QM - Fact or Fantasy

[Plasmatic]

Buddha said:

 

You do understand that the apple in your left hand and the apple in your right hand are existentially two different apples - and that their degree of similarity is relative to a pre-established, epistemic standard, right?  And that the apple in your left hand + the apple in your right hand does not equal 2 absolutely, existentially similar apples.  it equals two epistemically similar apples.

 

I'm objecting to your use of the words "exactly" and "absolutely" in what I perceive to be a disembodied, non-contextual sense.

 

 

1. I did not say anything about identical qualitative sameness between the two apples.  Similarity and conceptual standards are objective or factual, that means it is more than "epistemic". We cognitively isolate "existential" facts to serve as standards. This is what makes them objective....The epistemic nature of essence for Oism is not a repudiation of the factual nature of similarity....

 

This is a theme for you as I'll show. I mentioned to you before that similarity is not a matter of "strict identity" here:

 

http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=27504#entry327051

 

2. The very concept "1" is derived from bodies or entities. There is no context where an concrete entity is not an instance of "1"....And in the context of numbers one omits all the measurements of the units one is counting....

 

ITOE said:

 

AR: In a certain sense the measurements omitted from the concept of numbers are the easiest to perceive. What you omit are the measurements of any existents which you count. The concept "number" pertains to a relationship of existents viewed as units—that is, existents which have certain similarities and which you classify as members of one group. So when you form the concept of a number, you form an abstraction which you implicitly declare to be applicable to any existents which you care to consider as units. It can be actual existents, or it can be parts of an existent, as an inch is a part of a certain length. You can measure things by regarding certain attributes as broken up into units—of <ioe2_197> length, for instance, or of weight. Or you can count entities. You can count ten oranges, ten bananas, ten automobiles, or ten men; the abstraction "ten" remains the same, denoting a certain number of entities viewed as members of a certain group according to certain similarities.

 

Therefore, what is it that you retain? The relationship. What do you omit? All the measurements of whichever units you are denoting or counting by means of the concept of any given number.

 

Here the omission of measurements is perceived almost at its clearest. And I even give the example in the book—it's an expression I have heard, I did not originate it—that an animal can perceive two oranges and two potatoes but cannot conceive of the concept "two." And right there you can see what the mechanics are: the abstraction retains the numerical relationship, but omits the measurements of the particulars, of the kind of entities which you are counting.

 

 

Buddha said:

 

The statement: 1+1=2  (per Post #91)  is completely different from the statement: 1 apple + 1 apple = 2 apples (per post #93).  You incorrectly believe that they are interchangeable.

 

 

Yes they are interchangeable because they are symbols used to convey the meaning I chose them for. Remember that I said that I suspected that you don't "understand what I'm asking" in post 91, so the second is simply me clarifying what I meant in 91.

 

We can restate this intended meaning as: 1 entity + 1 entity =2 entities.

 

One of the reasons I asked this question is to see how deep the rabbit hole goes for your skepticism of measurement, absolutes, correspondence and universals. I didn't recall these past comments at the time:

 

Except for fairly mundane statements which can only be proven by ostensive definitions (the building exists) we never reach a point where we have "absolute" knowledge of anything.  Propositions are limited, finite and contextual and, most importantly, made by individuals. [...]

 see the "problem" of induction as having to do with measurement. [...]No two existents are ever EXACTLY identical and neither are two causes or two effects. Each moment in the Universe is unique  and never to be repeated. Everything is in a constant state of change. There are no Universals.

In any inductive statement, you must explicitly (or implicitly) state the degree of similarity that you are expecting to
observe. [...]

The essential demarcation between Objectivism and other philosophies is not A is A, or the Law or Non-Contradiction.  It's the Validity of the Senses as the basis for individual objective knowledge. [...]

 

Objectivism is not concerned with Truth! and Ultimate Reality!

 

Objectivist epistemology says that an individual, based on evidence provided by his senses, and through the application of reason, non-contradiction and non-evasion, is capable of obtaining objectively knowledge.  That's pretty much it.  It doesn't' say that you will at some point be omniscient or infallible or will reach a point where there is nothing more to learned or no new light can be shed on an old subject [...]

 

You are under the impression that Objectivism leads one to an "absolute" understanding of anything. This is not what Objectivism claims. [...]

 

There will never be a "Theory of Everything".  To even attempt to do so is to fundamentally misunderstand what knowledge is.

 

Edit 3: When I make a recording of a symphony, the recording is not equal to, or interchangeable with, the live performance.  But the recording was made by a QUANTIFIALBE exchange of mechanical/electromagnetic energy ( minus entropy's share, of course).  This is also true for ideas

 

 

The equivocation I mentioned earlier is concerning concepts like "absolute" being packaged into discussions about, measurement, objectivity, exactness, identicalness, and in particular the law of Identity (as has happened in this thread with Andie.)

 

A is A-the LOI as such, is a separate matter from essence and essentiality. The whole equivocation of "A=A with "A-ness" in this thread is misguided. You mentioned this to Andie in #88 and went right to differentiating objectivity from "theories of everything".

