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If you are a Hindu, there is a CCD for god (देव). If you are a Muslim or follower of the other monotheistic religions, you are in a difficult epistemological position because your faith is grounded in a polytheistic context, and one of your essential beliefs is that these other faiths are false (I don’t actually understand how Jews, Muslims and Christians understand their god compared to the other guys’ version of god). You may be aware that the Christian God’s actual name is Howard. Christians don’t form such a concept, not do they form a concept Barak Obama. Proper names are not concepts, they are the labels for individuals. Howard⛪ is similarly a proper name referring to a unique individual. If you want to understand the CCD for “god”, you shuld study a polytheistic religion, so learn about the concept देव and now Brahman, Indra, Śiva, Viṣṇu, Ganeśa etc are unified into one concept. (Warning: Hinduism was long ago infected by a low-grade case of monotheism, the result being that classical polytheistic Hinduism may be on its last legs). I think the problem is that you are not properly distinguishing “multiple instances” from “irreality”. Unicorns do not exist, yet there is clearly a concept “unicorn” (likewise “gremlin”). It’s not there is no CCD for “god”, it’s that there is no actual referent. For an under-educated Christian who believes in Howard⛪, "God" is indeed not a concept, it is a proper name.

Just going through ITOE and noting the importance of similarity in terms of CCD. This aspect is strikingly necessary to developing a concept. When thinking about how a person could develop the concept of "god" it does not seem like this could ever be formed because the would be no way to place god on a CCD since there is no similarity or commensurable characteristic. Since concepts can't be formed randomly and similarity is a vital aspect of the formation, wouldn't this preclude god as a valid concept?

My main point is that “God”, in the Christian sense, is not a concept, it is a proper name, like Barak Obama. Proper names don’t have CCDs. However, “unicorn” is a concept, and it has a CCD, even though there are no actual unicorns which you can touch. Mathematical concepts are all completely abstract and untouchable, but they are concepts. If we talk of “god” in the anthropological sense, i.e. supernatural personified beings across cultures as we might discuss in an Anthro class, then there would be a CCD, even though the term refers to an idea and not a tangible entity. “God” and “god” are both labels for existents, but they are not entities.

Book IV 1 - Does the genus partake in the subject? Only the species should be able to partake in the genus. Man partakes in animal, animal does not partake in man. Is anything true of the species that is not true of the genus? Object of knowledge cannot be a genus of opinion because opinions are of things sometimes that don't exist, but this is not true of any object of knowledge. Does the genus denote more than the species? There are of course more animals than there are dogs. 2 - Is the differentia being labeled as a genus? Immortality could distinguish living beings, but it cannot be a genus. Differentia don't signify essence (what makes things what they are), but only quality. This seems to implicitly connect identifying differentia with measurement. Is the genus put inside the species? 3 - Can the thing placed in a genus partake with a contrary of the genus? This would not be possible. The genus that contains extremes also contains the intermediaries. But defect and excess are in the same genus evil, yet the mean is good, so in this case, the genus does not contain the intermediary. But it often works. 4 - if the opposite of the species is a deprivation, then the deprivation is not in the genus. Blindness is not a form of sensation. Does the relationship remain when a term is called by the name of its genus? 5 - Is a state placed in the genus activity, or is a activity placed inside the genus state? A state of focus is not the activity of thought. Memory is an active process but is not itself a state of focus. Is blame or judgment placed on the capacity? This would not be valid. Capacity sounds like potential here. Sometimes people reverse differentia and a genus. If astonishment is defined as excess of wonderment, and excess is treated as genus while wonderment is treated as differentia. But if access is a genus, then even some inanimate things could have astonishment! That which is affected should not be in a genus of what affects or the other way around. Air is affected by wind (it is made to move a certain way) but that doesn't mean that wind is a type of air, or that air is a type of wind. Wind is not "air in motion", but the movement of air. 6 - You can distinguish genus from differentia in the following ways: -genus has wider denotation -stating the essence is more suitable for the genus -differentia always signifies a quality

Nemain, concept articulation can certainly be improved. We seem to know more about our concepts than first might be thought. We can come up with genus-species definitions of many of our concepts just thinking it over. When one has a genus for the definition of a concept, one has the conceptual common denominator, supposing there is one. That is, one has in such cases the dimension along which measure values may vary among species and among individual members within species under the concept. In my own view, we should start with formulating a genus-species definition. That articulation will be useful of itself. Then see if there is one or more magnitude dimensions shared at the genus level, that is, shared among all the species and their members. For the genus of a solid, we might take ability of a material to resist shearing stresses (fluids will not). Then specifying the different sorts of shearing stresses and how resistance to the various ones are measured, we get varieties of solids specified in terms of those sorts shearing-stress resistance. However, sometimes we have a genus, perfectly sensible, that does not seem to have one or more magnitude dimensions that can be Rand's conceptual common denominator spanning all the species under the genus and individuals under the species. Hardness, fatigue cycle limit, critical buckling stress, shear and bulk moduli, and tensile strength all fall under the superordinate concept strength of a solid. These various strengths of solids are all forms of resistance to degradations under stresses. That is their genus, but the variety of species seems so wide that there does not seem to be a conceptual common denominator in Rand's sense, though the concept with its wide range is useful in design engineering and in failure analysis.

Is that the ole "Howard be they name..." ? 🙂 I am specifically referring to the christian idea of god, which would be a supernatural being with no other equal either in nature or in status. Since there is no referent wouldn't it follow then that there would be no way to create a CCD to develop a concept. I think Ayn Rand would call this an anti concept right?

Welcome to Objectivism Online, QpQ! What about limit concepts such as a frictionless plane? The common denominator is friction of physical plane surfaces, but they come in different degrees of friction, which we can imagine extending on down to zero, and that could be useful in our thinking. Although, we would not ascribe concrete existence to such a plane surface. Similarly, one might predicate of the concept God the feature of being all-knowing. That feature could be a limit concept having common denominator with how much the deer know, how much I know, how much people a century from now will know, and on up to being all knowing. Offhand, I don't see "a being who is all-knowing" as failing to have a CCD, which would be degree of knowing. Of course, it would be a further step, one needing argument, to proclaim the existence of such a conceived being. Additionally, there might be thermodynamical and information-theoretic reasons and limitative theorems of logic (I'd have to research it) that might bear against the validity of the concept all-knowing.

Definition entry at the Ayn Rand Lexicon. The meaning of any concept is what it refers to. A definition tells us what a concept includes (and excludes). A proper definition is given in terms of genus and differentia. The genus of philosophy is 'science' and the differentia is 'the fundamental aspects of the nature of existence'. The ordinary definition of 'science' in the sense used here is just "A systematic method or body of knowledge in a given area" (From The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 5th Edition via Wordnik). That philosophy is the foundation of science and also a science itself is not much of a paradox, it just means that Rand is asserting a hierarchical relationship between philosophy and the other sciences. Other sciences are logically dependent upon philosophy because it is philosophy that explicitly identifies metaphysical axioms such as existence and identity and the methods of logic without which no other science could function as a systematic investigation. Specifically and most commonly that method is the principle of non-contradiction. Epistemology is the foundation of philosophy because the other parts of philosophy (ethics, politics, economics, ... ) are all also dependent upon epistemology to supply the methods used for systematic investigation. Epistemology is both a special area of investigation within philosophy (a branch) and a foundation because it enables other branches to be investigated systematically.

