The method which reason employs in this process is logic—and logic is the art of non-contradictory identification.

PWNI

Reason is man’s only means of grasping reality and of acquiring knowledge—and, therefore, the rejection of reason means that men should act regardless of and/or in contradiction to the facts of reality.

ROTP

The senses, concepts, logic: these are the elements of man’s rational faculty—its start, its form, its method. In essence, “follow reason” means: base knowledge on observation; form concepts according to the actual (measurable) relationships among concretes; use concepts according to the rules of logic (ultimately, the Law of Identity). Since each of these elements is based on the facts of reality, the conclusions reached by a process of reason are objective.

The alternative to reason is some form of mysticism or skepticism.

TOP

The development of knowledge is a question of cognitive development, not specifically of logical connections. I think, therefore, that while we could create scenarios for acquiring the concept, "knowledge," they would have to be regarded, at best, as conjectural. I'll take a stab at creating such a scenario, if you're interested.

One does not answer epistemological questions by consulting the special sciences.

Edited July 2, 2010 by Plasmatic

[DavidOdden]

What must we know before we can have a concept of knowledge?

Are you asking what other concepts the concept "knowledge" logically depends on, or are you asking as a matter of individual developmental psychology how a person might come to grasp the concept "knowledge"?

[A is A]

The logical relation between these positions and an explicit knowledge of what is and isn't knowledge is undeniable. But that doesn't mean we reach these positions prior to developing a full-fledged understanding of knowledge, or even a mature concept of it.

-Mindy

Isn't that what "Many other things we'd know by implication" means?

Edited July 3, 2010 by A is A

[A is A]

"Many other things we'd know by implication to grasp the concept. We'd have to know

• that our minds don't create reality (rejection of subjectivism) and
  
• that our minds are not passive perceivers of reality (rejection of intrinsicism) and
  
• that we can't accept ideas on faith without evidence (rejection of mysticism).
  

"

1 depends on a concept of error. The concept of error depends on the recognition of accidental wrong action or false statement. That in turn depends on distinguishing actions of consciousness and comparing mental content against perceptual evidence.

2 depends on a concept of mental processes, which can be formed by isolating the fact that consciousness can act while omitting the particular contents involved.

3 is a heuristic and depends on a lot of advanced knowledge.

Yes, and it takes a lot of advanced knowledge of specifics to grasp the concept of knowledge as separate from all these other issues. How many thousands of years have homo sapiens been on earth? During most of that time, man was ruled by superstition, fear, short life, miserable existence, and constant hunting for food. It was a mere two thousand years ago when man finally took a time out and began to consider what is the nature of the world and their thinking processes. The laws of logic were discovered. Yes, it took a lot of experience and advance knowledge to distinguish between knowledge of reality and superstitious belief.

[Vik]

David,

I am attempting to reduce the concept of knowledge to the perceptual level.

[Vik]

Are you asking what other concepts the concept "knowledge" logically depends on, or are you asking as a matter of individual developmental psychology how a person might come to grasp the concept "knowledge"?

Other concepts that require fewer steps away from the perceptual level and which the concept "knowledge" depend on.

[Mindy]

We need facts as well as concepts, but you are right to emphasize concepts. Not everyone attaches conceptual thought to "reasoning".

Mindy: I wouldn't oppose concepts with facts, as you do here. Also, I can't imagine anyone who considers reason that doesn't involve language--it is, after all, a specific set of forms in which sentences share the exact terms, in given positions...

It suggests how organisms evolved the levels of awareness leading up to concept-formation.

Mindy: That's true, but it wasn't my point. I mean to say, how do you not regard such behavior, let's say in the case of a baby's trying to see, as not being a manifestation of a grasp of the difference between knowing and not knowing--seeing versus not being able to see, etc., and thus as a working idea of knowing, (if not of knowledge?)

The child has knowledge but not a concept of knowledge as such. That's formed much later.

Mindy: Sure, the child has knowledge before it can conceptualize knowledge per se. But what is it that works to make a baby strain to see something blocked from his view? What is he afterwhen he squirms, or pushes things aside in order to see something?

Both an epistemologist and a layperson understand how knowledge differs from such things as fantasy, error, arbitrary speculation and so on.

Mindy: They understand some of how it does.

The concepts are the same.

Mindy: If you are saying that a rudimentary concept is the same concept as a precise version, OK, but the point was that some behvior of sub-humans and pre-conceptual humans appears to involve knowledge, at least in the form of sense-perception, as its instrumental goal. This behavior has knowledge as its target, its purpose, its motivational object.

