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These three concretes have something important in common: (1) A baby born without a rational faculty (2) A dog with no sense of smell (3) A flat tire They are all broken units. “A unit,” according to Rand, “is an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members” (ITOE 6). This particular chair I’m sitting on, for example, is a unit of the concept chair. A broken unit, then, is a unit that lacks a characteristic shared by the other units of the concept of which it is a member. The characteristic may be any characteristic, including the distinguishing characteristic of that concept. One might object at this point: “A dog that lacks a sense of smell is of a different kind than a baby who lacks a conceptual faculty. Man is the rational animal; a dog is not the smelling animal. A brainless baby lacks the distinguishing characteristic of the concept 'man'; a non-smelling dog lacks an incidental characteristic. A brainless baby is not a man; a non-smelling dog is still a dog.” This objection can be refuted very simply: by pointing out that in raising the objection, one concedes that we are able to identify the brainless baby as a baby. But how? How we can identify a brainless baby as a unit of the concept “man”? A concept whose definition is, “rational animal”? To fully understand the nature of broken units, and to understand why this objection does not hold water, one observation is crucial: a concept is not interchangeable with its definition. Man is not merely a rational animal – “rational animal” is the definition by which we retain the concept “man” and differentiate it from all our other concepts. “Man” means its referents – it means every man who has existed, who exists, and who will exist. If a ten-legged creature from Mars arrived on earth and happened to have a conceptual faculty, we would not say, “Ah, he is a rational animal, and therefore a man!” Rather, we would recognize that “rational animal” no longer serves to differentiate the units of the concept “man” from all other existents. Man would still be a rational animal, but “rational animal” would no longer distinguish man from the other existents he knows. “Man is the rational earthling,” we would probably say. But this raises a problem. If a concept does not mean its definition, but its referents, including all the characteristics of its referents, then how can we define man as a rational animal when some men lack a conceptual faculty? And how can we make general claims, such as, “Man sees color,” when some men can’t see at all? The answer, the key to defending the objectivity of concepts, definitions, propositions, and therefore all of knowledge, is to be found in the concept of broken units. Let us return, then, to our three examples: (1) A baby born without a rational faculty (2) A dog with no sense of smell (3) A flat tire What do these concretes have in common? The first two refer to living entities; the latter, to a man-made object designed to serve a human purpose. A purpose is a type of goal – a goal conceived by a conceptual consciousness. Living entities are also goal directed – a goal established by their survival needs. A goal serves as a standard of evaluation – it is because purposive actions and actions of living entities aim at a certain end that we can evaluate those actions as good or bad. Furthermore, since only living entities are goal-directed, it is only in relation to living entities that things can be evaluated as good or bad (“purposive actions” being a subset of actions of living entities). This leads to a major identification: only life makes the concept “broken unit” possible. One cannot conceive of a broken rock or a broken cloud or a broken ocean or a broken star. If any of these entities lacked a characteristic shared by the other units of their respective concepts they wouldn’t be units of that concept. If one dries up a puddle, one does not have a dried puddle – there is no longer a puddle. Likewise, if one chops a rock in half, one does not have two halves of a rock, but two rocks. On the other hand, if one chops a puppy in half, one does not have two puppies. One has two halves of a puppy. This isn’t an issue of how complicated the entity or system is. If powerful forces tore a solar system apart, the resulting dispersal of stars, planets, and moons would not be “pieces of a solar system” in the same sense that one would have pieces of a chopped up puppy. But why? Because a broken unit is not simply a unit that lacks a characteristic shared by other units of the concept of which it is a member. Instead, a broken unit is a unit that lacks a characteristic that is proper for its survival qua the entity it is. Or, in the case of non-living entities designed to serve a human purpose, a broken unit is a unit that lacks a characteristic that is proper for its functioning given its intended function (a function supplied by man). A broken unit, in other words, is one that lacks a characteristic it should have but doesn’t [1]. “Should” implies “goal.” To say an entity should have X is to say X is a means of achieving some goal. Only living entities have goals. Putting aside for the moment the issue of human purposes, the goal that directs all living action is the survival of a living entity as the kind of entity it is. This last part is important – although it might perhaps be beneficial for a gorilla to be able to conceptualize, his survival qua gorilla is not dependent on conceptualization. Therefore, it makes no sense to say a gorilla should have the ability to conceptualize. Only man, who survives by his use of reason, should – in the relevant sense – have a conceptual faculty [2]. As for human purposes, these may be or may not be directed at man’s survival needs. That is relevant only insofar as one is evaluating the purpose itself. What matters here is that non-living objects can be evaluated in terms of whether they serve their intended purpose, which is supplied by man. This, then, is the key to conceptualizing broken units. Broken units are not fundamental – they are derivative concepts. One cannot form the concept “flat tire” or “brainless baby” until one has first conceptualized “tire” and “baby”. But once one has formed the relevant concepts, one can identify broken units that logically depend on these prior concepts (but which aren’t sub-categories of them in the way that, say, “coffee table” is a sub-category of “table”). For example, a man forms the concept “table” by observing several tables and differentiating them from, say, a chair. He retains this concept by means of a definition: a table is an item of furniture, consisting of a flat, level surface and supports, intended to support other, smaller objects. But suppose one Sunday he goes to a flea market. “Buy this coffee table – one dollar!” a salesman shouts. The man looks and sees a flat surface, but it is not level. One of its supports is missing. He does not look around in bewilderment, wondering where is the table the salesman spoke of. He says, “That table is broken. It should have another support so that it will be flat and level, and able to support other, smaller objects.” By the same token, if this man wanders upon a plank of wood, he will not say, “Ah, here is a broken table. It should have supports!” The plank of wood isn’t intended to be a table – that (presumably) isn’t its purpose (yet). It might be argued that what exists is not a table, and that the identification of it as such is an error. After all, one’s knowledge about tables wouldn’t apply to this particular object. Or would it? Holding concepts for broken units is not an arbitrary decision – there is a cognitive reason to retain such concepts as separate categories of the concepts from which they are derived. An example will make this clear. “Deaf” does not mean simply, “non-hearing.” A rock is non-hearing, but it is not deaf. “Deaf” means, “Should be able to hear but can’t, given the nature of the entity.” Man has two ears and can hear – such is good for man’s survival qua man. But some men are deaf. The concept “deaf men” integrates the relevant broken units and enables us to design a visual form of communication (sign language), to look for means of restoring their hearing (cochlear implants), and to warn motorists to be on the lookout for deaf children (Deaf Children At Play street signs). All these things are possible because broken units aren’t just broken – they share similarities, not just with the units of the concept from which they are derived, but with other broken units of the same type [3]. Because we have a concept for the broken units “deaf men,” we are able to study the deaf as such, and apply this knowledge to all the units of the concept “deaf men.” In the same way, we cannot regard a broken table simply as a non-table – it can be repaired, and knowledge of how to repair it follows only if we first grasp that this is a broken table. Notice that the latter concept is just as important as the former – deaf men are not simply deaf; they are deaf men. All our knowledge about man applies to deaf men except knowledge of a particular kind, just as all our knowledge about tables applies to broken tables except knowledge of a specific kind: all our knowledge about the referents of a concept applies equally to that concept’s broken units with the exception of those facts that are dependent on or follow from the broken characteristic. Everything we know about man applies to deaf men, except that which follows from man’s ability to hear. A deaf man, for instance, has rights because rights follow from man’s conceptual capacity, and not his ability to hear. Equally, a flat tire isn’t edible because the edibility of a tire is not dependent on whether or not the tire retains compressed air. A brainless baby, on the other hand, has no rights, because rights follow from the characteristic which, in him, is broken, i.e., non-existent – a rational faculty. This leads to an important point: when we make statements about the nature of a concept, we omit the broken units relevant to that statement, not on the premise that the broken units do not exist, but on the premise that they are non-essential in this context. For example, when we say, “Man can see color,” we omit from that identification men who cannot see and men who cannot see color because those are broken units with regards to man’s ability to see. They should be able to see, given their nature as men, but can’t. We do not, however, omit deaf men – their status as broken units does not derive from their capacity for sight. Deaf men, too, see color. It might be objected that we are arbitrarily omitting relevant facts in order to make the false, true. But this objection is entirely backwards. The reason we omit broken units is precisely because doing so enables us to gain knowledge. Without omitting broken units, we could not define our concepts, let alone know anything about their referents. Since conceivably every particular characteristic about man, for instance, could be broken in one unit or another, without omitting broken units, we would be unable to define “man” and thus retain the concept. Is man a rational animal? Some men are born without a rational faculty. Is man a thumb-possessing animal? Some men have no fingers at all. Is man an animal who walks on two legs? Some men can’t walk and have no legs. Without omitting the relevant broken units, our ability to conceptualize would be paralyzed. It must be noted that broken units are not omitted in the same way measurements are. When we omit measurements, we do so on the premise that the measurements must exist in some quantity but may exist in any quantity. When we omit broken units, what we are saying is, in effect, “An entity of this nature should have this characteristic, as determined by its goal(s) or intended purpose(s); those that don’t I will regard as non-essential unless I am dealing specifically with facts that follow from their lack of this characteristic.” To fully understand the nature of broken units, let’s look at a complicated example. “Man has two eyes and can see.” This is a true statement – man, by nature, does have two eyes and can see. In stating this truth, we omit the category of broken concepts that includes men who do not have eyes or who have eyes but are blind, because we have identified that man’s having eyes and his ability to see are proper for his survival qua man. “Men should look both ways before they cross the street.” This is also true, but since it is a derivative of the fact of being able to see, it does not apply to the blind. So, for example, we would not pass a negative judgment on a blind man for crossing the street without looking, because he is a member of the class of broken units defined by their inability to see. Because he is blind he is not to be judged by this particular principle. “Man has individual rights.” This is a true statement. Since rights are not derivative of the ability to see, whether or not one is a member of the class of broken units defined by their inability to see is irrelevant in this context. A broken unit, then, is a unit that lacks a characteristic shared by other units of the concept of which it is a member. A broken unit is to be regarded as a unit of the concept from which it is derived is because it should have the characteristic it lacks, as determined by its goals or purpose. Broken units are essential tools for conceptualization, because they allow us to omit contextually non-essential units which would otherwise wipe out the possibility of defining and conceptualizing facts about living organisms and man’s purposive creations. ************************* [1] “Should”, in this context, is not meant to imply “choice” - rather it means, "proper, given its goal or purpose." [2] It must be stressed that “broken” does not mean simply, “different from the norm.” The standard for what is or is not a broken unit is its relationship to the goal it is intended to serve, given its nature. For example, if all cars were black, and I painted my car white, that would not by itself make my car a broken unit – the color of a car is not relevant to the purpose it is intended to serve – although in some contexts it might be. [3] In this sense, medicine is a science devoted to the study of broken units.

