Is all of reality, in principle, accessible to us?

[Teez]

Hi all, I am new to this forum, and relatively new to the philosopher of Ayn Rand. Maybe ya'll have already been bombarded with newbie questions like the ones I am about to ask, but if its all the same to you, I would really appreciate your input.

The problem I am facing comes from the Metaphysics and Epistemolgy of what Mrs Rand was saying: "Axioms cannot be reduced to other facts or broken down into component parts. They require no proofs or explanations. Objectivism’s three basic philosophical axioms are existence, consciousness, and identity -- presuppositions of every concept and every statement."

Ok, now I agree with the jist of this - the universe exists regardless of weather or not I am conscience or not - it existed before me, and will exist after me. Reality is there, and through being conscience, we can perceive it, and learn patterns about it and how it works, the physical laws, etc.

So essentially: Reality is there regardless of us: Agree

Conscienceness doesnt make reality, just perceives it: Agree.

But my question is this:

Can reality have some aspects of itself that cannot ever be knowable to us through our senses (direct perception and tools) or predictions (reason/cognition)?

thank you

Edited August 20, 2005 by softwareNerd

[JMeganSnow]

        But my question is this:

        Can reality have some aspects of itself that cannot ever be knowable to us through our senses (direct perception and tools) or predictions (reason/cognition)?

          thank you

Are you distinguishing "reality" from "existence" in some way?

By definition, the answer to this is unknowable, because to answer it we would have to know that which cannot be known, a contradiction in terms.

[Teez]

Hmmm, Let me re-phrase the question:

Is one aspect of reality, that all of it can be known by our perceptions/cognition?

(If yes, then our perceptions.cognition will be able to figure out all properties of reality - everything about it. If no, there is the possibility that there are some things that our perception will not ever be able to sense, and/or our cognition cannot understand.)

[Cole]

The question is one of epistemology. Read the Objectivist position on agnosticism.

If one is to claim that there exists aspects of reality that are unknowable to humans, the onus of proof is on the person making this claim. If "unknowable to humans" is an attribute of these aspects of reality, then how can humans know of their existence? On what basis are we to even entertain the notion of it being a possibility? The claim is entirely arbitrary.

[JMeganSnow]

          Is one aspect of reality, that all of it can be known by our perceptions/cognition?

Literally, yes. Why? Because consciousness is the faculty of percieving that which exists, if you can't percieve it (or conclude via. reason that it must be there), how can you conclude it exists? How can it be part of reality?

[DPW]

Literally, yes.  Why?  Because consciousness is the faculty of percieving that which exists, if you can't percieve it (or conclude via. reason that it must be there), how can you conclude it exists?  How can it be part of reality?

No, no, no! This is primacy of consciousness. The proper answer is that to claim something as unknowable involves a contradiction, since one would first have to know it. To assert that there is nevertheless something that is unknowable is to assert the arbitrary.

[DavidOdden]

No, no, no!  This is primacy of consciousness.  The proper answer is that to claim something as unknowable involves a contradiction, since one would first have to know it.  To assert that there is nevertheless something that is unknowable is to assert the arbitrary.

I suggest the word "can't" is significant. "Can't" is distinct from "don't". At least that's what I'd say if I had written that. Make the substitution, and tell me if you don't agree.

[DPW]

I suggest the word "can't" is significant. "Can't" is distinct from "don't". At least that's what I'd say if I had written that. Make the substitution, and tell me if you don't agree.

But that still says that the standard for something's existing is that it be perceivable. That's backwards. It's the fact that something exists that implies that it's perceivable (directly or indirectly). (It implies that because the only thing that could exist and yet be unknowable would be something that existed in a vacuum and had no effects on anything else.)