What's different is the level of knowledge about the nature of the units.

Mindy: Again, I don't agree with your formulation, but that's another topic.

It isn't conjecture to grasp that a concept of knowledge isn't possible without a concept of entities. Some things are necessarily implied and don't require specialized scientific knowledge to grasp.

Mindy: If it isn't conjecture, you can supply us with a proof. A proof would need to use the term, "entities," you realize...

Sure, some things are implied. (Not to be too picky, but "necessarily implied" is redundant.)

However, I would be happy to hear a cognitive science perspective.

"Cognitive science" is a specific branch of psychology, and not one I take part in. Mainly, it attempts to model human knowing on computer architecture.

Do you recall Aristotle's point about what is first known and what is better known? Do you happen to know about a speech Peikoff gave in NYC, during which he talked about a "spiraling" growth of knowledge, in which each return to a concept produced a richer, more precise conceptualization? Both of these recognize the order of development of knowledge as compared to the logical implications and relations of various ideas.

-- Mindy

Edited July 6, 2010 by Mindy

[Mindy]

This is a false dichotomy as far as Objectivism is concerned:

PWNI

ROTP

TOP

One does not answer epistemological questions by consulting the special sciences.

As I understood it, it wasn't an epistemological, but a psychological question. It was a question about how we acquire a certain concept. If I'm off point, then debate is pointless.

The attempt to "reduce" the concept of "knowledge" to the perceptual is easy as pie. Take instances of how a sighted person crosses a park and compare it to how a blind person does, or a deaf person's ignoring a siren versus a hearing person's reaction to it. I didn't think the original question could be that.

As far as claims such as that we have to have the concept of entities in order to acquire the concept of knowledge, that IS a question of process, not of logic. It has logical constraints, of course.

In a contentious mood: The special sciences, as you call them, do not write philosophy, but they dictate what philosophy must encompass, as does all of my personal experience--yes, and yours. Facts are facts. If you don't answer epistemological questions by consulting all of knowledge, you won't answer much.

[Mindy]

Other concepts that require fewer steps away from the perceptual level and which the concept "knowledge" depend on.

Are you supposing that the concept of knowledge is not introspective?

--Mindy

[Mindy]

Isn't that what "Many other things we'd know by implication" means?

Your phrase, "knowing by implication" presents many problems to me. If it is epistemology, how does it differ from plain, "implied?" If it is psychology, that is to say, if it means someone's actual knowing, then what is it?

I realize one can possess the knowledge to allow one to arrive at certain conclusions, if one only pays attention to it. I could see that being called, "knowing by implication." Is that what you mean?

Rand has implicit knowledge play a dynamic role in certain cognitive achievements. I don't understand that either. Think of the observation that as the universe is entirely interconnected, one fact implies all others, assuming omniscience. That sort of implication doesn't move one forward in understanding. I remain puzzled.

-- Mindy

[Vik]

Are you supposing that the concept of knowledge is not introspective?

--Mindy

Out of what material provided by introspection can you form the concept of knowledge?

[Mindy]

Out of instances of knowledge, of course. You must mean something I didn't get.

-- Mindy

[DavidOdden]

Other concepts that require fewer steps away from the perceptual level and which the concept "knowledge" depend on.

I see. Well, a worthy question. I have not read a direct answer to your question in the Objectivist literature. As a starting point, I would distinguish knowledge from whatever opposes it, which would be "error" and "ignorance". "Ignorance", at least in the ordinary sense, describes a consciousness whose nature (at least with respect to the particular matter) has no causal relationship to reality. If in the context of your consciousness a proposition is arbitrary (lacks logical basis for affirmation or denial), then you are ignorant of the proposition's truth or falsity. "Error" on the other hand describes a consciousness which accepts as true claims which are false (which could be because of an error in logic, or an error at the perceptual level). So as a first step, "knowledge" describes a proper causal relationship between a proposition and reality -- that is, the consciousness has integrated awareness of facts, and has validated a conclusion by the use of logic, applied to that awareness.

