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How much education do we OWE our children?

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2 hours ago, necrovore said:

Trying to "derive things from the axioms" is a fundamentally deductive approach, but you cannot derive anything from the axioms.

I haven't said anything that implies that the derivation must be merely deductive. I haven't said that it must be in any form except that it starts with the axioms. I haven't said that, after starting with the axioms, then the derivation must be only by deduction. Indeed, I listed: 

"Axioms and corollaries.

Facts.

Methods of reasoning.

Conclusion."

And I did not preclude induction from being among the methods of reasoning.

And Objectivism does use the words 'derive' and 'derivation' in a sense not confined to the Objectivist sense of deduction [emphases added]:

"Proof is the derivation of a conclusion from antecedent knowledge, and nothing is antecedent to the axioms. Axioms are the starting points of cognition, on which all proofs depend." [OPAR]

"Logic is man's method of reaching conclusions objectively by deriving them without contradiction from the facts of of reality - ultimately, from the evidence provided by man's senses." [...]" [Ayn Rand Lexicon]

"It is not society, nor any social right, that forbids you to kill - but the inalienable individual right of another man to live. This is not a "compromise" between two rights - but a line of division that preserves both rights untouched. The division is not derived from an edict of society - but from your own inalienable individual right." [Ayn Rand Lexicon]

"Egoism is based on and derived from the requirements of human life on earth [...]" [The Objective Standard]

"The reason why it is a philosophy for living on Earth is that its every principle is derived from the observable facts of reality and the demonstrable requirements of human life and happiness." [The Objective Standard]

And dictionary English includes induction as well as deduction:

"derive [...] 3 : to gather or arrive at (as a conclusion) by reasoning and observation: a : to obtain inductively <ideas derived from nature> [...]" [Merriam-Webster] 

2 hours ago, necrovore said:

What you have to do is start with perception, integrate the facts into concepts and principles, and only then you can apply the principles to new facts by using deduction.

You have to do this in such a way that the axioms are not contradicted; that is what the axioms are for.

And I haven't precluded that anyone do that. In the method you mentioned, my question is: What perceptions and integrations of facts into concepts and principles and applications of induction or deduction, all not contradicting the axioms are used to reach a conclusion about the status of children and what is that conclusion?

And that does not preclude others from asking questions or mentioning points about the axioms.

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Children are people; they have the same rights as anybody else.

The argument I'm about to make was made by either Rand or Peikoff, but I am not sure I'm remembering it correctly, and it certainly isn't word for word:

Generally if you own a boat you have the right to decide who may board and who may not, and you may also have the right to change your mind, but that doesn't mean you can take someone out into the middle of the ocean, and then decide that they no longer have permission to be on your boat, and throw them off.

I support abortion because no one has the right to another person's body. But once the child is born (and especially if abortion was available, which makes the birth of the child a deliberate choice), its helplessness puts it in the same position as a passenger on your boat, in the middle of the ocean. You can't just throw the child off. You have to "get it to shore," so to speak. Transferring the child to "another boat" (i.e., adoption) is acceptable. But you have to at least arrange that the child can eventually reach a position where he can take care of himself.

I think that's all that's required, although it's nice if you can give your kid a good education. Good education is hard to find anyway nowadays...

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On 6/16/2023 at 11:03 AM, InfraBeat said:

You mentioned that earlier, but just to be clear, the notion I'm mentioning is not that argument. Rather, I'm mentioning the notion that all members of the species have rights no matter their individual degrees of rationality.

Criminals don't and there is a reason for that.

 

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1 hour ago, necrovore said:

Children are people; they have the same rights as anybody else.

The argument I'm about to make was made by either Rand or Peikoff, but I am not sure I'm remembering it correctly, and it certainly isn't word for word:

Generally if you own a boat you have the right to decide who may board and who may not, and you may also have the right to change your mind, but that doesn't mean you can take someone out into the middle of the ocean, and then decide that they no longer have permission to be on your boat, and throw them off.