I have not clearly understood the concept of broken units within a concept. Specifically I am having problems figuring out how the concept of "broken units" apply to the problem of reconizing human rights to people who, because of a physical condition, like a severe neurological disorder, are uncapable of abstract thinking. My question is whether rights are for men as units, or for the concept of "men". If rights are for men as a concept, then it is applied to all men, regardless of the particular units (individuals) who for some reason do not match the concept of an animal with abstract thinking capabilities. But if rights are for individuals, for the units, then I have a problem with recognizing rights in people without this capability. I can't deal with a broken table the way I deal with a normal table. Even if the broken table is still a broken unit of the "table" concept, I wouldn't use it as a table and place a heavy object on it. Same with animals. A horse which cannot walk is still a horse, but I can't treat it like a horse: I can't ride it. A a cow that does not secrete milk is still a cow, but I can't milk it or sell it or even treat it as I would treat a normal cow. For example, I may decide not to invest any money in veterinary care. Then, in human species, what kind of treatment do severily mentally disabled people deserve /are they entitled to? What is the rationale for it? If they have a right to life, for example, on what grounds do they have such a right? On the grounds of being broken units of a "man" concept? Do we acknolwedge rights to a concept of man or to individual men?

Wait, wait, wait. Doesn't the thing about "broken units" specify that there is a lack of (or some other kind of problem with) not just any element of a concept, not just any important one either, but one of the defining elements? This would mean missing limbs or diabetes doesn't qualify a human as a "broken unit." What *would* qualify as a broken unit when it comes to humans is a baby born without a brain being kept alive on life support. Missing a brain means there is zero capacity for rationality. So far, my thoughts seem to be pointing toward only entities being capable of being broken units, not properties/attributes of entities. I can think of many examples of entities that may be broken, but none when it comes to properties. What would a broken unit of "blond" be? Or a broken unit of "big"? Properties I can think of being more or less, there or not there. I can't think of what it would be like for some kind of property to be there, yet missing an essential element. Actually, anything that can come in varying intensities and/or that you could imagine adding "ness" to the end of I can't think of a way to "break," conceptually or literally. "Feminine" and "masculine" I think fall into the properties categories. I could see somebody being or not being one of those or being more or less of them maybe. However, even if I knew clearly what the defining elements of femininity and masculinity were, I don't know how you could break them rather than differ intensity or just cease presence in somebody. Everything I'm coming up with so far that could have a broken unit is something we could just say was plain old broken. Something becomes/is a broken unit when it gets a break of the sort that destroys a defining element of the thing. Now, females and males on the other hand are entities and thus maybe they can have broken units. The sexes are pretty strictly defined separately from gender though. I think first for broken units and genders to go together there would need to be a concept that encompasses both sex and gender as defining elements. That concept could then be broken by lacking in the gender department hypothetically. But, since we already have concepts for each of those separately, I think rather than getting a broken unit of this hypothetical concept we'd just get somebody that is of [blank] sex or somebody of [blank] gender. Maybe one would want to argue there should not be separate concepts for those two things then? Having the separate concepts are useful for thinking and discussing though and that's the point of concepts pretty much. I'm generally having trouble seeing how broken units can be applied to gender matters. It seems like mostly a linguistic question though anyway. I don't think if somebody could be officially labeled as a broken unit in some regard to gender that this would impact what anybody should do or how somebody should be assessed morally or otherwise. You know what somebody is in this situation even if you don't know for sure what to call it and what somebody is is the important part for running your life.

The "broken units" problem is an aspect of the "problem of two definitions". I will make that link in the broken units thread (sorry for the epic necro). The problem of two definitions is covered by Peikoff in lecture 3 of "Unity in Ethics and Epistemology".

