Jump to content
Objectivism Online Forum

Rejecting "Optional Values"

Rate this topic


epistemologue

Recommended Posts

http://hankc.atwebpa...nal_values.html

<br><br>

sorry for the formatting... cross-posted from the above link... please let me know any questions/comments you have...

<br><br>

<center><h1>Rejecting Optional Values</h1></center><br>In Viable Values, Tara Smith equivocates between two different meanings when she uses the term "optional values". The equivocation is this: values that are "optional among people", and values that are "optional for a person".<br><br>The former meaning is valid, and she goes to great lengths to correctly explain and defend this meaning, but it is bad wording. Options imply a choice, and a choice implies a chooser. How can you have "options" that are "among people"? Why not call them "varying values" or "contexually dependent values"? The answer is that she wants to equivocate with the latter meaning. She does so explicitly here:<br><br><ul style = "list-style-type: none;"><li>Moral values are the most fundamental values that apply for all human beings. They so apply because they are necessitated by our common human nature. No one can live by defying his own nature or circumstances. Thus, honesty, justice, and courage, I would argue, are virtues for everyone. Certain ends and certain types of actions are required for anyone to achieve his life.<br><br>People can pursue numerous futher, optional values, however, that may vary considerably from person to person.<br><br>...<br><br>My point here is that even among human beings, the objectivity of value permits for some variation in particulars. There is not one complete set of values that is identical for everyone. Nor is it the case that a given person in given circumstances will always find himself with only one right choice or proper course of action. Sometimes, morality sanctions each of several options because they would all equally advance his life.<br><br>"Morality's Roots in Life,"<br>Viable Values, 100<br><br></li></ul>In this case she is someone who says, "suppose you have two options of apparently equal value, aren't they individually both allowed but neither is specifically obligatory?" To say that there are situations where the choices are "optional" and that no choice is "obligatory" necessitates there to be no objective standard of value, because if there were, you could always measure and order your choices according to that objective standard, and the highest choice would always be obligatory. Thus if one has objective values, in any given choice among alternatives, there is always one non-optional obligatory choice, and one or more non-optional prohibited choices. If there is sufficient uncertainty you might say that it is obligatory to choose one of two or more choices, although you are uncertain which one in particular, and thus act accordingly - but that does not mean any of those two or more choices are "optional" and that none of them in particular is "obligatory".<br><br>She says that,<br><br><ul style = "list-style-type: none;"><li>"In order to determine the ligitimacy of any seemingly optional value, the question to ask is whether its pursuit will advance one's life. Whenever the answer is negative, the would-be value must be rejected."<br><br>"Morality's Roots in Life,"<br>Viable Values, 101<br><br></li></ul>We must assume her next point of advice would be to then accept any and all choices that further one's life - no matter to what degree or magnitude - as equalivalent "options", and then proceed to choose among them according to one's arbitrary whim. The point being, it is not enough to simply reject anything that does not further one's life; one must choose the greatest choice available according to the measure of one's ultimate standard. To choose anything less than the greatest choice is a sacrifice.<br><br>As Ayn Rand said,<ul style = "list-style-type: none;"><li>"Sacrifice" is the surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a nonvalue ... and the rational principle of conduct is the exact opposite: always act in accordance with the hierarchy of your values, and never sacrifice a greater value to a lesser one.<br><br>"The Ethics of Emergencies,"<br>The Virtue of Selfishness, 44<br><br></li></ul>To further illustrate the consequences of failing to reject "optional values", look at the relationships between "errors in knowledge", "errors in morality", and "errors in choosing one's values".