I support abortion because no one has the right to another person's body. But once the child is born (and especially if abortion was available, which makes the birth of the child a deliberate choice), its helplessness puts it in the same position as a passenger on your boat, in the middle of the ocean. You can't just throw the child off. You have to "get it to shore," so to speak. Transferring the child to "another boat" (i.e., adoption) is acceptable. But you have to at least arrange that the child can eventually reach a position where he can take care of himself.

I think that's all that's required, although it's nice if you can give your kid a good education. Good education is hard to find anyway nowadays...

No, you are making the argument that applies to adults. Children even now, don't have a right to sign contracts. They don't have all rights and there are reasons for that. Not ALL humans have rights. Those who do have them are based on some reasoning. A similar reasoning has to apply to children. What is it?

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7 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

No, you are making the argument that applies to adults. Children even now, don't have a right to sign contracts. They don't have all rights and there are reasons for that. Not ALL humans have rights. Those who do have them are based on some reasoning. A similar reasoning has to apply to children. What is it?

You are equivocating between natural rights and legal rights.

All humans have natural rights (life, liberty, property, the pursuit of happiness, derivatives such as freedom of speech, right to a fair trial, etc.). This includes children, who have "guardians" who are supposed to protect their rights.

Legal rights are different. As far as contracts, there is the question of competency; a contract shouldn't be binding if the person signing it doesn't understand it or is not capable of holding up their end. This can apply not only to children but also to elderly people with dementia or people with brain damage or the like.

Further, some people have the right to serve on a jury and others don't. Some people have the right to vote and others don't (e.g., because they are visiting foreign tourists).

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13 hours ago, necrovore said:

Children are people; they have the same rights as anybody else.

Suppose a child starts to leave the house at 3 AM to walk to skid row to live with intravenous drug users and violent criminals, then don't parents have a moral (not just legal) right to stop the child? If so, then the child doesn't have the same moral rights as anybody else.

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3 hours ago, necrovore said:

You are equivocating between natural rights and legal rights.

One has a moral right, as well as a legal right, to make contracts. Making contracts is part of free trade among humans, and as such, humans have the moral, not just legal, right.

Also, we don't need to appeal to things like contracts. We can adduce many moral rights that children seem not to have. Moreover, if one said that children do have those moral rights but that it's moral that they don't have them as legal rights, then that contradicts the principle that it is not moral to legally prohibit exercise of moral rights.

 

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3 hours ago, necrovore said:

All humans have natural rights

If I am adequately stating the Objectivist view, the basis for rights is that the defining characteristic of 'man' is rationality and that a man's survival is attained primarily through use of reason. But why do people who lack sufficient rationality have rights? If a particular human has less reasoning skills than an ape, then we still consider that human to have the right not to be killed. What is the Objectivist basis for that? 

Moreover, what is the Objectivist derivation of rights from rationality? I rely on a lot on reason to survive. I also rely on a lot of other faculties to survive. Meanwhile, other creatures rely on faculties other than reason to survive. Why do rights accrue only to members of the species that uses a lot of reason, and, as mentioned above, to all members of that species even if they don't use very much reason to survive?

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2 hours ago, InfraBeat said:

why do people who lack sufficient rationality have rights? If a particular human has less reasoning skills than an ape, then we still consider that human to have the right not to be killed.

The Objectivist principle is that man has rights, from which it follows that anything that is “man” has rights. You can disagree with that principle and we could have a different discussion, but the question about “people who lack sufficient rationality” makes no sense in the context of Objectivist ethics.

Moving to that different discussion, you might offer an alternative principle: “only a being with sufficiently demonstrated rationality has rights”. Unlike the Objectivist principle, the actual application of this principle is very much up in the air. Who judges what constitutes a sufficient demonstration of rationality; what is the standard? There is no such vagueness with the Objectivist principle. You can, of course, invent a science fiction scenario where it is not clear whether a particular being is “man”, but in the real world, this is a non-question. The Objectivist ethics is based on the obviously true fact that man chooses his actions, and properly uses reason to guide his choices. But man does have the choice to act according to his nature, or not. In contrast, an ape cannot use the faculty of reason to make choices, and cannot act contrary to his nature.

