Individuality versus Gender

[bluecherry]

Wait, wait, wait. Doesn't the thing about "broken units" specify that there is a lack of (or some other kind of problem with) not just any element of a concept, not just any important one either, but one of the defining elements? This would mean missing limbs or diabetes doesn't qualify a human as a "broken unit." What *would* qualify as a broken unit when it comes to humans is a baby born without a brain being kept alive on life support. Missing a brain means there is zero capacity for rationality.

So far, my thoughts seem to be pointing toward only entities being capable of being broken units, not properties/attributes of entities. I can think of many examples of entities that may be broken, but none when it comes to properties. What would a broken unit of "blond" be? Or a broken unit of "big"? Properties I can think of being more or less, there or not there. I can't think of what it would be like for some kind of property to be there, yet missing an essential element. Actually, anything that can come in varying intensities and/or that you could imagine adding "ness" to the end of I can't think of a way to "break," conceptually or literally. "Feminine" and "masculine" I think fall into the properties categories. I could see somebody being or not being one of those or being more or less of them maybe. However, even if I knew clearly what the defining elements of femininity and masculinity were, I don't know how you could break them rather than differ intensity or just cease presence in somebody. Everything I'm coming up with so far that could have a broken unit is something we could just say was plain old broken. Something becomes/is a broken unit when it gets a break of the sort that destroys a defining element of the thing.

Now, females and males on the other hand are entities and thus maybe they can have broken units. The sexes are pretty strictly defined separately from gender though. I think first for broken units and genders to go together there would need to be a concept that encompasses both sex and gender as defining elements. That concept could then be broken by lacking in the gender department hypothetically. But, since we already have concepts for each of those separately, I think rather than getting a broken unit of this hypothetical concept we'd just get somebody that is of [blank] sex or somebody of [blank] gender. Maybe one would want to argue there should not be separate concepts for those two things then? Having the separate concepts are useful for thinking and discussing though and that's the point of concepts pretty much.

I'm generally having trouble seeing how broken units can be applied to gender matters. It seems like mostly a linguistic question though anyway. I don't think if somebody could be officially labeled as a broken unit in some regard to gender that this would impact what anybody should do or how somebody should be assessed morally or otherwise. You know what somebody is in this situation even if you don't know for sure what to call it and what somebody is is the important part for running your life.

[Spiral Architect]

There seems to be a fundamental premise off here. You are treating gender issues that are really psychological as if they were a philosophic issue. Peikoff once said in a real good clarification that Rand’s opinion on gender roles or attitude was her opinion on a psychological issue, colored by her values and thoughts as an artist (for example, women President or the feminine desire for man-worship), and he did not included it in OPAR or elsewhere exactly because it is not a philosophic issue but an opinion based on psychology. The only thing philosophy really has to say about sex is that it is good, which means the sexual act and not gender roles. This makes sense as gender is metaphysical and choices are epistemological.

[DonAthos]

There seems to be a fundamental premise off here. You are treating gender issues that are really psychological as if they were a philosophic issue. Peikoff once said in a real good clarification that Rand’s opinion on gender roles or attitude was her opinion on a psychological issue, colored by her values and thoughts as an artist (for example, women President or the feminine desire for man-worship), and he did not included it in OPAR or elsewhere exactly because it is not a philosophic issue but an opinion based on psychology. The only thing philosophy really has to say about sex is that it is good, which means the sexual act and not gender roles. This makes sense as gender is metaphysical and choices are epistemological.

I must admit, I don't recognize any special distinction between "philosophy" and "psychology" as I believe you might have me do. So far as I'm concerned, a truth claim is a truth claim, with respect to psychology or astronomy or any other subject under the sun. If a person says that humans tamed dinosaurs -- though that's properly the province of "history" or "geology" or "archaeology" or "anthropology" or "biology" or somesuch -- I think it's yet possible to be able to agree or disagree with that truth claim, on the basis of reasoning, evidence, and etc., just as within any other field.

And all of these pursuits do have a relationship with "philosophy," insofar as our understanding of what constitutes "evidence" relies on our answers to epistemological questions, and etc. So a controversy within a given "special science" might find its origin in the basis of divergent answers to philosophical questions, and may require recourse to philosophy to sort out. Here I am addressing truth claims that people have advanced, here on this board and elsewhere, on what "rational" and "good" men and women do, which thus relies both on the science of psychology but also on one's underlying beliefs regarding epistemology and ethics.

So perhaps I misunderstand the point you're making -- and perhaps you would be willing to clarify? But it seems to me that maybe you're saying that people are entitled to hold (and promote) any opinion on gender they'd like, quite apart from any particular reasoning or evidence, because it exists in a realm of "psychology" where "philosophy" (i.e. holding truth claims to a standard of right or wrong) is inapplicable. That one's opinions on psychological matters, "colored" as they are by "values" and "thoughts as an artist," are properly the province of whim, and should in no case be gainsaid.

But maybe you mean something else?

Edited December 20, 2012 by DonAthos

[Eiuol]

Doesn't the thing about "broken units" specify that there is a lack of (or some other kind of problem with) not just any element of a concept, not just any important one either, but one of the defining elements?

Not necessarily. Broken unit applies to units that lack an essential feature, as well as units that lack features that they are supposed to have, teleologically speaking. In the thread Dante linked:

A broken unit, then, is a unit that lacks a characteristic shared by the other units of the concept of which it is a member. The characteristic may be any characteristic, including the distinguishing characteristic of that concept.

Later on in the thread, "deaf man" is an example of a broken unit, so in some sense, medicine largely involves the study of broken units. Any person should be able to hear, in terms of biology. I believe part of the justification for the idea of broken unit is that attributes cannot be separated from a unit. If you split a rock in half, you can say that you have two rocks, or that the rock is split. If you split a computer into many pieces, you can't say there are many computers. As a unit, there is no more computer. Lacking a motherboard, though, would not mean there is no computer. The point here is that even if a computer lacks things it really should have that impact its functioning as an entity, it's still a computer. Lacking essentials always impacts functioning, while nonessentials might, or might not. Hair color has no bearing on the functioning of people, so varying hair colors won't lead to brokenness. I agree, though, that attributes themselves cannot be broken.

But, since we already have concepts for each of those separately, I think rather than getting a broken unit of this hypothetical concept we'd just get somebody that is of [blank] sex or somebody of [blank] gender.

That really depends on the causal relationship between sex and gender. Anyone who takes the view that there is a causal relationship between sex and gender probably would say that sex is the encompassing concept while gender would be a resulting psychological attribute. Some may say that. being male leads to certain levels of testosterone, which leads to masculine behavior. If it is true, then [blank] gender would be an example of a broken unit, caused by a lack of testosterone (or whatever leads to genderized behavior). Whether or not this ought to be fixed depends upon if the consequences have a negative impact on one's life. I'd bet there would be no negative consequences, so it wouldn't need to be fixed. Still, the question matters to the extent of whether or not there are negative consequences.

Part of the reason I think there is no causal relationship between sex and gender is the variation I've seen in how strongly people identify with their gender. I usually think of myself as having a weak gender identity, while some people have a strong gender identity, but neither type of person is impacted much in terms of how they function. The only impact gender seems to have on functioning is with how values are pursued.

Edited December 20, 2012 by Eiuol