Before I respond to you on this -- though I will, and soon -- may I ask whether it is clear that the point of my OP is not primarily to rehash the many debates on 1) whether there is any genuine, fundamental distinction between genders or 2) what they might be? Because based on the responses I've thus far received, it appears that my point may not be clear. If I am unclear, let me restate it as directly as I can: an individual human being -- howsoever we would like to classify that individual, according to race, gender, sexual orientation, etc., etc., etc. -- has no ethical duty to set "human life," as such, as their standard of value, or "masculinity" or "femininity," or "heterosexuality," or whatever we think should be true according to what we perceive as their "nature." An individual's only proper standard of value is his own life, per his own nature. If a person is a "broken unit" (somewhat more on that to come), I don't know that this changes my assertion. Their ethical standard must follow suit to accommodate and reflect their "brokenness." An individual lives his life for himself -- for his own, one existence on earth -- and not for the sake of any other entity. But to speak to what most people seem to find interesting, I do think that this has a general application to all of these controversies. As when we attempt to group people into these categories and make moral pronouncements -- general moral pronouncements as to what is good for members of that category (e.g. a woman should not run for President) -- we are certainly misstepping. Because, whether we're ultimately agreed with the idea that men are typically one way, and women another -- and howsoever we account for those who do not fit our mold ("they are broken"; "they are outliers"; etc.) -- we must still recognize that there may exist a woman who should run for President (in the same sense as such men exist), which makes the sentiment that "a woman should not run for President" false. It remains tautologically true that a person for whom it would be irrational, or immoral, or self-destructive to run for the Presidency ought not do so. And for many (or even most) women, this may well be the case. And ethically, I don't know that much more must be said on the matter -- do you? "Judge for yourself whether taking this action (here: running for the Presidency) would be best for you in your given context (one's 'nature' considered), and if it is, then do so, and if it is not, then don't." But whatever is our interest in proclaiming that women are a certain way when we know that "broken units" exist, when we know that it is not true of all women that they are the way that we say that we are, when what we have to say amounts to a falsehood in some individual applications... whatever we believe we stand to gain from this, I don't know that we don't stand to lose much more. In my view, philosophy ought not be about the "approximate," but the exact. Not the "mostly true, sometimes false," but the true. I agree. I've read the OP and done a quick review of the thread, which seems to descend into the kind of mindless acrimony that so many discussions on this board do. As that topic is seemingly likewise controversial, and as I haven't given it sufficient time and attention yet to know my position, I don't think I can agree to it without reservation for the purposes of our discussion; it may be begging the question. And so, while I will shortly attempt to make an initial response to the topic of "broken units," on the basis of the thread to which you've linked, I would hope that you are willing to develop those aspects of that case which you find germane, here, for the purposes of our discussion. I don't know that I am inclined to argue against the proposition that there are "differences" (fundamental or otherwise) between men and women. That I recognize men as being one thing and women being another lends credence to the claim. But when it comes to issues of psychology -- human psychology -- it seems to me that the wide divergence of individual variation trumps whatever generic claims we would like to make about a given population, time and time again. And if we would like to make some claim that a woman's psychology is necessarily directed in a certain way according to the shape or function of her genitals -- if we even want to make the case that this somehow amounts to general proscription against running for the Presidency -- then as you say, I expect "serious, objective evidence" and likewise serious discussion on the topic. The case must be made. And argued. And if and when it is, I fully expect it to be found wanting. But instead of this method (a claim is made, a case is made and argued, with recourse to evidence and logic and etc.) what I instead find here seemingly without exception? The "case" that is made for such things is: "men and women are different -- so you see, I can make whatever claim I'd like as to their differences, sans reasoning, sans evidence, but presented as a matter of obvious truth, acquired somehow." This board, which is supposedly organized as a means of discussing Objectivism, which I believe to be a philosophy of reason, regularly entertains, without apparent irony, such "discussions." It is (and I don't use this word lightly) a travesty. It is appalling. Again, I don't know that I can immediately agree to "broken units" wholesale -- I hope you'll forgive this. But as an initial attempt to address that subject directly, insofar as it relates to our topic here, let me pull from the OP of that thread: So... what is the potential claim with regards to a "broken unit" here? That a woman somehow "insufficiently feminine" (however we believe that would express itself...) does not have a characteristic "that is proper for its survival qua the entity it is"? Can you elaborate on this? It seems to me that the phrase "qua the entity it is" introduces the potential for a question-begging argument. For I would ask whether -- taking this all quite literally -- a woman who runs for the Presidency thus condemns herself to a shorter actual lifespan (as against men in the same position)? But in response, a person might say ("qua the entity it is") that, at that point, she is somehow no longer living "as a woman, but as a man does." Ta da. Apart from that, the "broken unit" argument appears to rest on a claim that things cannot serve their "purpose," though I believe that DPW intends this to apply solely to "non-living entities." Still, perhaps it is important to state that other people are not means to our ends. A given woman does not have the burden of our "purpose" for her, and she is not "broken" because she does not conform to what we wish her to be, or does not serve our ends. Approaching this idea of "broken units" more generally, I wonder... at what point would we conclude that the "break" occurs? In another thread along Kevin Delaney's quest to reshape this board into his personal blog, he has made wild and insulting claims as to what women are supposedly like. Insofar as my wife does not conform to Delaney's expectations (and thank god for that)... would my wife be "broken"? Or is it rather the women Delaney encounters who have -- we must presume -- somehow led him to his sad vision? Is this understanding achieved through a statistical analysis? How would you propose we establish the paradigm for female behavior, against which outliers must be considered "broken"? And is it a binary thing? Or a continuum? If a woman enjoys -- oh, I don't know, scents which are accounted masculine -- is she broken yet? Is she yet missing that vital characteristic "that is proper for its survival qua the entity it is"? Will she curl up and die? Or just turn into a man? (And if I begin to make this all sound a bit preposterous, I apologize -- but it's hard for me to revisit these actual arguments, these actual claims, these actual, tortuous threads, and not get a little giddy.) Well, you never know. I don't think I'm disagreeing with you or your example, per se, except that I don't believe a person should feel either guilty or inadequate for being "poor at digesting dairy" in the first place. Do you? About women and the Presidency -- just to pull a topic out of nowhere, and apropos of nothing -- do you think that a woman who thinks to herself, "yeah -- I might want to run for the Presidency someday" should feel either guilty or inadequate? Well indeed. What may cause a person to feel guilt, perhaps, is if they attach moral significance to their individual "nature" conforming to, or contradicting what supposed "authorities" proclaim as being that which ought to be true of them, depending on their membership in some group.