Again exploring alternatives to the Objectivist ethics, you might claim that man’s essential character is a combination of reason and great body strength, and therefore it is right that a being with the faculty of reason and great body strength act according to his nature, thus allowing him to treat rational beings of lesser body strength to treat beings of lesser body strength as sacrificial animals. In fact, this characterizes primitive human ethics. The most glaring problem with this alternative is that it is based on a false identification. It is false that man’s essential character is a combination of reason and great body strength (or, simply, great body strength), and if that much is false, then the ethical principle said to follow from that assumption is also false.

A completely different approach to the question, again following non-Objectivist thinking, is that rights cannot be assessed using abstract principles, they must be judged on a case-by-case basis. Now, my hope is that you will see that these alternative accounts are wrong, but perhaps you accept one of these alternatives, then we could explore why, and where the contradiction resides.

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37 minutes ago, DavidOdden said:

The Objectivist principle is that man has rights, from which it follows that anything that is “man” has rights. You can disagree with that principle

I don't disagree with the principle. But it does make sense to ask how we derive that principle rather than a more limited principle by which the scope is not universal to the entire species. Moreover, if all members of the species had such rights as freedom of action that is not force, then children would have such a right, but generally it is regarded that they don't. 

37 minutes ago, DavidOdden said:

Who judges what constitutes a sufficient demonstration of rationality; what is the standard?

Of course that would be a pressing question. But is it your Objectivist argument that all humans have rights, including those virtually without rationality, because we don't have a standard for what would be sufficient rationality?

37 minutes ago, DavidOdden said:

you might claim that man’s essential character is a combination of reason and great body strength

More fundamentally would be to examine whether the Objectivist notion of essential characteristics is tenable. Moreover, even if the essentialist concept were sustained, still there would need to an argument for considering only essential characteristics as proper basis for conclusions such as about rights.

37 minutes ago, DavidOdden said:

this characterizes primitive human ethics

The philosophical answers are not determined by what is less primitive or less abhorrent to certain non-primitive sensibilities, unless one takes as already given premises, prior to deriving the concept of rights, such things as that it is morally wrong for humans to murder humans. 

37 minutes ago, DavidOdden said:

It is false that man’s essential character is a combination of reason and great body strength

But no one has said that man's essential character is such a combination.

 

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1 hour ago, DavidOdden said:

But man does have the choice to act according to his nature, or not. In contrast, an ape cannot use the faculty of reason to make choices, and cannot act contrary to his nature.

That requires that there is a select property that constitutes a nature, thus excluding other properties that are even universal to all humans or held differently by different humans, and that conclusions about rights must be derived only from that select property. As mentioned, that depends on sustaining essentialism, and, even if essentialism is sustained, it needs argument to derive that conclusions about rights must be based on an essential property and only that essential property.

And we would need to define "act according to its nature". Do you mean act contrary to its essential property? So, since Objectivism holds that reason is the essential property of man, do you mean that a human may choose to not act rationally, therefore against his essential property? So humans have rights because they can choose to act against their essential property? But, back to children, in what way can they choose to act against the essential property of being human? Then what is the essential property of an ape such that an ape may not act against that property? Is it that an ape cannot make choices? If so, we need to explicate what constitutes making a choice. If we do that satisfactorily, then perhaps the answer is that hopefully we could sustain the claim that humans can make choices but that, for example, apes cannot. But if we can explicate the notion of choice without requiring that it be defined in terms of reason, then rights reduce to the capacity for choice irrespective of reason. Anyway, it still wouldn't be clear in what sense infants can make choices but apes cannot.

/

If a government is moral, then it can't morally deny legal rights that are moral rights. So, if a moral government denied children certain moral rights, then those must be moral rights that don't extend to children. Thus, if a moral government made an age qualification to meet a presumed expectation of rationality per age, then it is not precluded that it make some other qualification such as passing some kind of direct test for rationality. For example, we may have a given eighteen year old with less developed rationality than some given fifteen year old, yet the fifteen year old is denied  moral  rights (such as the moral right to not have to sleep every night in a specified location) that are not deined the eighteen year old. So, if it is moral government, then there must be a moral basis for that. 

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8 hours ago, InfraBeat said:

I don't disagree with the principle. But it does make sense to ask how we derive that principle rather than a more limited principle by which the scope is not universal to the entire species. Moreover, if all members of the species had such rights as freedom of action that is not force, then children would have such a right, but generally it is regarded that they don't.