 

The law of Identity doesn't tell us what anything is in particular and certainly not what something is essentially...but likewise identification doesn't imply exhaustive knowledge-omniscience either.

 

This post is an example of the way you bring objectivity and uniqueness- particularity into a discussion about what you see as a denial of what you seem to think of as as the limited nature of knowledge or the repudiation of the uniqueness of particulars :

 

 

You are equating the Law of Identity with the (cognitive) Method of Identification.  It is wrong to equate them.  Identity does NOT equal Identification.  A single, human mind will never exhaustively understand what "dog-ness" is.  To a single, unique human mind, "dog-ness" will always remain open ended, and subject to revision/clarification/expansion.

 

However, this does not mean that what a single, human mind knows is not objective.  The knowledge can be said to be Objective to the degree that the individual has integrated, to the best of his ability and experience, what he knows to be true, while rejecting contradictions and evasive thinking. [...]

 

 

Notice the way you differentiate identity from identification here. The law of Identity does not say anything qualitative about any existent except that none will have and not have the qualities that is possesses. Simply put, contradictions do not exist mind independently.

 

 Identity is not a synonym for omniscience or exhaustive knowledge of an existents qualities. In several places in this forum you make this kind of differentiation and then immediately begin discussing objectivity and individuality. But objectivity has nothing to do with the notion that knowledge is final or exhaustive and similarity has nothing to do with exact sameness or Leibnitz's "identity of identicals" . Why package them together so often as if omniscience-"exhaustive knowledge" is a foil for objectivity?

 

I have wondered why you always make this type of comment about objectivity and Individuality following repudiations of absolutes, and "Truth" etc.

 

Example:http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=27665&page=2#entry327837

 

I wonder if the reason for this repeated type of statement from you is contained in this comment:

 

The essential demarcation between Objectivism and other philosophies is not A is A, or the Law or Non-Contradiction.

 

It seems you don't accept the Oist claim that the Primacy of Existence as a corollary if the LOI is the central them to all of Objectivism. You rather see the reliability of the senses as the essence of Oism and some kind of cornerstone for individuality that somehow serves as a type of bulwark against what you think are claims to omniscience .  

 

 

The "1 entity+1 entity" question was a rhetorical device to get at the implicit confusion in your qualitative comments about essences or similarity between particulars. (2x8 D fir, Drawing vs things drawn ,etc.) But there is another reason which I will get to later.

 

But the objectivity of the senses is in fact the absolute foundation for exact correspondence for Ms. Rand !

 

There is an entire discussion in ITOE on this topic of exact correspondence in the section title "Exact Measurement and Continuity":

 

Ms. Rand Said:

 

 if you are able to measure it, and you are able to grasp relationships by means of measurement which you didn't invent, that is exactness. And if you are able to grasp that maybe some milli-milli-parts of a millimeter are not correct and you are not able to bring it to a greater precision, who grasped that? You did. Therefore, your concept is correct, does correspond to reality, and it is reality that you have been consulting in discovering that perhaps you can't measure submicroscopic quantities. [...] when we speak of measurement, we begin with a perceptually given unit, and that unit is absolute and exact [within the context of our means of perception]. Then conceptually we may refine our methods and we may measure such things as milliseconds and a part of a subatomic particle, which we can't do perceptually. But the standard of these measurements, the base from which conceptual complications may later be derived, is that which we perceive directly on the perceptual level; that is what measurement means, that is its base. Therefore, when I say that for measurement there has to be a unit of measurement, I mean that even when you take a submicroscopic, conceptual type of measurement, that type ultimately has to be reduced back to our standard of measurement, which is the perceptually given, and nothing more or less.

 

With scientific development you might discover that, microscopically, the edge of this piece of paper is ragged and has tiny mountain peaks and valleys. That is not relevant to your [macroscopic] process of measurement, because you had to use the perceptual method as a start in order to get to your microscopic instruments of measurement. [....]

 if you say it is so much measured by a ruler, or it is something else measured by some fancy apparatus, you have complied with the requirement of absolute correspondence to reality.

 

 

 

More later.....

Edited January 10, 2015 by Plasmatic

[New Buddha]

Plas,

I appreciate your well thought out replies, and I admit I should do a better job of demarcating where I am veering from Objectivism and posting my own investigations.  I'm certainly not trying to establish a "Neo-Objectivist" movement, or anything like that.  I'm trying to extend Objectivism into what I perceive to be uncharted territories.

 

My central philosophical concerns of late have been:  The analog nature of thought at the neurological level.  Information Theory concepts such as entropy, information loss, signal/noise ratios and how, at a neurological level, these concepts might pertain to Objectivist's position on concept formation.  And I'm also very much interested in the epistemic nature of complex models, such as structural engineering models, traffic engineering models, economic models, Relativistic models and Quantum models, etc.

 

An example that references some of the ideas is:

 

You and I are playing tennis, and there is dispute regarding whether or not a ball hits the line. How do we settle this matter?

 

A classical physicist would argue that we can "at least theoretically" construct a model that will predict if the ball will hit the line.

 

A QM physicist can accept that, at the classical level, it is possible to construct such a model, but it is not possible to do so at the QM level. All possible hit/no hit outcomes can only be modeled as equally probable until event is observed.