Having thought about the idea of "broken unit" more, I do not think it would apply to attributes that are due to choice. Being a Marxist is a choice, as is being a Christian or even a Scientologist. What would a "broken unit" of a Christian be? A Mormon? We can argue into the finer details of conceptual hierarchy about whether or not Mormon is properly a species of Christian, but the point I'm making is that for chosen viewpoints and/or non-concrete abstractions (i.e. justice) don't have broken units. Lacking some important features seems to really only move the concept around in hierarchy, or modify the concept's definition. Broken seems to only be relevant in the cases where choice is not directly part of the equation (e.g. tires, apples, genetic traits, some psychological disorders/problems, medical conditions). My reasoning is that concrete entities or anything close to concrete is meant, by nature, to function a particular way. Certainly, philosophical concepts have a nature and function, so my point is that variation may be more acceptable and even epistemologically necessary in order to interact with physical entities on a direct level. Trying to consider any person with a medical flaw as inhuman would be an epistemological nightmare, as would a dog with three legs being declared a "nondog". Or that a flat tire is a "nontire". Those types of aspects can be theoretically fixed, like if someone discovered a cure for diabetes. Even if fixing is impossible, all of these entities still maintain clear semblance to what they are supposed to do in normal circumstances. Perceptually, there is enough to not establish a whole separate category for these broken units. With psychological traits/personal aspects, this is difficult to break apart. Personal aspects are anything like choosing one's moral code, while psychological traits are things like cognitive ability. Personal aspects on their own may be immoral, as anyone here would say about choosing an altruistic morality. But psychological traits are not immoral on their own because they are largely not up to choice; cognitive ability caused by certain psychological traits isn't immoral on its own. A person with dyslexia, for example, is not inherently immoral. If that person fails to take into account their dyslexia into their life and doesn't make proper considerations for their circumstance, then that is immoral. Is a moral code of altruism a "broken unit" of a proper moral code? I say no, as treating altruism on its own terms is epistemologically important. Is someone with bipolar disorder a "broken unit"? I'd say so, because for all intents and purposes, a person with dyslexia is as human as anyone else for interaction, yet dyslexia is an abnormal condition, in the same way a physical disability is an abnormal condition. As was said earlier, thinking about people on an individual level is what's important, not whether or not they conform to the statistical norm. But figuring out cases of a "broken unit" is important to figuring out what actions a person can take in order to be moral. A dyslexic would value knowing they are dyslexic for purposes of adaptation. The "brokenness" isn't immoral, though. An on the other hand, one can help being altruistic, so it's possible to condemn that choice for being totally up to individual choice. At the same time, it's possible to praise choosing egoism. Where does gender fall? I think it primarily falls under individual choice, so "broken units" in gender don't make sense. Any justification I've seen for masculinity/femininity have been based on someone being male or female, which often seems like begging the question. If gender falls in the other category, then it is still treated like any "broken unit": becoming fixed isn't always obligatory, but making one's life as good as possible given the circumstances is. (I think from now on I'll say "deviant unit", I don't like the connotation of broken when it involves people.)

The "broken units" problem is an aspect of the "problem of two definitions" covered by Dr. Peikoff in lecture 3 of "Unity in Epistemology and Ethics". A 'broken unit' in the context of this thread is only possible when a concept has a two definitions, and the criteria of the second more normative or teleological definition is absent.

To return to the content of the article, bypassing the condescending and logically irrelevant "uhm" sarcasm. The article does not require extensive analysis. The concept "broken" is valid, and it is a valid endeavor to analyze it. That does not make "broken units" a fundamental issue of epistemology. The article's major claims that "the key to defending the objectivity of concepts, definitions, propositions, and therefore all of knowledge, is to be found in the concept of broken units" and "without omitting broken units, we could not define our concepts, let alone know anything about their referents" are both preposterous. Even the article recognizes that "broken units" are "derivative concepts". But it doesn't require an extensive essay to understand the "hierarchy" in identifying that "broken" is relative to the "normal". Further, a "broken" inessential has no bearing on concept formation and application, while a missing essential puts the matter squarely into the realm of the methods Ayn Rand described under the topics of borderline cases. Neither that nor the use of abstractions from abstractions were mentioned at all in the article. There are other errors in elevating the status of "broken units", such as the claim that "medicine is a science devoted to the study of broken units"; medicine studies the means of curing and preventing illness based on a scientific study of the normal and how it functions, it is not a study of "broken units". It is good to see someone who writes well, and who has an understanding of many elements of IOE and an ability, at least in large part, to apply it, but the article is not without major errors. I hope that the author keeps thinking about and continues to explore Ayn Rand's epistemology because almost no one else is and it is very important. But while the article itself would be an interesting student exercise showing a good degree of understanding, ability and potential, it is not what it claims to be in its major theses, and while it is an interesting attempt at application, but not extension, using several important elements of Ayn Rand's epistemology, anyone who understands IOE should be able on his own to understand the issues raised in the article without having to contend with the article's distracting errors. This is not a criticism of the author -- I wish him the best, partly because he has potential -- just see the article for what it is.

I dont think thats entirely accurate, (DPW): "The reason we omit broken units is precisely because doing so enables us to gain knowledge. Without omitting broken units, we could not define our concepts, let alone know anything about their referents. "" and.. (DPW): "It must be noted that broken units are not omitted in the same way measurements are. When we omit measurements, we do so on the premise that the measurements must exist in some quantity but may exist in any quantity." This appears to be a different angle on the necessity of measurement ommision in concept formation..... however, the paragraph between these two raises concerns ..... (DPW): "Since conceivably every particular characteristic about man, for instance, could be broken in one unit or another, without omitting broken units, we would be unable to define “man” and thus retain the concept. Is man a rational animal? Some men are born without a rational faculty. Is man a thumb-possessing animal? Some men have no fingers at all. Is man an animal who walks on two legs? Some men can’t walk and have no legs. Without omitting the relevant broken units, our ability to conceptualize would be paralyzed." As in the first quote, "unable to define" seems a bit strong. I enjoyed the essay, but this strong statement may be the reason evw is taking a strong stance against the importace of broken units in concept formation. But, imo, examined from start to finish, in full context, the essay is not in contrast to objectivist epistemology as evw is asserting.

Correct, it is not a matter of how often these situations come up. No, if it's a referent then it is, more loosely, "a part of" the concept. They are the same thing. The example you give of the lunatic could be a borderline case. You would have to be more specific. Does he function mentally at all? Is it temporary insanity? Are you specifically referring to the same man across time, or in accordance with his condition within a specific time frame singled out? How you deal with it also depends on the context in which it comes up. A specialized technical theory focused on genetic background would be different than assessing rights, for example. I reject the idea of a "broken unit" as any kind of starting point for a universal principle of applying the idea of "borderline case" because of its meaning (here) in an epistemological role that is not valid. You can of course use the compounded "broken unit" as a generalization of a broken something-more-specific, but such uses simply invoke the perfectly valid adjective "broken", a concept of a characteristic. So not all instances of broken are "borderline" issues at all. Something that has changed, like a broken chair, is the same entity it always was, and you know that. You have the concept "broken" to use in a qualified instance, i.e., as the compound concept "broken chair", used as if it were a single concept. It may be broken and still function, or it may no longer function at all, temporarily or disposed of on the scrap heap -- such considerations and the context in which you need to refer to it determine whether it is a "borderline case" and what method to use to deal with it. This all involves a higher level abstract thought than the base concept "chair" you started with (which is why the article correctly referred to broken unit as "derivative"). But such common situations of brokenness are different than, for example, a baby born with no brain (if that is possible), which starts off as a different kind of unit that as an aberration starts off as a borderline case to deal with right from the beginning. Further applications of even higher level abstractions come up when you talk about hypothetical 'men without brains', for example; you are using your abstract abilities to reconfigure entities in your mind (like cartoon characters). These are concepts of consciousness, with their additional complexity of multiple units referred to through the hierarchy of abstractions and combinations. You cannot reduce these cases to an epistemology based on "broken units" in which the essential characteristic required for the concept is missing. That would violate Ayn Rand's "basic principle of concept-formation" in addition to attempting to collapse the necessary process of higher level abstractions down to the base concept.