I don’t see how that makes more sense. A moral principle is a form of conceptual knowledge, and as you know from ITOE, simplicity is a fundamental requirement of human knowledge. In order to limit the principle to only certain humans, you have to complicate the proposition, which is anti-sensible. Your counter-argument that if Objectivism were correct then children would have the right to freedom of action but some people hold that they don’t falls on its face, since truth is not a social construct. Children actually have the same rights as adults. If you have a direct proof that children don’t have rights, or lack certain specific rights, let’s see the argument. In addition: you say “I don't disagree with the principle”, but everything you say shows that you do disagree. You cannot agree with the Objectivist ethics while also holding that only a subset of men have rights – that is a contradiction. Unless you mean “I don’t understand the principle”, or worse “I refuse to evaluate the truth of the principle”, there’s no way to maintain that the Objectivist ethics is correct and yet some humans have no rights. You are free to disagree, but remember the sage words of Abu Sina, “Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned”. If you have comprehended the Objectivist ethics, then you either accept it and reject the proposition that some humans have no rights, or you reject the Objectivist ethics.

I really want to belabor the epistemological underpinnings of ethics. We have a simple proposition that “rights” is a necessary concept for man to exist qua man. Man’s special tool for existence is “use reason”, not “turn color when threatened” or “run fast”. We do not have instinctual knowledge that certain berries are poisonous or that certain creatures are dangerous – we have to learn this from observation and reason. Your comment that “More fundamentally would be to examine whether the Objectivist notion of essential characteristics is tenable” indicates to me, rather persuasively, that you do not accept the Objectivist epistemology, meaning that you have a very different view of human cognition. To fling around a few obscure terms, it looks to me like you are a fan of extensionalism rather than intensionalism. In a nutshell, do you see knowledge as being “the set of things that it refers to”, or “the principles that identify concretes”? Is your focus the concretes, or the conceptual abstractions from which the concretes can be derived? Essential characteristics are essential to human cognition. We do not understand the notion of “man” in terms of a complete list of all things true of man, we reduce the concept to an essential characteristic from which all other knowledge about “man” can be derived. That would be “rational being”. Again, it’s okay if you reject the Objectivist position, I just object to the notion that you can accept it while accepting its contrary. Or, to frame the matter differently, let’s see exactly what you reject. The epistemology? I find that most rejections of Objections reduce to a rejection of our epistemology.

 

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You've terribly misrepresented what I wrote. You've put up a huge strawman. You've read into my remarks what is not there. Please do not do that.

Before I discuss the subject, I should clean up your misrepresentations:

(1) [DavidOdden] "Your counter-argument that if Objectivism were correct then children would have the right to freedom of action but some people hold that they don't"

I did not make such an argument. I have not said that if Objectivism is correct then children would have the right of freedom of action. What I said:

[InfraBeat] "if all members of the species had such rights as freedom of action that is not force, then children would have such a right, but generally it is regarded that they don't."

Obviously, that is in context of the discussion where I was talking about children not having the full range of a right of action as adults do. It would be ridiculous for anyone to claim that generally people regard children as having no rights of action whatsoever. 

And the quote doesn't even mention Objectivism. It applies to any philosophy. Indeed, the first two clauses hold from the fact that children are members of the species. And the last clause holds since it's clear enough that generally people don't think children have a right to defy their parents and go live with junkies.

And, by the way, I did not make a modus tollens argument that "therefore, children don't have the right of freedom of action".  I didn't make that argument since I didn't claim that the fact that generally people don't hold that children have a right of freedom of action implies that children don't have a right of freedom action (and, again, this is in context of the discussion where I was talking about children not having the full range of right of action as adults do).

Moreover, I did not say that Objectivism holds that all members of the species have the right to freedom of action. It is part of the question being discussed, which is: What does Objectivism entail about rights of children? I have not said that Objectivism entails that children have rights of action as do adults, and I have not said that Objectivism entails that children do not have rights of action as do adults.
 
(2) [DavidOdden] "If you have a direct proof that children don’t have rights, or lack certain specific rights, let's see the argument."