Entity and Ousia Contrasting Roark with many other people, Mallory remarks to Dominique of those others: “At the end there’s nothing left, nothing unreversed or unbetrayed; as if there had never been any entity, only a succession of adjectives fading in and out on an unformed mass” (GW V, 485). Consider in Rand’s full metaphysics the finer structure in her conception of the law of identity: "Whatever you choose to consider, be it an object, an attribute, or an action, the law of identity remains the same. A leaf cannot be a stone at the same time, it cannot be all red and all green at the same time, it cannot freeze and burn at the same time. A is A (AS 1016). Rand clearly intended here, in Galt’s Speech, that what is proposed for objects is to be generalized to entities. Every entity is of some kinds that are exclusive relative to other kinds of entity. Rand used the term entity in the paragraph preceding the object examples of leaf and stone. That is, she uses entity in the initial statement of her law of identity: “To exist is to be something, . . . it is to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes” (AS 1016). On that page, it is clear that she takes for entities not only what are ordinarily called objects such as leaf, stone, or table, but micro-objects such as living cells and atoms, and super-objects such as solar system and universe. Now we have a modest problem. If we say “to exist is to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes,” we seem to say that attributes are either entities or are not existents. Consider for attributes “the shape of a pebble or the structure of the solar system” (AS 1016). To avoid the patent falsehood that the shape of a pebble does not exist, shall we say that not only the pebble is an entity, but its shape is an entity? Rand reaches a resolution by a refinement in her metaphysics nine years after her first presentation. In 1966 she writes “Entities are the only primary existents. (Attributes cannot exist by themselves, they are merely the characteristics of entities; motions are motions of entities; relationships are relationships among entities)” (ITOE 15). In Rand’s view then, we have that to exist is either (i) to be an entity consisting of particularities and specific attributes and a specific nature or (ii) to be some specific character in the nature of entities or among an entity’s particularities. Philosophers often use the term entity to mean any item whatever. That is one customary usage and perfectly all right. Rand decided to take entity into her technical vocabulary as something more restricted. She went on to name some fundamental categories that cannot exist without connection to entities: action, attributes, and relationships.[1] As with Aristotle’s substance (ousia), where there is any other category, there is entity to which it belongs.[2] Though Rand held entities to be “the only primary existents,” she did not suppose entities could ever exist without their incidents of action, attributes, and relationships. To trim away, in thought, all the internal traits of an existent as well as all its external relations should in right thought leave no existent. Out of step with Aristotle, Rand did not maintain there is such a thing as an entity that is a what, yet is without any specification by other categories of existents.[3] Entities have relations to other entities, but not the belonging-relation (inherence) had to entities by the categories not entity. The entity that is the sofa is in a region of the living room and it is in a force-relation with the floor. But it is not in anything in the way its shape and mass and stability and flammability are in it. Though she held actions, attributes, and relations to be incapable of existing without the entities of which they are incidents, Rand did not import to entity Aristotle’s concept of substance as somehow imparting existence from itself to the other fundamental categories. In Rand’s view, all of those categories have some instances in concrete existents. Actions, attributes, and relationships are not entities in Rand’s sense. To qualify as an entity, I say and think Rand could have been brought around to say, an entity has to do more than be able to stand as the subject of predication (or as the argument of a propositional function). Running or oscillation can be the subjects of predicates, but they can do so as actions, not entities. Fraction and containment can be the subjects of predicates, but they can do so as relations, not entities. Twill and vesicular quality can be subjects of predicates, but they can do so as attributes, not entities. Rand’s entity as primary existence parallels to some extent Aristotle’s ousia as primary being. Entity as subject of attributes, actions, and relationships parallels Aristotle’s ousia.[4] Substance has been the most common translation of Aristotle’s ousia, when used as the fundamental form of being. Joseph Owens argues that the traditional translation of Aristotle’s ousia is poorly conveyed by substance and is better expressed by entity.[5] Joe Sachs argues for the more Heideggerean translation thingness for ousia.[6] In whatever English translation, Aristotle’s full conception of ousia in his Metaphysics is far from Rand’s conception of entity. Entity does not stand as of-something. In that respect, it is like Aristotle’s ousia. Unlike his ousia in Metaphysics, entity as such is never the essence of something. Also contra Aristotle’s being that is ousia, the existents that are entity can have parts that are entity. Furthermore, as noticed earlier, unlike the accidents of Aristotle’s ousia in Metaphysics, the existence of incidents does not derive from the existence of entity.[7] Existents of the incidents are coordinate with existence of entities, not derivative from nor secondary to existence of entities. In contrast with Aristotle, Rand’s entity, primary form of existence, is only of this whole of existence, our spatial-temporal world, with both its actualities and its potentials, and our understanding over it. That is the all-encompassing reality. Contraction of being to existence includes a denial that there are metaphysical perfections and denial that there is such a thing as unqualified being. Such perfections, and unqualified stuff, when added together with existence per se constitute Aristotle’s being. Aristotle has Rand’s entities as occasions of ousia, at least prima facie, and these he calls natural ousia.[8] Aristotle’s primary ousia, fundamental form of being, I should add, is always an individual, a this something, though not always a concrete.[9] “Substance is on the one hand, matter, on the other hand, form, that is, activity” (Metaph. 1043a27–28).[10] Shape, such as shape of a bronze statue, is not all Aristotle means here by form (mophê). That which explains the coming to be of the statue from unshaped bronze is here included as form; then too, form is here determining principle of which the bronze constitutes this statue rather than any other being. Bronze of itself is determinate matter, but as matter of this statue, it is this form’s matter in consideration of its potential to be another form’s matter. For Aristotle explanation of substance requires both matter and form. Like most all moderns, Rand and Peikoff reject Aristotle’s fundamental form/matter division of all beings.[11] Aristotle had ousia not only primary in account of the kinds of being, but prior in time to them.[12] In the shift from being to existence as most fundamental and in the shift from ousia to entity as most fundamental category of existence, we do not conceive of entity as temporally prior to attributes and relations. For the move from being to existence as most fundamental is move to existence already with identity. If existence is identity and most fundamentally concrete, then entity is identity and most fundamentally concrete. Let us say further that entity is identity, essential and inessential. Essential identity of an entity is identity without which the entity would not be the kind it is.[13] To say that entity is essential identity might seem close to Aristotle’s view that ousia and its essence are one.[14] Rand’s principle existence is identity has greater scope than Aristotle’s ousia is its essence. For her existence is identity has comprehensive scope: it spans not only entity and its essential attributes, but its entire suite of attributes, as well as its standings in actions and relations. For Aristotle capturing what is a specific ousia—where ousia is the primary form of being and the subject of attributes and alterations—requires formulating its definitions such that the essence expressed in the predicate (definiens) has a uniquely right necessary tie and has explanatory tie with the subject (definiendum). Without that essential trait, the ousia defined could not be the kind of ousia it is. Furthermore, if no such trait can be found, the subject is not an ousia, a what-it-is, but a depending quantity, quality, relation, time, location, configuration, possession, doing, or undergoing.[15] In Rand’s modern metaphysics, capturing best what is a specific entity requires formulating its definiens such that it has a right, necessary, and explanatory tie with the subject entity. The unity of essential characteristics with existence of the entity to which they belong are not absolute in the way Aristotle’s specific essence belongs to specific ousia. His is an ascription right independently of context of knowledge. Rand’s theory of essential characteristics for definitions allows for evolution as our knowledge context grows.[16] Furthermore, unlike Aristotle’s theory, the unity of the essential in definitions of existents is just as tight where those existents are attributes, actions, or other relations as when the existent being defined is an entity. The essence of Newtonian force is expressed in its definiens, with specific mathematical defining formula relating certain physical quantities. Special relativity recasts that fundamental defining equation of force, the old equation imbedded in a more elaborate one taking newly learned factors into the account of force.[17] Contrary Aristotle, existents not substance and not entity can have essential characteristics, and these are a function not only of what is so, but of what it is we know of what is so. Although Rand made essential characteristics dependent on context of knowledge, these characteristics are real, the dependencies (such as causal or mathematical) other characteristics have upon them are real, and the explanatory character of essential characteristics vis-à-vis other characteristics is objective. Additional likeness and difference in the metaphysics of Rand and Aristotle are the following. In the metaphysics of Aristotle, when we grasp the essence of ousia, we become that essence; such an assimilator is what is a mind.[18] In Rand’s metaphysics, our grasp of an essence is an identification of an identity; such an identifier of identity is what is a mind, although essence is not the only identity of the existent determining mind, and as mentioned, entity is not the only category in which there are essential aspects. Furthermore, unlike the metaphysics of Rand and other moderns, the metaphysics of Aristotle has it that essence is only in kinds of ousia (kinds of substance/entity) such as the kind man. The essence of man—rational animal—exhausts the kind man. Aristotle recognizes, naturally, that the individual man is more in particulars and specifics, more than the essence and ousia. Rand has it rather that the kind is only a class of individuals, each with all their identity, and essential characteristic(s) of the class concern causal and other explanatory relations, identities that are categories not only the category entity. Rather than her loose and overlapping categories of action, attribute, and relation, Rand could have conceived of them as mutually exclusive categories by confining attributes to traits not essentially in relation to other things and by confining relations to features not monadic and not action. It would remain, however, for her selection of fundamental categories that electric current, for example, could be (a) an attribute of an active conducting wire, manifest by shock or by resistance heating of the wire, and (b) a flow of electrons within the wire and (c) a source of the magnetic field around the wire. Assignment to a Randian category, unlike an Aristotelian one, should, I think, remain dependent on the physical situation under consideration. In the present example: (a) attribute, (b) action, (c) entity. In Rand’s fully developed theoretical philosophy, as I mentioned, essential characteristics, though factual, are functions of the human context of knowledge.[19] If we extend functional dependence of essential characteristic to context of consideration, then multiple highest genera of an existent is not problematic, unlike the circumstance for Aristotle with his metaphysically absolute essences, ever the same whatever our level of knowledge and context of consideration. Notes [1] AS 1016; ITOE 7, appx. 264–79. [2] ITOE appx. 157, 264; Aristotle, Cat. 2b3–6; Metaph. 1028a10–30. Aristotle maintained two sorts of substance, primary and secondary. The former would be an individual such as the individual man Parmenides; the latter would be the species or genus of such an individual. Rand’s entity is always only a concrete individual. [3] Aristotle, Metaph. 1028a30–b3. See further, Pasnau 2011, 99–102. [4] ITOE 15; Aristotle, Cat. 2a14–19; Cael. 298a26–b3; Metaph. 1028a10–b7. [5] Owens 1978, 137–54; see also Gotthelf 2012, 8n11. What is traditionally translated as being in Aristotle, is sometimes translated as existence; Barnes 1995, 72–77. Here again, we must not let that dull us to the differences between Aristotle and Rand on the concept in play. [6] Sachs 1999, xxxvi–xxxix. [7] Aristotle, Metaph. 1045b27–33; Lewis 2013, 13–15, 91. [8] Cael. 298a26–b3; Metaph. 1017b10–15, 1028b9–32, 1040b5–10, 1042a7–11. [9] Cat. 3b10–23; Metaph. 1028a12, 25–30. [10] A. Kossman, translator. [11] ITOE appx. 286. Koslicki 2018 offers a modern defense of Aristotle’s hylomorphism. [12] Aristotle, Metaph. 1028a32–33. [13] Top. 101b37; Metaph. 1025b11, 1029b14–16 ; ITOE 42, 45, 52. [14] Metaph. 1031a28–1032a5; see also Top. 135a9–12; further, Witt 1989 [15] Cat. 1b25–2a; Top. 103b20–25; Metaph. 1028b1–3. [16] ITOE 40–52. [17] What force is in our contemporary physics is also informed by the setting of force in relation to Hamiltonian mechanics, a more general classical mechanics having natural joins with quantum mechanics. Newton’s gravitational force, whose definition requires its fundamental equation, is also recast by situating it in the deeper successful theory that is general relativity. [18] Aristotle, De An. 429a10–430a26. [19] ITOE 43–47, 52. References Aristotle c.348–322. B.C. The Complete Works of Aristotle. J. Barnes, editor (1984). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Barnes, J. 1995. Metaphysics. In The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gotthelf, A. 2012. Teleology, First Principles, and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s Biology. New York: Oxford University Press. Koslicki, K. 2018. Form, Matter, Substance. New York: Oxford University Press. Owens, J. 1978 [1951]. The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. 3rd ed. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies. Pasnau, R. 2011. Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671. New York: Oxford University Press. Rand, A. 1943. The Fountainhead. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. ——. 1957. Atlas Shrugged. New York: Random House. ——. 1966–67. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. In Rand 1990. ——. 1990. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. Expanded 2nd ed. H. Binswanger and L. Peikoff, editors. New York: Meridian. Sachs, J., translator, 1999. Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Santa Fe: Green Lion Press. Witt, C. 1989. Substance and Essence in Aristotle. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

