Identical situations create identical outcomes?

[Harrison Danneskjold]

1: The actions of any entity are "determined" or caused by some context IF it must always act that way within that context and cannot do so beyond it.

2: A causal relationship is implied, for any body of knowledge, when it contains observations of an entity behaving a certain way under a certain set of circumstances, but none of that entity doing so outside of that set of circumstances.

3: A previously-discovered causal link allows one to make temporal inferences; to predict the consequent from the antecedent, as venture capitalists do, and vice versa, as archeologists do.

4: If some abstract, omniscient being were to infer a causal relationship, in perfect accordance with #2 (since it has an infinite attention span), any subsequent inference from that knowledge would ALWAYS yield correct predictions.

If these are true then we only have to determine whether or not certain people consistently behave in certain ways, under certain circumstances. I believe that this is directly related to identification of philosophy as the moving force of history.

The question then, as I see it, is whether people with certain philosophical premises do, in fact, behave predictably in certain situations. That is a question which can actually be answered empirically.

If I have not left anything out (?) then we should be able to answer that question by the scientific method.

---

I realize that these premises immediately imply a clockwork universe, from the outset. In fact, I anticipate that we won't all be able to agree on them; it simply seems more productive to discuss the question itself, until we can discuss the answer more coherently.

Edited February 16, 2015 by Harrison Danneskjold

[StrictlyLogical]

HD

 

I believe perhaps you are confusing the meaning of "imply" with the meaning of "presuppose"... just perhaps...

[Harrison Danneskjold]

I believe perhaps you are confusing the meaning of "imply" with the meaning of "presuppose"... just perhaps...

Probably. I'm not sure how else to express the idea, without assuming my own conclusion, but I'd be interested in any suggestions.

[Eiuol]

I realize that these premises immediately imply a clockwork universe, from the outset. In fact, I anticipate that we won't all be able to agree on them; it simply seems more productive to discuss the question itself, until we can discuss the answer more coherently.

It doesn't, since it doesn't say a thing about mental states which can be a part of all you said. Mental states don't operate like clockwork really. By mental states, I include mental states of animals, like bees and ants!

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Mental states don't operate like clockwork really. By mental states, I include mental states of animals, like bees and ants!

No, they don't. They can't really be reduced to a series of step-by-step instructions because there are so many different things happening simultaneously.

They aren't like algorithms because they're concurrent.

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concurrency_(computer_science)

However, while any given part of a concurrent system doesn't behave determinately (they could be altered or interrupted by some other part, mid-course), the whole thing taken together does. So while I couldn't say whether or not you'll solve some puzzle, just from the information available to you (you could be altered or interrupted in the middle of solving it, too), I could predict that if I also knew what was happening around you.

If I could predict you at all, that is.

Edited February 17, 2015 by Harrison Danneskjold

[DonAthos]

If I could predict you at all, that is.

Maybe I'm wrong -- and I sincerely don't mean to be boorish about this -- but I don't believe I've yet received any credible answer to my "predicting computer" thought experiment.

I think that it (successfully?) demonstrates that man is unpredictable -- not alone due to "chaos" or complexity, like the weather -- but in a fundamentally different way.

To try to describe it again in least terms (if you'll do me the honor of trying to answer this question in the spirit I ask, such as you understand it to be):

Grant an omniscient god or supercomputer or whatever it is that could predict the future, based on current states (including Eiuol's mental states), which also has all of the information you believe it needs to successfully do its job.

This predictor is responsible for a single prediction: whether a man is going to select Door A or Door B. It will provide output in the form of either "Door A" or "Door B."

The experiment runs as follows: 1) the predictor must make its prediction; 2) the man will then be made aware of the prediction (which is also information the predictor has initially, prior to making its prediction, as it knows "whatever it needs to know"); 3) the man will then choose between Door A and Door B.

I say that if the predictor predicts Door A, that the man is yet capable of selecting Door B, to spite the predictor (and to spite determinism generally). If the predictor predicts Door B, he might choose A.

I think that this demonstrates that man is unpredictable, not only due to ignorance, but by nature. And if man is unpredictable by nature -- in a way that is untrue of everything else (allowing for further debate over QM, etc.) -- then I think that it demonstrates that man's expression of "causality" is fundamentally unlike dominoes, the weather, and etc. Not alone due to the greater complexity introduced by "mental states," but because these mental states are governed by a different ability, which is self-governance or volition.