 

This classical/QM contradiction is seen by some as built into the the fabric of the Universe, i.e. that the contradiction is ontological and has far reaching consequences regarding such thing as free will, climate models, economics, etc.
 

An engineer/Objectivist (imho) will tell you that, while he can construct an instrument to observe if the ball "hits" the line – he can only do so to a quantifiable and acceptable level of precision. Because if you look at the both the tennis ball and the paint line at the atomic level, there is granularity.  A paint line is not a one-dimensional, mathemcaical line. A tennis ball is not a mathematical sphere. He will also tell you that, while he can calculate the tragectory of the ball, there are too many varibles to do so with much precision.  In addition to wind, each tennis ball is different and so is each racket, etc. Edit:  we don't measure when the ball touches the paint, we measure when the ball touches the instrumentation that is "close" to the paint.  The measurement is a physical analog of an event.  The measurement is not THE event.  The measurement is an event in it's own right with its own granularity.

 

Here is the cental tenant of my idea:

 

1)  Objective models are used to systematiclly break down complex things/events into maneagble chunks. This is done by diagrams/equations/etc. Models break down big problems into little, maneagble problems.

 

2)  Models are not constructed from First Principles.  Models both start and end with observation.  First Principles are, themselves, models.

 

3)  Models are not ends within themselves, they are a means to an end.

 

4)  The "end goal" determines what level of precision is acceptable.

 

5) While not touched upon in the above example, when trying to control complex systems, models require feedback and adjustment.

Edited January 10, 2015 by New Buddha

[Ilya Startsev]

. . . to extend Objectivism into what I perceive to be uncharted territories.

 

My central philosophical concerns of late have been:  The analog nature of thought at the neurological level.  Information Theory concepts such as entropy, information loss, signal/noise ratios and how, at a neurological level, these concepts might pertain to Objectivist's position on concept formation.  And I'm also very much interested in the epistemic nature of complex models, such as structural engineering models, traffic engineering models, economic models, Relativistic models and Quantum models, etc.

 

. . .

 

Here is the cental tenant of my idea:

 

1)  Objective models are used to systematiclly break down complex things/events into maneagble chunks. This is done by diagrams/equations/etc. Models break down big problems into little, maneagble problems.

 

2)  Models are not constructed from First Principles.  Models both start and end with observation.  First Principles are, themselves, models.

 

3)  Models are not ends within themselves, they are a means to an end.

 

4)  The "end goal" determines what level of precision is acceptable.

 

5) While not touched upon in the above example, when trying to control complex systems, models require feedback and adjustment.

 

You understand Neo-Objectivism quite well, regardless of whether you want to believe otherwise. I congratulate you with this immense achievement!

[New Buddha]

@ Plas #82,

 

"The objective determination of essential characteristics is a relation between observer and observed but that doesn't mean that two observers can be objective in the same context and disagree and both be right and objective."

 

To build on my statement above, that when devising models to control complex systems, it is necessary to receive feedback and make adjustments.  Specifically I was responding to Veterinarians, and more generally, medicine.

 

In devising a treatment plan (a model) for a patient, two doctors can objectively prescribe two methods of treating the same patient.  Different medicines are often developed because patients respond differently.  This cannot be known before hand - you must administer the medicine and then wait.  If the response is favorable, then you might continue.  If there are unacceptable side effects, then the Doctor might adjust the dosage, or change to another medicine.  Different doctors will have different experiences that will objectively influence them to develop different treatment plans.

 

I wasn't saying that two people standing in a living room can't agree that the coffee table in front of them has four legs.

Edited January 11, 2015 by New Buddha

[Plasmatic]

Buddha, I find the term "model" to be notoriously elusive in my discourse with folks who deploy it. Could you try your best to define this concept? Perhaps differentiate it from something, so I can get at the similarities and differences of your intended genus and differentia?

[Ilya Startsev]

Andie Holland wrote (later deleted, but unjustly, I think):

 

The premise that A (must necessarily) equal dog-ness is Aristotle's not mine. Anything-ness is ultimately defined by its telos, or final cause.

 

For example, finding 'dog-ness is what makes it possible for us to deduct that any particular  animal observed, smelled, or heard can be labeled a 'dog'. This is because all dogs share an essential dog-ness, which according to Aistotle is their 'purpose', or again, 'final cause.

 

Please remember here that Greek 'logos' means 'speech'. To this end, Aristotle said to speak correctly --'logic'-- first means non-contradictory identification, which means nothing more than holding oneself to one's defined criterion...of essential 'dog-ness'. So all he's simply saying is that we don't change rules, definitions,and standards post facto. Otherwise, it would shoot the deductive system straight to hell.

 

Out of many things you wrote, Andie, this one is true. Aristotle never idealized his philosophy, but Rand did. For Aristotle the logic is directed at an end, for Rand - the logic starts at the end as if it were a beginning position.

[Plasmatic]

Greg Salimieri's paper Aristotles's Conception of Universality:

http://www.salmieri.org/papers/Aristotles%20Conception%20of%20Universality.pdf

is a great source on the confusion that began with the scholastics misinterpreting Aristotle.