<br><br><br><ul style = "list-style-type: none;"><li>"Learn to distinguish the difference between errors of knowledge and breaches of morality. An error of knowledge is not a moral flaw, provided you are willing to correct it; only a mystic would judge human beings by the standard of an impossible, automatic omniscience. But a breach of morality is the conscious choice of an action you know to be evil, or a willful evasion of knowledge, a suspension of sight and of thought. That which you do not know, is not a moral charge against you; but that which you refuse to know, is an account of infamy growing in your soul. Make every allowance for errors of knowledge; do not forgive or accept any breach of morality."<br><br>John Galt<br>Atlas Shrugged<br><br></li></ul>One's choices of their most fundamental values affect one's decisions and actions over a long period of time as one pursues those values throughout their lives. Therefore, choosing an "optional value" which does further one's life, but does not further one's life as much as the choice of another value would have, requires the rejection or evasion of many higher-valued choices in many different instances over the long term. Errors in choosing one's values are often the worst breaches of morality.<br><br>For example, suppose there is Dr. F, whose chosen values were "enjoying life", and "making social connections", who frequently went to parties and didn't excel in school, but ultimately became a doctor. Dr. F saw a patient with a rare disease. He didn't diagnose it, and the patient died. Another doctor, Dr. G, may have made his most important values "doing well in school", or "looking good to his parents and society". He studied hard and passed with good grades in his schooling, and became a prestigious doctor. Dr. G saw a patient with the same disease, and was able to pull off the difficult diagnosis and save the patient. Now suppose Dr. G saw another patient, with a very rare disease that itself also came on with an unusual presentation, and Dr. G despite his professed "best" efforts, was unable to diagnose the disease and save the patient. Finally, there is Dr. H, who chose as his values "mastering medicine" and "being the best doctor possible", who abandoned the usual college course, studying voraciously with all his passion to learn medicine in an integrative fashion for which schools were not designed. He barely scrapes by with passing grades in school, often by cheating on the "better students" like Dr. G. He also sees a patient with the same very rare disease and unusual presentation that Dr. G saw, and "miraculously" makes the diagnosis and saves the patient. Despite all of them having perhaps all of the right virtues, the differences in their values accounted for the difference in their outcomes in reality. The values chosen and pursued by Dr. F had a lower overall value than those of Dr. G according to the ultimate standard, and Dr. G as well made a lower value choice than Dr. H. You can't say either Dr. F or Dr. G chose the best within their knowledge; they all had available to them the same alternative values they could have chosen from, and the same information about the consequences of choosing those respective values, and still chose the lesser of the possible fundamental values, and thus went on to make many lower-value choices over the long term, which ultimately resulted in many lower-value outcomes in reality.<br><br>Another example is from Atlas Shrugged in the character of Eddie Willers. Eddie Willers sold his soul to the railroad - not to his own life and happiness. His concrete-bound mentality of picking as his standard of value that particular railroad required major mental evasion over the long term - an evasion of many higher-value alternatives in many choices, and most importantly evading the choice to make as his ultimate standard of value his own life and happiness instead of the railroad. He shared the same fate as the railroad accordingly. All his actions were in the wrong direction because he had the wrong values, despite perhaps having all the right virtues.<br><br>It's your own responsibility to choose to fight for the ultimate standard of value which is your own life and happiness, and to check your premises and the consequences of your actions by that ultimate standard. It's your own responsibility to be your own John Galt. If you end up dying alone and defeated in the wilderness, failing miserably by that ultimate standard, even when alternative choices abounded around you for a very long time even up to the very end, then you are the very picture of immorality. Errors in choosing your values are often the worst breaches of morality, and in a morality that actually has relevance in reality, the consequence of a failure of morality is a loss of value according to that ultimate standard of your own life and happiness.<br><br>

