A Philosophical Critique of Heterophenomenology

[dianahsieh]

By Diana Hsieh from NoodleFood,cross-posted by MetaBlog

Christian Beenfeldt, Oxford graduate student in philosophy and occasional writer for the Ayn Rand Institute, recently published a paper in the Journal of Consciousness Studies entitled "A Philosophical Critique of Heterophenomenology." Here's the abstract:

In this paper Dennett's method of heterophenomenology is discussed. After a brief explanation of the method, three arguments in support of it are considered in turn. First, the argument from the possibility of error and self-delusion of the subject is found to ignore the panoply of intermediate position that one can take with regard to the epistemic status of first-personal knowledge. The argument is also criticized for employing an epistemic double-standard. Second, the argument from the neutrality of heterophenomenology is found to be defeated by the fact that, contrary to Dennett's claims, third-person, functionalist and instrumentalist assumptions substantially underpin and inform the method. Similarities between heterophenomenology and the Turing Test are furthermore explored, and it is shown that a weaker version of the neutrality claim also fails. Third, the argument from the appeal to the standard practice of science is shown to substantially rest on an equivocation on the term 'heterophenomenology' and is therefore rejected. Finally, it is suggested that the use of introspective reports is not inherently at odds with sound scientific procedures.

I haven't read it yet, but it looks of interesting! (It should be available for free via university accounts.)

Cross-posted from Metablog

[Thomas M. Miovas Jr.]

Christian Beenfeldt, Oxford graduate student in philosophy and occasional writer for the Ayn Rand Institute, recently published a paper in the Journal of Consciousness Studies entitled "A Philosophical Critique of Heterophenomenology."

His abstract is available on the web, but not his paper, at this point, but I did find another paper on the topic HETEROPHENOMENOLOGY VERSUS CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY and I have to say that this stuff is weird and it is too bad Christian Beenfeldt has to waste his time discussing it. But I guess that is part of the price one has to pay to get a PH.D. in philosophy these days.

In essence, the claim of some aspects of phenomenology is that we do not experience the world or reality when we perceive something, but rather qualia -- like sweet, blue, cold, etc. -- that probably don't have any relation to reality but are our own subjective grasp of our conscious awareness; only to make it more weird, we are not even aware of our own consciousness but rather qualia of the mind (they probably have a special name for that, but I don't know what the hell it is, nor do I care). The overall point in this line of pseudo-thinking is that we don't perceive the world, but rather Kantian fragmented experiences brought about by -- blank out; and because of this being questionable objective in nature, our introspection of what is going on in our minds based on these qualia, is even more questionably objective. You know the line, it is all only phenomena, rather than neumena.

I think arguing with these guys seriously and having to write papers on it that are somewhat academically respectable given their terms is a hell of a waste of one's mind. Introspection is valid, but if one accepts the idea that real reality is unknowable in principle, then of course anything going on in your mind is also unknowable, basically by the same principle that it does not involve direct awareness of an object. Though I suppose that by the time one takes this stuff seriously to the extent that one wants to teach it as a professor, his mind will already be so garbled that the statement that introspection is invalid is true for him -- he doesn't know what the hell is going on in reality or his own mind. And I have known philosophy professors like that.

Besides, how can one make a logical argument against someone who will not accept facts? since logic is non-contradictory identification of facts -- facts, you idiots, not qualia! It is an attempt to reduce man to the level of sensations, rather than taking the perceptual level as the given and the epistemologically fundamental.

I hope Christian can survive it.

[IchorFigure]

I watched a short video called "the Four Horsemen" where Dennet, Hitchens, Dawkins, and Harris sit around literally doing nothing else but casually chatting. At one point Dennet brings up a question along the lines of "have you ever thought of something that was too dangerous to be known". That has always annoyed me. All I could think was, I wonder what on earth this bozo could possibly think he's discovered that is dangerous? Maybe he figured out he's full of it.

Edited November 15, 2008 by IchorFigure

[Steve D'Ippolito]

Actually that was quite a LONG video (at least in original form) and another spot that was appalling was the four of them agreeing on the need to be skeptical and uncertain.

[Tenure]

I can access this paper via the campus network here, and it's a really good paper. He lays out the ridiculous and self-defeating nature of Heterophenomenology, as well as just the absolute absurdity of the things Dennet says. Christian is also a very clear writer and makes everything very understandable, with a minimum of background knowledge needed.

This is a positive step-forward in having scholarly work done by Objectivists on academic issues. It's more stuff like this we need, except not just in Philosophy, but Economics, English, History, Maths, etc.