93b - 100b 10 - A definition is: an indemonstrable statement of essential nature, or a syllogism of essential nature (the difference is grammatical form), or the conclusion of a demonstration that has given essential nature. 11 - One version of the 4 causes, but not the commonly mentioned version. It seems to be missing material cause, and "antecedent which necessitates a consequence" replaces it. Aristotle seems to me cases where causes are linear as opposed to simultaneous or complementary. A cause can both exist for an end as well as by necessity. A cause might also only be for an end, like why people build houses. 12 - Further ideas about temporality in relation to causes. Processes are divisible, events are indivisible and atomic. Past events and present processes are not contiguous. Aristotle says that a process contains an infinity of past events. But I don't understand how if a process contains an infinity of past events, that it wouldn't be contiguous? In any case, the issue might be translation, and Aristotle recognizes that this explanation is not good enough because he says he will talk more about it later (he might be offering a response to his ideas). 13 - This section basically describes what we would consider epistemology about the way concepts are related to each other. Aristotle talks about a method to tracing predicated elements that contain or involve the definable form. I understand this to mean finding what are in fact the essential elements of a subject that are put into its definition. Even more simply, the method of how to properly define something. He talks about attributes that apply to the subject and has wide application, but doesn't extend beyond the genus. This sounds equivalent to the CCD. Hue applies to red, but also green, and in fact all colors - the genus. These are the kind of attributes we need to think about. Further he says that if you're writing a book about a subject generically as a whole (a general handbook about a subject), you should divide the genus into species, then find the definition with the help of what I called the CCD. After that, examine the differentiae. Divisions are not primary. But dividing from something more general to something more specific will guarantee that the general category will contain everything more specific. Find what elements a set of individuals in a species have in common. Repeat this, but for a different species in the same genus. Keep going until you find a particular identity, and can create a formula for that identity, that is, the definition. But! If you reach several formulas, you have to do more work. Or at least, you are defining more than one thing actually. Although this still is far from scientific experimentation, Aristotle clearly advocates for examining specific individuals of multiple species and finding out what they do. 14 - Collect common characters that you observe. Sometimes, though, the common character has no specific name. 17 - Effects may have more than one cause, but not when the subjects are the same species. 19 - If you possess scientific knowledge from birth, it would mean that you possess apprehensions more accurate than demonstration and fail to notice those apprehensions. If you need to acquire those apprehensions, you would need to do so with pre-existing knowledge (but you don't have the apprehension in the first place of any knowledge!). So, there must be some capacity, because we still manage to apprehend things, but it can't necessarily be superior then developed states like scientific knowledge. Aristotle explains this capacity by reasoning from animals in general. Because of sense perception, all animals have a discriminatory capacity. To the extent that sense impression does not persist, the animal doesn't "know" anything beyond the simple act of perceiving. If the sense impression persists, and repeated enough, it becomes memory. When memories repeat enough, they become experiences; memories becoming experiences is possible for those with the power of systematizing. Essentially, Aristotle is saying that the capacity and basis for our ability to possess scientific knowledge through demonstration is built up from the capacity of sense perception. He is giving a biological explanation. The content of sense perception is universal? This is unclear. Then again, Aristotle literally says his statement will be unclear. He says that intuition is always true. I doubt that he means intuition in this context the way we mean it.

