Can man mechanically recreate consciousness?

[Capitalism Forever]

Just look at the latest addition to our forum, "Bridget," aka "LadyAttis."

Judging from the response she sent to my warning, she is probably also the latest person to find out that we on this forum are simply too "closed-minded," un-"sophisticated," "reactionary," etc. to appreciate the lofty levels of thought she reaches. I trust that she has sense enough to stop wasting her time on us unteachable rubes.

[Capitalism Forever]

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| 2 + 2 = 4 

[stephen_speicher]

What do you mean by running a computer simulation? You could certainly learn to fly a plane by use of a computer simulation in a virtual reality environment, and I believe that pilots are often trained that way. There would be no phenomenological difference whatsoever between using a sufficiently advanced computer simulation, and flying an actual plane. If I've missed your point then please clarify what you mean.

If in Los Angeles I am using a computer simulation of flight , after five hours of doing so I am still in Los Angeles. After five hours of flying an actual plane originating in Los Angeles, I am in New York. Surely you must grasp the fundamental difference and many important implications between a computer simulation and the physical reality of an actual plane?

But there's no difference from the point of view of the person as he is experiencing it. When the imagining is sufficiently vivid (such as during a dream or hallucination) there is nothing to distinguish between what is purely a product of the mind, and what is real. It is only after one wakes up that the difference can be appreciated - ie only when viewed from the outside.

Since you are awake and not hallucinating, then this seems to imply that you do recognize that there is a fundamental difference between a simulation model in a computer and the physical reality the simulation mimics. I mean, you do not mean to imply that you do not know that you created a computer model, rather than the actual physical reality, right? You do recognize that a computer simulation of a man being shot through the heart will not result in a real man being buried the next day, in a real cemetary. Right?

I meant the relations to which the parts stand in to each other. The world consists of relations as well as objects, and I was using 'structure' to describe the former. When I say that a computer could replicate the structure I mean that it could duplicate the relations using different 'non-material' objects. For instance a computer running a flight simulation would have to duplicate all the structural relations that flying involves (such as the sky being above the plane, the location of controls in the cockpit, and so on). The computer wouldnt be using 'real' objects (the 'sky' in the program obviously isnt the actual sky), but the relations between parts would be identical.

So then, the computer simulation would act as if it were conscious, mimicking in the simulation the actions of a real conscious entity, while not be a real conscious entity itself. Right?

Likewise when a child plays with a model airport, the structural relations of the toy duplicates the structural relations of a 'real' airport. The model plane is on the model runway, and the model pilot is in the model cockpit.

Well, the similarity here between a computer model and the child's toy model is that they are both models, but the difference is that child's toy model has an actual physical existentence, whereas the computer model is just a simulation of an actual physical existent.

[Hal]

Since both arithmetical statements are true, both instances of "The ... box contains a false statement" are equivalent to "The other non-arithmetical statement is false"  ; i.e. this is like Statement A saying "Statement B is false" and Statement B saying "Statement A is false." That, in turn, is equivalent to "This statement is true." Since it is purely self-referential, it is meaningless.

Huh? 2 statements each saying the other is false isnt self referential. Where is the self-reference?

[Hal]

If in Los Angeles I am using a computer simulation of flight , after five hours of doing so I am still in Los Angeles. After five hours of flying an actual plane originating in Los Angeles, I am in New York. Surely you must grasp the fundamental difference and many important implications between a computer simulation and the physical reality of an actual plane?

I suppose it depends whether the flight simulator is in the back of a moving truck. In any case I'm unsure why this matters - I'm not saying there are no differences whatsoever, just no relevant ones. I wouldnt class "finishing up somewhere other than where you started" as particularly relevant to the experience of flying a plane, otherwise there wouldnt be much point in test-flights where one landed at the same airfield from which one took off.

So then, the computer simulation would act as if it were conscious, mimicking in the simulation the actions of a real conscious entity, while not be a real conscious entity itself. Right?

If "acting as if it were conscious" involves having intentional first person experiences then there isn't a difference between 'being conscious' and 'modelling consciousness'. If the computer was just mimicing the behavior of how we would expect a human to act then it wouldnt be conscious. You're assuming the first scenario isn't possible, and I see no reason for this.

Well, the similarity here between a computer model and the child's toy model is that they are both models, but the difference is that child's toy model has an actual physical existentence, whereas the computer model is just a simulation of an actual physical existent.

