Eiuol

When this is the case, that happens if the other party uses emotion to dismiss the idea, or uses sarcasm/subtle insults instead of reasoned arguments. It could be that the person dismissing an idea is evading a better idea. This happens anywhere from youtube comments to pundit TV shows to public arguments. I've seen it on this forum. Even if the reason is nothing to do with fear, often the fear accusation is trying to make sense of other people jumping straight to irrelevant/irrational arguments. Other times, the fear accusation is evasion of one's own errors.

I don't think a single person came up with them, it's more a quick summary to get the gist of legal proceedings in crime shows as far as I know. I found a decent source for some facts. It says that Cicero called mens rea (basically motive) an implicit rule of mankind. You probably won't find "the" person, it probably was around long before it was written down. You can look into Roman law if you're interested in where modern principles originate. http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2828&context=jclc

There are no appointed intellectual heirs. Peikoff is a self-proclaimed intellectual heir - not at all chosen. You can figure out reasonable interpretations, but you can see easily anyway that the three partial quotes are about different things, so that's why there won't be a reasonable interpretation. By the way, I barely read your post all the bold and italics is difficult to read well.

Well, that book is not a verbatim transcript of Rand's statements. A number of answers in that book are alterations by the editor which may seem minor to the editor, but change the tone and sometimes interpretation of what Rand actually said. In terms of scholarship, it is not a good source for precise philosophical discussion. I don't expect you to know that or many others. I plan to make a separate thread on it. As for this thread, I'm pointing it out so we can make better claims of who said what. Each of those quotes seem to all be answering different question than "is it okay to kill the innocent? if so, when?" A seems to involve specifically Russia and may further qualify that the question mixed up innocents with morally culpable people, hence the scare quotes. B seems to be discussing a direct and easily measurable imitation of force, much less murky than asking how members of a population may still be morally culpable. C seems to be discussing a person living in a dictatorship or emergency situation trying to survive, totally different than large-scale war as implied by A and B.

Whether ideas tend to arouse fear by virtue of being new is almost impossible to establish. Do new ideas get resistance? Sure, because often it requires changing or evaluating the idea from how things are. Is resistance sometimes irrational or evasive? Yes! And if you're asking why someone may evade a truly good new idea, then it might be simply comfort in familiarity. Fear implies a perceived threat and a visceral emotional response, a lot stronger than preferring your traditions and habits because they are traditions. The way I see it, you should be courageous towards new ideas, engaging in ideas with the confidence that good ideas have the strength and power to overcome bad ideas. Fear is the mind killer.

Logical positivism yes, positivism I don't know. I don't know if Plasmatic meant to say Logical Positivism instead.

Or Wyatt could figure out new ways to be productive. It's not really a problem. If you can't find a job, then create your own job. Hard as it may be, it is possible.

What about biology, linguistics, computer science, medicine, neuroscience, music, fashion, interior design, cooking, meteorology, etc? Really, any subject is fine, I disagree that the four you mention are fundamental for education. Those subjects you listed may be more abstract, but aren't more fundamental, developmentally speaking. A plan of study is good, just don't limit yourself. Personally, I like computer science and psychology best for understanding epistemology.

I switch interests all the time. That's not a bad thing. There are general questions/ideas I'm interested in, like how concepts are formed, how people think ethically, cognitive science, and how people can think creatively. For me, I really wanted to understand how creativity works, so that's now a passion since I want to explore theories of mine. At the same time, I think about so many different things. This actually makes it easier for me to stay interested, and make interesting connections to other fields. Some people are into a narrow interest, but such "focus" isn't necessarily superior to interests that are all over.