[Eiuol]

I think that this demonstrates that man is unpredictable, not only due to ignorance, but by nature. And if man is unpredictable by nature -- in a way that is untrue of everything else (allowing for further debate over QM, etc.) -- then I think that it demonstrates that man's expression of "causality" is fundamentally unlike dominoes, the weather, and etc. Not alone due to the greater complexity introduced by "mental states," but because these mental states are governed by a different ability, which is self-governance or volition.

I'm not even sure I know what you mean by fundamentally different. I mean, yes, there are differences between the nature of things with mental states and without mental states. There are also similarities because they're equally part of the universe and are still operating on the same causal rules of reality. Unless you want to be supporting a property dualist position. Repeating that volition is how decisions are made is not helpful here. What is its nature? It bugs me that you didn't follow through with the rational action case.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

The experiment runs as follows: 1) the predictor must make its prediction; 2) the man will then be made aware of the prediction (which is also information the predictor has initially, prior to making its prediction, as it knows "whatever it needs to know"); 3) the man will then choose between Door A and Door B.

But this whole thing hinges on the computer changing whatever it intends to observe (his mind). If you take step 2 out then there's nothing peculiar about it, at all.

Suppose it knows that he will choose the opposite of whatever it predicts. It could TELL him that he'll choose door A, while knowing that he'll choose door B, and that poses nothing significant; the issue only arises when we require that he be told what he's actually about to do (which is only an issue because that knowledge may well change his decision).

Changing what we observe is not something odd about observing humans; it's something odd about making observations, as humans.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

When you get right down into it the impossibility of omniscience necessitates some possibility for error, at all times, in everything. I think we call that fallibility, though; an attribute of consciousness (not existence).

[DonAthos]

But this whole thing hinges on the computer changing whatever it intends to observe (his mind).

Of course things will happen which will change what the computer intends to observe, including incoming data/information.

The computer -- if that's what we're running with as the "predictor" -- needs to be able to account for all of that incoming information in order to make its prediction (and we're granting it all of the information that it would theoretically need; the total state of the universe at present, which I'd hope would be enough to accommodate your theory). That's how a computer predicting the weather would predict the weather, after all -- by accounting for those things which impact the weather. If it were a sizable enough computer generating sufficient heat such that it would, itself, affect the weather, it would have to take that into account, too.

But I presume that this poses no theoretical problem for weather prediction (assuming that the computer is such that we've solved our difficulties, vis a vis complexity/"chaos"). So why is it different with predicting man?

 

If you take step 2 out then there's nothing peculiar about it, at all.

Sure. If you completely change the scenario, you'll get different results, and perhaps results you're more comfortable discussing, judging them to lie within your theory.

But I'm presenting my hypothetical for the purpose of probing an area that I do not believe your theory accounts for, or will withstand. I say we consider step 2 and try to account for it, too. It's rather the point of the exercise.

 

Suppose it knows that he will choose the opposite of whatever it predicts.

Then I think that this is as much as saying that "a prediction is impossible." Besides, I'm not certain what it means that the computer "knows that he will choose the opposite"; the computer is programmed to offer a prediction between two choices -- "Door A" or "Door B." We're not giving it other output possibilities, and in reality, one of those -- and only one -- will be selected by our test subject. If predicting man is possible, then this small test should not be beyond our computer's capability.

Isn't your answer really, "This computer cannot accurately make a prediction in this scenario"?

And since we're allowing this computer to have all information, including its own involvement, and whatever formulae are required, and etc., then doesn't this rule out "prediction" where man is concerned altogether?

 

It could TELL him that he'll choose door A, while knowing that he'll choose door B, and that poses nothing significant; the issue only arises when we require that he be told what he's actually about to do (which is only an issue because that knowledge may well change his decision).

Yes. All knowledge could potentially change a man's decision. But if we could (in theory at least) predict entire weather systems, celestial movements, atomic explosions, etc., etc., etc., then why does pinning down even the least of a man's decisions -- between two choices no less -- seem such an insurmountable task?

At some point don't we have to conclude that we're looking at something different?