[DavidOdden]

I decided that all answers so far have a problem, that they give too much a priori weight to the epistemological problems entailed by unperceivable existents. Since I don't have a better answer up my sleeve, I withdraw any implied support for all proffered answers. Don, from your answer, I take it (rather weakly) you don't rule out the possibility of there actually existing an imperceptible, and you just object to making statements about or giving consideration to such supposed things. I arrive at this surmise because of your answer "The proper answer is that to claim something as unknowable involves a contradiction, since one would first have to know it. To assert that there is nevertheless something that is unknowable is to assert the arbitrary". The thing is, I understand the original question as asking something about a particular kind of existent, and not the question "how would we ever know that such a thing exists" which is the classical epistemological question. The arbitrariness of a claimed imperceivable existent is "about" epistemology, not metaphysics. There's no arbitrariness in existence -- either it exists, or it doesn't. Basically, you're saying that this is a pointless question because of the epistemological problem. I don't see how that's any less of a "primacy of consciousness" answer. Arbitrary claims can, nevertheless, "describe facts".

[DPW]

I decided that all answers so far have a problem, that they give too much a priori weight to the epistemological problems entailed by unperceivable existents. Since I don't have a better answer up my sleeve, I withdraw any implied support for all proffered answers. Don, from your answer, I take it (rather weakly) you don't rule out the possibility of there actually existing an imperceptible, and you just object to making statements about or giving consideration to such supposed things. I arrive at this surmise because of your answer "The proper answer is that to claim something as unknowable involves a contradiction, since one would first have to know it. To assert that there is nevertheless something that is unknowable is to assert the arbitrary". The thing is, I understand the original question as asking something about a particular kind of existent, and not the question "how would we ever know that such a thing exists" which is the classical epistemological question. The arbitrariness of a claimed imperceivable existent is "about" epistemology, not metaphysics. There's no arbitrariness in existence -- either it exists, or it doesn't. Basically, you're saying that this is a pointless question because of the epistemological problem. I don't see how that's any less of a "primacy of consciousness" answer. Arbitrary claims can, nevertheless, "describe facts".

I actually made two arguments: One epistemological (which you noted), one metaphysical. See my second response: I said that to exist is to be knowable (either by the senses, or indirectly, by reason), because everything that exists exists in a relationship with the rest of existence and has effects on the rest of existence. Nothing can exist in a vacuum, yet that is what would be required of an unknowable existent.

But that is not to denigrate the epistemological argument, which correctly notes the absurdity of the question.

As for that last sentence, no -- an arbitrary claim cannot "describe facts" in any meaningful sense. It has no relationship to facts until someone brings it into relationship with the facts by providing some evidence, for or against it.

[JMeganSnow]

No, no, no!  This is primacy of consciousness.  The proper answer is that to claim something as unknowable involves a contradiction, since one would first have to know it.  To assert that there is nevertheless something that is unknowable is to assert the arbitrary.

That is NOT primacy of consciousness. Note that I maintain that conciousness merely percieves reality, it does not CREATE it, I was trying to indicate that the only means of defining what existents constitute "reality" is that we can percieve them, i.e. that perception and reason are the only means to knowledge. Nothing else merits discussion or inclusion in the "realm of the real". I realize it's still an awkward statement but the question itself is absurd.

[TomL]

        Can reality have some aspects of itself that cannot ever be knowable to us through our senses (direct perception and tools) or predictions (reason/cognition)?

No. There are existents within the universe that man cannot see without instrumentation, for example: atomic particles. Given a collider and extreme magnification, one can see with the eyes physical evidence of protons & neutrons.

There are also existents for which no instruments exist to bring them within range of our sensory organs. For example: quarks. They can be induced mathematically, but as far as I know, no one has ever seen one. That doesn't make them any less real.

For concepts of consciousness such as "love" or even "consciousness", introspection is the only "sense" which can validate their existence. But that doesn't make them any less real, either.

[DPW]

That is NOT primacy of consciousness.  Note that I maintain that conciousness merely percieves reality, it does not CREATE it, I was trying to indicate that the only means of defining what existents constitute "reality" is that we can percieve them, i.e. that perception and reason are the only means to knowledge.  Nothing else merits discussion or inclusion in the "realm of the real".  I realize it's still an awkward statement but the question itself is absurd.

Okay, thanks for clearing that up. :-)

[Teez]

Hi all,

...so is there a verdict amongst you?...

