On the question of free-will vs. determinism

[Capitalism Forever]

The actions of a volitional consciousness are quite unlike the physical actions of an entity. You can mentally combine them as an "event as a whole," but that "event as a whole" is really comprised of two radically different, independent yet causally connected processes.

I think I have found the root of my problem: I do not see the physical occurrences as independent from the volitional actions. After all, as you say, the two are causally connected. So what happens physically depends on what choice the volitional process results in: e.g., your muscles may or may not lift your arm up, depending on whether you choose to raise your arm or not. For this reason, I see the physical actions of a volitional being as dependent on the volitional choices of that being.

[stephen_speicher]

I think I have found the root of my problem: I do not see the physical occurrences as independent from the volitional actions. After all, as you say, the two are causally connected. So what happens physically depends on what choice the volitional process results in: e.g., your muscles may or may not lift your arm up, depending on whether you choose to raise your arm or not. For this reason, I see the physical actions of a volitional being as dependent on the volitional choices of that being.

When I refer to the volitional acts of a consciousness I am usually focusing exclusively on the mental processes, independent of any physical processes. When I refer to the physical actions of an entity I am usually focusing exclusively on the physical processes, independent of any mental processes. Referring to the actions of a human being as a whole, this is, of course, an integration of mind and body, a perspective by which we view the independent mental and physical processes as combined into a single continuous action. This is just a matter of perspective.

There exist scientific and moral reasons for why we study and judge mental processess independent of physical ones, and why we study and judge physical processes independent of mental ones, and why we study and judge the combined action of both. Incidentally, you should also keep in mind that most of the physical actions of a human being are not performed directly under volitional control.

[vaclav-KI]

Originally posted by Spearmint

I'm not sure if I fully understand the Objectivist stance on this subject (or even if there actually is an 'Objectivist stance'). 

Reading various threads on the matter of consciousness on this forum, I didn't see anybody mentioning the following excerpt I took the liberty of quoting here in its entirety.

It is an answer L Peikoff once gave to somebody in audience at TJS conference, which I think could be taken as an 'Objectivist stance' on the matter at hand.

The square brackets contain words that I had trouble deciphering (it is an unedited verbatim transcription I made from audio tape for the purpose of quoting here).

Leonard Peikoff, The Jefferson School, August 1987, 'Question period #2' on audio cassette tape sold by The Ayn Rand Book Store

"You want to know my opinion about the metaphysical status of consciousness."

"I don’t have an opinion… because I don't believe that there is any scientific - any philosophic way of answering what I think you are asking."

"Philosophy I say can say only this much: Consciousness definitely exists - [therefore] the behaviourism is wrong.  Its inseparably connected to the body - immortality is wrong. It is volitional - determinism is wrong and it has causal efficacy over the brain and the body that it is connected to - so epiphenomenalism is wrong. Beyond that, I don't know - [i... perhaps...] because those things I can demostrate philosophically but beyond that, is it simply an attribute of the total, maybe there is nothing more to say about consciousness than there is if you said to me 'what is vision made of', on the parallel to the eye, is it a special stuff, is it some kind of radiant who knows what, maybe there is nothing ever to say about it."

"I asked Ayn Rand once, what's her solution to the problem of how consiousness affects the body and she said "what's the problem?" [laugh from the audience here]

...and that starts as...  "...but you know, they're... they're... they're not... I don't know exactly, they're not like each other..." and she said "well, so what, if its the fact that you have consciousness and your decisions influence the body, how do you know there is some special mechanism connecting them or some kind of special transformation or x-ray, maybe [omniscient ??], all that will be to say, we have the faculty of awareness and this is what it does, all explanation stops somewhere, this is the way the reality is. Because if you went all the way down to sub subbest [not sure on spelling of this non-standard word] atomic particles, well, why are they that way and how do they operate and at some point you have to say this is reality, this is it. All my explanations go back there and that's where I start."

So I couldn't give an answer which I have no means of answering to a question which I don't grasp as yet even clear - which is exactly where I stand. I think it is very important not... [for...] you know, I am not criticizing anybody who... who wants to speculate if they make it clear on what basis, what they see as the question and that this is not part of Objectivism or philosophy but in effect lets call it speculations arising from science or whatever. That means, that can be fun to do but you have to keep it separate from philosophy."