Are you suggesting that I claimed that children don't have rights? I haven't made such a claim. Moreover, there is a distinction between having all rights that adults have and having only some rights that adults have. For example, one may hold that children have the right not to be murdered but that they don't have the right to defy their parent's command not to leave home late at night to hitchhike to skid row to take up residence with junkies. 

(3) [DavidOdden] "you say “I don't disagree with the principle”, but everything you say shows that you do disagree."

What I said I don't disgree with is: [DavidOdden] "man has rights, from which it follows that anything that is "man" has rights."

I don't disagree that children have rights. For example, children have the right not to be murdered. And I have not said anything (let alone "everything") to contradict that. 

(4) [DavidOdden] "Your comment that “More fundamentally would be to examine whether the Objectivist notion of essential characteristics is tenable” indicates to me, rather persuasively, that you do not accept the Objectivist epistemology, meaning that you have a very different view of human cognition. To fling around a few obscure terms, it looks to me like you are a fan of extensionalism rather than intensionalism."

It doesn't indicate (let alone, not persuasively) what you have chosen to misrepresent it as indicating. In particular, it does not indicate that I endorse extensionalism and reject intensionalism or reject essentialism. Personally, I don't even reduce the subject to teams to be "fans of" like that. I'm interested in different views on the subject. And to say that it's needed to examine whether a notion is tenable is not itself to take a position on whether the notion is tenable. 

/

Back to the subject:

[DavidOdden] "In order to limit the principle to only certain humans, you have to complicate the proposition, which is anti-sensible."

It is anti-sensible to deny that sometimes correct conclusions have degrees of complication and are not all ultimately simple.  

[DavidOdden] "you know from ITOE, simplicity is a fundamental requirement of human knowledge"

Would you please tell me the page numbers in ITOE that say that?

[InfraBeat] "if all members of the species had such rights as freedom of action that is not force, then children would have such a right, but generally it is regarded that they don't."

[DavidOdden] "truth is not a social construct."

I did not claim that children have all the rights adults have and I did not claim that children don't have all the rights that adults have. Rather, I'm interested in what the arguments are, especially Objectivist arguments. And I did not claim that "generally people hold that children don't have all the rights that adults have" implies "children don't have all the rights that adults have". Rather, I mention it because it behooves us to explore why people think that children don't have all the rights that adults have; understanding why people think certain things may uncover arguments on behalf of their view or even detect faulty premises or bad logic. 

Especially relevant to this discussion is what view Objectivists have and why that have that view. 

If an Objectivist holds that children don't have the right to defy their parents and go live with junkies, then that Objectivist holds that the full range of rights that adults have is greater than the range children have. Then we may ask why one would hold that not all rights are not universal to all humans, and whether that accords with the Objectivist account of rights, or whether there is a flaw in the Objectivist account of rights.

If an Objectivist holds that children do have the right to defy their parents and go live with junkies, then we would ask whether that view accords with the Objectivist account of rights; and, since the Objectivist account seems to be universal to all humans, then why wouldn't Objectivism uphold that children have the full range of rights as adults, including the right to go live with junkies? 

[David Odden] "If you have comprehended the Objectivist ethics, then you either accept it and reject the proposition that some humans have no rights, or you reject the Objectivist ethics."

First, I haven't claimed that children have no rights. Second, it is not required that a person has reached a conclusion, or stated a conclusion, about any aspect of Objectivism in order to ask questions about it or to engage in critical thinking about it. 

[David Odden] "We have a simple proposition that "rights" is a necessary concept for man to exist qua man."

It's simple in the sense that it's only eleven words. Not so simple when we go to unpack it.

"Man's special tool for existence is "use reason", not "turn color when threatened" or "run fast".

Perhaps an unstated premise is: "Whatever is the special tool of a species, is what solely determines certain conclusions about all the members of that species".

There are two parts to that: (1) That the special tool is what solely determines those conclusions and (2) That the conclusions apply to all members of the species. 