Let’s look at some facts and context rather than just arguing about statements without referents to reality. Consider these statements: a. Apples are fruit. b. Apples are red. c. Apples are eaten. Does a contradict b or c? If you needed to specify the quantity of the subject class (apples), would you assume that each sentence should be “All apples are …”? I seriously doubt it. It would be absurd to make such an assumption on the premise that a concept refers to all of the characteristics of the units, for clearly not all units are red. If I said “apple” mean all units of apples but not all apples are red, you seem to imply that means I’m holding a contradiction. In order to know whether the sentence is universal (subject refers to all or none) or particular (subject refers to some) one must have knowledge of the predicate. The complete exclusion or inclusion, or partial exclusion or inclusion depends upon one’s knowledge of the predicate. One must know the facts about the subject. One must look at reality. In other words, to establish a contradiction one must show that the statements contradict the facts, not that the words appear to contradict with each other, as if reality were just a word game. “I love dogs, I hate dogs” is not a contradiction if I am referring to “some” dogs in each case (and the dogs in each case are different dogs). Moreover, you have no justification for assuming a contradiction if there is a simple way to explain the sentence. Now, let’s get back to “"Man" does not mean "all men" in any context I can think of, and it is a logical fallacy to use it that way.” (S1) And “"Man" means all men.” (S2) Are these a contradiction? In what context did I make these statements? I said it in the context of distinguishing between the Objectivist view of concepts and the theory put forth in the first post by DPW: “If a concept does not mean its definition, but its referents, including all the characteristics of its referents” (Post 1, my bold). This is important to remember: a concept means its units not all its characteristics. There is nothing in Objectivist epistemology to justify the inclusion of characteristics that are particular (and different) to individual units into the meaning of the concept. (I’ll say a little more about this later.) I said S1 clearly in the context of man’s characteristics that differ: “Man can see color, man can murder, man can build skyscrapers, man can dig ditches, man can live on farms, man cannot see color” “On what justification would you conclude than any of these generalizations apply to all men?” (Post 84). Thus, “man does not mean all men” means not all men’s characteristics. That is the context of my statement: as a refutation of the views that concepts include all characteristics, and that anyone should assume that “man is x” means “all men are x” when different characteristics are under discussion. “Broken units” are the result of such an error. So, when I hold S2, I mean the concept, man, refers to the units of the concept. What is a unit? “A unit is an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members.” (ITOE, my bold). A two-legged creature and a four-legged creature are not similar members. A creature with lungs and a creature with gills are not similar members. A surgeon and a mechanic are not similar members. A person who uses his mind to save people’s lives and a person who uses his mind to fix automobiles are similar in a significant respect: they use their minds for survival and achievement of values. They both possess reason, a rational faculty, which is the fundamental characteristic: the common characteristic that distinguishes the units from other units that have different characteristics and fall, therefore, under a different concept. Within the Objectivist framework, Man does mean “all men”: all units: all similar members: all common fundamental characteristics. A surgeon and a mechanic are similar in that both possess the faculty of reason (as well as other similar essential characteristics). The characteristics that differ among existents are not the basis for regarding them as units of a concept.

On that note, it appears I dropped the context of this part of the thread. Here is a link to the results on 'broken units' that may be more relevant.

Not necessarily. Broken unit applies to units that lack an essential feature, as well as units that lack features that they are supposed to have, teleologically speaking. In the thread Dante linked: Later on in the thread, "deaf man" is an example of a broken unit, so in some sense, medicine largely involves the study of broken units. Any person should be able to hear, in terms of biology. I believe part of the justification for the idea of broken unit is that attributes cannot be separated from a unit. If you split a rock in half, you can say that you have two rocks, or that the rock is split. If you split a computer into many pieces, you can't say there are many computers. As a unit, there is no more computer. Lacking a motherboard, though, would not mean there is no computer. The point here is that even if a computer lacks things it really should have that impact its functioning as an entity, it's still a computer. Lacking essentials always impacts functioning, while nonessentials might, or might not. Hair color has no bearing on the functioning of people, so varying hair colors won't lead to brokenness. I agree, though, that attributes themselves cannot be broken. That really depends on the causal relationship between sex and gender. Anyone who takes the view that there is a causal relationship between sex and gender probably would say that sex is the encompassing concept while gender would be a resulting psychological attribute. Some may say that. being male leads to certain levels of testosterone, which leads to masculine behavior. If it is true, then [blank] gender would be an example of a broken unit, caused by a lack of testosterone (or whatever leads to genderized behavior). Whether or not this ought to be fixed depends upon if the consequences have a negative impact on one's life. I'd bet there would be no negative consequences, so it wouldn't need to be fixed. Still, the question matters to the extent of whether or not there are negative consequences. Part of the reason I think there is no causal relationship between sex and gender is the variation I've seen in how strongly people identify with their gender. I usually think of myself as having a weak gender identity, while some people have a strong gender identity, but neither type of person is impacted much in terms of how they function. The only impact gender seems to have on functioning is with how values are pursued.

If you followed the thread on "Broken Units" then you'd realize that it is an invalid approach to conceptualization. Borderline cases is sufficient to apply the concepts to. Now, rights are not for any concept or units. Rights are moral principles that apply to individuals, the only entities that exist in physical reality, in a social context. Individuals do not "match" concepts of animals. A broken table is not a broken unit of the concept table. It is a broken table. Entities are observed to be similar to other entities, or they are not similar. They are regarded as units because of their similarity, which, in turn, allows us to form the concept. This is what allows us to use the similarity of entities, the unit, as an instance of the concept. If they are similar in some respects but not others, they may be borderline cases, not broken units. Units cannot be broken; entities can be broken. Now, to answer the question about "severely mentally disable people" one only need ask, "in what way are they similar to other entities to which the concept of rights applies, and in what way are they different from other entities to which the concept of rights does not apply?" The answer should be fairly clear and not that difficult to grasp.

We are dealing here with units that are "broken", not concepts that are broken. There are units are still within a concept, the same concept, despite lacking the essential characteristic. This is a problem if you think "Must means must. Essential means essential", because then you "must" cast out the broken unit into a separate concept. An oxygen atom that gets one of its protons knocked out of it is not a "broken oxygen atom", it is a nitrogen atom. Instead, we recognize what should be there and that there is no basis to form a new concept based on the broken units. Everything we know about a concept applies to the broken units except those facts specifically relating to the missing attribute. Epistemological measurement omission cannot occur because physical attribute omission has already occurred. The Razor applies here: Many of the physical attributes of man are not fundamentally related to his essential characteristic of rationality. Since no new concept is justified by the presence of a new attribute, and there is a basis in physical similarity to apply the old concept for medical and nutritional purposes, brainless babies and lunatics get relegated to the old concept. The broken units are justifiably omitted when otherwise employing the concept, because employing the concept is invoking the essential characteristic by means of the objective definition, "determined according to widest context of knowledge available."