The mind isnt a physical existent. In any case, I was illustrating what I meant by structural relations. I could picture an airport in my head, and that would have all the structural relations of real airports, without involving any physical existents.

[Bowzer]

I suppose it depends whether the flight simulator is in the back of a moving truck. In any case I'm unsure why this matters - I'm not saying there are no differences whatsoever, just no relevant ones.

You have crossed into the realm of the truly bizarre with that reply...but that's just my own phenomenological experience.

[AisA]

In any case I'm unsure why this matters - I'm not saying there are no differences whatsoever, just no relevant ones.

Relevant to whom and for what?

[stephen_speicher]

I'm not saying there are no differences whatsoever, just no relevant ones.

So then you see no relevant differences between a computer simulation of an aspect of physical reality, and that physical reality itself?

[stephen_speicher]

Judging from the response she sent to my warning, she is probably also the latest person to find out that we on this forum are simply too "closed-minded," un-"sophisticated," "reactionary," etc. to appreciate the lofty levels of thought she reaches. I trust that she has sense enough to stop wasting her time on us unteachable rubes.

I would be happy to suggest a couple of places for her to go that would be much more tolerant of her ... ahem ... intellectual charms.

[source]

Knowledgeable physicists know that classical and quantum mechanics each have their own domain of applicability...

Try Brian Greene's "The Elegant Universe," Michio Kaku's "Hyperspace," and/or "Beyond Einstein."

Anyway, it IS true that these theories have their domains of applicability, however - they are not correct. Reality is only one and governed by a certain set of laws which do not contradict. Quantuum mechanics does contradict classical physics in the macroscopic world just as the classical theories contradict the formulae of quantuum mechanics in a microscopic world. These theories force us to view these two instances of one reality as separate. I think that, from what you say we agree on that.

I also think that we would agree that there is only one reality which in fact isn't suffering this dichotomy which we are forced (for now) to embrace. This inevitably leads to the conclusion that quantuum theory or classical physics are not correct. They are only approximations of some more fundamental laws which we have not yet grasped.

[Capitalism Forever]

Huh? 2 statements each saying the other is false isnt self referential. Where is the self-reference?

Statement A: "Statement B is false."

Statement B: "Statement A is false."

Substituting Statement B into Statement A, we get:

Statement A: "The statement 'Statement A is false' is false."

[BurgessLau]

Statement A: "Statement B is false."

Statement B: "Statement A is false."

Substituting Statement B into Statement A, we get:

Statement A: "The statement 'Statement A is false' is false."

I am confused. Are you saying that these two or four lines of text together are "self-referential"? I have never heard the term "self-referential" used this way.

Usually, "self-referential" refers to a single (hence "self-") statement, such as:

"[i know that] Knowledge is impossible"

or

"[it is absolutely true that] People who make absolute statements are fools."

[Hal]

Substituting Statement B into Statement A, we get:

Statement A: "The statement 'Statement A is false' is false."

Technically you can't perform substitutions like this indiscriminately, since it's possible to produce cases where doing so leads to false conclusions. But in any case, if I were to accept that your reasoning here was valid and that these statements did constitute self-reference, surely Godel sentennces would be self-referential too, and hence invalid? The entire Godel argument rests upon the claim that we know the self-referential sentence ("this sentence cannot be proved within system X") is true. However on your view, purely self referential sentences arent true, they are meaningless.

In any case, purely self-referential statements aren't meaningless. "This sentence contains 27 letters" is undeniably true.

[Hal]

So then you see no relevant differences between a computer simulation of an aspect of physical reality, and that physical reality itself?

It depends entirely on the circumstances, and to what end its intended to be relevant. There's no relevant difference between (an advanced) flight simulator and a real plane when it comes to training pilots for instance. I doubt that theres any relevant difference between the brain and a 'simulation' of the brain when it comes to generating consciousness either. If interactions X Y and Z are sufficient to produce consciousness when performed by physical neurons, I don't think there's a reason to rule out the same interactions producing consciousness if performed by virtual neurons.

There would be a relevant difference between the brain and the simulation if you wanted to open it up and perform neurosurgery however.

[RationalBiker]

There's no relevant difference between (an advanced) flight simulator and a real plane when it comes to training pilots for instance.

I wonder how many pilots would object to this statement? I wonder why the FAA still requires them to log actual flight time in for training purposes? Such a waste of fuel when they could just be doing flight sims.

