Checking Premises . ORG Statements and My Position

[bluecherry]

You missed my point. I was not asking for a solution to that particular case of the spare key. I left it intentionally low on detail and vague on some things because actually solving this case is not the point. That spare key thing was just meant as an illustration, a situation where there is no difference in knowledge about the context between the two disagreeing parties nor is there a failure to address any of the information available, there just is a conflict over what to make of certain aspects of the circumstances. One side may be right and the other wrong, but would it be justifiable to say one party is employing *rationalism* because they are not factoring in something the other side concluded (such as "force was used" in the example) because they think is not part of the actual state of things (they aren't factoring force into their conclusions because they looked at the info and concluded there was no use of force.) Rationalism is not the only path to being wrong, so even if the people who think there wasn't force are wrong, that alone obviously is not enough to say they were using rationalism. Do you contend that the one side who thinks there is force would be justified in saying the other side who does not think there was force was employing rationalism for not factoring force into their assessments?

[Steve D'Ippolito]

"Hardly anybody cares what Kant thought about aesthetics, yet people who have never heard of him follow his lead by denying that objectivity is possible in any field whatever, including art."

I think you're giving far too much credit to Kant. The impulses driving the visual arts at the time had far more to do with the political/cultural context of the times. Skill was out, "feeling" was in. This was a very handy and acceptable criterion, as it meant, for the first time, that skill mattered little. In fact, any evidence of skill was denounced as counter-whatever the new standard-bearers declared was OK. And you all swallow it up as so many sheep..........I doubt that many here are familiar with the Declaration and the Constitution. If they were I think they would have to be honest and state that they wished to promote a very different state (Objectivism) than traditional values. I haven't seen any data that shows that abandoning traditional values is a positive force (quite the opposite). So -- just how are you trying to transform society, and why? Since historically the "family" has stood in the way of Utopian idealsim, just how does your Utopia better that record?

Um,,, WTF? Over? How did you jump from criticizing modernistic art as denigrating the importance of skill, to deciding that Objectivists approve of that? And from there to asserting we don't understand the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution? Or is this directed at some specific individual participating in this thread? (In which case I still don't see what the DOI and Constitution, and alleged Objectivist misunderstandings of them, have to do with the subject at hand.)

[Hairnet]

I don't think he meant that Objectivists approve of promoting emotional content over skill. His sentence structure was a little off so I could see why you would interperet it that way. He was saying that Objectivists swallow the idea that Kant was the source of modern art without reasoning.

1) The constitution was a compromise made by good men with evil men, and we are still undoing the damage of that compromise to this day. Maybe they had to do it, or maybe they could have fought harder. Point is that those documents have nothing to do with rationally constructed political philosophy.

2) Society needs to recognize the values of rationality, production, purpose, independence , responsibility, justice, and benevolence. Probably forgot something but whatever.

[Grames]

"Hardly anybody cares what Kant thought about aesthetics, yet people who have never heard of him follow his lead by denying that objectivity is possible in any field whatever, including art."

I think you're giving far too much credit to Kant. The impulses driving the visual arts at the time had far more to do with the political/cultural context of the times. Skill was out, "feeling" was in.

Objectivism has a theory of history that gives an account of why it is the case that the "impulses driving things" change over time. and what a "political/cultural context of the times" essentially refers to.

Contrary to the prevalent views of today’s alleged scholars, history is not an unintelligible chaos ruled by chance and whim—historical trends can be predicted, and changed—men are not helpless, blind, doomed creatures carried to destruction by incomprehensible forces beyond their control.

There is only one power that determines the course of history, just as it determines the course of every individual life: the power of man’s rational faculty—the power of ideas. If you know a man’s convictions, you can predict his actions. If you understand the dominant philosophy of a society, you can predict its course. But convictions and philosophy are matters open to man’s choice.

There is no fatalistic, predetermined historical necessity. Atlas Shrugged is not a prophecy of our unavoidable destruction, but a manifesto of our power to avoid it, if we choose to change our course.

It is the philosophy of the mysticism-altruism-collectivism axis that has brought us to our present state and is carrying us toward a finale such as that of the society presented in Atlas Shrugged. It is only the philosophy of the reason-individualism-capitalism axis that can save us and carry us, instead, toward the Atlantis projected in the last two pages of my novel.

edit: I would deny that Objectivism is any sense utopian in the sense that "everything would be perfect if everyone followed orders", both because no one would give orders and because there can never be a final perfect solution for the problems of the human condition (mortality, fallibility, volition, and obtaining the material requirements of life) because they appear anew in each individual's life.