 

Changing what we observe is not something odd about observing humans; it's something odd about making observations, as humans.

I think there's really nothing odd in what I describe. Volition accounts for it. It only becomes odd -- or requires "oddity" -- when we try to describe human behavior sans volition. It only becomes odd when we expect a computer to be able (theoretically) to predict a man's choices with complete accuracy, holding these choices to be predetermined, which is nothing that I expect, but does seem to me to be required by your professed beliefs.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

So why is it different with predicting man?

It's not.

Suppose we had a weather-predicting computer that was meant to make not only accurate, but very precise predictions. Suppose we wanted to know the trajectory of each droplet of rain that would fall over the next few weeks.

Well, to do that it would have to take its own operations into account, ultimately (given enough precision) down to individual calculations- which would need to be calculated in order to account for them.

The same problem crops up in observing individual subatomic particles.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Do you think that there is an answer for every "why" we can ask?

[DonAthos]

Suppose we had a weather-predicting computer that was meant to make not only accurate, but very precise predictions. Suppose we wanted to know the trajectory of each droplet of rain that would fall over the next few weeks.

Well, to do that it would have to take its own operations into account, ultimately (given enough precision) down to individual calculations- which would need to be calculated in order to account for them.

The same problem crops up in observing individual subatomic particles.

 

Just as I'm granting whatever information would be required for a computer to make this calculation, you may take it that I'm granting the required level of precision necessary (whatever you suppose that might be) to make the prediction of "Door A" or "Door B."

If we were talking about whether it was possible to predict the weather, and I was asking whether a computer could exist such that it could predict whether it will rain tomorrow in Houston... I suspect that you would quickly and confidently respond, "Yes, given a computer of sufficient power, the requisite information, and so forth, a computer could theoretically predict whether it will rain tomorrow in Houston." You wouldn't come back with quibbles over the trajectory of individual droplets, or trying to equate (or analogize) the actions of men with the motion of individual subatomic particles. You'd just answer directly, because weather is deterministic, and you and I both believe that such things are theoretically calculable.

So give your computer whatever it needs to do the job, but please respect the scenario I'd originally constructed. Tell me whether it can accurately predict a simple choice between two alternatives. I say it cannot. I say that's meaningful.

[StrictlyLogical]

Don, would you split the thread starting at post #101? It's offtopic from the OP albeit related. Maybe merge it with Harrison's newest thread. Delete this post when you read it. Just seemed better to mention it this way.

 

I would request you create a new thread Don... I'm discussing hierarchy of properties and determinism with HD

[Harrison Danneskjold]

I'm discussing hierarchy of properties and determinism with HD

Are you?

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Don, as meaningful as your scenario is (and it has changed how I look at multiple things), I don't see whatever it is that you see in it. I think that, for us, I can reduce it to a single question.

I believe that there must be an answer for every "why" that we could ever be ask. If I did not then I would still be Mormon.

Do you?

[DonAthos]

Don, as meaningful as your scenario is (and it has changed how I look at multiple things), I don't see whatever it is that you see in it. I think that, for us, I can reduce it to a single question.

I believe that there must be an answer for every "why" that we could ever be ask. If I did not then I would still be Mormon.

Do you?

My answer to this question will be a touch indirect. I'll ask for your patience as I try to answer it as best as I can:

I know that certain atoms, in particular arrangements called molecules, form water. If I were to ask "why" about water, we could perhaps speak in terms of those atoms and their molecular arrangement... but why do those atoms form water, with its particular properties, and not some other substance with other properties? If it's to do with the characteristics of these atomic particles (or however they're best conceptualized), then why do those particles have those characteristics and not others? If that's down to subatomic particles, the same question can apply.

At some point (though honestly, we're already well past my comfort zone and knowledge base)... I think I'll exhaust the "why" questions I can reasonably ask. At some point, I believe I'll just have to accept that things work in some way, because that's how they work. And this is not alone in terms of physics, and looking towards smaller or more fundamental units -- but if you believe that things can "emerge," then this acceptance I describe must be found on "higher" levels as well.

