Fair Representation?

[Veritas]

Is this not an inaccurate represntation of Rand's views?

"age 428 in Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. I suggest all Christians read this book at least once at some point.

Moreland and Craig counter general forms of 'ethical egoism'(EE hereafter)which is what Rand's philosophy amounts to. They produce three pretty strong arguments against EE. The most interesting are the last two, being, firstly: EE is inconsistent with love, friendship, etc. which leads to a paradox. In order to pursue EE effectively it may be that you have to abandon it at some points. Secondly, another paradox of EE is that for something to be a moral rule it would seem to have to be universalizable, But, they argue(pages 429-430), suppose we have two people--A and B--who will die if they don't get a kidney. Suppose a kidney comes available for transplant. It seems like from A's perspective both A and B have a duty to act according to A's self-interest. But from B's perspective, B and A have a duty to act in B's self-interest. So there is a contradiction, A and B both a moral duty to act in their own self-interest and not to act in their own self-interest.

There's more. Suppose the ethical egoist says that A should want B to act in B's own self interest because it is in fact B's duty to do so. Another problem arises. A should think B should act in his own self interest. But B's acting in his self-interest would be thwarting A's acting in his own self-interest. It seems like a problem to think A has a moral duty to thwart B's moral duty; and B has a duty to thwart A's moral duty. Having a moral duty to thwart someone else's moral duty seems a strange thing.

I don't think ethical egoism has a leg to stand on, myself. So, for a psychological explanation: I think that's it's popular in the United States because we've become very individualistic and it appeals to our individualism. It also has an air of intellectual superiority in its labeling. "Objectivism" sure sounds better than "ethical non-realism" or "deontologist ethics" or "emotivism."" (http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/PageServer?pagename=message_board)

[John McVey]

Is this not an inaccurate represntation of Rand's views?

No.

EE is inconsistent with love, friendship, etc. which leads to a paradox. In order to pursue EE effectively it may be that you have to abandon it at some points.

...

A should think B should act in his own self interest. But B's acting in his self-interest would be thwarting A's acting in his own self-interest.

Complete and utter codswallop. Everything in the first part relies upon that assertion in the second part of a clash of interests among men. All they have done here is add in a clash of interests within men. The paradox he speaks of then arises because of the clash between the fact that love and friendship are indeed values, but then the external clash leads to the internal clash of these interpersonal values with other non-personal values.

The fault is that of the authors for their erroneous assertion in the second part, not with Objectivism for advocating rational self-interest and stating there can be a great value achievable with others. There is no clash of interest among rational men, and no alleged paradox in regards to love and friendship. Objectivism recognises love and friendship as special types of trader relationships, and in all such relationships the rule is action to mutual self-interest or going separate ways in peace.

Secondly, another paradox of EE is that for something to be a moral rule it would seem to have to be universalizable

Again, codswallop. For something to be a moral principle, that something merely need be a broad guide for action applicable to a volitional being so as to best live. That moral principle muse be induced from the nature of that being and the nature of the world in which it exists. Whether or not that principle is 'universalizable' is irrelevant to its status as moral principle. The ability to universalise that principle is a consequence of the fact that there are other such volitional beings with the same basic nature living in the same world, not a condition of status as moral.

But, they argue(pages 429-430), suppose we have two people--A and B--who will die if they don't get a kidney...

Here we go again - the fallacy of using life-boat situations in discussing ethics for day-to-day living. The example is worthless.

Having a moral duty to thwart someone else's moral duty seems a strange thing.

It's funny how this seemed not to lead the author to question the core assumption of a clash of interests (I haven't read the book nor perused that website - and have no intention of doing so).

I don't think ethical egoism has a leg to stand on, myself.

That's because the assumptions underlying the argument are totally out of whack and the author is merely refuting a strawman.

JJM

[Chops]

Is this not an inaccurate represntation of Rand's views?

These are inaccurate representations of Objectivism.

EE is inconsistent with love, friendship, etc. which leads to a paradox. In order to pursue EE effectively it may be that you have to abandon it at some points.