As well as Prof. McCaskey's Freeing Aristotelian Epagoge From Prior Analytics :

http://www.johnmccaskey.com/joomla/images/for-download/FreeingAristotelianEpagogeFromAPrII23.pdf

Any Oist should read these before taking Andie seriously....

Edited January 12, 2015 by Plasmatic

[dream_weaver]

Andie Holland wrote (later deleted, but unjustly, I think):

No, that post was not deleted.

Out of many things you wrote, Andie, this one is true. Aristotle never idealized his philosophy, but Rand did. For Aristotle the logic is directed at an end, for Rand - the logic starts at the end as if it were a beginning position.

For Rand, logic is the fundamental concept of method upon which all the others depend. She also goes rather in depth into definitions and standards, and explains where refinement to definition arises. For Aristotle, essence was metaphysical, out there, if you will. Rand disagreed. Essence is epistemological in nature. This has come up several times here. (search: essence metaphysical epistemological)

[Ilya Startsev]

No, that post was not deleted.

For Rand, logic is the fundamental concept of method upon which all the others depend. She also goes rather in depth into definitions and standards, and explains where refinement to definition arises. For Aristotle, essence was metaphysical, out there, if you will. Rand disagreed. Essence is epistemological in nature. This has come up several times here. (search: essence metaphysical epistemological)

 

Ops, those e-mail notifications messed me up. Sorry about that.

 

I would think that essence is metaphysically necessitated but is epistemological. I will read those articles on Aristotle that Plasmatic linked and see who is right.

[New Buddha]

Buddha, I find the term "model" to be notoriously elusive in my discourse with folks who deploy it. Could you try your best to define this concept? Perhaps differentiate it from something, so I can get at the similarities and differences of your intended genus and differentia?

I'll give you an example of something I'm familiar with.  In structural engineering, the engineer is interested in understanding how a building might respond to the stresses that he anticipates to be present in the future.  These stress are such things as lateral acceleration due to seismic events, wind loads, live loads, differential settlement of soil, creep, deflection, snow drift, ponding of rain water on the roof, etc.  It is impossible to (....wait for it ....) exhaustively model for every possible variable that could impact a building and it's impossible to know their varying magnitudes.   Which stresses the engineer chooses to model, and their assumed magnitude, is a combination of professional experience and the availability of historical records (often of questionable accuracy).  Material science is fairly well understood, and based on strict, replicable empirical testing, but there are always a great deal of assumptions and unknowns.  Keep up your professional liability insurance payments....

 

The reason why I keep bringing up the limits of precision, and why I think it's important to Objectivism is this:

 

1)  Physical Determinism (i.e. Causality, of which I support) when COUPLED with a priori based knowledge (which I, of course, reject) leads one inescapably to the idea that "in theory" one could account for every single possible stress, and their moment to moment change in magnitude, through the creation of First Principle based Models.  What this means is that from a priori knowledge of such things as electromagnetism, the strong and weak nuclear forces, gravity and the properties of chemical elements, it is possible to inductively arrive at a complete "model" of a specific building on a specific parcel of land and know precisely how it will behave at 8:32 am on January 14th.  And all this can be done independent of empirical observation.

 

This is the premise on which the interpretation of much of Modern Physics and mathematics rests.  Even when you hear of such ideas of Chaos Theory, this is nothing but the discarding of Physical Determinism, while still retaining the idea of a priori knowledge.  It is the belief that is possible to mathematically model chaotic (a-causal) systems by "finding" such things as "emergent behavior" or "strange attractors" or other such crap.  A cloud hovering around Mount Hood is just a cloud hovering around Mount Hood.

 

A 50 cent tour of how to design the structural system of a building:

First you size the roof deck and joists based on the anticipated loads.  Then you size the two girders supporting the loads of the joists and roof deck.  After this, you size the four columns supporting the loads of the two girders, joists and roof deck.  And then finally, you size the four concrete footings based on all the above loads and the bearing capacity of the soil.  This is what I mean above when I say that models "break-down" big problems into smaller, more manageable problems.  It is, of course, much more complicated than this because such things as seismic loads are very complex wave-like events, etc.

 

And how closely does this resemble the description of how a baby is first awash with sensations, but that over time he beings to break-down his environment into mother and father, blanket, table, dog, sofa, etc.?

 

Understanding that it is impossible to know all the variables and their varying magnitudes, COUPLED with the way that we break-down the complex to the simple so that we can apprehend it, means that there are very real limits on what we can model - even with the almighty computer program (a computer program is, itself, a break-down of a big problem into subroutines).  This is why it is impossible to centrally plan the economy (it has nothing to do with free will or choice) or "predict" the weather, "model" the climate or determine that if we place a tax of $1,000/per metric ton on CO2 emissions then the economy won't collapse and that 70 years from now we can realize a reduction of 1.045 degrees in the annual temperature anomaly compared to the arbitrarily selected base line of 1960 to 1990.

 

The economy, the weather and the climate are NOT a-causal - we just can't model them.