For instance, "happiness." If you believe that happiness is a real thing, as I do, and if we seek to understand it, then I don't believe that it can be explained in terms of the motions of atoms or quarks. I don't think that it is reducible in this way, or exists outside of conscious entities. So when we ask our "why" questions with respect to happiness, we will find the "bedrock" far sooner than we would in trying to describe water. If happiness is "the successful state of life," as Rand describes it, then we might fruitfully ask what we mean by "successful," and what constitutes "life," and so forth, but at a certain point, if we continue to ask "why" to every successive answer, (e.g. "why should one want to live?"), I don't know that we'll always find some deeper answer.

I believe that volition, as "happiness," is not reducible past a certain point. Rand took it further than I can -- further than I feel comfortable in arguing -- in her identification that the root of volition is the ability to initiate focus. As subatomic particles act in certain ways "because that's they way they act" -- as that is the fundamental answer to all successive "whys," past a certain point -- I believe that the root of man's choice, and the answer to "why," is because "that's what he willed." I believe that's how men behave, just as subatomic particles behave how they behave, just as water behaves how water behaves, just as happiness is constituted how it is constituted; that it is man's nature to act in this way, as entities act according to their nature; and that this is man's particular expression of causality.

Edited February 19, 2015 by DonAthos

[StrictlyLogical]

My answer to this question will be a touch indirect. I'll ask for your patience as I try to answer it as best as I can:

I know that certain atoms, in particular arrangements called molecules, form water. If I were to ask "why" about water, we could perhaps speak in terms of those atoms and their molecular arrangement... but why do those atoms form water, with its particular properties, and not some other substance with other properties? If it's to do with the characteristics of these atomic particles (or however they're best conceptualized), then why do those particles have those characteristics and not others? If that's down to subatomic particles, the same question can apply.

At some point (though honestly, we're already well past my comfort zone and knowledge base)... I think I'll exhaust the "why" questions I can reasonably ask. At some point, I believe I'll just have to accept that things work in some way, because that's how they work. And this is not alone in terms of physics, and looking towards smaller or more fundamental units -- but if you believe that things can "emerge," then this acceptance I describe must be found on "higher" levels as well.

For instance, "happiness." If you believe that happiness is a real thing, as I do, and if we seek to understand it, then I don't believe that it can be explained in terms of the motions of atoms or quarks. I don't think that it is reducible in this way, or exists outside of conscious entities. So when we ask our "why" questions with respect to happiness, we will find the "bedrock" far sooner than we would in trying to describe water. If happiness is "the successful state of life," as Rand describes it, then we might fruitfully ask what we mean by "successful," and what constitutes "life," and so forth, but at a certain point, if we continue to ask "why" to every successive answer, (e.g. "why should one want to live?"), I don't know that we'll always find some deeper answer.

I believe that volition, as "happiness," is not reducible past a certain point. Rand took it further than I can -- further than I feel comfortable in arguing -- in her identification that the root of volition is the ability to initiate focus. As subatomic particles act in certain ways "because that's they way they act" -- as that is the fundamental answer to all successive "whys," past a certain point -- I believe that the root of man's choice, and the answer to "why," is because "that's what he willed." I believe that's how men behave, just as subatomic particles behave how they behave, just as water behaves how water behaves, just as happiness is constituted how it is constituted; that it is man's nature to act in this way, as entities act according to their nature; and that this is man's particular expression of causality.

 

Certainly you are very possibly correct regarding fundamentals - the "Why" could very easily stop at some point. 

 

"Why?" here really means "How does it work?" or "What makes it work the way it works?"  Unless you are an advocate of an infinite regress of complication and complexity in the universe, certain fundamental things will be simple and will simply do what they do.

 

As for Happiness and other higher level things... can you please describe what you mean by "reducible"?

 

Metaphysically speaking they are "destructible"... they go out of existence when the configuration or functioning of the matter upon which they depend is sufficiently interfered with.  They also are "creatable" ... insofar as 2 years ago I decided to create happiness outside myself ... after much fun, worry, and hard work I have a created a son who has lots of giggles.  I did not write the code for happiness, but I brought the DNA together and oversaw (with much help) the creation of a natural system in which it now exists.

 

I may have gone a little off track with this... but can you please define precisely what you mean by reducible? Can you contrast it with other things which ARE "reducible"?  and for clarification is it that the thing itself is not "reducible" or that an understanding or explanation of the things is not "reducible" and how do you know?