How is it inconsistent with love and friendship? To love and befriend someone is to appreciate that person's company, which is itself a selfish reason. There is no contradiction, and no abandonment of one's philosophy.

suppose we have two people--A and B--who will die if they don't get a kidney. Suppose a kidney comes available for transplant. It seems like from A's perspective both A and B have a duty to act according to A's self-interest. But from B's perspective, B and A have a duty to act in B's self-interest. So there is a contradiction, A and B both a moral duty to act in their own self-interest and not to act in their own self-interest.

A has a moral duty to act in A's rational self interest, and B has a moral duty to act in B's rational self interest. I fail to see the contradiction. In all cases, the context must ALWAYS be present. In its current form, this is a thinly veiled lifeboat situation. Who's kidney is being provided? If A's cousin's kidney is being provided, one would assume that A's cousin would have requested that A use the kidney. What payment are A and B offering (assuming they could "bid" on the Kidney)? If one could have a legitimate auction for a replacement body part, then whoever is willing or capable of paying more should receive it. But with our system being based on waiting lists, and assuming, for the case of argument that A and B have the same ailment (at the same stage) and desire the kidney with the same degree of necessity, then the determining factor, rationally, would be "whoever got on the list first." A's rights are not violated by B getting a kidney.

There is no contradiction.

(also, a kidney isn't exactly the best example, as a kidney is one of the easier organs to get. A heart would be a much better example).

That said, using a lifeboat situation as an example of the supposed "failure" of an ethical system is bogus. If you wish to see what OBjectivism has to say about emergencies, read "The Ethics of Emergencies" in Rand's "The Virtue of Selfishness."

Suppose the ethical egoist says that A should want B to act in B's own self interest because it is in fact B's duty to do so. Another problem arises. A should think B should act in his own self interest. But B's acting in his self-interest would be thwarting A's acting in his own self-interest. It seems like a problem to think A has a moral duty to thwart B's moral duty; and B has a duty to thwart A's moral duty. Having a moral duty to thwart someone else's moral duty seems a strange thing.

If we're both in line for an iPod at the store, and I grab the last one, I've done nothing to violate your rights. I've "thwarted" nothing. You had no guarantee of receiving the iPod, and I beat you to it. I've deprived you of nothing. You did not h8ave an iPod. You had no guarantee of getting an iPod. And you still have no iPod.

Now, if you decide that you want the iPod and that you wish to grab it from me and run, that's theft and is a distinct violation of rights, and is indeed immoral and condemned by Objectivism. Whether an iPod or a Heart is irrelevant. You retrieve what you rationally acquire, and advocating that others rely on the same philosophy is no contradiction.

It is a rather common fallacy to believe that someone can only succeed at another's expense.

An individual not receiving something is not an expense.

Edited September 9, 2007 by Chops

[RationalBiker]

Is this not an inaccurate represntation of Rand's views?

"age 428 in Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. I suggest all Christians read this book at least once at some point.

Aside from the excellent refutations already provided to what appears to be at the very least a gross misrepresentation of Objectivism, this is not a site to be used for the propagation of Christian ideas. Cease that immediately!

[Robert J. Kolker]

Is this not an inaccurate represntation of Rand's views?

"age 428 in Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. I suggest all Christians read this book at least once at some point.

Moreland and Craig counter general forms of 'ethical egoism'(EE hereafter)which is what Rand's philosophy amounts to. They produce three pretty strong arguments against EE. The most interesting are the last two, being, firstly: EE is inconsistent with love, friendship, etc. ......

I disagree. Charles Lamb in his essay On Friendship notes that a Friend is another I. Mutual selection of friends of friends is a manifestation of ego and is generally beneficial. Friends (or lovers) are so to each other because their souls resonate. That is ego at work. Each needs the other.

Bob Kolker

Edited September 9, 2007 by Robert J. Kolker

[DavidOdden]

I disagree. Charles Lamb in his essay On Friendship notes that a Friend is another I. Mutual selection of friends of friends is a manifestation of ego and is generally beneficial. Friends (or lovers) are so to each other because their souls resonate. That is ego at work. Each needs the other

Do you realize that not a single word that you wrote refers to Ayn Rand, and therefore your response is completely, utterly and totally off-topic?

[Tenure]

Was that irony, David?

[DavidOdden]

Was that irony, David?

Not as I understand the concept. When the question posed is "does X represent Rand's view", the response should be about Rand's view, and not something else. Of course I can't be certain how others interpreted what I said, but in fact what I said and what I intended to say are the same.