I see no inconsistency in the statement tadmjones quotes. It names two species of the genus freedom (among several others including religious freedom, medical freedom and the freedom to cross borders). "I bought some fruit: grapes, apricots and pears" is similarly not a contradiction, although "a grape is an apricot" is.

On page 15 I'm having trouble with what exactly the ccd is and the distinguishing characteristics role in the ccd.

The learnings from study-group are turning out to be much better than expected. Just yesterday I clarified my understanding of CCD. Posting the "Acknowledgement of error" little bit later in this post. Apart from that there have been debates on whether entities rather than attributes can be standard of measurement, and whether symbols in the form of sets should be used for concept formation. Primary focus still remains text though, and we are studying mainly through Q&A. Number of participants has now increased to 10, and knowledge level of one of the new participant is really good. Here is the acknowledgement I posted after the new participant identified error in my understanding of CCD Acknowledging error in my understanding of CCD After reading post "A Couple of Observations", I have realized that my understanding of CCD was mistaken. I was indeed using it interchangeably with essence of particular concept like "table". Having said that, there are few things that require explanation 1. If in my previous posts, we replace CCD with essence, I think that will more or less cleanse them. Little bit of restructring might still be needed though. Same error has penetrated some of my already finalized coming posts, I will try to rectify these as much as possible. 2. Now two questions that come to mind are a. What is CCD ? b. Why is it needed in concept formation ? Here is what I have arrived at after trying to correct error in my understanding a. As has been pointed in another posts, CCD is the "Genus" of essential characteristics of the concept. Further, that Genus has same characteristic in foil, "chair shape" in case of example table, as another unit of CCD "shape". The concept of that "Genus", shape in this case, may be formed much later than the concept like "table" for which it is CCD. And therefore it is not part of concept explicitly, or even implicitly, as by implicit undertstanding we mean grasping existent which is the unit of concept. As I mentioned before, concept will include its units, later it will add some more units, and also derive some characteristics from those units. These characteristics will further be classified as essential and epistemologically accidental(like color for table). So every concept, at any point of time can be described by its units, characteristics, and essence. My stand on this aspect of concept formation remains unchanged. b. Now coming to why is CCD needed. CCD I think has same role in understanding of "method of formation of concept", as concept has in understanding of reality(here I am referring to physical world of tables and chairs as reality). Concept economizes large number of tables we have seen, and the knowledge we have about those tables in the form of characteristics of those tables. Further it has symbol and definition, using which we can bring units and characteristics to consciousness through reduction. Similarly, CCD of particular concept economizes large amount of knowledge we have gained about the "formation of that concept". So after recognizing CCD of table as shape, we can reduce to "shape of table" and "shape of chair" as the two units of shape. This will imply that these two attributes, even though not understood at the time of formation of "concept table", were used in isolating tables from chairs in identity stage. Further, while in case of table and early concept of entities, concept of corresponding CCD shape was formed much later. In case of gravity, concept of corresponding CCD "cause" was formed before concept gravity. So in that sense, CCD is like a concept, enabling subsuming of new and more complex units, after it is formed. Therefore I used the sentence "The concept of that "Genus", shape in this case, may be formed much later than the concept like "table" for which it is CCD.

Only indirectly, as a reaction to the horrors of AI “reasoning”. Of course I am using “can” in the standard Objectivist way, as “possible, based on evidence”, not “imaginable, where anything is possible” and one can “imagine” A and Not A being simultaneously true. I have wasted some time trying to understand the “epistemology” of ChatGPT, and conclude that its greatest weakness is that there is little if anything that passes for a relationship between evidence, and evaluation of evidence. I was puzzled about how something so fundamental could be missed, but then I realized that this is because the system doesn’t have anything like a conceptual system that constitutes its knowledge of the universe, it has a vast repository of sensory impressions – a gruel of “information”. But furthermore: it cannot actually observe the universe, it can only store raw experiences that a volitional consciousness of the genus homo hands it. If you ask about the basis for one of its statements (ordinary statements of observable fact, not high-level abstractions), it just gives templatic answers about “a wide variety of sources and experts”. It does react to a user rejecting one of its statements, apologizing for any confusion, embracing the contradiction, then saying that usually A and Not A are not both true. It is perfectly happy to just make up facts. Sometimes it says that there are many possible answers, it depends on context, then if you give it some context it will make up an answer. Human reasoning is centered around conceptual and propositional abstractions that subsume observations, where the notion of “prediction” is central to evaluation of knowledge. Competing theories are central to human knowledge, so when we encounter a fact that can be handled by one theory but not another, we have gained knowledge that affects our evaluation of the competing systems. These AIs do not seem to evaluate knowledge, or even data. Instead, they filter responses based on something – it seems to be centered around "the current conversation".