[DonAthos]

As for Happiness and other higher level things... can you please describe what you mean by "reducible"?

By "reducible" I mean that some higher level/more complicated thing can be described or expressed completely in terms of lower level or more fundamental units or behaviors.

Here are a couple of definitions I've found online which speak to my intended use:

 

reducible

3. (mathematics, of an integer) Able to be factored into smaller integers; composite.

reducible

Variant of reduce

1.b to put into a simpler or more concentrated form

A society is reducible (generally speaking) in that we may describe the actions of a given society in terms of individuals; a piece of bread toasting is reducible in that we may describe "toasting" through thermodynamic and chemical reactions (I presume).

Other things are "emergent," however, in that they only exist at the higher levels and thus cannot be reduced past a certain point. Life is emergent; the constituent elements of life (atoms, molecules, etc.) are not themselves alive -- but in some particular arrangement or combination, there is life. Consciousness is emergent; no single atom which makes up a human being is conscious, but a human being is.

To attempt to describe certain emergent aspects of human beings (including those of human consciousness, such as happiness, or volition) in terms of constituent or fundamental aspects -- beyond a certain point -- are bound to be frustrated. (I say "beyond a certain point," because Rand did attempt to reduce volition -- to the choice to focus.)

 

"Why?" here really means "How does it work?" or "What makes it work the way it works?" Unless you are an advocate of an infinite regress of complication and complexity in the universe, certain fundamental things will be simple and will simply do what they do.

Yes, but more than that, "fundamentality" exists not only in terms of whatever we would consider to be the smallest existents (subatomic particles, or whatever constitutes those). Insofar as things emerge -- not existing on lower levels, but only existing on higher levels/in particular arrangements or conditions -- then it is equally true of those things that they "will simply do what they do," qua their nature. There is a fundamentality in this same sense to volition, which is what I mean by saying that it is not reducible.

Does this clarify my meaning? If it does not, it might be helpful to take a look at the Wiki article on "emergence," or of course ask if there's further question.

[StrictlyLogical]

I was more curious about your concept.  If you can understand and express it to yourself.. I am sure you can express it to me in a way I could understand.

 

What does it mean for something to "be described or expressed" 'in terms of lower level or more fundamental units or behaviors".

 

Using words such as "described" and "expressed" I assume you are talking about knowledge or lack thereof and not about metaphysics and the reality of what things are....

 

What does it mean not to be able to describe something "in terms" of other things?  Once one learns constituents A in particular configurations B cause functionality C ... is one, by recognizing this fact able to "describe" the something (functionality or result C) "in terms" of the constituents A and configuration B?  And once one understands that (and better yet HOW) constituents A in configurations B cause C... does one now know that in some sense already inherent in A, is the potential when configured according to B, to cause C... is this within or outside the realm of "reducibility"? 

 

What kind of ignorance or sense of "mystery" is required for the label "irreducible"?    

Edited February 20, 2015 by StrictlyLogical

[DonAthos]

I was more curious about your concept. If you can understand and express it to yourself.. I am sure you can express it to me in a way I could understand.

I'm sure that was the purpose to my initial reply. As to whether I can express myself to you in such a way that you can understand, I cannot yet tell.

 

What does it mean for something to "be described or expressed" 'in terms of lower level or more fundamental units or behaviors".

Using words such as "described" and "expressed" I assume you are talking about knowledge or lack thereof and not about metaphysics and the reality of what things are....

Perhaps it would be instructive to first look at a portion of the post to which you'd initially responded:

 

For instance, "happiness." If you believe that happiness is a real thing, as I do, and if we seek to understand it, then I don't believe that it can be explained in terms of the motions of atoms or quarks. I don't think that it is reducible in this way, or exists outside of conscious entities.

Despite the fact that human beings are composed of atoms, and that whatever configuration of atoms gives rise to consciousness (including aspects of consciousness, such as happiness), I believe that consciousness does not exist on the atomic level; consciousness "emerges" from some later, particular organization. As such, I do not believe that a study of atoms will help us to understand happiness; a physicist is not necessarily either a psychologist or a philosopher.