Edited February 17, 2012 by Grames

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Do you contend that the one side who thinks there is force would be justified in saying the other side who does not think there was force was employing rationalism for not factoring force into their assessments?

You weren't clear about it being a question of rationalism, or I overlooked something you wrote; but no, rationalism is not the only type of mistake, and one can overlook facts without being a rationalist. Rationalism is a specific methodology of arguing from idea to idea without every bringing in any facts or any references to existence. Take a look at the quote from Kant presented in this thread about a priori knowledge, and notice that he does not refer to a single fact of existence -- it is all one big floating abstraction; and his whole philosophy is that way.

A person may have the facts and argue from the facts, but overlooked something, which would not make it a rationalistic presentation. For example, your key example. Suppose the spare key had been left there for a long time as an emergency entry key, if her keys got lost, and she forgot about it. She walks into her house and finds a total stranger there, and accuses him of breaking the lock to gain entry to her house. Here, she has forgotten that she had left a key outside.

Regarding the issue of context, the plot-line of Atlas Shrugged is a great example of rational men coming to differing conclusions because one side or the other simply doesn't have all the facts. Dagny considered John Galt to be a great destroyer of the economy given that she reasoned out that he was behind the disappearance of important businessmen that she wanted to deal with. She wanted to shoot him on sight because she thought he was so evil. However, she didn't have a clue as to what those following John Galt were up to; and once she did, she had a different assessment of John Galt. So, even in these threads,which tend to go in all sorts of direction, one should not jump to the conclusion that so and so is irrational or rationalistic simply because all of the relevant facts may not be known by one side or the other. But, in general, I do see the most basic mistake students of Objectivism make is to be rationalistic. They can tie the philosophy together in the abstract, but cannot get it down to the facts or argue from the facts in a consistent manner. Objectivity is not an easy skill to learn.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

1) The constitution was a compromise made by good men with evil men, and we are still undoing the damage of that compromise to this day. Maybe they had to do it, or maybe they could have fought harder. Point is that those documents have nothing to do with rationally constructed political philosophy.

That's quite a bit of an over generalization, considering how much effort the Founders went into to learn about and to study all the past types of government (and the theories backing them up) to find the one best suited to a free people. The biggest "compromise" they reached was to permit the South to have slavery. However, at that time, there were many pseudo-scientific claims that the negro was not fully human given the very primitive African cultures they had. It was a very big mistake, and some of them knew better, but it wasn't generally accepted that the negro was man the rational animal, though lacking in education. I agree with you that they should have stood fast and not have permitted slavery, but what they feared is that there would be continuous war with the slavery south and the industrial north, especially if they were two separate countries. But, then again, the mechanisms were there to correct the mistake, though it took a very bloody civil war to resolve it out. Then the Constitution was amended, and slavery was ended. It is still the Constitution with the first ten amendments (the Bill of Rights) that is protecting us to this day, so long as Federal politicians are held to it by the people.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

I am reposting the quote from Kant that Grames provided, because it is important to realize something about it. Notice that Kant considers this to be a very important point to be made, in fact, the center piece of his entire philosophy; and yet he does not refer to a single fact of reality in making the determination that there is even such a thing as a priori knowledge. He gives no examples whatsoever (not even on the level of Plato, who is the arch rationalist). The whole thing and his whole philosophy, is a total floating abstraction not tied to cognition based on reasoning from evidence whatsoever. It is totally non-objective, without evidence, and contains no proof of anything.

Kant on a priori knowledge:

Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object (as an object of the senses) conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them as representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized (as given objects) conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. (Bxvi-xviii)

[Jonathan13]

You can stop right there because what is conventionally referred to as Romanticism does not have much overlap with what inspired Rand.

No, what is conventionally referred to as Romanticism is exactly what inspired Rand.

You appear to be missing my point that Romantic art inspired Rand, not necessarily the theories behind the Romantic art (or the theories of any other aesthetic movement).

Or perhaps you're reversing things in your mind? Do you think that Rand began her interest in art and ideas without any aesthetic preferences and without what she called a "sense of life," and then, rather than looking at art, reacting to it, and then identifying the fact that Romantic art was the type with which she had felt most connected, you think that she instead began by studying aesthetic theories, and, like an emotionless adding machine, she logically tallied up the aspects of the theories that she thought were the most rational, and then went out and found examples of art which contained those aspects, and then rationally valued them highly accordingly?

If so, you're wrong. Rand spoke of being inspired by Romantic art prior to having any exposure whatsoever to aesthetic theories. Only later did she analyze why she had emotionally reacted to it so strongly.