Four Things 1. For several days running, the odd (to us) insect pictured to the right would sit on the hood of my wife's car. It looked like a leaf, but had grasshopper-like legs. I'd never seen one in my life. After taking several photographs and sending them to family, I searched and quickly learned that this was actually a very common bug whose name I'd heard many times before, a katydid:Image by the author, who permits reproduction and use.The only species in the genus Pterophylla, the Common True Katydid (formerly called Northern True Katydid) is the insect that everyone associates with the name "katydid." This species is large, bright green, and bulky in appearance. Even though its forewings are large, the Common True Katydid is incapable of flight. The males have a dark brown stridulatory field. It is extremely difficult to capture these katydids because they are usually high up in trees, especially oaks, and they blend well with their surroundings. During the breeding season, however, they may sometimes be found walking across roads, moving in the direction of dense choruses.At the link are recordings of the sound the males make and which give these beautiful insects their name. 2. Back in Boston, when my wife was pregnant with our daughter, I noticed during classes about childbirth that the folks at the hospital had a strange, yet very consistent way of pronouncing the word centimeter. Randomly recalling this and that someone incorrectly told me that "sohntimeter" was the French pronunciation, I tried to figure out what this was, and why it happened. Here is part of what I found:Well-educated folks, born and raised in the USA with English as their primary language and no trace of a foreign accent, were speaking oddly - but only in the context of metric measurements. Very specifically, the unit which referred to a hundredth of a meter: They called it a "son-timeter." ... I'm generally not a member of the Grammar Police, and I tend not to offer correction when I hear folks misusing words or saying things the wrong way - it leads to defensiveness, hurt feelings, and the risk of coming off as a nerd or know-it-all. Certainly, when the erroneous party is my senior (in age and/or rank), I err on the side of caution. I felt motivated to action, however, as I saw that, one by one, other residents in the program, and even medical students on radiology rotations, were falling prey to linguistic peer-pressure. Before my dismayed eyes (or, more accurately, ears), they switched from speaking of centimeters to sontimeters. As a member of a teaching facility, I determined that I should not stand idly by, even if I did risk some backlash. So it was that I finally administered a pop-quiz to one such student (or junior resident; I cannot recall which): What do you call the insect that has a hundred legs? (I got a momentary look of confusion, then the answer.) "Centipede." What's the word for a period of a hundred years? (Less hesitation this time.) "Century." How much is a penny worth? "One cent." So, what's a hundredth of a meter? (A rewarding look of comprehension and relief.) "A centimeter." I never saw a single disciple of mine revert to sontimeters...I found vindication on this search, more than an answer, although I am sure "linguistic peer pressure" had something to do with it, perhaps originating from a would-be Francophile medical professor somewhere ages ago. 3. The holiday season is long past, but this story about Iberian ham sniffers was a fun read and is still worth passing on:One aspect of Cinco Jotas' quality control beats its other old-world habits by a nose: a cadre of six sniffers whose job is to poke each pork loin in four specific places with probes made of cow bone and take evaluative whiffs. The probe is called a cala, and a sniffer's formal title is calador. This olfactory squad is core to the ham factory. To test the curing process, the caladores puncture, in rapid succession, four specific spots -- the hock, next to the hip bone, and twice around a joint of the hip and femur. After they probe, they quickly repair the holes using their fingers to smudge the perforations with fat from the meat. ... The pigs are acorn-fed, so the sniffers are seeking an ideal bouquet of woody, umami nuttiness with a slight sweetness. The aroma must not be too strong or toasted, an indication that the meat is on a path toward pasty texture. Not every scent profile they rule against is putrid or vile. Rejects often smell like coffee, licorice or toffee. The sniffers' exquisite attentiveness has been unexpectedly helpful, such as when Mr. Vega once detected a gas leak at the factory.No need to page Mike Rowe about this job, though: Applicants must pass a very stringent test of their olfactory discrimination ability. The company rarely gives the test, which some take hours to complete, and only three people have ever gotten a perfect score. 4. Neat Site of the Week: "Your deadline is coming up, and for some reason you're the one handling Arabic text on the project," the brief description at Help! Is this عربي? begins. The guy who created this site reminds me of the medical professor in Item 2 above, but he has accepted a much more difficult mission. I know next to nothing nothing about Arabic, but even I have spotted script misaligned to the left in the wild, so I feel for him. -- CAVLink to Original

From that second link, in the preceding post, to Lennox: Lyell pretty clearly assumes that to allow for evolution is to deny the reality of species. For a species to be ‘real’, it must have ‘permanent existence in nature’, or as he puts it elsewhere , “…fixed limits beyond which the descendants from common parents can never deviate from a certain type…”. (Lyell 1831, II. 23) To accept evolutionary change, on this view, you must become comfortable with a variety of nominalism about species. And Darwin seems to have become so.[9] Permanence, as applied to species, is for Darwin a relative concept, and there are no fixed limits to variability within a species. Given enough time the individual differences found in all populations can give rise to more permanent and stable varieties, these to sub-species, and these to populations that systematists will want to class as distinct species. Moreover, he concludes the Origin with very strong words on this topic, words bound to alarm his philosophical readers: Lyell, Herschel, Whewell, Sedgwick and many of Darwin’s contemporaries certainly would not find this a cheering prospect, since they were unrepentant essentialists about species.[10] Members of a species possess a ‘type’ established in the original parents, and this type provides ‘fixed limits’ to variability. Lyell clearly feels this is an empirically verifiable fact—most of chapters 2–4 of Principles Vol. II is devoted to presenting the evidence that such ‘fixed limits’ exist; and after the Origin’s publication this evidence was canvassed again in Fleeming Jenkin’s review. If this is so, then species extinction is easy to account for—there are fixed limits to a species’ ability to track environmental change. But a naturalistic account of species origination is more difficult, since there will need to be, in sexually reproducing species, a natural production of a new pair of parents with a new type. On the other hand, to adopt the sort of nominalism that Darwin seems to be advocating in the above quotations has undesirable consequences as well. How are we to formulate objective principles of classification? What sort of a science of animals and plants will be possible if there are no fixed laws relating their natures to their characteristics and behaviors? A good deal of chapter 2 of Darwin’s Origin is devoted to convincing the reader that current best practice among botanists and zoologists accepts a natural world organized as he is insisting rather than as his opponents claim: From a Darwinian perspective, this is a predictable consequence of the fact that the organisms we today wish to classify as species are merely the most recent stage of a slow, gradual evolutionary process. Organisms within a genus have common ancestors, perhaps relatively recent common ancestors; some naturalists may see ten species with a few varieties in each; others may rank some of the varieties as species and divide the same genus into twenty species. Both classifications may be done with the utmost objectivity and care by skilled observers. As systematists like to say, some of us are ‘lumpers’, some of us are ‘splitters’. Reality is neither. 2.3.5 Tempo and Mode of Evolutionary Change The question of nominalism versus realism regarding species points toward a final aspect of Darwin’s theory with which many of those otherwise sympathetic to him disagreed, his gradualism. For apart from the question of whether his views entailed ‘nominalism’ about natural kinds, they do seem to reflect a belief that the evolutionary process must be a slow and gradual one. It is perhaps here that we see the most lasting impact of Darwin’s careful study of Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology while on H.M.S. Beagle. I stress slow and gradual, for it is clear that one could have a slow but non-gradual evolutionary process (perhaps the long periods of evolutionary stasis punctuated by geologically rapid periods of speciation postulated by Eldridge and Gould’s ‘punctuated equilibrium model’ is such); and one could have a rapid but gradual one (for example the process George Gaylord Simpson labeled ‘adaptive radiation’, where a population migrates to a location with a variety of unexploited niches, and rapidly evolves to exploit them). Darwin stresses over and over again that he conceives of natural selection ‘adding up infinitely small variations’, and that he imagines the process of speciation to take place over a very long period of time. One of the strongest arguments for insisting that ‘Darwinism’ as it is used today is isomorphic to Darwin’s Darwinism, as Gayon puts it, is that each of these questions is still hotly debated, and has been throughout the theory’s history. With all of the amazing changes that have been wrought by the genetic, biochemical, and molecular revolutions, with the development of mathematical models of population genetics and ecology, of sophisticated techniques for both field and laboratory investigation of evolutionary processes, and of cladistic analysis in systematics, it nevertheless remains true that one can find evolutionary biologists who adhere to Darwin’s Darwinism, and are recognized as doing so by both themselves and their critics. In the next section of this article, I will develop a portrait of contemporary Darwinism around each of these contested features. By the same token, however, Darwinism has evolved. As one example of this truth, think for a moment of contemporary debates about the nature of selection. The problems people had with natural selection in the 19th century continue to be problematic, but there are a variety of problems that were either not discussed, or discussed very differently, in the 19th century. Can, and does, natural selection work at levels other than the level of Darwin’s focus, individual organisms; is there a non-vacuous way to formulate the theory abstractly; how are we to understand the relationships between the concepts of fitness, selection and adaptation? How strong are the constraints on the selection process, and what sorts of constraints are there? Are there other motors of evolutionary change besides selection, and if so, how important are they? In particular, how important is ‘drift’, and how are we to differentiate it from selection?