Note: when I say that "consciousness does not exist on the atomic level," I am talking directly about "metaphysics and the reality of what things are." Atoms, in themselves and outside of the very specific organization which allows for conscious thought, do not have any faculty for consciousness. Atoms are not happy, and cannot be happy; only conscious creatures can be happy.

 

What does it mean not to be able to describe something "in terms" of other things? Once one learns constituents A in particular configurations B cause functionality C ... is one, by recognizing this fact able to "describe" the something (functionality or result C) "in terms" of the constituents A and configuration B? And once one understands that (and better yet HOW) constituents A in configurations B cause C... does one now know that in some sense already inherent in A, is the potential when configured according to B, to cause C... is this within or outside the realm of "reducibility"?

If we're discussing constituents A in configuration B, because we know that constituents A in configuration B cause functionality C, then we are as much as discussing configuration B -- aren't we?

If I wanted to study happiness -- to understand what it is and how to achieve it -- what would you propose I do? If the point you're trying to make is that people are ultimately comprised of atomic material (which is then comprised of some subatomic material), then you should understand that this isn't in contention, as far as I can tell, anywhere in the thread. But will a study of atoms (constituents A) help me to understand what happiness is or how to achieve it?

If your reply is "no, not alone; but a study of atoms in configuration B would," then I'd say that you're suggesting a study of... man. Because man, in this case, is the "configuration B" where it makes sense to study happiness -- because the potential for happiness, as an aspect of consciousness, emerges from atoms in that particular configuration, and only there. Those who study "atoms" in that particular configuration may be biologists, or psychologists, or philosophers, or etc.

A study of atoms outside of that configuration, which is what a physicist might do, will not lead us to conclude that "happiness" is somehow possible to atoms. This is what it means that happiness (or consciousness) is not "reducible" to its constituent elements. If you think, however, that happiness exists somehow as a "potential," inherent to all atoms, just waiting for the right configuration to be unleashed, then... I guess you're welcome to that belief, though... to me it's a bit like asking about the sound of "one hand clapping."

In any event, it still wouldn't help us to distinguish what's possible to atoms, in terms of any given configuration of atoms; it wouldn't help us to validate or rule out "volition," which -- if it is sensible to talk about finding in atoms, can only be done in very particular configurations. That is to say, volition would remain something which can only be studied in man, because it only exists in man*.

And if you remember what I was responding to in your reply:

 

Certainly you are very possibly correct regarding fundamentals - the "Why" could very easily stop at some point.

"Why?" here really means "How does it work?" or "What makes it work the way it works?" Unless you are an advocate of an infinite regress of complication and complexity in the universe, certain fundamental things will be simple and will simply do what they do.

Then perhaps you'll see that volition is in this sense equally "fundamental," because while atoms in some specific configuration (i.e. man) possess volition, no study of atoms apart from that very configuration will illuminate the subject further.

Atoms in the specific configuration of men (or, in shorthand, "men") "simply do what they do."

____

* "[O]nly exists in man" for simplicity, and not to comment on other conscious creatures and their capabilities.

[Harrison Danneskjold]

I need some time to digest that. Thank you.

[StrictlyLogical]

Let us put consciousness and experience aside... it poses some unique difficulties primarily in relation of first person's subjective experience versus third person objective description... like I said it is unique and do not want to touch it right now.

 

 

Take a single celled organism... Don you have stated that the property "life" is not reducible.

 

Suppose we could create the living single celled organism at will, assemble its DNA RNA, nucleus, fluids, flagella, cell walls etc. watch it move and eat .. and suppose we could interfere with it at will, make this or that part not work, determine under what conditions this or that component will or will not operate to enable or disable the life of the thing.  When we can explain all the behaviours of the thing when it is living, all of the possible ways it could in a modified in a fashion it could continue to live (even in some mangled configuration), all the possible ways it would die... the exact amount of variation of any bit of it which would cause it to die. 

 

 

In what sense could our description of this life... be irreducible? 

 

Is it ONLY in the claim that each part of the organism alone, the DNA, the cell wall, the flagella ... is not "alive" by itself?  This seems more like a statement of metaphysics...  the subparts simply do not do what the combination does...  BUT the subparts by definition CANT do what the combination does because the subparts ARE NOT the combination... so this fails to surprise me. 