"Does that answer you?"

vaclav (Knowledge Integration)

[Spearmint]

There exist scientific and moral reasons for why we study and judge mental processess independent of physical ones, and why we study and judge physical processes independent of mental ones, and why we study and judge the combined action of both. Incidentally, you should also keep in mind that most of the physical actions of a human being are not performed directly under volitional control.

I haven't responded to this thread for a while, because Capitalism Forever appears to be making the exact same points that I would have

However, the segment of your poste quoted above seems to be the part that I dont understand. Regardless of whether you choose to study consciousness independently of physical processes (and I do believe that this is how the two phenomenon should be studied), it seems that some kind of indeterminism is inevitable on the physical level.

I am currently sitting here typing this post. I just stopped now, and raised my right arm out of choice, causing the physical matter composing my arm to move abount 20 inches into the air. Before I done this, you could not have predicted this movement regardless of the physical information at your disposal. If we could somehow roll back time to before I raised it, there remains the possibility that I would choose not to do so, and this time the matter composing my arm would not rise. In other words, matter would have acted in two different ways, given the same initial circumstances. Does this not logically lead to indeterminism? We can agree that the cause of this matter rising was my volition and we can agree to treat the conscious cause seperately from the physical cause, but the fact remains that either my arm goes up or it doesnt, and a repeated run of this 'expiriment' may yield a different outcome.

Although its slightly off-topic, my current (although by no means fixed) stance on this is to abandon determinism in the context of matter composing structures with volitional consciousness - I can think of no reason why global determinism is a logical necessity, nor how indeterminism is in conflict with either identity or causality. If it were being claimed that indeterminism was a result of metaphysical randomness or some similar phenemenon then I would agree to dismiss it out of hand, but as long as it is being made clear that indeterminism is being proposed as a consequence of the immediately verifiable existence of volition, there seems to be no problem from a purely philosophical standpoint (although obviously science may eventually rule out this possibility).

[Spearmint]

Reading various threads on the matter of consciousness on this forum, I didn't see anybody mentioning the following excerpt I took the liberty of quoting here in its entirety.

Thanks, I hadn't read that before.

I would agree with Peikoff (although I would question his dismissal of behaviorism, since behaviorism isnt so much the denial of the existence of consciousness, but the claim that since consciousness cannot be measured other than in terms of its effects, it is not a proper object of scientific study. I probably do disagree with behaviorism, just not for the quoted reasons). However, although philosophy cannot make claims regarding how consciousness is caused or how it interacts with the body, certain statements made by philosophy dictate to an extent how scientific enquiry must proceed, and serve to put constraints upon its results. If philosophy says that consciousness and volition exist, then any scientific explanation of the universe must be compatible with both consciousness and volition. I do not think that determinism satifisfies this condition.

[Guest jrshep]

I would agree with Peikoff (although I would question his dismissal of behaviorism, since behaviorism isnt so much the denial of the existence of consciousness, but the claim that since consciousness cannot be measured other than in terms of its effects, it is not a proper object of scientific study.

Scientific study using what faculty to identify the nature of the facts being studied? Consciousness perhaps?

[Spearmint]

Scientific study using what faculty to identify the nature of the facts being studied? Consciousness perhaps?

Yes of course. I dont really want to derail this thread into a discussion about behaviourism, but the best way I can explain what I mean is to draw an analogy to love or justice. Noone is denying that love or justice exist, and the scientist most likely experiences both when he is outside the laboratory (or even inside it!). However there is no real way to measure or observe love or justice in a person other than yourself, except by watching the behavoir which they exhibit (Rand mentions this in IOE). Therefore the behavoirist would claim that a scientific account of love/justice should be phrased purely in terms of the actions of people, rather than by appealing to the unmeasurable abstract concepts of love or justice as experienced by the scientist himself. The same, it is claimed, applies to consciousness - its not that the scientist isnt using his own consciousness when performing experiments (since he obviously is), its that his only 'access' to the consciousness of others is through their behavoir and actions. Some scientists do seem to take this further and negate consciousness altogether but this is a mistake on the part of these individuals, not behavoirism as a concept.