Well it is premised on a theory of trade or production as a matter of intrinsic value in the goods and services, such that land has no intrinsic value, making land improper or force with something that is valued by one's declaration alone. Except, no value at all as intrinsic, a major point of Rand's. Whether that's right is another question, but the Objectivist view is that land to be valuable in a real sense takes production and/or maintanence. Putting a fence up and declaring everything inside as yours is not productive at all, while if it were farmland, it's easy to see how land is used, used to produce, and maintained. To say it is consistent with Georgism is to misunderstand the Objectivist view on property. To answer Dustin: Resources are traded and consumed, which is to say desired values have demand associated with them. The amount available goes up in price if more people want, say, oil. Long ago, this was a non-issue. Now, it is increasingly expensive by being harder to acquire. If oil were the ONLY resource left on the planet, you may have a point. Yet, what is or is not a resource varies over time! The reason resources aren't zero-sum is because people have the ability to discover new forms of resources or technology, unless you choose to say development is always static. And anyway, there isn't a lack of natural resources for people to be able to work. If there really weren't enough resources, the world would be a lot more like Africa. The thing is, Africa doesn't lack resources, although you may say African people can't get even resources like clean water. That is true - but is it because the resource is finite, or because of other issues pertaining to rights? Or something else.

I know this one! Use of the land that the owner improves and/or maintains and/or uses. Simple.

I told you a fundamental difference: Part of volition is that it "feels like" something, along with requiring active choices that only happen by an active process. You DO choose in a deep and volitional way, that's my point. Also, what you DO choose would, as far as I see, not ever be anything else. So I'm asking you, why would you choose differently? I'm not denying your volition, I'm only asking why you would choose anything else. I'm not implying you don't choose, my position is only that you would always end up making the same choice if the context is absolutely identical. The answer is true or false. Only one of the two is selected. It is possible to answer true or false. It COULD answer true or false, but it WILL answer only true or only false. The essay you're talking about discusses the metaphysically given, not the metaphysically possible. As far as I know, Rand didn't ever say metaphysically possible.

A mathematical infinity is not an actual infinity. The type of infinity of recursion is more like a computational infinity which as you say is digital, which says nothing about an infinite universe. I'm iffy on Chomsky's theory, or at least any interpretations where people innately have a conceptual capacity to do logic or implicit statistical analysis. The furthest I go is saying there are non-conceptual mechanisms people have innately that provide the content for conceptual thought.

The claim there is different than the one in the book even! It says that she thought the statistics of the health risks were not reliable evidence. Perhaps she was rationalizing, perhaps not. Still, it's no where near saying all scientific evidence of smoking risk was bullshit... That's a failure of reading comprehension of the writer's own references!

The difference is massive, on the level of comparing dogs to viruses. The difference is complexity, and that complexity leads to various new ways of behaving. Part of volition is that it "feels like" something, along with requiring active choices that only happen by an active process. I don't know why this is so, but it is just a very basic premise that I don't need to posit a strange new form of causality for volition. Things operate by a definite nature, meaning it is possible to know how and why anything happens without resorting to saying "I don't know why you want to eat dinner every day". Clearly, it may be hard to say for sure, but I can figure out why, and even why people may be irrational instead. We can know because methods of acting/thinking other people use lead to definite behaviors. However, even if we MUST use a method that processes parameters, the fact that you don't know what you will do until you make your choice and complete the method makes it so volition is a crucial distinction between selections that are deductive and lack any awareness as in modern computers. Modern computers don't reason. It is metaphysically possible to say A > B is false or true from an epistemic standpoint - the answer can't be 'pineapple' for a computer. A and B are given values to find an answer. Merely stating A is 5 and B is 2 STILL doesn't say whether A > B is true. Despite metaphysical possibility, in the end, one selection will be made since there are a finite number of methods to employ to get the right answer. If more than one method is equally appropriate and there is no preference in a context, then the system is indeterminate. That goes for people too - insofar as people process information (if people DON'T process information, well, I think it's an absurd premise). By reasoning at all, you are giving preference to a method. That brings me to the thought experiment again that you avoided answering further: What would lead you to in reality pick anything else than what you did the first time? "mechanistic form of causality to choice" I'm not saying that, I mean that any manner of information processing is not at all mechanistic, if mechanistic means causality like why a rock falls or why a ball rolls.

This doesn't follow at all... How does that lead to actual infinity? What IS an actual infinity? On top of that, tabula rasa in Rand's sense isn't that there are no underlying mechanisms of thought. It's only that we aren't born with knowledge or concepts. If anyone insists blank slate to Rand meant even blank architecture of the mind at birth, it's simply wrong.