Don't let this degenerate into a discussion of epistemology!!! I responded, before immediately returning to the subject, to this: -- a condescending appeal to something other than any discussion of the content of the article in question, nevertheless revived here. The topic is the article on epistemology. I think that as a fairly recent business school graduate who writes, apparently primarily, political articles, he does have a lot of potential and a promising future, and that his article on "broken units", despite its major errors, indicates that. He is a very good writer and obviously is concerned with aspects of Ayn Rand's epistemology that most are not and do not grasp. Impact has been very well done for many years now and still is. I am glad that he is pursuing what he is. But none of this supports the thesis in the "Broken Units" article or means that its author has reached the culmination of his abilities or yet established a major career beyond what could be possible in a few years out of college. No one has complained about elucidating on what Ayn Rand wrote. It is not an elucidation. It has a main thesis that is incorrect and contrary to what Ayn Rand wrote. The article claims that the negative, derivative concept of "broken" is "the key to defending the objectivity of concepts, definitions, propositions, and therefore all of knowledge, is to be found in the concept of broken units" and "without omitting broken units, we could not define our concepts, let alone know anything about their referents". Both claims are preposterous. I would not "might describe", let alone describe, Ayn Rand's IOE as "pure conceptualization" versus "actual use of language". What is "illusory" about the article is the notion that it is a significant addition to Ayn Rand's IOE. The author's understanding of at least some important aspects of IOE did not lead in fact to a valid conclusion in its major thesis, and his facility in dealing with some elements of IOE should not mislead readers into thinking otherwise. To state this and describe why, in more detail than I originally thought would be necessary, is not "belittling", and certainly dealt with the issue more objectively than the stream of the sarcasm, the polemics and the misrepresentations of Stephen Speicher that have substituted for serious discussion here. This person's false insinuation that I have not explained anything myself somehow means that all I do is "go around belittling other people's work" is either an obvious logical fallacy or merely another resentful sarcastic smear, or both. It does not address the issues I previously tried to seriously raise, but this evidently is not the place for that.

Beyond the surface-level identification of biological sex -- speaking of gender rather as some collection of psychological attitudes or preferences, as I believe we tend to do -- I would like to know what kinds of things you're proposing that might be a "fundamental gender characteristic" that would yet not necessarily "apply to absolutely everyone of that gender." And how would you propose we arrive at such a conclusion -- by what actual methodology? How would you decide which people represent "femininity as it ought to be" and those who are "broken units"? (We're not talking about a "woman" who is born without a uterus -- are we? Because that seems more closely akin to a deaf man or a flat tire or etc. But what of a woman who prefers blue to pink, likes to be on top during lovemaking, and wishes to be President?) At some point, we must be talking about something. Mustn't we? And our conversation does not take place in a vacuum, does it? We live in a world where there has been strict division between genders and gender roles -- and much social re-enforcement of the same, including shaming and humiliation -- for a very long time. (And, for what it is worth, great contention within the Objectivist community. I have known Objectivist homosexuals -- have you? Turns out that they're not monsters.) So while it is wonderful to approach these topics on an abstract level, and I consider that to be a rewarding and necessary part of the total conversation, I would also like to have some idea as to the practical and concrete applications you have in mind. Otherwise, I fear that this vague sort of acceptance of "things that may be true generally... kinda sorta" will just embolden those who wish to make claims for a group without actually having to take into account the real world discrepancies that we find. ("Oh -- what I say doesn't fit you? Presto chango! Broken unit!") And please forgive me if I take these ideas seriously? I have for a long time, as I take ideas seriously in general, but recently I was fortunate to have a baby daughter, and it has caused me to engage in a lot of sustained reflection on the subject of gender roles. It has been an illuminating experience already in many ways. For instance, my wife and I declined to learn the sex of the baby until delivery. You cannot believe what consternation this caused for our relatives, who seemed to be unable to know what clothing and what toys to purchase for our child without that data; so early do we begin to segregate and treat people differently according to their gender. And going forward, beyond merely selecting pink or blue blankets for baby, I will eventually have to make some potentially more difficult decisions. Let me give you some examples of what I mean: Suppose my little girl decides that she wants to pursue some activity that is not generally considered feminine -- some traditionally male sport, for instance, or occupation. Should I encourage or discourage her in her pursuit? Suppose that she doesn't like the scents that some on this very forum would say are appropriate for "femininity"? Or suppose that she doesn't become the kind of convoluted harpy that Delaney believes a "good woman" ought to be? (I don't want to raise a bad woman, Dante.) As she gets older, suppose she likes a boy and wants to pursue him. Do I tell her that the feminine (and thus good, per her "nature") thing to do is to wait for him to take action? Do I decline to give advice on any of these topics, because my brain -- "masculine by nature" -- cannot possibly divine what is appropriate for a woman such as herself? Or -- suppose she and I have the talk in which I tell her that she can do anything she'd like: become a doctor, a lawyer, an actress, an athlete, an astronaut, etc. Do I leave President off of the list, because she could not, in reason, ever desire such a thing? And if she were to come to me and ask whether she could one day be President, what should I say? Do I then tell her that the shape of her vagina makes such a bad idea? Suppose this conversation takes place at, like, nine or ten years of age -- suppose that she has not given sufficient consideration as to how a masculine penis will one day penetrate her feminine vagina, and how this somehow leads to a need for her to "worship heroes" (heroes like George W. Bush and Barack Obama), and thus it is irrational for her to aspire to the very pinnacle of power, if we for some reason agree that the Presidency represents this? Suppose she has not reached these very sound and well-thought-out conclusions all on her own? What then? Do I tell her that she is probably just a "broken unit" of femininity? A woman, sure, technically speaking, but not as a woman "ought to be"? She will be facing a heavily gendered world. She will have questions. How do you propose I answer them? I know that the modus operandi around here is typically that we all just pontificate as to the way other people ought to be. It is a very reassuring and self-congratulatory thing to do. But when I log off from here, I must participate in the real world, with actual human beings. This discussion of gender is not some abstract fantasy for me; I am raising a child, and I should like to do it right. I don't have time for armchair musings, and if anyone has any actual claims to make they had best be ready, willing, and able to back them up. If you'd like to apply "broken units" to gender, I'm all ears, but I should like to hear an actual case of how this might work. I'd like to know what we're actually talking about. But doesn't it remain that regardless of this "convincing case for the fundamental nature of a gender," there remains the case to be made that one's actions must actually benefit one's life (speaking of life either as "survival" or as "eudaimonia," though it occurs to me that we have a conversation on that topic that I'd sorely like to get back to at some point)? Trade is valuable because it helps a man to survive. If we wish to argue that people ought to adopt certain gender roles, I would like to see similarly that the adoption of those gender roles benefits their life, in terms of survival, or something. That one dismisses those gender roles at one's own peril, because.... X bad thing will happen. So: a woman runs for President and... her head explodes! That would work for me. Then it would only remain to establish that, yes, a woman's head does in fact explode when she runs for President. Give me something like that. A female baby, when draped with a blue blanket, experiences some sort of cognitive dissonance -- and here's why. Something. Beyond "first and foremost," can I ask you something? Why should we try to categorize people and their resultant ethical obligations at all? (For we shouldn't stop with men vs. women, should we? There are biological differences among races, too -- so oughtn't we start to speculate on racial roles and morality?) Why concern ourselves with anything apart from ourselves as individuals?