Going by the conventional wisdom gathered on the Wikipedia page for Romanticism or this material used in Humanities 303 offered by Washington State University, the element that Rand might have approved of is a focus on the individual and nothing else.

I disagree that a focus on individualism was the only element of Romanticism that Rand approved of. She also loved its drama, emotional impact, scale, conflict, etc. Rand's love of Romanticism was more emotionally "sense of life" based than explicitly philosophical.

Rand rejected everything else: the malevolent universe premise she reported to perceive in Wagner and Shakepeare...

You (and/or Rand?) consider Shakespeare to be from the Romantic Period? Weird!

...the lone starving artist as heroic martyr, spontaneity, reliance on emotions as cognitive guides, religion, folk art, nature worship. If there is inspiration here it is a negative inspiration, the desire to contradict everything that was wrong and wrongly associated with individualism. Yes there was a Nietzsche period but we know that was definitely due to his apparent individualism and not the other elements—and she had to fix up the individualism and reject Nietzsche to reach her mature work and philosophy.

I understand that Rand was critical of many aspects of the Romantic Movement while admiring and being inspired by the art that it produced. The point is that she did not reject the element that Kant brought to Romaticism, but embraced it as her signature style (perhaps unknowingly). Her novels do not present Greek Sublimity, or Shaftesburian Sublimity, or even Burkean Sublimity. They present Kantian Sublimity.

In an actual parallel with Rand (perhaps she was inspired) Kant recapitulates his epistemology in the Critique of Judgement and uses it to reach his aesthetics. I take it that the epistemology is what she is referring to...

So your theory is that a brief, non-detailed outline of Kant's epistemology in the prologue to his Critique of Judgment is what Rand believed caused modern art, rather than Kant's formal, detailed presentation of his epistemology elsewhere, and that the artists who came up with abstraction in visual art were influenced only by that prologue and not the aesthetics which flowed from it? And they interpreted his epistemology to mean what Rand interpreted it to mean (which is quite unusual since I know of no one outside of Objectivist circles who takes it to mean what Rand took it to mean)? In other words, is it your view that the "modern" artists accepted a Randian interpretation of Kant's outline of epistemology, and accepted it where she rejected it, but they then rejected his explicit, epistemologically-based conclusion that all works of art are mimetic and have representational content or themes -- that "the beauty of art is a beautiful representation of a thing"?

I'm sorry, but your argument appears to boil down to the idea that you disagree with Kant and you disagree with the idea of "modern art" qualifying as art, and therefore the one must have been the cause of the other, even though Kant would not have accepted "modern art" as art, and even though you have no actual evidence of "modern" artists crediting Kant with having influenced them. You seem to believe that because you (and Rand) interpret Kant in one way, then the originators of "modern art" must have also interpreted him in the same way (but that they agreed with what they took him to mean where you disagree), and they must have based their aesthetic theories on his ideas because you think that you see similarities between their mindset and his.

...not to mention such features as Kant's version of sensus communis as 'what other people think', or that there is no conceptual universal behind the judgment of beauty (and perhaps no concept).

Are you claiming that Rand or anyone else has identified a "conceptual universal" behind the judgment of beauty? If so, I'd love to hear it. I've always been under the impression, as was Kant, that human beings don't have a collective consciousness, but rather have widely differing tastes and opinions of what is beautiful or ugly. That's the reason that I asked, on the "Banishment of Beauty" thread, why Stephen Hicks, in his essay "Why Art Became Ugly," did not define beauty or make any attempt to offer any objective criteria which would allow his readers to identify which things are beautiful and which are ugly, but instead did nothing but offer his personal, subjective tastes as the implied objective standard.

To be continued...

[Jonathan13]

I don't read German and have not read the Critique of Judgement.

Okay, so you haven't read the Critique of Judgment, but, having glanced at a few online sources, you think you've found some ideas that you disagree with, and therefore those ideas caused "modern art" but not the Romantic art which inspired Rand? So apparently the originators of abstract art were influenced by Kant's prologue, even if they never read it, and that caused them to invent abstract painting?

Also, did Kant invent time travel? I only ask because time travel is the only solution that I can come up with which would explain why Cozens began experimenting with abstract "blotscapes" prior to Kant's publication of his ideas.

The philosophical movement from Kant to the modernism of Weimar Germany is described in Peikoff's The Ominous Parallels.

I asked for proof, not for Peikoff's groundless opinions.

Are you familiar with this critique of Peikoff's theories?