Boydstun, I feel like you're almost talking about how similarity criteria are used in engineering. In the case of elastic deformation, the Poisson ratio comes to mind. Or consider such proposals for chemistry as this: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8607974/ With regard to your remarks on what you're calling magnitude dimensions, a given characteristic might map to a number of them. But if our state of knowledge hasn't found something as rigorous as dimensions, we'd have to enumerate and map out the CCD's some other way. One type of situation that comes to mind is how sometimes not having a certain characteristic counts against the possibility of it being an A much more than having the characteristic provides strong evidence for the possibility of it being an A. That sort of asymmetry could complicate the use of a rigorous definition that you already trust. Also, while a tentative definition can sometimes help, I can think of two major classes of situations where a definition could be misleading: 1. There can be situations where it is premature to try to articulate a definition. Consider that before we learned that the number of protons defined the elements and constrained oxidation numbers, elements were given lengthy descriptions and were associated with specific chemical tests to determine composition of materials. 2. There are perfectly decent definitions which do not explain a number of characteristics actually used for the purpose of classification. Consider "heat flow". Or consider the use of equations serving as similarity criteria for comparing physical systems.

6 - There is a point about negation that I don't understand, it sounds convoluted. It seems like he is saying that supposing a genus absolutely singular like a Platonic Form, somebody dividing that genus with a negation would not be possible - Length would never lack breadth (or never have breadth) so it would not be possible to divide in this way. It almost sounds like context is missing, because this only seems to be a response intended for Platonists. Is the species or genus rendered as the differentia? Is the species or object predicated of the differentia? Is locality or present time rendered as the differentia? Is affectation rendered as the differentia? It shouldn't be, because the differentia shouldn't be what is changing, but rather, what is staying the same. Differentiae indicate quality. 8 - Another attack on Platonism at the end of the chapter. Absolute wishing is for the absolute good. There cannot be apparent absolute good to a Platonist, because Ideas are supposed to be spoken of in relation to other Ideas. So if a Platonist talks about apparent good, they cannot be talking about Forms. Usually the word apparent is constructive for conation, but it is destructive when used against a Platonist since it reveals their disconnection from reality. 10 - Aristotle really doesn't like Platonism. Basically, the idea seems to be check whether somebody's definitions contradict their own philosophical position especially when those positions are common. Is a single definition used to define more than one sense of an ambiguous term? If it applies to all of them, it is not true of any of them. 11 - for definitions of complex terms, when taking away the definition of one of the elements, does the rest of the definition of the complex term apply to the rest of the elements? If you define 'finite straight line', leaving out the definition of 'finite line' should leave you with the definition of straight.

Not sure if the reply below will answer your question in general. After I finished it, I thought you might be annoyed that I didn't directly answer your question, so I added these couple of sentences here, to try to avert that. I would tend to say that if I limit my knowledge to just this screen, in essence become a child with no prior knowledge, then I would say that yes my pictures I have on my screen in comparison to these two stamps, would make me say that the two stamps are similar. First we need to understand what we mean by similar. Do we mean that kinda, for the most part? Or do we mean exactly? Rand's similarity would be exactly. Exactly within the parameters I set, something either is or is not an automobile. Similarity is contextual. The context are the items that you are comparing something to (the relationships among the items). The species to the genus, in concept formation. However, if you want to compare one stamp against the other, you would say that they are not exactly alike, they are not similar, IF you are just comparing the two and using the term similarity in an exact manner. (The black marks are different and one is torn). If we just weigh the amount of common traits and similar traits among the two objects - we would say that they are similar, if by similar you mean kinda of, for the most part. That's just comparing one stamp to the other, and I object to that method, because it is not precise and is undefined and assumes that similarity isn't a classification system by man for his needs, but inherent in the objects themselves (only). Of course, that is much different than similarity in forming a concept and grouping a number of items under one concept, because we are only going to form a concept when we have the need for unit economy. My points on similarity have been in relation to concept formation - that's the context. in regards to concept formation, you notice similarity based not only with the existing items on display as above and other items in the immediate environment but also in relation to all of your previous knowledge. Are these stamps similar? Depends on the context of the knowledge that you have. Given that I've seen a lot of different stamps in my lifetime and I compare these stamps to them, I would say that these stamps are similar, exactly the same in a certain respect (omitting the different black lines on them and the torn edge on the one) compared to the genus of all the other stamps that I have seen. Keeping in mind that I'm mentally taking the one item (two attached stamps) and mentally creating two individual items to compare, against my entire memory of all the stamps that I have experienced and remembered in my life. Ask your self - could these two stamps be dis-similar? In that they wouldn't be included in the same concept, assuming that we had a need to form concept of this particular kind of entity in reality? Certainly not if I compare them to the various stamps that I have seen in my lifetime or the other images on my computer screen. Based on a genus that is all the stamps that I have seen in my life i would say that they are similar. However, if I was a stamp collector and had seen and knew that the black markings on the stamp on the right were printed on 42 million of these stamps that were made and that the stamp on the left had the different location of the black markings because it was the last stamp on the final run and was personal torn off by Jefferson himself, then I would say that these two are not similar, that the stamp on the left is significantly different than the stamp on the right - in relation to the genus (42 million prior Jefferson stamps) as opposed to the genus of every stamp ever made. This is where based on your need and purpose, you control the choice of the genus, the items that you want to compare those items that you are trying to identify for a specific purpose. Are these two stamps similar? That question always has to be are these two stamps contextually similar? There isn't absolute knowledge that has no relation to anything else. What's the context? It's based on your values. The thought that you can see similarity by looking at two items and just comparing them to each other - really since everything is different - they would not be exactly the same, then nothing would be similar UNLESS your definition of similarity is a vague resemblance or not exactly the same but mostly the same. She has created an exact system of thought. It is or it is not, no grey area. Also, if all you had to do was compare two items, in other words that is the only way that you determined similarity, then things would be similar (assuming two things could be exactly the same) or not similar, AND that would never change. That would be a world where things were absolute, where knowledge was not about relative relationships among things but frozen in time. That would be the erasing of value, goals, intent, context, life from knowledge, when those are the only reason we have knowledge! Knowledge is always in relation to man, to your needs and purpose- that's the context for the relevant & appropriate genus. As I described above, depending on the genus chosen, the stamps could be considered similar or not similar. Now, if the stamp on the left was unique and different than the stamp on the right and also different than the other 42 million stamps that matched the one on the right, and Jefferson himself had torn it off of the last run, then I would imagine it would be worth a tremendous amount of money and that would further make me consider it NOT similar to the other stamp, for obvious reasons (black markings are different plus the value is different). On the other hand, if you didn't know the story behind it, regardless of the fact that it was slightly different than the other 42 million, you might group it with the 42 million against all the other different types of stamps and just see it as a 2 cent stamp, lick it and mail off your envelope. So the last paragraph, not only took the markings into consideration when comparing the stamps to other stamps, but it also took into account the value of the stamp in addition to the markings. Similarity is contextual. It's not just in the objects, but it's items in the objects viewed from a certain comparative relationship. So to quote her on page 6 and 7 of ITOE 2nd edition "Notice that the concept "unit" involves an act of consciousness ( a selective focus, a certain way of regarding things), but that it is not an arbitrary creation of consciousness: it is a method of identification or classification according to the attributes which a consciousness observes in reality. This method permits any number of classifications and cross-classifications: one may classify things according to their shape or color or weight or size or atomic structure; but the criterion of classification is not invented, it is perceived in reality. Thus the concept "unit" is a bridge between metaphysics and epistemology: units do not exist qua units, what exists are things, but units are things viewed by a consciousness in certain existing relationships." While reading the above quote, I would add something to it. Because it covers that your identifying something in reality, and involves a certain way of regarding things, that is by shape, color, etc., but instead of saying "it is a method of identification or classification according to the attributes which a consciousness observes in reality", while true, that's a little dry for me, a little scientific and doesn't fully validate the value judgment made in picking the classification category. You don't just classify according to the attributes you observe in reality. That's part of the story but not the whole story, the relevant classification takes into account your values, desires and goals. Those control the proper context for selecting the relevant genus that provides the concept that is correct for that context. As noted in the two stamp examples above, how you value something or your intent or goal, determines what you compare it to 9chosen genus) and what you do with it. Similarly, picking a genus to create your concept is no different than picking a standard to measure movement. Is the pen on the table in front of you moving? No, not in relation to you. However, If you are an astronaut, traveling to the far reaches of the galaxy, and are coming back next week, you better realize that your pen is moving otherwise when you come back on the same exact path that you went out on, you'll miss the planet earth. The genus chosen in forming a concept has to be appropriate for the value and goal at hand. Your values and the goal at hand determines the appropriate context that guides the appropriate and relevant choice of genus to use. That in turn, controls your result of whether something is similar or not.