The best I can lay out the Objectivist argument in discrete steps is: Humans' goal is to survive and flourish. Humans' special tool for surviving and flourishing is reason and the essential property of humans is reason. Therefore, humans' special tool for their goal is reason, and reason is the essential property of humans. Therefore, humans have rights, and all humans have rights. The special tools of other species do not include reason, and the essential property of other species is not reason, so other species don't have rights. (If I missed any steps, then I'm happy to know what they are.)

But how do we go from "Humans' special tool for their goal is reason, and reason is the essential property of humans" to "Therefore, humans have rights, and all humans have rights"?

An unstated premise seems to be: "If humans' special tool for their goal is reason, and reason is the essential property of humans, then humans have rights, and all humans have rights." Or some other linkage needs to be filled in (or I might have overlooked it).

Also, an unstated premise seems to be: "If a species special tool for their goal is not reason, and reason is not the essential property of that species, then no members of that species have rights." Or some other linkage needs to be filled in (or I might have overlooked it).
 
[David Odden] "We do not understand the notion of "man" in terms of a complete list of all things true of man, we reduce the concept to an essential characteristic from which all other knowledge about "man" can be derived."

There are two issues: (1) Whether the Objectivist essentialist claims hold up, and (2) Whether it is conceivable that, for ordinary working purposes, there is a better general notion of humankind other than with a definiens of "ability to reason". 

(1) is a whole subject onto itself. I point it out here only to note that the Objectivism hinges on it. As to (2), in this context, I acknowledge that one would have a hard time indeed to dispute the central importance of reason as a property held by most humans. 

[David Odden] "We do not have instinctual knowledge that certain berries are poisonous or that certain creatures are dangerous – we have to learn this from observation and reason."

That's an interesting argument: Even infants must use primitive reason. That would seem to refute the extreme view that infants have no rights based on an argument, "Infants are not rational, therefore they are an exception to rights, even an exception to all rights". Or put another way, it supports the view, "If some humans have rights, then all infants have rights". 

But as to the general question of how we derive that humans have rights, I refer back to the point about a seemingly unstated premise.

[David Odden] "let's see exactly what you reject"

It's not a matter of what I reject of accept, but rather I am interested in certain questions and points I think should be addressed. 

The first one is about the first axiom. How does Objectivism infer "there exists the sum of all existents" from the premise "existents exist". How would one preclude that there could be existents but not a thing that is the sum of all existents? One claim made about the axioms is that you can't dispute them while not thereby affirming them. But I don't see that one can't dispute that there is a thing that is the sum of all existents without affirming that there is a thing that is the sum of all existents. 

/

You can rest assured that I acknowledge the law of non-contradiction, so, please, you don't have to beat and burn me to get me to agree with it. 

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22 hours ago, DavidOdden said:

we reduce the concept [of man] to an essential characteristic from which all other knowledge about “man” can be derived.

Obviously, it is not true that all knowledge about humankind, or even about the concept of humankind, can be derived solely from the notion that humankind's essential characteristic is reason. For example, we can't derive the knowledge that humankind has explored all the continents solely from the notion that the essential characteristic is reason. Nor can we derive, solely from the notion that reason is the essential characteristic, that the concept of man includes that man is a primate.

Even if we grant the claim that 'man' cannot be properly defined without taking reason as the essential property, that doesn't provide us with "all" knowledge about even the concept of man, since the concept includes that that man is a primate. Not to mention knowledge about man regarding language, mortality, anatomy, behaviors, psychology, technology, society, culture, the history of man, etc.

And it requires an argument to support the view that rights are determined by the notion that the essential characteristic is reason. 

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1 hour ago, InfraBeat said:

[David Odden] "We do not have instinctual knowledge that certain berries are poisonous or that certain creatures are dangerous – we have to learn this from observation and reason."

That's an interesting argument: Even infants must use primitive reason. That would seem to refute the extreme view that infants have no rights based on an argument, "Infants are not rational, therefore they are an exception to rights, even an exception to all rights". Or put another way, it supports the view, "If some humans have rights, then all infants have rights". 

But also, if I understand your argument, it is that other species survive instinctually but that humans survive by learning. Yet, arguably, don't certain other species survive not merely instinctually but also with learning? In any case, whether survival or not, it's pretty clear that certain other species do learn. Moreover, arguably, certain other species use reason.