The movement from Kant to Post-Modernism is described by Stephen Hicks in several works, but start on his "art page" at http://www.stephenhicks.org/art/ .

Again, I asked for evidence of Kant's influence, but Hicks makes no mention of Kant in the essays on the page that you linked to.

He did try to make a causal connection between Kant and "modern art" here, and I demolished his argument here, pointing out that he was apparently unaware of the fact that scholars' comments on Kant's influence over "modern aesthetics" refer to the time period beginning with Romanticism, that their use of the term "modern aesthetics" is nowhere near to being the same thing as what Rand meant by "modern art," and that Hicks appears to mistakenly equate the two terms. Basically, Hicks went out looking to vindicate Rand, began with her unfounded conclusions, sought to "fill in the blanks," and failed.

The actual way to vindicate Rand would be to quote the originators of "modern art" as citing Kant as being the primary influence in their decision to create their art. I have yet to see any such quotes.

Like Newberry, Hicks also tried to connect Kant's concept of the Sublime to "modern art" here, and I refuted him here and here. Hicks appears to be trying to do art history by philosophical fiat. He would do better to actually study art history and find some evidence to support his speculations.

It is part of the premise that ideas matter that good ideas have good consequences and bad ideas have bad consequences.

I'm not sure that I'm understanding you. Are you saying that Kantian Sublimity is a "bad idea" because people go overboard in their zeal for the aesthetic experience (as I suggested is the case with Newberry)? And, since Rand's novels are great examples of Kantian Sublimity, are you saying that they are also "bad" because they cause zealousness is many people? If so, I disagree with where you're placing the blame. It is not Kant or Rand's fault for creating powerful aesthetic theories and powerful art, but the fault of the readers who are too immature to distinguish between reality and the powerfully emotional effects of art.

I would not pretend to do what Rand could not, nor is there even a thorough account of what objectivity consists of that we could agree upon.

If Rand, the most passionate defender of objectivity in art, could not succeed in producing a purely objective judgment of a work of art, doesn't that tell you something?

J

Edited February 18, 2012 by Jonathan13

[Jonathan13]

Please be careful you don't get into psychologizing territory. Such would not help your case.

Oh, I'm being careful. I'm not drifting into the territory of psychologizing. It is not an act of psychologizing to ask someone if my speculations about his motives have merit. I wasn't claiming to know Thomas' mind better than he does, and, more importantly, my speculations were not made "in the absence of or contrary to factual evidence."

However, if you want to see an example of psychologizing, I would suggest that you read Thomas' statement to which I was responding:

"It is total bullshit, yet people think it is profound because they do not understand it; likewise for modern art. And Kant gave rise to all of this with his philosophy."

In the above, Thomas is claiming to know what people think and why. He is claiming to know their minds better than they do. He is asserting that "modern art" cannot be profound because he gets nothing out of it, and he is claiming to know that others are accepting "bullshit" which they don't understand.

Rand said about music:

"In listening to music, a man cannot tell clearly, neither to himself nor to others- and, therefore, cannot prove- which aspects of his experience are inherent in the music and which are contributed by his own consciousness. He experiences it as an indivisible whole, he feels as if the magnificent exaltation were there, in the music, and he is helplessly bewildered when he discovers that some men do experience it and some do not." [My bold]

Now, with the bolded section above in mind, image if someone who did not experience in a work of music what Rand experienced took Thomas' approach and accused her of falling for "total bullshit" in thinking that the music was profound. That's exactly what Thomas is doing in regard to "modern art" -- he is asserting that it cannot possibly have profound meaning to others because it does not have meaning to him. In effect, he has arbitrarily established himself as both the standard and the limit of rationality, psychological health and human cognitive and aesthetic capacity: Anything beyond what he is capable of grasping or experiencing is "bullshit."

If you'd like to see another example of psychologizing, look at the Objectivist position that Kant must have been the cause of "modern art." Objectivists are asserting that they know the minds of the originators of "modern art," and that they were unable to know their own influences and motivations. They reject any denials, and all rules of evidence, logic and proof are suspended. These Objectivists are not basing their conclusions on any artists' statements or conscious convitions, but merely on their own spurious inferences in the absence of factual evidence.

J

Edited February 18, 2012 by Jonathan13

[Eiuol]

If you'd like to see another example of psychologizing, look at the Objectivist position that Kant must have been the cause of "modern art." Objectivists are asserting that they know the minds of the originators of "modern art," and that they were unable to know their own influences and motivations. They reject any denials, and all rules of evidence, logic and proof are suspended. These Objectivists are not basing their conclusions on any artists' statements or conscious convitions, but merely on their own spurious inferences in the absence of factual evidence.