There may be worthwhile communities. That doesn't mean supporting those who would violate rights. Nor does a government always represent a majority. As some examples, various people have lived under oppressive regimes in South America, anywhere from Peru to Chile. It's not as though -everyone- supported those regimes. America may have been more free, yet there are cultural differences in say, Peru, that makes it unique in terms of people that's not identical to America. Food, music, architecture, etc. In some cases, it is better to fight for freedom in the current country. There isn't always an either/or here. You can value country A and B for different reasons without giving up the other. Here's a person that may interest you, especially since he supports free markets: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mario_Vargas_Llosa

A country's government is not equal to the country's communities. I could love the people in one country and the way of life despite an unfree government. I could love the freedom of another country, but living there, I don't relate to the people. It's hard to say which is better, I don't think it's a matter of choosing one or the other. Some people choose the unfree option, and then work to make that country free.

That selection occurs as a consequence of psychological, active process. Namely, it "feels like" something. Why are the processes active? I don't know, all I know is that it allows for extremely complex selections relating to concepts and long-term planning. What would lead you to make a different decision? I didn't ask if it was metaphysically possible in general to make a different choice. If you can't think of a reason, then you'd be admitting that you are so indeterminate you can't know how your own choices will occur. If you can think of a reason, then the method of decision making is so indeterminate that you don't know what methods you would use. Part of my argument is that at any -particular- moment, one method (process) will use one set of information (inputs) to make one decision (output).

I didn't equate man with a computer. Personally, I use the word "choose" for both, but I specified the difference of the -way- choices happen. People need volition, computers don't. For this conversation, selection is what matters. Rocks don't select anything, they lack information processing. Computers process information, so they select all the time. People process information, too. So the point is, we can't treat computers like rocks; the presence of switches is not relevant, as all that means is physical mechanisms are required for anything to happen. Anything that processes information does so by computation via specific methods. Some methods are automatic. All modern day computers use automatic methods. Some human methods are automatic, like perception or emotions. Some human methods are not automatic because they use volition, like concept formation. My only argument is that volition primarily differs as a psychological process, while non-volition is non-psychological. Reply to my thought experiment first.

A selection is a choice. Indeed, my example was two possibilities. So what? Two or two million possibilities - the principle is the same. In terms of volition, I mean a lot more than two. The point is, methods and procedures are used. When methods are used, the consequences can be otherwise, but once it starts, there will be exactly one answer. Of course, volitional consciousness is not automatic. Part of what I said is that, for whatever reason, an active (i.e. complex and more deliberate as well as conscious) is necessary to make wildly complex decisions, orders of magnitude above what today's computers are able to do. But just because you are using a DEFINITE method with DEFINITE choices every time does not deny your need to actively choose. Think of what you do when solving a calculus problem. There are specific ways to find derivatives, but you need to guide the whole process along. If you look for the derivative of x^2, the answer is 2x. If I gave you the problem again immediately, you'd still say 2x. The answer is not "automatic" at all. In a sense, the process is "deterministic" but still requires volitional consciousness. All I'm doing is refusing to appeal to a "special" causality. I don't know why volitional consciousness is needed, but saying two or more outcomes in an IDENTICAL context is invalid - it is an implicit denial of the law of identity. Since I can't turn back time, I'll never know what else has this special "multiple outcome identity", and I'd be reaffirming Humean causality because all I'd know is history but not if tomorrow the other outcomes start happening. Computers choose, but not in the human sense. I'm being as clear as I can that there are volitional and nonvolitional choices, where computers are still making choices. If you prefer, say "selection" for nonvolitional choice. I wonder if circumstance here means TOTAL context or just being faced with different times to think about a choice. If I tell you what I want for dinner today, the answer will be different tomorrow. The circumstance is going to be the same tomorrow, but the context is new. My choice can be otherwise every single time because total context will be new every single time. But choosing what I want to eat? That isn't changing. This brings me to the thought experiment. I'll start really simple. Suppose you made a decision to work overseas for a year to work on a new business startup in China. You leave a fulfilling job because you think the new opportunity is exciting. It turns out that the startup failed, and your old job is now taken. Two years of your life ended up nowhere. Now suppose you find a time genie as you pack up to move back to the US. He offers to send you back in time to the moment you decided to go overseas. The catch is, you won't remember anything from the past two years. You'll relive the moment fresh. So you decide to go back in time. The question now is: would you make the same decision? Why or why not?