 

Knowledge is not prediction - knowledge is description.  Induction is an archaic term, and has no place in Objectivism (imho).

 

 

Edit:  Just to be clear, the above example is not just limited to structural engineering.  It's true for every field of study:  biology, economics, philosophy, mathematics, medicine, geology - and each of these disciples are further broken-down into specialties.  And the fact that we have "fields" is further evidence.

Edited January 13, 2015 by New Buddha

[Ilya Startsev]

Greg Salimieri's paper Aristotles's Conception of Universality:

http://www.salmieri.org/papers/Aristotles%20Conception%20of%20Universality.pdf

is a great source on the confusion that began with the scholastics misinterpreting Aristotle.

As well as Prof. McCaskey's Freeing Aristotelian Epagoge From Prior Analytics :

http://www.johnmccaskey.com/joomla/images/for-download/FreeingAristotelianEpagogeFromAPrII23.pdf

Any Oist should read these before taking Andie seriously....

 

In McCaskey's article, he differentiates Aristotle and Bacon's induction on p. 368:

'This one is F; that one is F; the other one is F; are all such things F?' A problem presents itself. What are 'all such things'? Knowing this, as Aristotle says, ís one of the most difficult of things.' Modern notions of induction generally presuppose that we already know they are, say, Gs. We pose the question as 'G1 is F; G2 is F; G3 is F; are all Gs F?'

So, Aristotle did not mean inference under induction. Very interesting. I tend to agree with this notion.

As for the other article, I did not enjoy when Salmieri wrote "universals as “matter” " and that "Aristotle regards all universals, rather than only kinds, as determinable matter". Kant interpreted Aristotle as an empiricist, which is wrong. Aristotle was not just an empiricist. What do you think?

[Plasmatic]

Ilya said:

In McCaskey's article, he differentiates Aristotle and Bacon's induction on p. 368:

Can you quote what you are referring to please?

I know in several places Prof. McCaskey says the opposite:

Aristotle had said that what induction is, is obvious, but in a commentary published in 1542 on the chapter in which Aristotle gave his definition of induction, Agostino Nifo said that there was now great uncertainty about what induction is. 19 The debate affected English textbooks. In the first edition of the first logic textbook published in English, Thomas Wilson‘s Rule of Reason of 1551, the author gave a thoroughly conventional Scholastic treatment. 20 But in the second edition, ―newly corrected,‖ published only one year later, Wilson added a section, longer than the f irst, discussing what he explained is another kind of induction, ―called . . . Socrates[‘] Induction.‖ 21 John Seton‘s Dialectica, first published in 1545, jumbled the two kinds together. Both textbooks were popular in the school days of Francis Bacon. More engaged with Aristotelian and Renaissance philosophy than generally recognized nowadays, 22 Bacon (1561–1626) was the first to explicitly make induction the centerpiece of an epistemological system, and his conception of induction was essentially that of Socrates and (properly understood) of Aristotle. It is to Socratic induction that Bacon refers when he says, ―[the correct procedure] has not yet been done, nor even tried except only by Plato, who certainly makes use of this form of induction to some extent in settling on definitions and ideas.‖ 23 Bacon‘s induction is a codification of Socrates‘. But Bacon also stressed something that Socrates and Aristotle let pass without comment. Bacon directly illustrated how well-formed concepts could ground universal propositions.

When Induction Was About Concepts

Edited January 13, 2015 by Plasmatic

[andie holland]

Andie Holland wrote (later deleted, but unjustly, I think):

 

 

Out of many things you wrote, Andie, this one is true. Aristotle never idealized his philosophy, but Rand did. For Aristotle the logic is directed at an end, for Rand - the logic starts at the end as if it were a beginning position.

 

Ilya said:

Can you quote what you are referring to please?

I know in several places Prof. McCaskey says the opposite:

When Induction Was About Concepts

For Aristotle. 'logion' or word-ness relates to ordering words correctly with the ostensible goal of discovering purpose, or telos. 

 

To this end, 'logic' in general and 'identity' in particular can establish a deductive skein in which all horses with one horn are essentially unicorns'. Likewise,  all animals that go 'bow- wow' and pee on tress are called 'kynos' or 'dogs' 

 

Yet because logic qua speech gives equal reference to the lived and the imaginary, 'identity' cannot tell us whether or not either dogs or unicorns really exist.

 

Moreover, it was discovered by Bacon & Cie that Identity is really a hindrance because it asserts what needs to be demonstrated. For example,. Einstein's EPR must necessarily be correct in its proposal that photons come in pairs because that's the only logical way of explaining their polarized behavior regarding nature's 'speed limit'- the velocity of light.

 

So it's fairly easy t assume that Aristotle, coming back today, would give Identity the heave-ho because, after all, logic is nothing but a means to an end. 

 

With Rand, Identity seems an end in itself which seems to involve sacrificing all of modern science.

 

AH

[dream_weaver]

For Aristotle. 'logion' or word-ness relates to ordering words correctly with the ostensible goal of discovering purpose, or telos. 