I would suggest that no one is saying that Kant directly caused modern art, more that he had an indirect cause because of a profound impact on philosophy, which had an impact on philosophers like Hegel, which in turn influenced later aestheticians that are associated with "modern art", (and later on influenced post-modernist philosophy). In this sense, no one is saying that somebody like Rothko said "I read Kant all the time!" Rothko wouldn't even have to explicitly know anything about Kant. In this sense, I don't think anyone is psychologizing in the way you describe. Perhaps bad reasoning, but not psychologizing. However, from what I know, that's a result of Kant's epistemology and not strictly his aesthetic views. I've only read little about Kant's aesthetics, but it seemed more like a Platonic take to beauty (still rationalist, to be sure) than his own screwy epistemology. (This is getting offtopic enough to warrant a thread split perhaps)

[Jonathan13]

I would suggest that no one is saying that Kant directly caused modern art, more that he had an indirect cause because of a profound impact on philosophy, which had an impact on philosophers like Hegel, which in turn influenced later aestheticians that are associated with "modern art", (and later on influenced post-modernist philosophy).

Well, when someone claims that a person is the "father" of something, to me that says that they're claiming that he is the direct and primary cause. But, anyway, would you have a problem with the statement that Kant was more of a "father" to Romanticism than he was to "modern art"?

In this sense, no one is saying that somebody like Rothko said "I read Kant all the time!" Rothko wouldn't even have to explicitly know anything about Kant.

Would you also then accept the idea that Rand must not have explicitly known that she was being influenced by Kant's concept of the Sublime while denouncing him?

J

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Would you also then accept the idea that Rand must not have explicitly known that she was being influenced by Kant's concept of the Sublime while denouncing him?

What is Kant's concept of the Sublime (quote from Kant please), and what were his examples of his supposed concept? What specific facts of reality did he indicate gave rise to this supposed concept, and what are his referents to this supposed concept?

[Eiuol]

Would you also then accept the idea that Rand must not have explicitly known that she was being influenced by Kant's concept of the Sublime while denouncing him?

Only if her aesthetic philosophy was connected in some notable way to another artist who in turn was influenced by Kant. For all I know there is at least something of value to be said of Kant's aesthetic philosophy, as opposed to his epistemology which from what I know really is unredeemable.

[bluecherry]

You weren't clear about it being a question of rationalism, or I overlooked something you wrote; but no, rationalism is not the only type of mistake, and one can overlook facts without being a rationalist. Rationalism is a specific methodology of arguing from idea to idea without every bringing in any facts or any references to existence. Take a look at the quote from Kant presented in this thread about a priori knowledge, and notice that he does not refer to a single fact of existence -- it is all one big floating abstraction; and his whole philosophy is that way.

A person may have the facts and argue from the facts, but overlooked something, which would not make it a rationalistic presentation. . . .

Suppose two sides in a dispute have all the same info again. Side A claims that elements 1, 2, and 3 of the issue being discussed mean that dangerous aliens must have caused something and therefore shooting the culprit on sight is warranted. Side B, which has the same info, contends that side A is pulling this alien business out of thin air, that it does not follow from things 1, 2, and 3 as side A claims it does and (since the culprit was probably a human) the culprit is in need of subjecting to the court system, not immediate killing on sight. A says that B's conclusion that shooting on sight is not justified is rationalizing because they ignored factoring in the dangerous aliens element. Is A justified in saying B is rationalizing?

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Suppose two sides in a dispute have all the same info again. Side A claims that elements 1, 2, and 3 of the issue being discussed mean that dangerous aliens must have caused something and therefore shooting the culprit on sight is warranted. Side B, which has the same info, contends that side A is pulling this alien business out of thin air, that it does not follow from things 1, 2, and 3 as side A claims it does and (since the culprit was probably a human) the culprit is in need of subjecting to the court system, not immediate killing on sight. A says that B's conclusion that shooting on sight is not justified is rationalizing because they ignored factoring in the dangerous aliens element. Is A justified in saying B is rationalizing?