Heh, when I first noticed the thread, I thought how seeing the word gender in a thread title is like a signal for me to post. "If there is any truth to the contention that certain things are generally true for the member of a gender (i.e. Poison X is bad to drink, and women ought not seek the Presidency), don't we counsel our own destruction when we continue to apply this derivative thinking to individuals to whom these things do not, in reality, apply" Sure, but before talking about what is true for gender at all requires specifying what gender means, and proposing essentials to the concept. Ethics have to be applied to personal circumstances through principles, so for gender to be part of developing any ethical principle depends upon knowing what gender specifically refers to. A lot of the time I think culture has a massive influence on raising kids, and leading them to adopt genderized behavior. While that may be interesting sociologically speaking, in terms of ethics that is mostly irrelevant - society isn't a basis for ethical principles. Anyone who accepts Objectivist ethics wouldn't care if their behavior conforms to society, only if it conforms to pursuing values and one's own life. For psychological interpretations of gender, that requires expertise or background, and evidence. Studies are even better. Dante stated a similar idea, I think, by saying that simply theorizing is insufficient. That's true for any statement regarding reality, whether its physics or psychology. I should say that some studies are questionable because of poor statistical methodology that generalizes far too much, and extends too far. Are there differences between genders for spatial processing? Perhaps; I haven't seen many studies. Even if there are, how significant are the differences in daily life? The differences might not be noteworthy, even if statistically significant. There is likely more overlap than people on average care to acknowledge, but I need to read more on the subject. There are scientific questions that need to be answered. Suppose a fundamental characteristic of gender (i.e. masculinity, femininity) was discovered. Whatever it could be still doesn't quite warrant ethical considerations about what behaviors to take, because broken units exist. A person has to be established as a non-broken unit before anyone can make a proclamation of immoral behavior. For instance, I think of how telling someone in a wheelchair to work out more to be able to walk again has moral weight to it if the person can be expected to recover, but it is meaningless if the person is that way due to genetic disease. DonAthos, I think you misunderstood the point of a "broken unit". Changing the terminology to "abnormal unit" may make more sense, it really doesn't matter. A person being born diabetic is a broken unit to the extent any human should be able to produce insulin, but this individual does not. The difference isn't enough to suggest a diabetic is inhuman, but enough of a difference to be diagnosed with a disease that negatively impacts survival/existence. In the case of gender, "survival" of the unit as it doesn't have to do with dying per se, only whether or not a person has even the non-essential characteristics. If someone is a broken unit for whatever reason (e.g. transgender because of XXY chromosomes), then different behaviors become necessary than would normally be expected of anyone else.

Well, my first thought in this case is that the person theorizing about some characteristic being a fundamental element of femininity is simply wrong. That would certainly be my response to the idea that a woman should not want to be President. If we have actually discovered a fundamental characteristic of women, it should hold true for all instances of that concept (the exception is broken units, which I don't have a complete grasp on but I think is well explored in this topic: http://forum.objecti...?showtopic=1099). This is why we should be wary of claims about the fundamental nature of each gender which are based on nothing more than armchair theorizing and personal introspection. Personally, I think it's obvious that there are fundamental differences between men and women, but what they are, and which ones are truly fundamental rather than just generalizations, I have no clue. The more I think about it, I think the broken units discussion might get to the core of what some of the issue is here. It could certainly be the case that there are instances of men and women who do not share the fundamental characteristics of their genders, in the same way that a broken unit generally is missing a characteristic that it should have. On the other hand, most of what is said about the "fundamental" nature of men or women is just people speculating based on their personal experiences. Serious claims should be backed up by serious, objective evidence.

Building on what the other Tom said, I think it's important to distinguish broken units from abnormal units. By the phrase "abnormal unit", I mean a unit which lacks a metaphysically-given characteristic statistically predominant among the units subsumed by the concept of which it is a member. Broken units are not merely abnormal. Humans lacking a certain part of the cerebrum also lack the rational faculty. They are abnormal because they genuinely lack a faculty overwhelming predominant among their bretheren. They are also "broken" because they lack something they are supposed to have per the definition of man. At this point, one might be tempted to classify broken units under the more general category abnormal-units. However, humans who choose not to use their rational faculty still possess it, so they are not broken per se.

It most certainly applies to groups. An entity is a sum of its parts in the same way as a group is. Society is a group of individuals and if you apply a true statement about society that is not true of the individuals, then it is the fallacy of division. After all, a group, or a concept, is a mental entity. Are not individual people a part of society? Are not particular customs a part of society? Are not particular laws a part of society? There is a difference between saying "man can see color" and "(all) men can see color". The former is a statement about the nature of the concept 'man' and does not depend upon how many men can see color as long as there is at least one. The latter is a statement about the number of particular men who can see color. This is why it is invalid to go from the generalization "man can see color" to "all men can see color". "Man" does not mean "all men" in any context I can think of, and it is a logical fallacy to use it that way. Man can see color, man can murder, man can build skyscrapers, man can dig ditches, man can live on farms, man cannot see color, etc., etc. On what justification would you conclude than any of these generalizations apply to all men? Clearly, they do not. Since the meaning of a concept is its units or referents, if any particular man can do something, then man can do it. Utlimately yes, but that doesn't tell you anything about the specific man or the causes of his ability to see color. Not only are there internal, biological causes (properties of the eye), there are external causes such as there being sufficient light, an object with the ability to reflect certain colors, eyes are open, etc. I don't see "human" in the definition here. The referents to the concept are all the entities that are its units. The subject under discussion here is "broken units" (units without a characteristic of a concept) and conveniently leaving out units from a concept's meaning has led to a great deal of confusion. "Baby human" is not redundant if there is a group of young humans, dolphins, gorillas that are the subject of an experiment and one wants to only refer to the humans. And what is a pup, kitten, calf? A _________ that is a baby.

OH BABY When presenting philosophic issues it is extremely important to be consistent when rephrasing so as not to produce confusion by implicitly or explicitly changing the meaning of what is being presented. Let’s see if this is a problem here. The discussion begins: “These three concretes have something important in common: (1) A baby born without a rational faculty…” Now, let’s just consider these two examples from the standpoint of clarity in the article. The next time this issue is mentioned is, ( A ) “a brainless baby lacks the distinguishing characteristic of the concept ‘man’… ” ( B ) “A brainless baby is not a man…” The question is then raised, “how [can we] identity a brainless baby as a unit of the concept “man”? Right away, we are confused: are we talking about baby or man? The examples are used to illustrate “a broken unit … is a unit that lacks a characteristic shared by other unites of the concept of which it is a member.” Which concepts are we talking about, baby or man? Let’s notice one thing. There was a switch from “born without a rational faculty” to “brainless.” This leads to some confusion. First, since when is any baby born with a rational faculty. They all share the lack of that characteristic. Next, the example of being born without a brain changes the entire meaning of the example: a rational faculty cannot be developed in a brainless baby but can be in a normal one. This leads to significant confusion. To what exactly does the concept ‘baby’ refer? Any organism without a rational faculty? Does having a brain or not have significance for the concept? In my post above, I presented the fundamental principle of concept formation, as presented in ITOE by Rand, “regarding something as a unit means that one focuses on an attribute that two or more objects have in common but is different from a similar attribute of other objects.” One integrates and differentiates based upon the same attribute of different entities. Since no baby has a rational faculty, it certainly can’t be included in the concept. However, a brain is certainly a critical organ. However, the concept ‘baby’ goes beyond human babies: “women give birth to babies,” or shape: “it looks like a baby.” After all, baby chicks are not born, baby frogs look so different from its parents it has its own concept: toad. What about baby plants where there is no sex between the parents. Or baby fish where eggs float in water and are fertilized by sperm floating in water? How do we know when to apply the concept “baby” in each of these contexts? We seem to be overwhelmed with broken units: the lack of characteristics shared by so many units of the concept. There seems to be more differences than similarities. I suggest reading ITOE to understand the proper method of concept formation. The rational mind is fully capable of grasping the context and meaning of the concept ‘baby’ when the term is used. When I consider baby chicks, my mind is not implicitly wondering about what characteristics are lacking with human babies. That is because the concept ‘baby’ was not formed with that consideration. A baby is a progeny of its parents and has the potential to grow into an adult. How do we handle “a brainless baby”? Why do we still consider it a baby? Because our mind automatically switches contexts to an earlier stage of definition based upon shape. Just as Rand demonstrates the development of the concept “man” in the mind of a child, a previously developed definition is used for baby. In the same way, a man who is in a coma or is brain dead is considered a man because the mind automatically inserts a definition from an earlier stage of development of the full concept. In each case, similarity of attributes allows the application of the concept, not any presence of broken units. A man in a coma is similar in shape to a man with a rational faculty than to the shape of the bed he lays in.