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On 6/19/2023 at 9:32 PM, DavidOdden said:

Children actually have the same rights as adults.

There are two aspects of rights and both do not apply to children. I think that has been the issue.

One aspect of "rights" is a moral principle that protects individuals from the initiation of force or coercion by others. A second aspect is that it is a foundation for voluntary interactions, individualism, and respect for individual freedom.

A child, just like an adult, has a need for this protection. So in this case, the security that prevents aggression is needed which is an aspect of rights. But the other aspect of rights, the freedom of action to survive is not a necessary requirement for a child in the sense that he cannot use that aspect.

But the question still stands: What is the key element of a human that epistemologically provides for this protection? Is it the potential for rationality (I emphasize potential because humans are potentially rational, not always rational (this is the case for both children and adults))... Because why doesn't a rabbit have rights?

It should also be specified that the fact that the child has rights does not mean "his dependency" is a requirement for others to take care of it. The "taking care of" aspect should be voluntary.

 

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10 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

What is the key element of a human that epistemologically provides for this protection? Is it the potential for rationality (I emphasize potential because humans are potentially rational, not always rational (this is the case for both children and adults))... Because why doesn't a rabbit have rights?

I’d say that this is the key identification. It is not the actual demonstration of (sufficient) reasoning in each and every choice, it is the fact that man has a rational faculty whereby a man chooses his actions. A rabbit does not. Only humans have a conceptual consciousness. Perhaps you claim otherwise?

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2 hours ago, DavidOdden said:

I’d say that this is the key identification. It is not the actual demonstration of (sufficient) reasoning in each and every choice, it is the fact that man has a rational faculty whereby a man chooses his actions. A rabbit does not. Only humans have a conceptual consciousness. Perhaps you claim otherwise?

No, I'm not claiming otherwise, only that a baby at a certain point has the consciousness of a rabbit. But the rabbit does not have that potential.

 

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50 minutes ago, Easy Truth said:

No, I'm not claiming otherwise, only that a baby at a certain point has the consciousness of a rabbit. But the rabbit does not have that potential

I disagree with your (apparent) stance on infant consciousness. Newborns have already gained perceptual experience in utero, and will have some experiential knowledge of the ambient language, which is essential to developing full adult rationality. It’s not just that an infant will eventually develop concepts, it’s than they have already started to develop their conceptual consciousness prenatally, which a rabbit never does.

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3 hours ago, DavidOdden said:
4 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

No, I'm not claiming otherwise, only that a baby at a certain point has the consciousness of a rabbit. But the rabbit does not have that potential

I disagree with your (apparent) stance on infant consciousness. Newborns have already gained perceptual experience in utero, and will have some experiential knowledge of the ambient language, which is essential to developing full adult rationality. It’s not just that an infant will eventually develop concepts, it’s than they have already started to develop their conceptual consciousness prenatally, which a rabbit never does.

That's up for debate and a scientific question, but it is clear that humans do have the potential for rationality that other animals have not shown to have in the sense of creating scientific progress and large-scale civilizations. So humans, given the chance can improve in this sense while rabbits etcetera repeat the same strategy of survival generation after generation.

But why doesn't a rabbit have no rights, as in it does not have a right to NOT be murdered? As in you raise it, play with it, love it, and then  ... eat it. But not a child. In both cases, there are emotions like empathy or disgust if the entity (child or rabbit) is killed, but in the case of a child, there is a moral principle at play. The only difference is the potential for rationality that the child has and the rabbit does not have.

 

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4 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

[Well, whomever, said the following, it's the idea, not who, to be addressed.]

. . . The only difference is the potential for rationality that the child has and the rabbit does not have.

Is that the ONLY basis? What about the self-likeness basis of "species solidarity" which Branden wrote of in "Benevolence versus Altruism" (1962)? I'd bet a Coca-Cola that potential of any sort is not the most basic reason humans are protective of human infants. I know all the usual chant about children being most precious because "they are our future." That is a preciousness for sure, but not the main preciousness of the individual child one is dealing with. It's a more human-to-human-as-particulars thing than any sort of considerations about continuation of the species or potentials of the actual child at hand.*

Edited by Boydstun
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