I think you reversed your A and B's in your question, because it is side A that suggest the immediate shooting on sight, not B. At any rate, this is more the issue of an application of a rational principle. The principle of justice would require some sort of counter-force action (assuming rights were violated, which I think you are assuming, though you gave no specific example). And, yes, there can be legitimate disagreements on the application of broad principles even with all of the facts taken into account. For example, my dad read Atlas Shrugged back when I dropped out of college to study Objectivism on my own (about 1976) and I told him that if he wanted to understand my motivations, then he ought to read AS. Well, he did, and he most definitely disagrees with the way the John Galters handled the situation. He thinks that if it gets to the point where something drastic must be done, then what ought to be done is to have a full-scale rebellion against the government to re-institute a government that will abide by the limits of the Constitution. I cannot say he is irrational or rationalistic (especially since he has studied history, American history, and is a great fan of the American Revolution, and the second amendment). But it does come down to an issue of the scope of the novel and is it concerned only with politics and economic liberties? I think the strike involved more than that, but that is certainly the way most readers hold it in their minds.

[added on edit] The main plot-line of AS is Dagny and Hank fighting the bureaucrats, and it doesn't go into details of Hugh Akston fighting the irrationality prevalent in the university system, so the facts for the broader scope of the novel are not presented too much in the details.

Edited February 18, 2012 by Thomas M. Miovas Jr.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Besides, the purpose of this thread is to discuss methodology, not conclusions.The question is do they go by the facts in a non-contradictory manner relevant to the facts of reality. For example, you say that side A thinks aliens are involved and side B says they aren't aliens. So, before one could determine if irrationality or rationalism are involved, one would have to look at their methodology -- i.e. does A have any evidence that aliens are involved? and if they are, how did they conclude that individual rights don't apply?

[bluecherry]

I think you reversed your A and B's in your question, because it is side A that suggest the immediate shooting on sight, not B. At any rate, this is more the issue of an application of a rational principle. The principle of justice would require some sort of counter-force action (assuming rights were violated, which I think you are assuming, though you gave no specific example). And, yes, there can be legitimate disagreements on the application of broad principles even with all of the facts taken into account.

It doesn't matter which side is labeled with which letter since this is a new situation unrelated to the previous one. This example is about some kind of unspecified rights violation case, yes. The dispute though is over what the proper type of reaction is to it (in either case here though it would be a type of forceful one) in large part based upon a dispute over the meaning of some facts involved. I take it from your last sentence here (in conjunction with your earlier statements about how when even if mistakes are made, they aren't necessarily always rationalism) that party B in the to shoot-to-kill or not to shoot-to-kill issue here is not justifiably labeled as rationalizing by party A in this example, correct? People can have legitimate disagreements about application even in cases where everybody is taking all the facts into account and simply coming to different conclusions. One doesn't need to drop context to come to a different idea about proper application of principles than somebody else.

So then why do you conclude it is necessarily a matter of rationalism and general context dropping that has lead to some people's disagreements with you on various issues as opposed to a disagreement about the meaning of some of those facts of the issues? For example, on page one of this thread you state about property rights and the NYC mosque that your opponents, "ignores the hierarchy of right to life precedes right to property, and one cannot permit a deadly enemy to become established in one's country after 911." Why do you contend that there have been facts that are dropped rather than conclusions about the facts which are being disputed? Might it not be that your opponents, rather than thinking it's fine and dandy to let people run around freely who have evidenced that they are in fact a deadly enemy, are disputing that concluding the particular, specific people involved in this one mosque project are themselves a deadly threat? You may contend that they ARE such a threat, but is it dropping context and rationalizing if somebody disagrees rather than disregards?

[Eiuol]

I split previous 3 posts about aesthetics into this thread, since it's quite a distinct topic from the OP: http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=23118&pid=288957&st=0&#entry288957

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

So then why do you conclude it is necessarily a matter of rationalism and general context dropping that has lead to some people's disagreements with you on various issues as opposed to a disagreement about the meaning of some of those facts of the issues?

Well, I don't do that in all cases. I generally try to persuade them to my understanding by going over the facts and my reasoning from them. However, in the case of the NYC Mosque, both for DH and Biddle, they based their arguments on the sanctity of property rights and that their contention is that those who are against that are providing a possible case whereby the US Government could deny property rights merely on a disagreement on ideology. In my previous examples of Al Capone, was it merely a disagreement over ideals that lead to him being arrested and shot down in cold blood -- no, of course not -- and yet the proponents of the NYC M do not take into account that the Islamic Totalitarians do want to destroy us (and all of the rational based civilization across the world) and that the erection of the NYC M would be a boost to their morale, which we should not permit in time of war even aside from any direct physical threats on the part of the imam running the place. For example, though the raising of the America flag at Iwo Jima did not kill any more Japanese soldiers and took no more enemy prisoners, it greatly boosted the morale of the American fight in the Pacific.