 

To this end, 'logic' in general and 'identity' in particular can establish a deductive skein in which all horses with one horn are essentially unicorns'. Likewise,  all animals that go 'bow- wow' and pee on tress are called 'kynos' or 'dogs' 

 

Yet because logic qua speech gives equal reference to the lived and the imaginary, 'identity' cannot tell us whether or not either dogs or unicorns really exist.

 

Moreover, it was discovered by Bacon & Cie that Identity is really a hindrance because it asserts what needs to be demonstrated. For example,. Einstein's EPR must necessarily be correct in its proposal that photons come in pairs because that's the only logical way of explaining their polarized behavior regarding nature's 'speed limit'- the velocity of light.

 

So it's fairly easy t assume that Aristotle, coming back today, would give Identity the heave-ho because, after all, logic is nothing but a means to an end. 

 

With Rand, Identity seems an end in itself which seems to involve sacrificing all of modern science.

 

AH

This, to me, all of this simply begs the question: "What is the Law of Identity?"

[Plasmatic]

Andie said:

 

With Rand, Identity seems an end in itself which seems to involve sacrificing all of modern science.

 

 

As I said before, your comments show you do not comprehend what The Law Of Identity means to Ms. Rand. It is a metaphysical claim about reality. That is, it (reality) is not derived from or dependent on consciousness and therefore contradiction cannot apply to it.

 

DIRECT QUESTION: Do you accept that that there are no metaphysical-ontological contradictions, or do you claim that modern physics "proves" that reality is composed of contradictory existents? 

 

Andie said:

 

 

Moreover, it was discovered by Bacon & Cie that Identity is really a hindrance because it asserts what needs to be demonstrated

 

I say again, prove this assertion about Bacon. Where can I read Bacon saying this?

Edited January 14, 2015 by Plasmatic

[Ilya Startsev]

Can you quote what you are referring to please?

 

I quoted from the article you linked - McCaskey's "Freeing Aristotelian Epagoge From Prior Analytics." That's strange because it does seem as if he is contradicting himself in different articles. From reading the first article, I got the impression that Aristotle was misinterpreted by Bacon, unless he meant that "Modern notions of induction" are neither Baconian nor Aristotelian, but then where did they come from?

 

For Aristotle. 'logion' or word-ness relates to ordering words correctly with the ostensible goal of discovering purpose, or telos. 

 

To this end, 'logic' in general and 'identity' in particular can establish a deductive skein in which all horses with one horn are essentially unicorns'. Likewise,  all animals that go 'bow- wow' and pee on tress are called 'kynos' or 'dogs' 

 

Yet because logic qua speech gives equal reference to the lived and the imaginary, 'identity' cannot tell us whether or not either dogs or unicorns really exist.

 

Moreover, it was discovered by Bacon & Cie that Identity is really a hindrance because it asserts what needs to be demonstrated. For example,. Einstein's EPR must necessarily be correct in its proposal that photons come in pairs because that's the only logical way of explaining their polarized behavior regarding nature's 'speed limit'- the velocity of light.

 

So it's fairly easy t assume that Aristotle, coming back today, would give Identity the heave-ho because, after all, logic is nothing but a means to an end. 

 

With Rand, Identity seems an end in itself which seems to involve sacrificing all of modern science.

 

AH

 

Andie, I agree with Einstein that QM is incomplete. Einstein was indeed more logical than QMers. Apply the same reasoning to QM, and we get that QM cannot find "the only logical way of explaining" the double-slit experiment (i.e., Young's experiment). But that does not mean that there isn't one. The problem is to find it - not to simply ignore it.

[andie holland]

I quoted from the article you linked - McCaskey's "Freeing Aristotelian Epagoge From Prior Analytics." That's strange because it does seem as if he is contradicting himself in different articles. From reading the first article, I got the impression that Aristotle was misinterpreted by Bacon, unless he meant that "Modern notions of induction" are neither Baconian nor Aristotelian, but then where did they come from?

 

 

Andie, I agree with Einstein that QM is incomplete. Einstein was indeed more logical than QMers. Apply the same reasoning to QM, and we get that QM cannot find "the only logical way of explaining" the double-slit experiment (i.e., Young's experiment). But that does not mean that there isn't one. The problem is to find it - not to simply ignore it.

The lack of 'ignoring' --ie outright diatribe--began around 1930. In part, this was the famous exchange of letters between Einstein and Bohr--no small piffle in so far as the first QMers were mostly Bohr's extremely misbehaved students.

 

Until about 1964, the issue was that QMers were producing extremely detailed, conformed measurements that lacked explanation as to why the observations occurred. (I've patiently described two examples in letters that were censored. Adm is free to re-send.) 

 

Then came the challenge of 'Bell's Inequality' to the QMers to demonstrate why EPR would not stand as the most viable explanation. But Aspect demonstrated that EPR stood in contradiction to the fact that photons changed and re-coordinated opposite polarization after emission. 

 

Even Bell as an opponent was forced to admit that QM satisfied the basic requirements for internal coherence-- that it explanations followed the facts and constituted the best that we have: Photons communicate at speeds far greater than that of light itself.

 

For the QMers,this was not surprising, as the Heisenberg equation, dating from 1925, accepts the possibility. Likewise, the Josephson Junction demonstrates this to be a reality.