Edited by epistemologue
Link to comment
Share on other sites

"How can you have 'options' that are 'among people'?"

Easy. Suppose there's a handout given to people in a play saying that X, Y, and Z are required costume pieces, but A, B, and C are optional. Anybody can have or not have any of A, B and C as part of their costume. Each individual person in the group is making a choice among the options for themselves.

"To say that there are situations where the choices are 'optional' and that no choice is 'obligatory' necessitates there to be no objective standard of value, because if there were, you could always measure and order your choices according to that objective standard, and the highest choice would always be obligatory."

Wrong. There are two pieces of the same kind of pie sitting next to each other. Same size, no mold on one of them or anything like that. Unless you seriously want to blow a bunch of time on measuring the EXACT size, filling to crust ratio, et cetera of each piece, then there's really no discernible difference. Just grab one, either one will do, and move on. It isn't always worth the time and effort to figure out minute value differences. Sometimes, speed > accuracy and in that context, either/any of several evidently very similarly valuable options will do just fine.

"We must assume her next point of advice would be to then accept any and all choices that further one's life - no matter to what degree or magnitude - as equalivalent [sic] "options", . . ."

No. Just how much have you actually read of her stuff? Where are you pulling this inference from? You say this after she says, "Don't take stuff that will hurt you!" Nothing in that statement says anything to the effect that, "Anything which doesn't hurt can never have any variation in value and suitability." Tara Smith is perfectly aware that values come in hierarchies, that there are plenty of times when it is clear that thing 1 gives more benefit than thing 2 and therefore one morally should pick thing 1. That sometimes you have equally valid options doesn't mean everything is equally valid as long as it isn't down and outright harmful.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Optional among people is an acknowledgement that values can objectively vary due to any number of reasons, from genetics to general aesthetic preferences. Not all people will benefit from mountain climbing, while for others it is in line with their productivity and trained skills. Mountain climbing is the optional value here. This type of valuing does not reject objective values because all people have required values in order to pursue life on a more abstract level, with reason being one such value. I believe you agree on this, but optional still remains a valid distinction, since a person *can* forego mountain climbing and lead a moral life.

For that mountain climber, supposing they're using a hierarchy of values, mountain climbing is morally obligatory in the sense that it's a better option than another. You are saying this as well: when a standard is involved, anyone can figure out with effort what the best choice is for their unique context. When a standard is involved, surely that provides a measure which makes one choice correct, and another wrong. We could stop here and say "optional for people" is subjective, since that would mean a standard is failing to indicate the one right choice to make. If our standard fails, then there is no way to even decide if values like reason are really better than others.

Absolutely, standards indicate a right choice. Where, though, does that mean there is only *one* right choice? Smith herself is already saying that if a value will not advance one's life, that value ought to be rejected. Mountain climbing would not advance my life, so I reject that as a value. At the same time, does that mean there is only *one* right choice. Life is not a game of chess where there is *always* a one best move to make by the very nature of its deductive mechanics. In actuality, especially if we consider context of knowledge, there are at times multiple right values and choices. There isn't always a need (or possibility) of a precise utilitarian calculus. Some options may literally be the same, as in the trivial example of picking chocolate or vanilla ice cream when you like both equally. For me, these values are optional, but I may still have to choose in a particular moment in time which flavor I want, and decide to have chocolate today, vanilla next week. Personally, I usually pick both and combine them. Neither flavor is higher on my value hierarchy, even though in terms of a *temporal* hierarchy, the choice I make now comes first. If I choose to eat chocolate today, it doesn't mean I like vanilla less than chocolate.

I think your disagreement comes down to if any two values can be equal on a value hierarchy. I point out a temporal hierarchy because that's what you seem to be using to reject Smith's "optional for people" idea. There is a distinction to be made from an conceptual hierarchy, though. It is an option to pick any of the values in a set, like among your however-many best friends you want to see. There may be no reason to pick Harry over Sarah this weekend, because you just need to see them both anytime this month. But you pick Harry for this weekend since the new movie that you know Sarah wants to see badly with you comes out next week. Or just invite both Harry and Sarah to the Thai restaurant you all like. The values (your best friends) aren't optional, but the particular value you pick at the time is completely optional. I do not think Smith is arguing that optional values qua values can be ignored completely.

Edited by Eiuol
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'm not sure if this will quell the "dessert objections", but I've amended the offending paragraph like this:

...

In this case she is someone who says, "suppose you have two options of apparently equal value, aren't they individually both allowed but neither is specifically obligatory?" To say that there are situations where the choices are "optional" and that no choice is "obligatory" necessitates there to be no objective standard of value, because if there were, you could always measure and order your choices according to that objective standard, and the highest choice would always be obligatory. Thus if one has objective values, in any given choice among alternatives, there is always one non-optional obligatory choice, and one or more non-optional prohibited choices. If there is sufficient uncertainty you might say that it is obligatory to choose one of two or more choices, although you are uncertain which one in particular, and thus act accordingly (in fact, it could be uncertain to the degree that there is no way for you to effectively decide in time to any rational extent, as often happens for example in trivial matters or in matters of subjective taste) - but that does not mean any of those two or more choices are "optional" and that none of them in particular is "obligatory". The epistemo-ethical principle here is that every rational decision must employ a utilitarian calculus in some fashion.

Edited by epistemologue
Link to comment
Share on other sites

"that there are plenty of times when it is clear that thing 1 gives more benefit than thing 2 and therefore one morally should pick thing 1. That sometimes you have equally valid options doesn't mean everything is equally valid as long as it isn't down and outright harmful."