As far as their argument goes *as presented* and *in their writing or speaking* they do not take any of these issues into account -- it's just that differences in ideology should not lead to a denial of property rights. It's like the idea that a man has the right to practice his religion under the religious freedom components of the Constitution -- and yet, if a Muslim kills his children for the sake of an honor killing (several of which have actually happened), then no, they cannot practice their religion in an unrestricted manner, and are thrown in jail for a very long time for committing murder.

These are generally well known facts (especially among Objectivists), so it is not as if they would have had to have done a whole lot of extra research to present their case.

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

I split previous 3 posts about aesthetics into this thread, since it's quite a distinct topic from the OP: http://forum.objecti...=0

I think you misunderstand the purpose of this thread. I was comparing the *methodology* of Kant to the *methodology* of Ayn Rand. So it wasn't about esthetics, it was about how Kant never made a reference to existence when making his arguments, versus the objective approach.

[Eiuol]

Is it really context or fact dropping in an evaluation of an idea if other facts are apparently irrelevent? Not mentioning a fact doesn't mean disregarding a fact. It may take a lot more information to conclude that morale matters, or perhaps with more information you'd conclude that morale is irrelevent. Rationalism is about treating concepts apart from reality, where definitions and deduction is all that goes on, not just a wrong premise or wrong conclusion. You haven't really presented what about the facts you mention being important. I acknowledge that yes, morale can be boosted for some crazy terrorists if a mosque is built, but people get morale from many things. Can objective conclusions about rights even be made when you try to include "morale boosting" as a form of enabling some people to be more likely to violate rights? Giving money to a terrorist group directly leads to making it possible to violate rights, but giving morale doesn't really enable anything until the group gets funding. I'm not trying to argue just about the mosque, but I hope you see that there may be justification to not mention some facts. That's not disregarding as much as "okay, sure, it'll boost morale for some people. And?" A person may have a huge amount of morale, but I don't think it follows that they're a threat at that point. People need to act for a threat to be real.

I don't have to be treating rights in a contextless way to say that something you claim to be relevent I think has no bearing on the case made at all. The problem may have nothing at all to do with methodology as much as it is more information is needed for one of the parties. Knowledge being a sort of spiral makes it so that even rational people have have identical information about a particular event, but have a tremendous difference in knowledge about psychology that can have bearing on conclusions.

[Grames]

No, what is conventionally referred to as Romanticism is exactly what inspired Rand.

You appear to be missing my point that Romantic art inspired Rand, not necessarily the theories behind the Romantic art (or the theories of any other aesthetic movement).

You are technically contradicting yourself here. It cannot be true that "Romanticism is exactly what inspired Rand" if the theories of Romanticism are excluded because appending an -ism to Romantic to form Romanticism implies the reference to a normative ideal, some theory of what it is to be Romantic.

Art objects once created do have objective identities with multiple attributes some of which can be of value and others less so. Rand was inspired by some art that also is classified as examples of Romanticism but it does not follow that it was that theory of Romanticism that inspired Rand rather than the particular elements she later isolated in her own theory she also called Romantic. Peikoff gave a lecture series on the subject of the value of even overall bad art that has redeeming features.

I disagree that a focus on individualism was the only element of Romanticism that Rand approved of. She also loved its drama, emotional impact, scale, conflict, etc. Rand's love of Romanticism was more emotionally "sense of life" based than explicitly philosophical.

I wonder if it possible to have individualism as a feature of an artwork without there being some degree of drama, scale, conflict, emotional impact, etc. I think not, nor are these rather fundamental generic aspects unique to Romanticism (example: passion plays of the crucifixion of Christ).

You (and/or Rand?) consider Shakespeare to be from the Romantic Period? Weird!

He was an influence that partly defined and created Romanticism through the intermediate mechanism of being popular and republished in Germany. He does not belong to the traditions of the preceding period and is at least a transitional figure.

I understand that Rand was critical of many aspects of the Romantic Movement while admiring and being inspired by the art that it produced.

I agree.

I understand that Rand was critical of many aspects of the Romantic Movement while admiring and being inspired by the art that it produced. The point is that she did not reject the element that Kant brought to Romaticism, but embraced it as her signature style (perhaps unknowingly). Her novels do not present Greek Sublimity, or Shaftesburian Sublimity, or even Burkean Sublimity. They present Kantian Sublimity.