 

Back to the 1 celled animal, suppose we could describe how every possible subpart functions (sliced any way you can slice it) in the context... we could for example describe all of the possible ways the left hemisphere could function given all possible "boundary" conditions at its right side (and not actually invoking a description of the right side) and we could perfectly describe how the right hemisphere would function given any boundary conditions on its left hand side... could we then not describe the combination in terms of the left and right hand side, if we are careful to see how each forms the boundary conditions for the other?  In this context what kind of possible ignorance IS LEFT to claim we are still not able to describe the combination in terms of the subparts?  If we know everything about the way the subpart works... and how they would work given the boundary conditions, this MEANS we know they way it WOULD work in the combination.  And what about when we know everything to know about the subparts of the subparts... and the subparts of THOSE subparts?  I'm am still at a loss re. your conception of "irreducible".

 

Please DEFINE what you mean exactly by "irreducible"... I need a something more concrete and specific to work with.

 

I will then apply your concept to "life" and see what happens.    

Edited February 20, 2015 by StrictlyLogical

[DonAthos]

Let us put consciousness and experience aside... it poses some unique difficulties primarily in relation of first person's subjective experience versus third person objective description... like I said it is unique and do not want to touch it right now.

 

 

Take a single celled organism... Don you have stated that the property "life" is not reducible.

 

Suppose we could create the living single celled organism at will, assemble its DNA RNA, nucleus, fluids, flagella, cell walls etc. watch it move and eat .. and suppose we could interfere with it at will, make this or that part not work, determine under what conditions this or that component will or will not operate to enable or disable the life of the thing.  When we can explain all the behaviours of the thing when it is living, all of the possible ways it could in a modified in a fashion it could continue to live (even in some mangled configuration), all the possible ways it would die... the exact amount of variation of any bit of it which would cause it to die. 

 

 

In what sense could our description of this life... be irreducible? 

 

Is it ONLY in the claim that each part of the organism alone, the DNA, the cell wall, the flagella ... is not "alive" by itself?  This seems more like a statement of metaphysics...  the subparts simply do not do what the combination does...  BUT the subparts by definition CANT do what the combination does because the subparts ARE NOT the combination... so this fails to surprise me. 

 

Back to the 1 celled animal, suppose we could describe how every possible subpart functions (sliced any way you can slice it) in the context... we could for example describe all of the possible ways the left hemisphere could function given all possible "boundary" conditions at its right side (and not actually invoking a description of the right side) and we could perfectly describe how the right hemisphere would function given any boundary conditions on its left hand side... could we then not describe the combination in terms of the left and right hand side, if we are careful to see how each forms the boundary conditions for the other?  In this context what kind of possible ignorance IS LEFT to claim we are still not able to describe the combination in terms of the subparts?  If we know everything about the way the subpart works... and how they would work given the boundary conditions, this MEANS we know they way it WOULD work in the combination.  And what about when we know everything to know about the subparts of the subparts... and the subparts of THOSE subparts?  I'm am still at a loss re. your conception of "irreducible".

 

Please DEFINE what you mean exactly by "irreducible"... I need a something more concrete and specific to work with.

 

I will then apply your concept to "life" and see what happens.

I honestly do not know what we're discussing at this point, or how it relates to the thread. I feel like I've responded to everything you've asked, more than once, and that your replies are not dealing with anything that I say... so I don't see the value in continuing to repeat myself. I'm also disinclined to continue when I see someone attempting to dictate the terms of the conversation, a failure to respond to the specific arguments I've raised, and what I read as an increasingly hostile tone.

Thanks for your time.

[StrictlyLogical]

I honestly do not know what we're discussing at this point, or how it relates to the thread. I feel like I've responded to everything you've asked, more than once, and that your replies are not dealing with anything that I say... so I don't see the value in continuing to repeat myself. I'm also disinclined to continue when I see someone attempting to dictate the terms of the conversation, a failure to respond to the specific arguments I've raised, and what I read as an increasingly hostile tone.

Thanks for your time.

 

I bear no hostility toward you whatever... I honestly want to know what you mean.

 

I am not dictating terms of a conversation.  Either the examples I submit qualify as reducible according to your definition or they do not... or you may deem my example insufficiently defined to make such a categorization but by no means was what I was saying dictating anything.

 

Sorry if I offended you... more sorry you wont talk about this issue.