[stephen_speicher]

However, the segment of your poste quoted above seems to be the part that I dont understand.

I'm sorry if the issue is not clear, but I have explained it many times, many different ways, and I have nothing to add to my prior posts.

[stephen_speicher]

I would agree with Peikoff (although I would question his dismissal of behaviorism ...

You might want to read Ayn Rand's devastating analysis of behaviorism in her three-part article motivated through a book by Skinner, starting in the January 17, 1972 issue of the The Ayn Rand Letter.

[Spearmint]

You might want to read Ayn Rand's devastating analysis of  behaviorism in her three-part article motivated through a book by Skinner, starting in the January 17, 1972 issue of the The Ayn Rand Letter.

I've read her review of a book by Skinner (I think it was Walden-two) - is that what you are referring to? I'm not a behaviorist and I would agree with the majority of Rand's critiisisms as I remember them, I just think that particular quoted argument by Peikoff was wrong.

[stephen_speicher]

I've read her review of a book by Skinner (I think it was Walden-two) - is that what you are referring to?

No. The book was Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity. And, it was not really a review. More like a philosophical dissection!

I'm not a behaviorist and I would agree with the majority of Rand's critiisisms as I remember them, I just think that particular quoted argument by Peikoff was wrong.

Why?

[Spearmint]

No. The book was Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity. And, it was not really a review. More like a philosophical dissection!

Ah, yeah that was probably it. Do the articles you mentioned go beyond what was written in this, or did you mean that this was spread out over 3 articles in the Objectivist?

Why?

Because as I stated above, behavoirism doesn't necessarily involve the denial of consciousness. Skinner may well have made claims to the contrary, but Skinner isnt behavoirism.

[jimmay]

What's the problem?

You answered two key parts of my question, when you made clear that consciousness is non-physical and that it is volitional, i.e. not subject to physical determinism.

Now I'm curious about what exactly *is* a non-physical phenomenon? If consciousness has identity but is non-physical, then we've introduced another idea new to me; that physical phenomena are only a subset of existence, that there exists another class of distinct phenomena that is not physical and does not reduce to it, but is nonetheless causally tied to it, both ways, possesses identity and is real. You also mentioned somewhere that consciousness is unique, the only such non-physical phenomenon of which we are currently aware, so that in our current context, the class of non-physical phenomena consists entirely of the phenomena of consciousness.

Now, if I step a bit further and call this non-physical realm the "spiritual realm", the territory actually becomes more familiar; the Objectivist corpus is full of distinctions between physical and spiritual phenomena, and I never had a problem with any of that.

So there isn't a problem, really, especially not after these clarifications. My question now would pertain more to where the mystical view goes wrong, which is likely outside the scope of the thread.

Thanks for the effort Stephen, I appreciate it.

[stephen_speicher]

My question now would pertain more to where the mystical view goes wrong, which is likely outside the scope of the thread.

Historically, there have been several mystical views of consciousness, but they all fail to make the identification that consciousness is axiomatic, a primary, not matter, nor reducible to matter, yet dependent upon functioning brain matter for its existence. The typical mystical view is to assert consciousness as having an independent existence, not dependent on matter, something just temporarily trapped inside a body, like a religious-type soul.

Thanks for the effort Stephen, I appreciate it.

You're welcome.

[stephen_speicher]

Do the articles you mentioned go beyond what was written in this, or did you mean that this was spread out over 3 articles in the Objectivist?

It was an article spread across four issues (I mistakenly said "three" issues before) of The Ayn Rand Letter, the January 17, January 31, February 14, and February 28, 1972 issues.

Because as I stated above, behavoirism doesn't necessarily involve the denial of consciousness.

Denial of consciousness can be explicit or implicit, outright or effective. When you say that "a scientific account of love/justice should be phrased purely in terms of the actions of people, rather than by appealing to the unmeasurable abstract concepts of love or justice," that is an effective denial of consciousness. You say it again in similar words: "since consciousness cannot be measured other than in terms of its effects, it is not a proper object of scientific study."