The problem is that often people do think things are equally valid when not harmful, or that it's okay to regard "unclear" choices as "optional" instead of "uncertain" - which is especially dangerous and harmful, and immoral, when applied to one's more important values .... desserts aside...

Smith's equivocation on "optional" includes this meaning, and nowhere does she attempt to sharply draw the line as I am doing. To do so pretty much eliminates her point about choices about one's personal values as being "optional" except only in the most trivial examples - which are themselves more properly categorized as "uncertain"

Edited by epistemologue
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I've also rescinded my semantic argument... after all there's nothing wrong with using the word "optional" to mean "optional depending on who is doing the choosing". It's when you start thinking of "optional" as something that describes the choices a given person can make that there's a problem.

Edited by epistemologue
Link to comment
Share on other sites

"necessitates there to be no objective standard of value"

No, it just means sometimes things can measure up against that objective standard to a tie or at least what is close enough to a tie that it isn't worth the necessary effort required to determine exactly which has slightly squeaked ahead.

"If there is sufficient uncertainty you might say that it is obligatory to choose one of two or more choices, although you are uncertain which one in particular, and thus act accordingly (in fact, it could be uncertain to the degree that there is no way for you to effectively decide in time to any rational extent, as often happens for example in trivial matters or in matters of subjective taste) - but that does not mean any of those two or more choices are "optional" and that none of them in particular is "obligatory". "

Actually, yes, that's exactly what it means. Having to make a choice among options doesn't mean you had NO options, it just means that not picking at all is not one of the available options.

"The problem is that often people do think things are equally valid when not harmful, . . ."

Tara Smith, who you started writing in opposition to, is not one of those people though.

"or that it's okay to regard 'unclear' choices as 'optional' instead of 'uncertain'"

This is also not Tara Smith's position. Things can be optional within a particular context and only within that context. That context is when the effort and time required to sort out the superiority of one thing versus another is of greater value than the potential value difference between the options you are debating. For example, blue ink or black in pen? The potential benefit of one over the other is minuscule, but the time which may be required to get a thorough, solid case for the superiority of one ink color over another could take quite a long time since tiny differences can be the hardest to tease out. There is far more potential value in spending an hour with a friend then spending that hour researching and pondering pen ink color. Bigger, more significant issues (career, home, investments . . .) typically have more at stake though, more room for differences in value from one option to another and hence it is usually worth spending more time weighing these options.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

  • 2 weeks later...
Actually, yes, that's exactly what it means. Having to make a choice among options doesn't mean you had NO options, it just means that not picking at all is not one of the available options.

I believe epistemologue is saying that more precisely, IF you know all the relevant details and have all the time in the world to decide, THEN there is only one moral choice to make. In that sense, according to epistemologue, uncertainty just means you didn't have time to figure out the right choice. You might not know at this moment about astrophysics, but given enough time, there is only one right answer to be discovered about any question in astrophysics. (The rest of the post is directed at epistemologue)

I don't think it is true, though, that values can be treated in the same way. When speaking of achieving goals, life in particular, my idea is that sometimes, multiple values do achieve that end equally well. Even IF you can perform exact, exhaustive considerations of relevant costs and had plenty of time to decide, there are still equally good options. I did use a trivial example with ice cream before (or the blue pen or black pen distinction), whichever choice you make will help you achieve your goals, barring circumstances where there are essential differences that count. With trivial scenarios, there is nothing to be discovered that will make one choice more advantageous in the long run. Not all differences are worth considering.

There are other examples besides trivial ones. I'll be moving towards the idea that some values are equal in a value hierarchy, making a choice constrained by time as opposed to strictly if a value is the one right choice to make based upon its importance. Importance does matter, I'm not saying otherwise, but it is possible to make choices that does not reflect upon a value hierarchy or a choice's furtherance to your life. This may apply to music: I can choose to listen to The Smiths or Silversun Pickups right now, but I actually don't really like one over the other. Keep in mind that Tara Smith's discussion is about optional values, not even precisely optional choices. I could still choose either band right now based upon not having enough time to listen to a particular album I'm thinking of, but in terms of value, they are equal. By choosing one, I'm not rejecting the other due to lesser valuation.