Here's a summary of my position and thoughts: 1) I do not hold a position of causality in terms of determinism, nondeterminism, or indeterminism. Those aren't the only options. I hold the position causality, and that's it. None of these theories sufficiently deal with computations or methods, at least not without literally advocating dualism a la Binswanger. See http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=27779&p=329099 2) I claim that free will IS the act of choosing that occurs in a conscious manner while the whole methodology or decision procedures is happening. Think of how a computer uses logic gates to make decisions. If choices occur as the result of an action potential in my neurons, I'm only saying that most of the time, for conceptual thought especially, the choice among options is entirely mine, that is, fully active and conscious. 3) Nothing at all is free of antecedent factors. If anything were free of antecedent factors, it would violate the law of identity. At the least, being free of antecedent factors means its causal workings are literally random, thus unknowable. Probability and randomness only applies to situations where we don't have time to gather ALL relevant information. 4) There are a set of options available, but if the process of choosing repeated forever for eternity, the same decisions will always be made (see my next big post!) 5) If the logical end of my argument amounts to determinism, point out where.

I agree with the quote, too. To start off with, maintaining that choice in the human sense is valid with causality is only rejecting behaviorism, radical behaviorism especially. Stimulus and response as what guides action makes no effort to establish -any- mental processes. No sense of choice really happens since computational processes are ignored for selection anyway. This is valid for rocks rolling, or what you label "physical causation". Not only is there one result, there is only one possible result since no computation happens. Once you add in computation, there are multiple possible results depending on input or starting point. The computation once employed though will only run one way. For a simple computation, like checking if one object is larger than another, two choices are possible: true or false. A is being compared to B. The computation is A > B based on object height. If A is 5 inches tall, and B is 2 inches tall, this returns true every time. As long as the computation isn't random, this will always happens, even though a choice is made. The only way it might return false is if the thing doing the computation is broken, or no method at all is used. Even if you add in an "I don't know" choice, -that- choice still follows a definite method. Despite the simplicity here, this is applicable to -any- decision procedure. Look at a flow chart. Many possibilities! But once you start following it, only ONE choice is valid at each point, unless the choice is random, without a method. No matter how many times you repeat the chart, you'll keep getting the same answer. Imagine if the flow chart was how to diagnose the flu. If you asked the doctor to go through it again, he'd make the same diagnosis. The choices may change if the information available changes, or the method employed changes. If two or more outcomes are possible even if information and method is the same, then there really is no method to privilege one choice over another. As soon as you provide a reason for a new choice, you're still ending up exactly one answer. The presence of an identity requires that only one action WILL happen in a given context. Otherwise, you're saying I might find the doctor saying I have the flu 80% of the time - and not because the doctor learned more. On a level of abstraction at human action, in terms of ethics and politics, the exact procedures aren't important. All that I really need to know is that the choice itself IS my free will. In particular, it might just be that conceptual thought for whatever reason is so complex that the choice has a feeling and activity to it. Not as an illusion, but the whole process of reasoning IS free will. If you follow me so far, let me know. If so, I will say some more. As a preliminary, here's a short but interesting video about Nietzsche's thought experiment, the eternal recurrence:

I'm working on a post to detail my idea better. For now though, I'm not talking about the possible ways an entity can act, but how an entity will act depending on the context. An entity will act in only one way. If an entity will vary how it acts in a specific context, even if the possibilities are finite, it is essentially random, indeterminate, and unknowable no matter how hard you try. How would you be able to learn anything at all if there is no way to determine which entities have "hidden" identity? All I know to appeal to is randomness - and then we're left with transforming the Uncertainty Principle into the pop science view that truth itself is never more than probability.

A choice to focus still follows a methodology implicitly so that method is always followed, and if the same context repeated, you'd repeat your choice. It is metaphysically possible to make a different selection, and it doesn't violate volition one bit to say that the methodology only leads to one choice every time. The process is not random. The choice to focus is not random. If you are employing a method to make an argument, not a random assortment of propositions, your argument will only come out one way. Essentially, I'm saying that if we say MULTIPLE courses of events may happen in an identical context caused by the same entity, we give up on the law of identity.