If I only could pick one of your answers then it would be the first one. Certainly not the second one. So before I go, I've been studying her book ITOE over a period of 30 years now, off and on. That set the foundation that allowed me to make some big jumps when I started writing about it. If anyone wants to really learn a subject matter then write about it and it's an amazing process on your way to clarity. It's funny though, I consider her an incredible writer yet I've reached a point where I see a lot of presentation flaws in ITOE which makes it confusing and much more difficult to pick up the concepts. Unfortunate, because I've always found it to be an incredible book, and wish it would become available easier to more people. She is literally all over the map when it comes to similarity descriptions in the ITOE 2nd edition. Mostly due to the fact that the relevant context or frames of reference are not clearly identified. I'd like to thank dreamweaver for the interaction, as it allowed me to find my answer via this discourse. On the bottom of page 139 she states a vague idea of similarity and differences. However she clearly identifies the principle on page 140. "Observe that you would first have to grasp that there is such an entity, and then you would have to grasp in what way it is different from the class of objects which it resembles most." As referenced on the previous page yet the same answer, she is saying that the similarity is what they have in common with the things they resemble most, the genus i.e. the conceptual common denominator. The differences are the differences this specific group, set of measurements has with the genus, that is the distinguishing characteristic(s) that identifies the concept. She's saying that these automobiles are similar to motor vehicles and different in a certain way that distinguishes them from other motor vehicles, thus creating the concept automobile. Here's my problem or what perspective one needs to understand, is that, you don't directly (without a comparison to a foil) see similarity. Her writing implies or can lead the reader to believe that in regards to the genus, that you saw that similarity directly, as opposed to her definition of similarity as common differences to a genus. I think it is important to understand that you don't see "similarities and differences", that to be consistent you see "differences and differences", you see differences of trains, boats, automobiles from other items and that is how you create the similarity of the genus - motor vehicles. Then you do that step again, in order to determine the common differences that isolates the concept automobile from motor vehicles, that is you see the range of motor vehicles that specifies automobiles because they are different than other motor vehicles in the same way. She is starting from the CCD as a given starting point when it isn't, it too like the concept is created by noticing a common difference from a larger background. But she shortcuts that as a starting point and calls that noticing similarities and although the step below it performs the exact same thing, she calls that noticing differences. Her frame of reference is the genus- as a given -in regards that the items in question say trains, boats and automobiles are all similar and create the genus, (but you can't drop the context in regards to her ultimate similarity definition - common differences to a foil) that is in relation to the genus, these items are different in the same way. Fair enough if we understand the frame of reference. But I think it is important to understand the principle that similarity is common differences to a foil, so whether it be the genus or the range of measurements within the genus that identifies the concept, you find similarity by comparing to a wider category, a broader range of measurements. The common differences first establishes the genus from a wider range of measurements - that allows one to see that trains, planes and boats are similar IN RELATION to a wider group, then you perform the same calculation again, the specific measurement of automobiles within the larger range of motor vehicles, similarity is created by common differences to a wider range of measurements i.e. items. So you see similar items and then similar items within that group. or you see the common differences of certain items to a larger group and then again common differences to that group which forms your concept. A concept is a standard of measurement, of a relationship between a certain group of particulars in relation to the a larger group of similar objects. It's a two step repeated process. In addition, to writing about it, for those that really are fanatics - I'd take the entire book, put it on a word document, and have it reorganized into the following three categories 1) measurement, 2) Language/grammar, 3) concept, also alternatively once you grasp the basics of the book, reverse the order of the book - chapter 7 - cognitive role of concepts as chapter one and then chapter 6 is chapter 2, etc. starts to make more sense that way. I've appreciated this forum - but I've finished my research enough to finish the first chapter of my book and move onto the 2nd - it's an eight year project to integrate cognitive psychology, neuroscience, physics, geometry, anatomy into an integrated movement theory for the golf swing. All the Best! Mike

Metaphysics translated by Joe Sachs Book A 1 - Aristotle says that art is about things that are usually the case, produces something, and often involves skill. It seems that art in this sense is any subject that is deeply inductive by virtue of being extremely complex or being heavily context bound. I would say that anything he says about art pertains more to what we think of as induction in the modern world than what he says of what is translated with the word induction (epogee). Art comes out of many conceptions from experience, in a universal judgment or as from what is similar. This idea is even more like the modern sense of induction. 2 - Aristotle seems to say that people seek knowledge out of the freedom to do so and that knowledge freely gained is the best. This is explained mostly in terms of how scholarly thought is best accomplished when leisure is possible. But leisure seems to also suggest that knowledge can be pursued more deeply when one doesn't need to worry about basic survival or warfare. If knowledge freely gained is the best, then implicitly, I think Aristotle is advocating freedom of thought. 3-8 - A history of analyzing causes. 9 - Forms are shared in so they must be of independent things. They must share in each by virtue of what is not attributed to underlying subject. If forms were patterns, then there would be forms of forms. Aristotle says that philosophy has become mathematical for people. He is pointing out that other philosophers of his time were overly focused on the abstract instead of observation. Book a (α) 2 - Acting for sake of something requires that the process be finite. 3 - Mathematical precision is best for immaterial things. Book B 1 - It is easier to know you reach the end if you know all the ways you can get stuck. 3 - There cannot be a genus of thinghood because the differentia needs to be outside the genus. 4 - If the one is not independent, the number of things can’t be either. If the one is independent, then how is any being more than one? 5 - If the forms are things like points more so than the forms own bodies, nothing could be independent. 6 - If the universal were independent then Socrates would be many kinds of animals. I think this means that if a universal is independent, it would have being - in which case Socrates would be an independent individual animal, independent individual human, and so on, all at the same time.