Rand did not develop a theory of propositions, so we are on our own there, and clearly the concept "proposition" is crucial to reducing the concept of "knowledge". The concept of "awareness" reduces to "experience", which is a first-order concept. "Fact" is covered in the appendix on axiomatic concepts -- the crucial contribution of "fact" is to introduce a connection to existents. Somewhere we also need to cover the concept of "description" or "describe", in the sense that a proposition is true when it describes reality -- I think that "describe" (or, similarly, "grasp") is the fundamental concept in the transduction from metaphysics to epistemology. At any rate, this is certainly something that needs more careful development.

[Vik]

As a starting point, I would distinguish knowledge from whatever opposes it, which would be "error" and "ignorance".

Also "justified true belief". There are JTB that aren't knowledge.

"Ignorance", at least in the ordinary sense, describes a consciousness whose nature (at least with respect to the particular matter) has no causal relationship to reality. If in the context of your consciousness a proposition is arbitrary (lacks logical basis for affirmation or denial), then you are ignorant of the proposition's truth or falsity.

This also covers "underdetermined theories", where two theories explain a set of facts equally well and we lack sufficient information for going further. I think Peikoff's concept of "possible" is appropriate here.

"Error" on the other hand describes a consciousness which accepts as true claims which are false (which could be because of an error in logic, or an error at the perceptual level).

Or accepts as false claims which are true.

Do you regard conceptual errors, such as package deal, reification, stolen concept, equivocation, etc., as errors in logic?

So as a first step, "knowledge" describes a proper causal relationship between a proposition and reality -- that is, the consciousness has integrated awareness of facts, and has validated a conclusion by the use of logic, applied to that awareness.

The believers in "justified true belief" call this "justification", but "integration" seems to mean that knowledge isn't a species of belief.

It seems to me that when I integrate, I don't "believe" that something has those aspects. I *know* that it does.

Somewhere we also need to cover the concept of "description" or "describe", in the sense that a proposition is true when it describes reality -- I think that "describe" (or, similarly, "grasp") is the fundamental concept in the transduction from metaphysics to epistemology. At any rate, this is certainly something that needs more careful development.

As in the truth or falsehood of a proposition is determined by consulting the body of knowledge available and performing the necessary mental actions?

Also, what do you mean by "transduction"?

[Vik]

Out of instances of knowledge, of course. You must mean something I didn't get.

-- Mindy

When I tried that back in 2008, I managed to isolate the following characteristics:

• grounded in observed fact
  
• arrived at objectively
  
• discovered through a process of applying logic to facts
  
• integrated with the rest of one's knowledge without contradiction
  
• correctly placed within the hierarchy of knowledge
  

[Mindy]

When I tried that back in 2008, I managed to isolate the following characteristics:

• grounded in observed fact
  
• arrived at objectively
  
• discovered through a process of applying logic to facts
  
• integrated with the rest of one's knowledge without contradiction
  
• correctly placed within the hierarchy of knowledge
  

Again, I don't think the deductive mode is going to pay off.

Consider the behavior of a kitten who encounters a mirror for the first time. He bats and paws at his image, treating it as he would another kitten. But he just touches a flat glass. After a while, he quits reacting to his own image at all, and (usually) never does again. It seems as if he has learned that certain appearances of cats are not knowledge of the presence of a cat.

I'm not proposing that the kitten does arrive at such knowledge. My point is that experiences that simple provide data to support a first notion of knowing. I would also claim that actions of animals and infants in trying to see or otherwise perceive something amounts to a primitive notion of knowledge.

[Vik]

Again, I don't think the deductive mode is going to pay off.

Consider the behavior of a kitten who encounters a mirror for the first time. He bats and paws at his image, treating it as he would another kitten. But he just touches a flat glass. After a while, he quits reacting to his own image at all, and (usually) never does again. It seems as if he has learned that certain appearances of cats are not knowledge of the presence of a cat.

I'm not proposing that the kitten does arrive at such knowledge. My point is that experiences that simple provide data to support a first notion of knowing. I would also claim that actions of animals and infants in trying to see or otherwise perceive something amounts to a primitive notion of knowledge.

I've seen adult cats continually leap at the television screen, figure it out, and then leap at it again when a different program is on. They do NOT generalize. At best, the mighty television-hunters have knowledge of *particular facts*.

If there are cats that are able to omit the particular program AND the particular television screen, that would prove they can abstract from particulars but that does NOT prove they can abstract from abstractions. Saying that cats learn is a far cry from saying they have a "notion" of knowledge.

Most importantly, humans grasp the difference between reality and projection around the same time: 2 years.

Cats, if they ever grasp the difference, figure it out in adulthood across a wide variety of ages.