 

So in a theoretical sense. what's really at stake is the employ of General Relativity as a rational-deductive umbrella in which the speed of light, 'C', is employed as the base-line measurement. Small wonder, then,that Einstein fought back with such vehemence.

 

AH.

Edited January 14, 2015 by andie holland

[andie holland]

Andie said:

 

 

As I said before, your comments show you do not comprehend what The Law Of Identity means to Ms. Rand. It is a metaphysical claim about reality. That is, it (reality) is not derived from or dependent on consciousness and therefore contradiction cannot apply to it.

 

DIRECT QUESTION: Do you accept that that there are no metaphysical-ontological contradictions, or do you claim that modern physics "proves" that reality is composed of contradictory existents? 

 

Andie said:

 

 

I say again, prove this assertion about Bacon. Where can I read Bacon saying this?

Your description if the Lof I makes Rand out to be a Platonist: there's a metaphysical reality somewhere out there, to be grasped, that is neither dependent upon material objects nor mind-created.

 

I'll answer that by saying that I believe the task of Philosophy is to overturn Plato. To this end, Aristotle gave the first shove when he made 'logos' both mind-dependent as a human capacity and a tool to do science.

 

Ontology, as indicated by its name, is the pursuit of one-ness, or what Heidegger called 'being (dasein). If contradictions didn't exist, there would be nothing to work out.

 

Ditto metaphysics. We study how the world holds together in the most general sort of way because, prima facie, it doesn't. 

 

Hopefully, then, the solutions we work out for both will not appear too contradictory to others who engage in the polemic called 'Philosophy'.

 

AH

[Plasmatic]

Andie said:

Your description if the Lof I makes Rand out to be a Platonist: there's a metaphysical reality somewhere out there, to be grasped, that is neither dependent upon material objects nor mind-created.

How on earth did anything I said come out as Platonist? Where did I say anything about reality not being "dependent upon material objects"? Nothing I said can be construed as a sort of transcendent idealism.

Andie said:

Ontology, as indicated by its name, is the pursuit of one-ness, or what Heidegger called 'being (dasein). If contradictions didn't exist, there would be nothing to work out.

That is not what Ontology is as far as I mean it. I said contradictions don't exist mind independently earlier and that is what I meant by "reality".

Why do you refuse to answer a direct question? Because you want to spout spurious irrelevancies in an attempt to sound like you are the one with the chalk board at your back?....

Get relevant or get ignored.

Edited January 14, 2015 by Plasmatic

[Plasmatic]

Illya said:

I quoted from the article you linked - McCaskey's "Freeing Aristotelian Epagoge From Prior Analytics."

Nothing you quoted said any such thing. The name Bacon is not even in that paper...

Edit:

I got the impression that Aristotle was misinterpreted by Bacon, unless he meant that "Modern notions of induction" are neither Baconian nor Aristotelian, but then where did they come from?

He explained that in detail in the first article. You must have read it like you read Rand.

Edited January 14, 2015 by Plasmatic

[New Buddha]

To this end, yes, we can all agree that saying a photon can be in two places at once contradicts said Law Of identity.

How does that fact that a photon can be in two places at once contradict the Law of Identity?

 

If a photon can be in two places at once, isn't that it's identity?

 

If you say that a toaster weighs 2 pounds, does that contradict the Law of Identity?  By your logic, it must....

 

If we were to discover that by thinking positive thoughts and keeping our fingers crossed, we could change water into wine - would this contradict the Law of Identity? or confirm it?

Edited January 14, 2015 by New Buddha

[Plasmatic]

Buddha, I'll respond to our previous exchange in a bit.

What would you say is wrong with this statement:

"If we were to discover that discovery is impossible - would that contradict, or confirm the law of Identity?"

Edited January 14, 2015 by Plasmatic

[Ilya Startsev]

The lack of 'ignoring' --ie outright diatribe--began around 1930. In part, this was the famous exchange of letters between Einstein and Bohr--no small piffle in so far as the first QMers were mostly Bohr's extremely misbehaved students.

 

Until about 1964, the issue was that QMers were producing extremely detailed, conformed measurements that lacked explanation as to why the observations occurred. (I've patiently described two examples in letters that were censored. Adm is free to re-send.) 

 

Then came the challenge of 'Bell's Inequality' to the QMers to demonstrate why EPR would not stand as the most viable explanation. But Aspect demonstrated that EPR stood in contradiction to the fact that photons changed and re-coordinated opposite polarization after emission. 

 

Even Bell as an opponent was forced to admit that QM satisfied the basic requirements for internal coherence-- that it explanations followed the facts and constituted the best that we have: Photons communicate at speeds far greater than that of light itself.

 

For the QMers,this was not surprising, as the Heisenberg equation, dating from 1925, accepts the possibility. Likewise, the Josephson Junction demonstrates this to be a reality.

 

So in a theoretical sense. what's really at stake is the employ of General Relativity as a rational-deductive umbrella in which the speed of light, 'C', is employed as the base-line measurement. Small wonder, then,that Einstein fought back with such vehemence.