Book VIII (H) 2 – If thinghood is the cause of being, one must look for what is responsible for being. 3 – Independent things are like numbers because if you add or subtract anything, they are no longer the same. They are complete of a particular nature. 4 – Articulation that includes cause is the formal cause. Book IX (Θ) 1 – Potency is a source of change in some other thing or in the same thing as other. 2 – Potencies that include reason are capable of contrary effects. That's why people can be bad or good. 4 – I don’t understand this chapter at all. 5 – Whatever something desires, is what it does, whenever what it is capable of is present and that something approaches its object. Psychologically, this would mean everyone does what they desire as long as there are no obstacles and people perceive those desires. I'd say this is why behavior can be predicted, and why people are not totally indeterministic. 6 – Actions without ends are not complete. Being at work is complete. 7 – Being-in-potency is when things are in virtue of themselves and nothing stands in the way. 8 – A thing the same in form and at-work takes precedence in time. I think this means that a mover comes before a potential. Being-at-work comes before thinghood, like man to boy. A boy (despite being what this thing is right now) grows towards being a man, and the nature of what he is, is determined by the work of being a man. When material is at-work, it is in the form that it was going toward(when it was just a potency as a material). 9 - In geometrical figures the things inside them are discovered by being drawn, so their being-at-work is in contemplation. Book X (I) 1 – To be one is to be the primary measure of each class of things. Every amount is known by what is one. This one is a standard of measure as an irreducible unit. A measure is the same kind of thing as what it measures. This suggests that if you form a class of things, they can only be made universal with a measurement. That way, everything being measured is necessarily the same kind of thing. Also, the measurement is standard and consistent because the amount that the measurement even is, is known by what is one. 3 – Things differ in genus that do not have common material and do not turn into one another. 4 – Contrary things are spoken of with one of the contrary things viewed as a deprivation. Good as the presence of something that is good, bad as the deprivation of good. 6 – The one is what measures multitude. One measures, multitude is measured. They are opposed in this way. 7 – In-between things are composed of opposites. Something in-between good and bad as characteristics of both. 8 – The genus is the material of the species. Things that differ in species are a contrariness. 9 – The articulation makes a difference in species, but material and articulation does not. There is no contrary in the last one. This idea is confusing to me.

I'm not sure where exactly to place Rand on this, but I will argue to lean towards analogy. First, I would preface this by saying that I don't think she was aware of these debates which were pre-modern inter-Scholastic debates. Maybe in some discussions she had, but she only wrote things which can incidentally wander into these issues at some times, like the whole act-potency issue. She does not really have a developed doctrine. We moreso comment on what she doesn't appear to think on some issue because she never mentioned it specifically, like say, the issue of perfections of nature. But, I think we are just as justified in asking whether other positions she does take commit her to that position, like whether her adoption of life-based teleology, causality as identity in action, and the non-existence of evil commit her to, or at least gel with, perfections of nature. In the quoted part above, I think there's something about the act-potency distinction that commit us to rejecting univocality of being or existence. Consider the following argument: 1. Act is real ie., it exists. 2. Potency is real ie., it exists. 3. If potency existed in the same univocal sense in which act does, then it wouldn't really be distinct from act. 4. Potency is distinct from act. 5. So potency cannot exist in the same univocal sense as act. Potency-in-being is not being-in-act, they are really different things, after all. But potency isn't nothing either, it really exists, ie., is a kind of being. And since it is really distinct from act, we can't say it exists univocally or equivocally, so it must exist analogously (a Thomist would argue. Of course we'd have to develop that further to establish to positive treatment of the analogy of being.) The relationships between the existence of an actuality and the existence of a potentiality are not identical, otherwise the potentiality wouldn't exist as a potentiality, it would be actual, and everything that exists would be actual. There would be no act-potency distinction. Nevertheless there is a similarity between the relationships, they both exist, just in different non-identical ways, hence analogous and not equivocal. Of course much more could be said about primary potency and secondary potency to round out the case. And much more smarter people than I have been debating this issue in much more detail, with many more distinctions and examples, than I will ever probably understand. However I just want to make the point that I think Rand is committed to the analogy of being. The reason for this (beyond just that she appears to hold an act-potency distinction) is as follows: Univocal terms, of course, are perfectly valid among many things, and can be applied to very different things sometimes. But there is a crucial difference in the case of existence or being (I'm using them interchangeably for now.) A term like "animal" is applied to dogs, giraffes, fish, mammals, etc., because they are all species (logical usage of "species," not the biology term) of animal. In that way, "animal" is univocal. It names a genus under which various species fall. What's different about each is captured by the differentia and the differentia is external to the genus under which the thing it specifies falls. But, being or existence does not name a genus, such that substance, accident, essences, powers (or in the Randian) entity, attribute, actions, relationships, etc. are not understood as the various "species of existence." You yourself say: Correct. And Rand says (ITOE 59) "Since axiomatic concepts are not formed by differentiating one group of existents from others, but represent an integration of all existents, they have no Conceptual Common Denominator with anything else. They have no contraries, no alternatives. The contrary of the concept “table”—a non-table-is every other kind of existent. The contrary of the concept “man”—a non-man—is every other kind of existent. “Existence,” “identity” and “consciousness” have no contraries—only a void. It may be said that existence can be differentiated from non-existence; but non-existence is not a fact, it is the absence of a fact, it is a derivative concept pertaining to a relationship, i.e., a concept which can be formed or grasped only in relation to some existent that has ceased to exist." So we can't grasp entity or attribute (substance or accident) and so forth without grasping them as having being. But we can grasp, say, being cold blooded apart from "animal." There is nothing that can serve as a differentia to existence or being in that case to mark out existence because the only thing external to existence is non-existence, which is nothing, and it can't serve as a differentia precisely because it's nothing. So while all the concrete entities, attributes, actions, relationships and so forth that do exist are units of the concept of existence, they are not in fact species of existence, that is not how they are related. Thus, existence cannot be predicated of things in a univocal (or equivocal for that matter) way. It is predicated on a proportion or relationship of similarity, but not identity. Existence in relation to entities is identity, but entities do not exist identically and aren't predicated that way either. Thus, it seems if Rand wants to maintain this notion of the concept of existence, she should be committed to the analogy of being.

Topics translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge Numbered in terms of chapters. Book I 1 - Reasoning is dialectical when it uses generally accepted opinions, as distinct from using demonstrations (mostly deductions). 4 - arguments start with propositions, the subjects of reasoning are problems. Problems and propositions are only different in terms of how they are phrased; Problems are questions, propositions are statements. 5 - Properties belong to that thing alone but do not indicate the essence. There are also temporary properties, which are relative. 6 - If you show that the attribute (subject?) in question fails to belong either to property, genus, or accident, you have demolished the definition. 7 - There are 3 kinds of sameness: Number (the referent has more than one name, like doublet and cloak) Specifically (the same species) Generally (the same genus) But Aristotle still suggests more, despite the 3 kinds. In reference to alternative names and definitions (same as the number distinction) in reference to a shared property (what can acquire knowledge is the same as man, which sounds like specifically) Substituting a term with an accident (Socrates is the same as the man who is sitting)

Maybe, hopefully someone else can jump in and answer my question. Which is if you say in the same sentence in regards to forming a concept "similarities and differences" to what are you referencing the differences to? Because I'm beginning to think that although I made a tremendous effort to identify my point, question, issue - it's been missed. Likewise and in the same regard, I read your reply post Dreamweaver and I consider it doesn't answer my question that i've asked, when I assume you think it does (nothing against you on that one - potentially the same issue that I am having). Let me introduce one example of how "similarities and differences" in that sentence could make sense IF interpreted in a certain perspective. If you noticed similarities between the items in the concept that you are forming - cash, coin, stamp, promissory note, against a group of wider objects and that formed your CCD. Then you noticed specific differences of the stamps in relation to the CCD. Since the term similarity is noticing differences in both cases - you ignore that and say that you noticed the things in common to form the CCD and then noticed the things that are different from the CCD (the DC) to form the concept. Similarities CCD and differences DC. But then again, notice that you've switched the perspective as you move from one to the other, because you could easily and more correctly say that you noticed just similarities or just common differences in both cases i.e. in forming the CCD and in forming the DC. I am interested in a reply from someone - in regards to the sentence that I quoted from Dreamweaver: Hoping someone can help me. Dreamweaver - nothing personal against you, I've seen this in many publications including ITOE. However, I just don't grasp the context that it refers to. Looking for some help here.