Introspection is just as valid a process as extrospection, and it is perfectly valid -- nay, required -- that we infer from our own introspection that consciousness like ours exists in other men. To remove consciousness by not being "a proper object of scientific study" is just as wrong and just as bad as outright denial. Peikoff was perfectly correct in what he said, even considering that his remarks were made extemporaneously.

p.s. Incidentally, as a general principle it is a good idea not to assume naivete on the part of first-rate Objectivist intellectuals. More than eighty years ago S.C. Pepper wrote a paper in The Journal of Philosophy (V. 20, No. 9, pp. 242-244, Aoril 1923) titled "Misconceptions Regarding Behaviorism." He starts his paper with:

"Professor Pratt's recent article on 'Behaviorism and Consciousness' exhibits a pair of misconceptions regarding the nature of behaviorism which are widely current in philosophical circles at present. One of these is that behaviorism necessarily denies the existence of consciousness altogether ..."

For people who have studied this field, and especially for Peikoff who has made a career of philosophy, you can readily assume that what was made explicit -- what was "widely current" -- eighty years ago on this subject continues to this day, and was not lost to him in his remarks. It is really a matter of interpretation: what Pepper stated eighty years ago, and what you stated today, was based on too narrow an understanding of philosophy and consciousness.

[hippie]

I'm in much the same position as Student. I follow Ayn Rand, believe most everything in the philosophy, read most of her literature, but the free will issue I simply cannot agree with. The answer that most Objectivist give is that causality does not contradict free will when you appropriately define causality. Causality is the law of identity in practice--given a being's identity and context, its actions will follow. One person here has given the example that an acorn's nature, when planted, watered, and fertilized will make it become a tree. However, this only contradicts free will. By nature of a person, and the context of his existence, he will necessarily do X. Two people with the exact same genetic make up and the exact same environmental circumstances (that is to say, with the exact same identity) will produce the exact same results. I've been yelled at by Objectivists for holding this view, and I'm certain that this will be enough for some to jump on my back yet again—but for any other Objectivists who also find this troubling, I agree.

[stephen_speicher]

I'm in much the same position as Student.  I follow Ayn Rand, believe most everything in the philosophy, read most of her literature, but the free will issue I simply cannot agree with.... By nature of a person, and the context of his existence, he will necessarily do X.

But that is not the Objectivist position. The only action of a volitional consciousness that is necessitated by its nature, is the primary choice itself. But, granted the "nature of a person," and granted the "context of his existence," the content of that choice, and the consequential conscious actions, are not necessitated. A man may choose to do your "X," or not.

Two people with the exact same genetic make up and the exact same environmental circumstances (that is to say, with the exact same identity) will produce the exact same results.

This statement is just an outright denial of volition. On what basis can you make this assertion? I would argue that the contradictory of your statement is directly accessible to you through your own introspection. I will now introspect: I will now write a filthy four-letter word. Okay, I am done introspecting. Did you see the four-letter word? No? Why? Well, I can tell you the secret of that mystery. At the last moment, after I said I would, I chose not to write that filthy four-letter word. That is why you did not see it. My consciousness is volitional, and I chose otherwise. Upon introspection, is your consciousness different than mine in this respect? Do you not volitonally choose among alternatives? Do you not direct that actions of your conscious mind?

I've been yelled at by Objectivists for holding this view, and I'm certain that this will be enough for some to jump on my back yet again—but for any other Objectivists who also find this troubling, I agree.

Well, I'm not yelling at you, not yet at least.

[Spearmint]

But he claimed the other person had the same experiences and genetics as you. Surely your choice not to write the word was based on reasons, such as the kind of person you have chosen to become, and the way you have viewed four letter words in the past. If someone had had identical experiences to you, what reasons would they have to choose differently and actually write the word? Obviously you must have reasons to make whatever choice you made, otherwise we're back to Buridan's ass - if someone had the same identity, wouldn't they have the same reasons and hence make the same choice?

The implications of free-will are still something I'm not completely sure about at this point, so don't take this as a denial of volition or anything.