I think the idea of optional values makes even more sense if you think about interpersonal relationships. To begin with, choosing to respond to your thread doesn't say anything about my value hierarchy per se. It doesn't mean I don't care about my friends because I'm responding here rather than talking to them, or that this post is more important than them. In a similar way, picking to spend time with one friend instead of the other (the Harry and Sarah choice) doesn't mean I care about one more than the other. The two may well be equal. You could go and argue that time is the essential differentiating factor, and since I can't pick both friends realistically speaking (suppose I couldn't take them both to that Thai restaurant), that my choice is based on who I value more. However, I can't think of a reason to say that I can make a choice without reference to value hierarchy. Either person can provide equal amounts life-furthering benefit, and by spending time with the other friend later, there isn't any kind of loss. If value is zero-sum, then sure, I'd see the limitation, but I know you don't believe that, so I'm not sure why you're saying equal valuation isn't possible. Perform all the utilitarian calculus you want in the Harry and Sarah choice, the net benefit to flourishing is the same for both choices.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

1. if you theoretically had infinite time to consider the issue, then every difference can play into your utility calculation.

2. But in limited time and other sorts of situations, the value of calculating utility is less than just picking a choice at random.

3. you can certainly invent situations where two actions have mathematically equal utility - although these are very contrived scenarios and the world usually doesn't work like that.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

But when do we not have limited time? We can and even should allot more time to some things than others of course depending on the potential impact size the decision has, but it will never be limitless. There is not much point in talking about --- ooooh, wait, now I think I see. I was about to say that it is pointless to try to talk about what the ethics of an impossible situation would be, then I remembered you have set your sights on immortality and so from your point of view it would then seem like an actual, practical question. For the sake of sticking to one topic here, assume for the rest of us at least that it is a scenario which we will not experience, all our choices are within a limited amount of potential time. I'm proposing that means for we mortals that the amount of time which may be worth spending on a decision is in proportion to the amount of value at stake. If certainty can be achieved in less time then one may stop early, but otherwise one should call it quits once that time period has been used up because there are more and bigger fish to fry still.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

you have plenty of time to stop and deliberate for most of the important things in life to the point of being able to discriminate greater and lesser alternatives..

and often you also have the option to make tentative choices and continue to evaluate them as you go.

Edited by epistemologue
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I am not disputing what you have said in your last two posts. I agree with these things completely. I don't contend that one never has enough time available to consider everything sufficiently to get a clear best choice. I have only sought to dispute your rejection of there being times where one may make choices, irrevocable ones even (you can't go back after eating and decide the other piece of pie was the better choice after all and swap them for a small, simple example since people often associate the word "irrevocable" with just big, drastic choices) without there being a single, definite best and proper choice. There are plenty of times when you can find the definite best choice in time, but there also are plenty of times where it is impossible or not worth it to figure out the single best answer and one has to choose on incomplete analysis, which may mean not yet having one choice evidently in the lead, and move on. These kinds of situations where choices must be made without precise knowledge of the value of one thing versus another aren't even unusual. The other kind of choice, where one does have sufficient knowledge to know for sure what is the best choice, is not unusual either though. We have plenty of both types we face all the time.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I do not think there was any dispute that sometimes, choices must be made without precise knowledge, even if more time was available you could come up with a better choice. The dispute is over if any value could be optional, based on the idea that any circumstance only objectively has one good choice that will further your life. Tara Smith is talking about values though, not choices specifically. There may be a best choice (or effort at a best choice) when considering a course of action, but it's basically optional which value you pursue at that moment. Two values can be equal in a value hierarchy. Whichever you choose at this moment does not reflect on your valuation of the other necessarily. Both values further your life equally, and maybe even choosing one actually leads to all values involved being furthered, too.

In other words, in my Harry and Sarah example, is choosing to see Harry an indication that my choice is because Sarah is less valuable? I'm saying that as long as I see both of them this month, it won't matter which I choose in terms of value hierarchy, but if I choose based on what movie comes out next week, that only indicates that there is a relationship between time with Sarah and certain movies as a common value. There is a right choice indeed (the movie isn't out until the week after), but would choosing to see Harry this weekend before I see Sarah mean Harry is more important to furthering my life than Sarah?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

Loading...
  • Recently Browsing   0 members

    • No registered users viewing this page.
×
×
  • Create New...