 

AH.

 

I don't have a problem with photons comminicating "at speeds far greater than that of light itself." I have a problem with QM's "internal coherence." QM's only consistency is in being inconsistent. That is no "explanation" that follows the facts and constitutes "the best that we have." Einstein's fault was that his theory is also incomplete.

 

Nothing you quoted said any such thing. The name Bacon is not even in that paper...

Edit:

He explained that in detail in the first article. You must have read it like you read Rand.

 

If you read it carefully, you will find Bacon's name twice in that article. However, I should not have mentioned Bacon's name. Besides not knowing much about him, I did not know that "modern notions of induction" were not Baconian, even though Bacon was the father of empiricism. And I don't honestly care whether Bacon agreed with Aristotle or disagreed.

As for your edit, I didn't read Rand's books as sacred texts, if that's what you meant.

[andie holland]

Andie said:

How on earth did anything I said come out as Platonist? Where did I say anything about reality not being "dependent upon material objects"? Nothing I said can be construed as a sort of transcendent idealism.

Andie said:

That is not what Ontology is as far as I mean it. I said contradictions don't exist mind independently earlier and that is what I meant by "reality".

Why do you refuse to answer a direct question? Because you want to spout spurious irrelevancies in an attempt to sound like you are the one with the chalk board at your back?....

Get relevant or get ignored.

First, let's get something straight: you speak only for yourself. Anyone is free to find others irrelevant, or to ignore them, as individuals. 

 

The chalkboard at everyone's back says that either you're talking about something that possesses a  material substance or not. If so, then it can be acknowledged that human mind-constructs create a world of conceptual constructs that are hybrid. For example, 'baseball' is mind-dependent as an invented game, but could not be played without baseball oriented material objects, such as 'bats'

 

If not, then we're referring to 'ideas'. Therefore, either said immaterial substance (for example, a 'law) is either mind- created or discovered. A good example of the later would be 'gravity'. Of the former would be a speed limit.

 

But 'discovered' laws refer to the behavior and capacities of material objects (pennies and quarters falling at the same speed), while mind-created laws refer to what humans require of others ('Don't speed!'), or should do.

 

In this respect, 'Identity' doesn't describe either an object's behavior or its capacities. Moreover, because science is constantly up-dating what said capacities and behaviors are, to be seen as a 'law' would require Identity to constantly alter its own criteria. This, of course, is nonsense.

 

In other words, the metaphysical reality of 'gravity' depends upon its predictive use in what's called an 'equation'. But identity has none. rather, at best it can only legislate post hoc. 

 

An alternative definition would be what Aristotle cooked up: Identity is a logical guidepost that's used for thinking clearly and getting things right--correct speech, as it were. 

 

A Platonist, of course would disagree. To him/her, 'Identity' is grasped as an 'idea', then declared as self-evident, intuitive, 'axiomatic', whatever. Platonists don't need their ideas supported by material reality. 

 

 Platonists are then asked, "If not a material reality, then upon what foundation do you establish your ideas to be metaphysical realities?" Historically, answers have ranged from a) Socratic whispering in my ear, Pauline faith and hope c) claiming 'axiomatic' status d) hissy fit and abuse of skeptics.

 

Nietzsche famously compared the above to "the clouds of Sils Maria"--wish-fulfilling fluffery.

 

Now since then, the chalkboard stuff has notched down the claims of metaphysics a peg or two, at least. This ranges from Wittgenstein's statement  that metaphysics are baseless by definition to Heidegger, Sartre and Deleuze, et al insisting that overviews really are important, although hardly 'objective'. 

 

Rand's views, qua chalkboard, appear to fall within the Platonic purview. To this extent, Ii would disagree with her--at least s expressed by you, 'Plasmatic'. For the sake of argument, perhaps there's more...

 

Otherwise, You don't seem clear as to how you're using the term 'ontology'. although it's definitely not what's on the Great Chalkboard behind all of us, I'll be happy to comment upon your very special use of the term once you tell me what you want said term to mean.

 

AH

[andie holland]

I don't have a problem with photons comminicating "at speeds far greater than that of light itself." I have a problem with QM's "internal coherence." QM's only consistency is in being inconsistent. That is no "explanation" that follows the facts and constitutes "the best that we have." Einstein's fault was that his theory is also incomplete.

 

 

If you read it carefully, you will find Bacon's name twice in that article. However, I should not have mentioned Bacon's name. Besides not knowing much about him, I did not know that "modern notions of induction" were not Baconian, even though Bacon was the father of empiricism. And I don't honestly care whether Bacon agreed with Aristotle or disagreed.

As for your edit, I didn't read Rand's books as sacred texts, if that's what you meant.

If you carefully read my post, you'll discover the name 'Bell', who was a practicing Particle Physicist that was very pro-Einstein and anti-Bohr regarding debates.

 

As a hostile party, he was the one who challenged QMers by his own, not their, standards of consistency.

 

If Aspect's proof  doesn't meet yours, then I'm afraid you'll have to be far more specific as to why.. In other words, the conclusion 'far greater than the speed of light' is consistent with all photon interactive behaviors. 

 

AH