[hippie]

Speicher, many thanks for not yelling. That's a much appreciated gesture that is not always given me, though I don't see what people hope to achieve by yelling—as if my supposed volition may be commanded by the volume of their voices or inflection in their text.

Anyway, I meant to say this before but forgot: You said that an Objectivist believes in free will. This is quite right, and this is why I said I follow Rand but didn’t say I’m an Objectivist. I recognize that Objectivism has a specific definition and that I, not fitting it, am not an Objectivist. Even though I’m really, really, really close.

In addition to what Spearmint has said, I would like to throw another mind experiment at you: Assume there is a man who chooses to do a tap dance. Then, time is reversed. Nothing is changed, all things are exactly and perfectly the way they were, all variables being perfectly identical. Must he tap dance again? If he must, he is determined. If he is not compelled to, his will is random, causeless, and without reason. If choice comes ex nihilo, that is just mystical.

When you ask, do I sense my own free will, I don’t. When I act, I weigh my options, consider my knowledge, and do what I must because of my reason. For instance, when I must choose between apple juice and orange juice, I know that orange juice is healthy and tastes better than apple juice. Because I value what tastes better, I must drink the orange juice.

Something more: I find your example of the four-lettered word ironic. What you described was precisely what Aristotle called not free will. You were acting on random, unthinking whim. Your example is an example of the modern approach to ethics: emergency ethics—i.e. you consider one particular instance, rather than considering the proper life as a whole. Aristotle considered volition to be closer to what I believe the thought process is. He believed that choice was examining the world, weighing options, planning one’s life, and following through. He, however, fundamentally agreed with Ayn Rand. He believed that the fundamentally undetermined and, essentially, random choice that a person makes is the choice to think or not to think.

[stephen_speicher]

But he claimed the other person had the same experiences and genetics as you. Surely your choice not to write the word was based on reasons, such as the kind of person you have chosen to become, and the way you have viewed four letter words in the past. If someone had had identical experiences to you, what reasons would they have to choose differently and actually write the word? Obviously you must have reasons to make whatever choice you made, otherwise we're back to Buridan's ass - if someone had the same identity, wouldn't they have the same reasons and hence make the same choice?

You misunderstand. Volition comes first. It is volition that guides our reasoning processes. No matter what your thinking in the past, no what values you have attained throughout your life, you maintain and sustain that thinking and values every instant of your life, by the choices you make. The primary choice -- to focus your mind, or not -- is just that, an irreducible primary. You can choose to be rational every moment of your life, but every future instance of your life you are still confronted with that choice, and you could choose otherwise.

The implications of free-will are still something I'm not completely sure about at this point, so don't take this as a denial of volition or anything.

You may not intend it to be, but denying volition is exactly what your words imply.

[stephen_speicher]

In addition to what Spearmint has said, I would like to throw another mind experiment at you:  Assume there is a man who chooses to do a tap dance.  Then, time is reversed.  Nothing is changed, all things are exactly and perfectly the way they were, all variables being perfectly identical.  Must he tap dance again?  If he must, he is determined.  If he is not compelled to, his will is random, causeless, and without reason.  If choice comes ex nihilo, that is just mystical.

But the primary choice does not come from nothing; it derives from the nature of consciousness and the nature of the brain upon which consciousness depends.

You make a false alternative between determinism and randomness, thereby defining volition out of existence. The primary choice is both caused and necessitated by the nature of man; given any particular circumstances, man must choose, but what he chooses, to focus or not, is the expression of volition.

When you ask, do I sense my own free will, I don’t.  When I act, I weigh my options, consider my knowledge, and do what I must because of my reason.  For instance, when I must choose between apple juice and orange juice, I know that orange juice is healthy and tastes better than apple juice.  Because I value what tastes better, I must drink the orange juice.

If you want to really understand the process that you just described, you need to separate out two things: the primary, irreducible aspect of volition -- the choice to focus, or not -- and volition as a guiding process in our reasoning. This latter process, what Peikoff refers to as the "higher-level" actions of consciousness, unlike the primary choice, are not irreducible, and your thinking above in regard to juice is explainable in terms of your principles, your values, your knowledge, and a multitude of other mental and physical factors.