[DPW]

...so is there a verdict amongst you?...

We've given you our views. It's up to you to reach your own verdict.

Edited August 14, 2005 by DPW

[Teez]

Hi all,

Thanks for responces - and DPW, I expected there to be more of a concensus between ya'll regarding the core root of the philosophy, which is why I asked what the verdict is. No matter, this is a side issue.

I have thought of the best way for me to word this, so here goes: I am not actively saying that there certainly IS an existent that cannot ever be known. I am asking, why are we assuming that our brains have the capability to know (through perception/reason) all existents? Essentially I am saying that what we can perceive/reason is a subset of everything that exists, whereas (correct me if im wrong) you are saying that everything we can perceive/reason is the same set as everything that exists.

Let me try another angle, this one an analogy:

Suppose I told you, there definately does exist a God, (in the current religious sense), who is omnipotent, the most powerful. Then automatically, that is contradictory, and god in this sense cannot exist. Why? Because if he is omnipotent, then that means he can create an entity more powerful then himself, which he has no control over. But if he is omnipotent, then he must have control over it. But at the same time he can make it such that he doesnt. That is self-contradictory, and thus this concept of god cannot ever exist.

Now supposed I told you, ok, but there is a possibility that this concept of god exists. Again, since being possible means that it COULD exist, that still runs into the same problem of being self-contracdictory. So we can say for sure, that this concept of a god can never exist.

Now change gears:

Supposed I make the claim: Fact: In the universe, there exists a purple planet. Then you could say, ok, where is the proof? I will say "what proof?" and thus the claim is discounted. There is no proof of it.

But now suppose I make the claim: In the universe, there is a POSSIBILITY of a purple planet. Then you would say, ok, this is not self-contradicting, (unlike the god argument) nothing is violated metaphysically like in the god argument, therfore yes, it is POSSIBLE to have this. God argument: Impossible. Purple Planet: Possible. It is possible to exist within the realm of this reality. Even though we may never detect it.

Thus even though I do not "know" of the purple planet, have never seen it, or detected it, I know that it is not beyond the realm of possibility. That is my question: Realm of possibility.

*end of analogy*

The god argument shows that such an existent as the omnipotent god is impossible, because it is contradictory. Therefore it is not in the realm of possibility.

So my question becomes, why are existents that cannot be known by us considered outside the realm of possibility?

------------------------------

P.S. Don, I like your argument about existents being attached to each other so they all have an effect on each other, and since we can perceive some, that means we can perceive all - in fact this thought occured to me a couple days ago, but I figured let me ask anyway.

Edited August 14, 2005 by Teez

[JMeganSnow]

So my question becomes, why are existents that cannot be known by us considered outside the realm of possibility?

There's a difference between cannot be known and aren't currently known. One of the tricks of purveyors of the arbitrary (especially religionists) is to claim that humans are not capable of grasping God or whatever, they proceed to claim that it's completely outside access by reason and thus a process of proof, and then say, "Prove that this god does not exist."

Technically, the purple planet of your example isn't "possible", in that there is some evidence for it's existence. The existence of a purple planet does have ONE of the criterion for "possible". that being that it's existance doesn't contradict anything currently known. However, to be called logically "possible" there must be some existence that one DOES exist.

Existents that don't have at least some evidence pointing towards them aren't possible, the are arbitrary.

Oh, and there is a general consensus over this issue, the only disagreement is over what specific reasoning points most completely and accurately to the answer.

[DPW]

Thanks for responces - and DPW, I expected there to be more of a concensus between ya'll regarding the core root of the philosophy, which is why I asked what the verdict is. No matter, this is a side issue.

This isn't the core root of the philosophy. And to the extent that Objectivism does have an official answer to this question, we all agreed on it: to claim that something is unknowable is to engage in a contradiction. That was N. Branden's response to the question when he addressed it in The Objectivist Newsletter.

I have thought of the best way for me to word this, so here goes: I am not actively saying that there certainly IS an existent that cannot ever be known. I am asking, why are we assuming that our brains have the capability to know (through perception/reason) all existents? Essentially I am saying that what we can perceive/reason is a subset of everything that exists, whereas (correct me if im wrong) you are saying that everything we can perceive/reason is the same set as everything that exists.