I disagree. One theme of Rand's work is the smallness of the enemy. Cheryl Taggart was overwhelmed by her sense of the scale of evil at large in the world, but James Taggart is not a terrifying figure. Cheryl was wrong. The reader is equally wrong if he identifies and agrees with Cheryl's conclusion. The character of John Galt is Rand's presentation of the ideal and he bears no trace of Kantian sublimity. "A trace of Kantian sublimity" would be if Galt let the scale of what he was trying to do with the strike intimidate him into inaction or hesitation. Galt may inspire Kantian sublimity in James Taggart but I don't think that supports the point you were trying to make.

There is a case to made for the appearance of Kantian sublimity in The Wizard of Oz, but Ayn Rand did not author that.

So your theory is that a brief, non-detailed outline of Kant's epistemology in the prologue to his Critique of Judgment is what Rand believed caused modern art, rather than Kant's formal, detailed presentation of his epistemology elsewhere,

No, but it is the one work where Kant himself tries to move from his epistemology to aesthetics, acknowledging the relation of one to the other as cause and effect. Kant himself did not get his aesthetics fully consistent with his epistemology, that was done by subsequent generations of thinkers and artists. Who among the self-consciously Post Modernist artists of the present day aims at achieving Kantian sublimity?

Are you claiming that Rand or anyone else has identified a "conceptual universal" behind the judgment of beauty? If so, I'd love to hear it.

http://aynrandlexico...con/beauty.html

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Philosophically, the Romantic Movement was about instilling *emotions* into people via art, and not the concretization of concepts the way Miss Rand presents the nature of art. There is a brief passage of Haley the concerto composer artist in Galt's Gulch in AS who makes this point when he says that he wants the listener's *understanding* and to hell with their emotional reaction per se. So while some artists during the Romantic Movement may well have made some good art (by the standard of concretizing an abstraction) that led to a great emotional reaction, this was not Ayn Rand's focus in art.Tying this into the methodology discussion of this threat, emotions are not tools of cognition, and so the attempt to classify artwork based on emotional reactions as the basis (ala Kant) is not an objective approach. Even when Miss Rand was writing about music, she pointed out how certain musical phrases (the object in this case) brought about a conceptual grasp (like climbing a mountain, being involved in a difficult struggle, entering a cathedral, etc.) rather than just an emotional reaction.

Added on edit: Besides, emotional reactions are not universal anyhow. The very same fact of reality -- even an earthquake or a tornado or some other natural disaster -- will not necessarily bring about the emotional reaction of defiance in the face of adversity, since some people have the reaction of the loss and just pack up and move away as apposed to staying and fighting nature. Emotions come about due to one's value hierarchy, which is open to volitional choice to reason or not to reason about values -- and so emotional reactions are not universal, like a reflexive action (tapping on a spot near the knee will cause the leg to jerk).

Edited February 18, 2012 by Thomas M. Miovas Jr.

[Grames]

I asked for proof, not for Peikoff's groundless opinions.

Are you familiar with this critique of Peikoff's theories?

No, and I hadn't been missing out on anything.

On the contrary, he thought of his Critique of Pure Reason as answering David Hume's skepticism. In particular, he attempted to explain causality in order to justify philosophically the achievements of Newton's physics. Kant was, in brief, a defender, not an opponent, of the real world.

Which is complete bullshit because the real skepticism that concerned Kant was skepticism about God, and his method was to firewall the scope of reason away from the metaphysics that would consider God. But his method was generalizable, and was generalized by subsequent thinkers, to firewall reason away from everything. It is this criticism of The Ominous Parallels that is groundless.

edit: added

Peikoff's view of Kant's ethics is equally mistaken, although it at least makes more sense to think that someone's moral principles can have practical effect than it does to assume that the key to politics is to be found in recondite theories of epistemology. Peikoff has a good deal to say about Kant's stress upon duty and "categorical imperatives"; but, oddly enough, he never tells us what the categorical imperative is. It is, unfortunately, easy to understand the reason for this slight omission on Peikoff's part. Had he quoted the second formulation of the categorical imperative, he would have at once given the lie to his charge that Kant laid the foundation for the Nazi doctrine of blind submission to the omnipotent state. That formulation reads: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end."

Again this author exhibits complete obliviousness to the issue of method. It does not matter in the slightest what any of Kant categorical imperatives actually said, only that there were things such as categorical imperatives. All assertions of categorical imperatives are equally invalid, but once the habit of mind is adopted of thinking in terms of categorical imperatives and duties it is a much simpler matter to advocate to different imperatives and duties. This is another example of not being able to see the forest because of the obscuring trees in the foreground. It is so exasperating to encounter this self-righteous blindness over and over again.

Edited February 18, 2012 by Grames