I don't suppose the factor between a real threat to one's life by making a mistake in flight versus a virtual threat to one's life is relevant. I know being in the academy in a controlled training environment was just like my on the job learning on the street arresting real criminals some of whom really want to do me harm. Yea, those little mental differences probably aren't relevant or significant at all.

[stephen_speicher]

Try Brian Greene's "The Elegant Universe," Michio Kaku's "Hyperspace," and/or "Beyond Einstein."

I do not want to "try" anything. Please give the exact quote where the authors state, as you claim, that "quantuum[sic] mechanics and classic mechanics contradict each other." (And note that the books you chose are popularizations, and popularizations are known to be notorious in the physics community for their lack of precision and distortions of fact. And, even if you can find a quote from these popularizations that says what you claim, then it is, as I noted previously, at best the words of a very confused author whose view is at odds with the vast majority of physicists who understand this issue much better than that.)

Anyway, it IS true that these theories have their domains of applicability, however - they are not correct. Reality is only one and governed by a certain set of laws which do not contradict. Quantuum mechanics does contradict classical physics in the macroscopic world just as the classical theories contradict the formulae of quantuum mechanics in a microscopic world.

You speak nonsense. That is like saying that the gas laws are not correct because they do not work for solids. All truth is contextual, and you are putting the blame on truth for your totally inappropriate dropping of context.

I think that, from what you say we agree on that.

As has been well-established before, there is very little on metaphysics, epistemology, or physics that I agree upon with you.

[stephen_speicher]

It depends entirely on the circumstances, and to what end its intended to be relevant. There's no relevant difference between (an advanced) flight simulator and a real plane when it comes to training pilots for instance.

At this point I can only label this as pure sophistry. You understand the context for the distinction I draw, but you attempt to deflect from its significance. You completely ignore, for example, my noting that a computer simulation of a man being shot through the heart will not result in a real man being buried the next day, in a real cemetary. It is only by ignoring the fundamental differences between physical reality and simulations thereof, that the floating abstractions surrounding AI can be used at all.

I doubt that theres any relevant difference between the brain and a 'simulation' of the brain when it comes to generating consciousness either. If interactions X Y and Z are sufficient to produce consciousness when performed by physical neurons, I don't think there's a reason to rule out the same interactions producing consciousness if performed by virtual neurons.

A conclusion made possible by the refusal to address the implications of the differences between a virtual reality and the real physical one. This discussion with you is pointless -- I am done.

[Hal]

I wonder how many pilots would object to this statement?  I wonder why the FAA still requires them to log actual flight time in for training purposes?  Such a waste of fuel when they could just be doing flight sims.

The simulation will always differ from reality in some way, but given any list of conditions which it is important to model, there's no reason why it cannot be made to do so. Stephen said that a difference between a flight simulator and a plane was that flying a flight simulator doesnt leave you in a different place from where you started. Fine. Put the simulator inside a moving vechicle. You claim that a difference is the lack of risk to the life of the pilot. Fine. Kill them if they make a mistake (you could program the computer to release poison gas into the simulator if they crash).

The point is that given any list of 'relevant conditions', we could design a simulator that reproduces them. Yes there will always be some differences, but we can always design our simulator so that any specific set of conditions are fufilled. I've shown you how a simulator could have the 'ending somewhere different' and 'risking your life' built in, and I could probably do the same for most other differences you bring up. If you think there are things which the simulator cant capture, then its up to you name them.

[Hal]

At this point I can only label this as pure sophistry. You understand the context for the distinction I draw, but you attempt to deflect from its significance. You completely ignore, for example,  my noting that a computer simulation of a man being shot through the heart will not result in a real man being buried the next day, in a real cemetary. It is only by ignoring the fundamental differences between physical reality and simulations thereof, that the floating abstractions surrounding AI can be used at all.

We could build this into the simulator if you think it's so important (see above).

A conclusion made possible by the refusal to address the implications of the differences between a virtual reality and the real physical one. This discussion with you is pointless -- I am done.

You havent mentioned any differences that cant be overcome. I've refused to address their implications because I don't believe that any relevant ones exist in the first place - you're begging the question. Give me some specific details which a simulation of the brain couldnt capture that would make it incapable of producing consciousness, rather than simply asserting that these details must exist.

[Capitalism Forever]

Are you saying that these two or four lines of text together are "self-referential"?

I am saying that Statement A is self-referential. (And, by symmetry, I am also saying that Statement B is self-referential.) What's more, I am saying that they are purely self-referential.