And what are your (non-arbitrary) grounds for saying that? Look at what you're doing. You're saying, "What if there are things that are unknowable?" We're asking, "What are your grounds for thinking so?" You say, "I don't have any grounds. But what if?"

Your error, as demonstrated in the rest of your post, is to claim that anything which doesn't involve an inherent contradiction is "possible." It isn't. "Possible" means that there is some evidence for an idea. If there is no evidence for it, it is arbitrary. We can't discuss it because, apart from evidence (pro or con), nothing can be discussed. See OPAR on this point.

P.S. Don, I like your argument about existents being attached to each other so they all have an effect on each other, and since we can perceive some, that means we can perceive all - in fact this thought occured to me a couple days ago, but I figured let me ask anyway.

Thank you, although I don't think it's my argument. I'm pretty sure I got it from Leonard Peikoff or Harry Binswanger, but I'm not sure.

[Teez]

Hi DPW,

Yeah, I disagree with your definition of "Possible".

You said: "Possible" means that there is some evidence for an idea."

I think the word "Probable" would fit that definition you mentioned alot better. Possible simply means it doesnt contradict anything known proven laws, axioms, etc. The official definition seems to agree with me on this:

From dictionary.com, the definition of possible:

"pos·si·ble ( P ) Pronunciation Key (ps-bl)

adj.

Capable of happening, existing, or being true without contradicting proven facts, laws, or circumstances"

DPW: "If there is no evidence for it, it is arbitrary."

True. But as I am saying, no one is making a positive claim to that. I am just saying, that it is not beyond the realm of possibility.

*******************

P.S. I like the fact we are debating this. Thank you again for your time.

[JMeganSnow]

You might want to hit Don's (DPW's) site, he wrote an excellent blog entry discussing the difference between metaphysical possibility and epistemological possibility here.

Don, you owe me five bucks for the plug.

Just kidding.

[Teez]

Ok, I will read it and get back to you guys.

[DPW]

Don, you owe me five bucks for the plug. 

Actually I do. I had forgotten I'd written that and would have very likely spent a significant amount of time making those same points in this thread. Thanks!

[DavidOdden]

You said: "Possible" means that there is some evidence for an idea."

        I think the word "Probable" would fit that definition you mentioned alot better. Possible simply means it doesnt contradict anything known proven laws, axioms, etc.

You've described the arbitrary. When you add evidence in support of the conclusion, then you have the "possible". You can strengthen the evidence beyond just "some suggestive evidence", and you'll get the probable. Note for example that if there is some flimsy evidence for a conclusion, you wouldn't say "That conclusion is probably correct, even though I'm skeptical about it". A better term is to say that the unsupported idea is imaginable. The issue is a complex philosophical one where on average, most philosophers are confused because they think that that there is such a thing as metaphysical possibility. The way I've seen the expression used by others, it seems to imply that things happen randomly. Don's blog lays out the issue very clearly, so I second the motion to read it. In normal usage, when people say things about X being possible, they are indeed referring to the fact that they don't have enough evidence to conclude that it is a fact. So even though dictionary.com phrases their definition in a vaguely metaphysical way, that does not mean that their definition is accurate and reflects true usage of the term.

A conclusion has to derive from something, so you have to ask "What can I base a conclusion on?" A logically valid conclusion (and that's all we're interested in) is one that applies reasoning to observation (and knowledge reducible to observation). That's why the lowest level of validity for a conclusion is "possible", meaning "having observable support".

[Dufresne]

Can reality have some aspects of itself that cannot ever be knowable to us through our senses (direct perception and tools) or predictions (reason/cognition)?

Man is part of reality and has free will. It is impossible to know the course of action another person will choose. So yes, there are aspects of reality that man can't know.

[colin]

Man is part of reality and has free will. It is impossible to know the course of action another person will choose. So yes, there are aspects of reality that man can't know.

An individual's inability to predict the future does not equate to mankind's inability to know reality.