Contexts aren't true or false, they simply are, and higher levels of abstraction are not degrees of truth or falsehood -- I don't know what any of that was intended to mean. When you have a derivative concept like "broken" it depends on a more basic concept from which you start. There has to be something you are talking about which has changed, broken, etc. or there is nothing to talk about. Without a concept of the normal, the abnormal never comes up. You can conceptualize exceptions, aberrations, etc., and classify them for specific cognitive purposes, but they cannot contradict what you start with and do not change the concepts you start with. In the case of the "broken units" theory, contrasted with Objectivist epistemology, there is an attempt to include units under a concept that do not have the essential characteristic required to be subsumed in the concept in the first place. Recall that Ayn Rand emphasized, with respect to the process of measurement omission for the distinguishing characteristics for a concept, "Bear firmly in mind that that the term 'measurements omitted' does not mean, in this context, that measurements are regarded as non-existent; it means that measurements exist, but are not specified. That measurements must exist is an essential part of the process" [emphasis in original], and the "basic principle of concept-formation" is that "the measurements must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity" [emphasis in original]. She did not write that the essential characteristic "must exist except when it doesn't". It must be there to have a measurement. Must means must. Essential means essential. The theory that rationalistically concludes that the essential characteristic need not be there after all in some units, and that this is "the key" to objectivity in concepts and "all knowledge", and is necessary for concepts, without which we can't "know anything about their referents", is a contradiction of the starting point and of Ayn Rand's "basic theory of concept formation", not just "maybe an overstatement". Simply observing these conclusions in the article ought to be enough to see immediately that something is very wrong even before going back to analyze where it went off the rails. You can conceptually deal with borderline cases, aberrations, etc., but that requires additional knowledge at higher levels of abstractions and additional conceptualization. You can't roll it all back into the original (base) concept without regard to that process and hierarchy, and further, contradict the original concept. The article not only concluded with that contradiction -- which is its reductio ad absurdum -- it made no mention or recognition of any of the process of abstractions from abstractions, border line cases, etc. described extensively in her theory. I think that that omission of consideration in the article had a lot to do with how it ended so badly. Ayn Rand discussed 'borderline cases', 'qualified instances', etc. after she described 'abstractions from abstractions', which in turn had to follow the introductory chapters on first level concept formation. These further principles did not fall back and replace the foundation with something else contradicting it. The hierarchy of abstraction must always be maintained.

Wow, projecting much? I think I can see your brain up your nasal passages. I'm sure Mr. Watkins will be thrilled to hear that you think he has "potential"--since he's the editor of Impact and a contributor to The Objective Standard. Granted, this does not necessarily mean that all of his work is of exceptional merit, but his article on Broken Units really helped me to clarify some bits of epistemological confusion I was having. Elaborating on logical ramifications for those of us who may not have discovered ALL of them for ourselves is the JOB of intellectuals, so it makes absolutely no sense to complain that Mr. Watkins was simply elaborating on what Ayn Rand already wrote. Heck, Ayn Rand herself criticized this idea quite severely in The Art of Non-Fiction via a hilarious reductio ad absurdum where she declared that if you take this attitude, no one could say anything new after Aristotle figured out that A is A, because everything is included within the law of Identity. Are broken units fundamental? Certainly not as fundamental as, say, measurement-omission. However, it does help to make a bridge between what might be described as "pure conceptualization" and actual use of language, whereby a brainless baby (or a brainless adult) is nevertheless referred to as a man (or a human) in common parlance. Knowing that these broken units DO in fact fall under the purview of the concept (they fit in the "file folder") even though they lack an essential characteristic is important to understanding the precise operation of the conceptual faculty. Precise understanding of this operation is vital to being able to defend the Objectivist Epistemology. So I hardly think this is unnecessary even if it isn't some sort of major innovation. However, if this is all so "illusory" and unworthy in your mind, perhaps you'll provide us with some valuable article YOU'VE written elaborating a salient point of epistemology instead of just going around belittling other people's work.

No, it is exactly the right question he should ask. Hotu Matua wants to protect severely mentally damaged human beings but he thinks they do not have rights so naturally this is a problem. But they DO have rights, so the question of justifiably protecting them is easy. The only thing which is not easy, for him and a few others here, is recognizing a human being. Applying the concept man to a specific unit is the essence of the problem here, so asking about the concept of man is exactly the right question to ask. What he did not understand about the broken units idea was that broken units are still inside the concept. Broken men are still men. Once it is established that we are dealing with a man, the political principles that apply to all men apply to this one as well. This is what it means to think in principle. Why is applying a first level concept so hard for some people? One likely explanation is thinking in the style of the 'primacy of definition' instead of 'primacy of existence'. 'Primacy of definition' is the rationalist's way of engaging in 'primacy of consciousness'. It is a corruption of thought and should be put aside whenever one becomes aware of it. Children, the deranged and the incapacitated all have rights, but they cannot exercise them rationally or at all. The political solution to this political problem is the concept of a guardian, someone who exercise rights on behalf of someone else. This is possible to the extent that the safety and welfare of the protected is objectively ascertainable. (A guardian may not vote on behalf of his charge, but can consent to medical procedures.) Any action which is objectively not furthering the safety and welfare of the charge is an initiation of force and comes under the scope of the law. Dead men are not a type of broken men. A dead man has no rights at all, his last will and testament is executed to protect the rights of his survivors and inheritors. (edit: This line is not in response to your post softwarenerd, but I wanted to state it somewhere.) And what terrible advice this is: It is not possible to find truth without a concept. The possibility of truth and falsehood does not even exist until after concepts have been formed and applied. If you wanted to caution against rationalism, you bungled it. You should said something along the lines of 'look to the referents, not the definition'. (Another edit: Ok, you did say that but your example of the table which is about a fact does not port easily over to a normative principle. One might rationalistically conclude that a table will support an object but it does not, a contradiction. If one concludes rights apply to all men, and so I should respects this man's rights, what could be the contradictory fact?)