And at any given step along your reasoning process towards your decision about which juice to drink, you can choose to remain in full focus and avail yourself of the full context of your knowledge and the circumstances, or you can choose to lessen your focus and muddle the reasoning processes that ensue. So all your consequential reasoning is caused, in the sense of being guided by a matter of choice, but it is not necessitated because your primary choice, to focus or not, could have been otherwise.

He, however, fundamentally agreed with Ayn Rand.  He believed that the fundamentally undetermined and, essentially, random choice that a person makes is the choice to think or not to think.

I'm afraid you do not understand what Ayn Rand thought. She would have been horrified at the notion of a "random" choice, itself a contradiction in terms. Hopefully, based on what I wrote above, you will be able to form a different perspective on this issue.

[RationalBiker]

Then, time is reversed.

The major problem with your experiment is that your making a scenario outside of realistic context. When you can reverse time, this experiment will have some meaning. Until then, it has no meaning.

VES

[hippie]

Speicher, I simply cannot conceive of a third alternative to determinism and randomness. Nothing else makes sense. You say that consciousness causes our choices. I agree—but I can only understand that as consciousness determines our actions. I know that is not what you or Ayn Rand intend to say. It is not that I don’t understand Ayn Rand; it’s that I don’t agree with her. How does consciousness cause your choices, without causing the specific choice you make? If it doesn’t, how can it cause your choices in the first place? When a bat hits a baseball, the identities of the objects in question necessitate a certain end. Based on the angle, force, direction, etc., the ball *must* go in one direct and one direction only. Likewise, I can only understand the causal relationship between consciousness and human action as consciousness necessitating the specific action. I believe we will simply have to agree to disagree because I know that I am right, and I am rather certain you will not agree with me.

Rational Cop, I don’t accept that man cannot use his imagination to consider events that are not yet real. It is imagination and the consideration of what could be true that drives forward our science. If Copernicus had simply threw up his hands and said, “We know that planets move around the Earth, so we must keep using these complicated Euclidean models that only work at certain lines of latitude,” we would have had to wait several more decades to understand how the planets orbit. Aristotle also held a similar idea to what you express. If you had asked him, “What if a species of animal went extinct?” he would say, “That’s a nonsensical question. There are animals; there must always be animals. They just are. You cannot explain it further than that.” Darwin was a revolution against this thinking. He used his conceptual faculty to just consider what if animals could go out of existence while new ones came into existence, and collected evidence to support this hypothetical.

Likewise, while we cannot actually go through time, we can still think about what it might be like if we could. We can still conceive of reality being re-set to an earlier point, and continuing its causal relationship from there. In fact, modern quantum theory states that time does not actually move forward, but that all periods in time exist always, and that time is simply another dimension to existence (all of which, I assume, is based on factual information). By this mere conception of time, you conceive that the past events are still necessitating their future. And, by this definition of time, moving through it could be like moving through any other dimension (length, width, depth).

[Capitalism Forever]

Speicher, many thanks for not yelling.  That's a much appreciated gesture that is not always given me, though I don't see what people hope to achieve by yelling

TO MAKE YOU SEE THAT WE HAVE CHOSEN TO YELL, THAT'S WHAT WE DAMN HOPE TO ACHIEVE!

Not that I really expect this strategy to work--after all, it is entirely up to you whether or not you change your mind.

[AwakeAndFree]

Hippie - there will never be a possibility to turn back time. Time is just a human way to measure the sum of all changes. To "turn back time" you would have to reverse every specific process that happen back to a certain point.

Even then, it wouldn't be "the past". It would be a future in which everything changed back.

As for volition: you are not required to understand the process by which volition works. Just like Gravity: we don't yet know what is the specific process that makes it possible.

But like Gravity, volition is a fact that has overwhelming supporting evidence that we cannot deny.

People can change their minds, act "out of character" and most importantly: deal with reality on a level that no animal can match. They say Whales and Dolphins are more intelligent than humans. Perhaps - but they seem not to be able to change themselves, and therefor their environment, to their own needs.

I have more to say about this, but I have to organize my thoughts. Some new idea came up and I have to examine it...