[AisA]

Give me some specific details which a simulation of the brain couldnt capture that would make it incapable of producing consciousness, rather than simply asserting that these details must exist.

This amounts to a demand for proof of a negative. You make the assertion that consciousness can be simulated by a computer, and then you offer as proof the fact the we cannot prove otherwise.

[Hal]

This amounts to a demand for proof of a negative.  You make the assertion that consciousness can be simulated by a computer, and then you offer as proof the fact the we cannot prove otherwise.

I think that the fact consciousness is produced by the brain is sufficient reason to investigate the possibilities of it being produced by something else with a similar structure to the brain. If you don't think that this classes as evidence then please define exactly what WOULD. What could anyone show you that would convince you that AI is possible? If your standards of evidence are so high that they are impossible to satisfy even in theory, then I dont think that your demanding of evidence has any more signficance than a sceptic demanding evidence that we can know other humans are conscious.

In any case, you need to decide what you're arguing. Is machine volition IMPOSSIBLE, or is it ARBITRARY? Most posts in this thread seem to have claimed the former. If you're actually asserting the latter then that's a different debate.

[Capitalism Forever]

Technically you can't perform substitutions like this indiscriminately, since it's possible to produce cases where doing so leads to false conclusions.

Could you provide an example?

if I were to accept that your reasoning here was valid and that these statements did constitute self-reference, surely Godel sentennces would be self-referential too, and hence invalid?

You need to distinguish between self-referential and purely self-referential. The latter is a subset of the former.

Statement A in my example is purely self-referential, since it does not say anything about any aspect of reality other than itself. If you wrote a computer program for evaluating it, you would end up with infinite recursion:

boolean a() {

    return !b();

}


boolean b() {

    return !a();

}[/code]




A Godel sentence, by contrast, says something about the system's axioms and rules of inference. Those things are [i]external[/i] to the Godel sentence. Surely, the Godel sentence mentions itself, too, so it [i]is[/i] self-referential, but it is not [i]purely[/i] self-referential.

[code]boolean g() {

    return !provableWithinSystem.contains(g);

}

In any case, purely self-referential statements aren't meaningless. "This sentence contains 27 letters" is undeniably true.

Not if you write it like this: "This sentence contains twenty-seven letters."

Nor if you translate it to Hungarian: "Ebben a mondatban 27 betu van."

How can a sentence be true and false at the same time? Think about this. (Hint: Are the above three really the same sentence?)

[Hal]

Could you provide an example?

Yeah, but it would be highly highly arbitrary.

Statement A in my example is purely self-referential, since it does not say anything about any aspect of reality other than itself.

This is why I included the 2+2=4 and 3+3=6 in the boxes. Surely statement A is making a claim about "3+3=6" as well as itself, hence it wouldnt be purely self-referential. To illustrate this, consider the following:

--------------------

2+2 = 4

A statement in the below box is false

--------------------

--------------------

3+3 = 7

A statement in the above box is false

--------------------

(This is exactly the same as the example I gave before, except I have changed '3+3=6' to '3+3=7')

Now, the statement A is undeniably true. 3+3=7 is a false statement, therefore the box does indeed contain a false statement. Therefore, the truth of A depends upon the truth of the statement "3+3=6". Therefore, A cannot be purely self referential, since its truth depends upon something other than itself.

How can a sentence be true and false at the same time? Think about this. (Hint: Are the above three really the same sentence?)

They wouldnt be the same sentence. I'm not sure what you mean here, can you clarify?

[AisA]

I think that the fact consciousness is produced by the brain is sufficient reason to investigate the possibilities of it being produced by something else with a similar structure to the brain.  If you don't think that this classes as evidence then please define exactly what WOULD.

What reason is there to believe that a faculty such as volition can ever exist in an inanimate machine? What reason is there to assume that the distinction between living and non-living can be obliterated?

What could anyone show you that would convince you that AI is possible?

You could show me AI.

If your standards of evidence are so high that they are impossible to satisfy even in theory, then I dont think that your demanding of evidence has any more signficance than a sceptic demanding evidence that we can know other humans are conscious.

A monkey's brain is quite similar in structure to man's -- but its capabilities do not begin to approach the human mind. Yet you propose to replicate man's mind with a non-living structure that is merely "similar". What evidence is there that such a thing is plausible?

In any case, you need to decide what you're arguing.

I am arguing that volitional consciousness is an attribute of the living human brain, and that anything that has a different identity, no matter how similar the structure, will not be a volitional consciousness.